THE American POLITICAL SCIENCE Review

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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

RALPH J. BUNCHE
United Nations

This, the fiftieth annual meeting of our Association, has more than ordinary significance. Certainly it can be said that the Association has attained middle-age and the intellectual as well as the physical maturity to do proper credit to our years. We may, on this special occasion at least, regard with pardonable pride our record of growth, the recognition and development of our discipline in both teaching and research, the public service it has rendered, and its contribution to the forward progress of American political democracy. American political scientists, practitioners of what Aristotle rightly or wrongly described as the "master science," have recognized, as did Plato and Aristotle, the surpassing importance of political problems in society and have experienced the difficulties which they foresaw in the effort to employ scientific methods and procedures in the solution of such problems. Beyond doubt, however, we move steadily forward. Our scientific and professional standards show constant improvement. Our store of knowledge is immense. Our almost feverish search for new data is incessant. We know almost all there is to know about the political infirmities of our patients except how to cure them. The state of domestic and world affairs keeps us humble.

All of the fifty annual meetings of this Association have been held in the twentieth century, which may claim as its most tragic distinction its almost constant addiction to warfare. Even a superficial glimpse at the past half-century leads to the conclusion that but few of these meetings have been held at a time when people somewhere in the world were not at war. Indeed, it is an unflattering commentary on the condition of our times merely to point out that this fiftieth meeting of the Association is the first in well-nigh a quarter of a century which can look upon a world free, even if most insecurely, of organized warfare anywhere on the globe.

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* Delivered before the American Political Science Association at its fiftieth annual meeting in Chicago, Illinois, September 9, 1954.

This, I make bold to say, can be counted as a blessing even if one must hasten to add that while there is at this moment no war, neither is there peace, for the cold war waxes hot, tensions continue severe, provocative incidents constantly test our nerves and our forbearance, armaments pyramid, and the dark threat of atomic war ever lurks on the horizon.

Still, with the cessation of fighting in Indo-China, there is no instant war and, therefore, an opportunity is presented, slight though it may be, for governments and statesmen and peoples the world over to pursue with renewed vigor the ends of peace and bring thereby some measure of relief and hope to harassed and war-weary mankind. But, in truth, the precariousness of the times is such, the aggressive forces loose in the world are so unpredictable, and uncertainty so dominates one's thought and psychology, that even as I write these words on September 7th I grimly realize that they may not hold true at all on September 9th.

In this regard, it may be recalled that our Association came into being during an earlier lull in warfare throughout the world. The Sino-Japanese, Spanish-American, and South African wars were over and the Russo-Japanese war had not begun when the first meeting of this Association convened in New Orleans a half-century ago. There has not been much let-up in warfare since. No cause and effect relationship is implied, of course.

Only twenty-five were present at that initial meeting. At the end of the Association's first year there were two hundred and fourteen members, and of these most found their primary interest not directly in political problems but in history, economics, and other social studies having political implications. As former President John A. Fairlie pointed out in his presidential address at the 1929 meeting, "When this Association was organized, the systematic study and teaching of political problems was but slightly developed. Only a few courses in public law and government were given in some of the larger universities."

Since those early, lean days, the lustiness of the growth and the proliferation of our discipline is amply attested by the bulging program of this fiftieth annual meeting.

In many directions our Association and our discipline have made striking progress. Our membership today stands at well over 6,000, of which less than half consists of those actively engaged in the teaching of political science. This has been a development realized largely in the last quarter-century of our existence, for in 1929 President Fairlie noted that of some 1900 members at that time only a "small portion" were outside the teaching profession.

Political science is now firmly anchored in the curricula of American colleges and universities. There are today more than 300 departments of political science in American colleges and universities with many thousands teaching the subject, exclusive of the large number of those who teach civics and social studies in the secondary schools. The students of political science number in the tens of thousands and each year over three hundred colleges and universities grant degrees in the field. No doubt our most distinguished past president, Woodrow Wilson, were he with us, would be highly gratified by the increasing extent to which members of the profession, particularly in the past two decades, have emerged from the academic realm to render invaluable assistance to governments local, state, and national—and to international organizations and agencies.

In all directions—political parties; national, state, and local government; political theory; constitutional law; public administration; public opinion; political behavior; legislation; international law and relations; comparative government—there has been significant advance in the definition and development of subject-matter, in both teaching and research.

In quite recent years the Association has afforded organized public services through the assistance of the profession in response to requests from the White House and various departments of the government. Organized research efforts, involving collaboration of substantial numbers of political scientists, have been undertaken as a new and recent development; of these the study of delegations to the party conventions in 1952 is an outstandingly successful example.

It may be mentioned, in passing, that political science gains increasing stature as an international discipline. The International Political Science Association, under the initiative of UNESCO, is now well established, with active participation by American political scientists led by Professor James K. Pollock as Senior Vice President. But it remains a fact that political science, as we conceive of it, is unknown in most of the world beyond our borders—in much of Europe, the Orient, and elsewhere. At the time of the organization of the International Political Science Association in 1950, there were political science organizations in but eight countries. However, there is undoubtedly in this development an excellent opportunity to promote the interests of the profession, to widen greatly its horizon of service, and, more important, to reinforce the international bonds of democracy. Since it is estimated that more than eighty per cent of the world's political scientists are in this country, both our opportunity and our responsibility in this international venture are great.

Our collaboration in this international effort is motivated neither by intellectual imperialism nor by a missionary impulse to bring political wisdom to the "heathen." Rather, the International Association affords the opportunity for an exchange of thinking and a cross-fertilization of ideas among intellectual equals of all nationalities, colors, and creeds who have discovered, quite as we discovered, the need for a distinct discipline in the field of political phenomena.

Despite the rapid development of American political science as an independent discipline—and it could be said not altogether facetiously that in some respects there might appear to be more of independence than of discipline—and while we have made substantial contributions to the intellectual and public life of the nation, disagreement, frustration, and failure are not unknown to us.

Passing mention only need be made of such matters as the tendencies toward excessive intellectual diffusion, over-specialization, "splintering" of the discipline, and the lack of what might be called unifying roots. Nor shall I dwell upon the absence of agreement among us on methodology, techniques, and classification, or on the comparability of political science and the natural sciences. These undoubtedly are matters of vital concern to the profession and on any one of them there could be —and there has often been—discussion without end.

Partly because this is our fiftieth meeting, partly because of the extreme discretion in public expression incumbent upon an international civil servant, and in no small measure because of an acute awareness of my own limitations in the preparation of this paper, I have burrowed in the addresses of previous presidents of the Association.

It seems to me that this meeting at the half-century mark is a particularly appropriate occasion on which to reflect upon the wisdom, the hopes, and the cautions of those who may rightly be called the founding fathers of American political science, especially where they may offer wise counsel for our future course and for the challenges with which the present and the future confront us.

A review of the presidential addresses delivered before this Association in the course of the fifty years since that small band of pioneers came together in New Orleans, provides a graphic picture of the development of political science in America, its function and method, its achievements and shortcomings, as seen by some of its most distinguished disciples. In these addresses there may also be found no slight reflection of much of the nation's political history and thought of the past half-century.

Bearing in mind the virtue of brevity, note is taken here of only some of the salient points in a selected few of the addresses of the first half of the Association's existence. Rather arbitrarily, I have decided that the ex-Presidents since 1930 are still too young to be classified as "elder statesmen."

At the third annual meeting, Albert Shaw emphasized that the Association "is not partisan, or sectional or propagandist in its nature;" it "is not a body of reformers," and therefore, it "can help to bring to a hundred questions now under discussion in the affairs of the nation, of the States, or of the municipalities the spirit of calmness, of inquiry, of reasonable discussion—in short, the scientific spirit."

Without straining any point, it may be urged that it would be difficult to think of a greater service that could be rendered to our nation today as regards both national and international affairs.

Two years later, at the fifth annual meeting, Lord Bryce, after offering political scientists what he described as a "maxim of universal validity," i.e., "keep close to the facts," raised the question: "What is the use of Political Science? Can it be made to serve the practical needs of the time?" In partial answer to his questions, which are just as pertinent and timely today as when he posed them early in the century, he expressed the view that since in free countries "the chief problem of democracy is to make the citizens intellectually and morally fit to conduct their government"—this being especially so in the United States, where "the ultimate control of public affairs belongs to the mass of the people"—political scientists ought to try, through their influence on citizens in the universities and their publications, to improve civic intelligence.

There has been improvement certainly, but there are few, I imagine, who would not agree that the need in this direction continues to be great and urgent.

The next year, at the sixth annual meeting, A. Lawrence Lowell, pointing out that "politics is an observational, not an experimental science; and hence the greater need of careful observation of those phenomena which we can use," queried: "But how much do statesmen turn to professors of political science for guidance? Surely students of politics do not lead public thought as much as they ought to do . . . "

Would it not be true to say that we still do not; that in the main the impact of the political scientist on thought and leadership is by no means comparable to his knowledge and potentiality?

At the seventh annual meeting, Woodrow Wilson expressed his dislike of the term "political science," since in his view, "human relationships, whether in the family or in the state, in the counting house or in the factory, are not in any proper sense the subject-matter of science. They are stuff of insight and sympathy and spiritual comprehension." He preferred the term "politics," which in his view included both the "statesmanship of thinking" and the "statesmanship of action."

President Wilson adjured that "the statesmanship of thought" as against "the statesmanship of action" must be furnished by the political scientist

> out of his full store of truth, discovered by patient inquiry, dispassionate exposition, fearless analysis and frank inference. He must spread a dragnet for all the facts, and must then look upon them steadily and look upon them whole It is only thus that he can enrich the thinking and clarify the vision of the statesman of action, who has no time for patient inquiry, who must be found in his facts before he can apply them in law and policy, who must have stuff of truth for his conscience and his resolution to rely on.

Wilson went on to say:

> the statesman and the student of political science have not hitherto often been partners. The statesman has looked askance upon the student,—at any rate in America, and has too often been justified because the student did not perceive the real scope and importance of what he was set to do and overlooked much of the great field from which he should have drawn his facts,—was not a student of thought and of affairs but merely a reader of books and documents.

The weaknesses and deficiencies which Wilson saw in the equipment of the student of politics of his time have been, I would think, largely corrected by now. But despite the considerable and encouraging traffic between campus and bureaucracy, especially during war years, the gap between the realms of study and action continues more than wide enough. In my experience off the campus during almost fifteen years now, I have discovered that when I am referred to as an "academician," this is not always meant as flattery, that the habit of trying to marshall all the facts, weigh them, and think things through thoroughly as the basis for action is sometimes regarded as droll and at other times incites no little impatience.

In 1925, at the twenty-first annual meeting, Charles E. Merriam prophesied:

> we are likely to see a closer integration of the social sciences themselves, which in the necessary process of differentiation have in many cases become much too isolated. In dealing with basic problems . . . it becomes evident that neither the

> facts and the technique of economics alone, nor of politics alone, nor of history alone, are adequate to their analysis and interpretation.

Merriam, no doubt, would be pleased with the extent to which, in quite recent years, inter-disciplinary seminars, composite courses, and inter-disciplinary research programs have developed. There is, certainly, much less exclusiveness among the social scientists than in earlier years.

Merriam concluded:

> At any rate, it becomes increasingly evident that the basic problems of political organization and conduct must be resurveyed in the light of new discoveries and tendencies; that the nature of mass rule must be reexamined; that the character and range of popular interest in government and the methods of utilizing it must be reexplored; that we must call in science to help end war as well as to make war; that the mechanisms and processes of politics must be subjected to much more minute analysis than they have hitherto received at the hands of students of government, from a much broader view, and from different angles.

Merriam's suggestion that science be employed to help end as well as to help make war has not materialized, but science has certainly made the prospect of another war a tremendously frightening thought. But to view the hydrogen bomb as signalling the end of the world, as some are inclined to do, serves only to induce panic and to nourish the ambitions of reckless ones who would seek power through exploitation of fear. In the calm view, the new weapons in all their fearful destructive potential are merely the logical end of the concept of total war in this scientific age. If a minimum of reason can be brought to prevail, the atomic-hydrogen-cobalt bombs may yet prove to be the decisive deterrent to war as governments and peoples the world over increasingly realize that another world war and the survival of civilization are altogether incompatible.

Now and then, over the years, stern warnings and criticisms have been directed to the political scientists, as for example, by Charles A. Beard and my highly respected former teacher, William B. Munro.

Beard inveighed against a good many things, including our "academic sterilities" and "the peril of narrowing the vision while accumulating information."

Munro, with an eye on the changes which had occurred in the exact sciences in response to new knowledge, urged:

> It is time for political science to step up into line with the new physics by turning some of its attention to the sub-atomic possibilities. We should seek to discover the true reasons for that vast differentiation between good, bad, and indifferent citizenship which is perhaps the most obvious of all the phenomena of

politics. We should enquire diligently into the nature and scope of the forces which make each civic atom what he is. And we should discard our allegiance to the absolute, for nothing would seem to be more truly self-evident than the proposition that all civic rights and duties, all forms and methods of government, are relative to one another, as well as to time and place circumstance. They cannot be translated into unvarying formulas.

You will pardon me, I trust, if I say that to my untheoretical mind, the real measure of our success or failure as political scientists is to be found in the manner in which opportunity is served and responsibility discharged, in other words, in our total impact for good or ill upon the society. In this regard one may well question whether the Association and its members have met as well as we might the test of that leadership which could and should be afforded, in both research and teaching, toward the betterment of American public life, the strengthening of democracy, and the achievement of more stable international relations.

I do not know to what extent it may be true that the discipline of political science is at once a function and an expression of democratic ideology and practice, but there can be no doubt of the rich contribution which political science can make to the strength and growth of democracy, where, as among us, it is directed to the systematic teaching, analysis, and practice of democracy in government and administration.

The severest challenge to the political scientist and to the social scientist generally, it seems to me, is in the notable failure of political and social institutions and policies to keep pace with material and technical change. If in the past fifty years there has been progress in the development of institutions, in the art of governing people, in the understanding of political processes and events, domestic and international—and some are quick to deny it—there has been no progress in any way comparable to that which has accompanied the application of science and technology to industry, communication, and transportation. In this age of the weapons of fission and fusion which science has made available to war, may not the very future of civilization depend to a considerable extent upon the ability of the political scientists, who are indeed the true experts in political relationships, to find remedies for these potentially fatal defects in political conduct? If they do not, who is to do so? Are political scientists still too much attached to abstract formalism, to metaphysical and juristic concepts, to established patterns and a traditionally narrow scope, and too exclusive to be fully realistic about the political needs, motivations, and forces which stimulate and control the thoughts and actions of citizens and governments, and therefore to be of maximum usefulness to a world in dire distress?

There will nowhere be such a promised land of politics as Plato, the practical reformer, sought. But there can be societies better governed and international affairs better ordered than is now the case. There can be, certainly, a better world, and I have confidence that political scientists can help to make it so. To do so, it is not essential, to paraphrase Plato, that either philosophers or political scientists be kings, or vice versa. But it is essential that the acts of men which are, in the words of Lord Bryce, the "data of politics," in the broadest sense, be studied, analyzed, and well understood by political scientists. There is, it seems to me, very much truth in the observation recorded by Boswell in his journal for July 28, 1763, to the effect that "human experience, which was constantly contradicting theory, was the great test of truth. . . ." And, as Woodrow Wilson put it, "nothing that forms or affects human life seems to me to be properly foreign to the student of politics." The fields in which the political scientist must plow, if the yield is to be worthy of the effort, are indeed vast.

With considerable diffidence, in view of my lack of adequate knowledge of work underway in our field, I venture to suggest that there are certain problem areas which would seem to merit greater attention than is now accorded them by our profession.

There is, for example, the problem of colonialism, and more particularly of colonial Africa. This, certainly, is at once one of the most critical and the most difficult of international problems. In one form or another, colonialism commands a highly prominent position on the agenda of the forthcoming ninth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Postwar experience alone has painfully demonstrated how much of the trouble and conflict in the contemporary world flows directly or indirectly from this faucet. Our colleges and universities, however, and political scientists with few exceptions, have been regrettably slow in grasping fully the world significance of this problem. American political science, I fear, has not yet come to grips with it.

In scanning the presidential addresses of the past, for example, I noted that in only one or two of them was there any reference at all to the problem of colonialism. This subject, surely, is quite within the scope and the horizon of interest of the political scientist. If I stress this lacuna in our knowledge and effort, it is not alone because colonialism has been my major pre-occupation. It is also because the field provides such great challenge; there is in it for the diligent student so much of rich opportunity for constructive contribution; and as a present and potential source of vast trouble and danger it is today one of the world's leading problems.

Secondly, in view of the new position and responsibilities assumed by our nation in world affairs, which in our democratic system necessarily involves a new responsibility of judgment and decision for the American citizen, it may well be questioned whether our educational system has adjusted to the changed situation and demands in such manner as properly to equip the citizen for the political discharge of this still unfamiliar role and responsibility.

With respect to international affairs, for instance, there would appear to be much to be learned about the historical and entirely respectable role of negotiation, conciliation, and honorable compromise in the settlement of disputes. Expectations from policies and actions are often unrealistic to the point of being fanciful, while patience is correspondingly short. There is much to be learned about how to bear up under sustained uncertainty and danger. There is surely to be found in knowledge and understanding some measure of safeguard against frustration and cynicism.

Thirdly, the striking evidence of fear, suspicion, intolerance, and confusion in the society, providing fertile soil for demagoguery, imperil our traditional freedom, and pose a stern challenge to the political scientist. These are phenomena which surely demand our most urgent concern, on behalf of the nation at large as well as our own professional and personal interest.

In the ultimate sense, it is clear, our future professional effectiveness must depend upon the preservation of that traditional freedom of inquiry which is fundamental to the American way of life and to the very concept of self-government.

If you will permit me to make one further reference to my personal experience, I would say that in our analyses, calculations, and conclusions concerning political phenomena we should never lose sight of the human, the personal factor. I am constantly impressed with the extent to which purely individual characteristics, such as personality, temperament, disposition, integrity, humility, candor, and patience, often exert substantial influence on important matters. This I have found to be the case in administrative affairs, in negotiations, and in mediation. I suspect that it must be taken into account in other areas as well.

These are simple things but they often cause political situations and efforts to be far more complex than they would otherwise be. They may not lend themselves readily to scientific approach but they have to be reckoned with most seriously.

With no apology, I should like to conclude on the quite unscientific note of faith.

Civilization is in the grip of a moral crisis. While this, in itself, is no new experience in human history, the clear and present danger derives from the fact that our scientific knowledge far exceeds our knowledge of man; to such an extent, indeed, that man now has at his disposition a power of self-destruction never before approached. That same scientific knowledge also affords to man a greater possibility for improvement than he has ever known.

It is my conviction that it is toward the fundamental unity of man that we must look for the only means whereby civilization and mankind may survive on this earth. Our knowledge of man must begin to catch up with our mastery of science. It is only in this direction that we may usefully seek to disperse the poisonous fears and suspicions which actuate that irrational behavior of man which in turn keeps him in mortal danger, each to the other. This is a matter fundamentally and decisively of simple faith in man and in his future. Despite all manifestations of evil—and these are in abundant supply—I find in that faith all that is needed to sustain me and my hopefulness in these times of grave peril.

THE RYUKYU ISLANDS: PAWN OF THE PACIFIC*

RALPH BRAIBANTI
Duke University

The first territory to be returned to Japan by the United States since the 1945 surrender is a group of the Ryukyu Islands.[1] This fact focuses attention on this strategically important archipelago extending from southernmost Japan to Formosa, although the Ryukyus have been at least on the periphery of Western attention for two centuries.[2] The chief compulsions for American popular interest in the islands have been the Battle of Okinawa of World War II and, more recently, the best selling novel and Broadway hit, *The Teahouse of the August Moon.*

This transitory and popular interest will undoubtedly give way to wider international attention in the next few years as the Japanese become more articulate in their criticism of the questionable grounds on which these islands were stripped from Japan Proper at the end of the war.[3] Of further significance to political science is the fact that Okinawa, major island of the group, is (excepting only the Bonins) the last area of the world to remain under complete American military government control. The character of this nearly ten-year rule by the United States and its impact on a million people who have continually demanded "reversion" to Japan must inevitably be the subject of study of those interested in the confluence of cultures under conditions of sustained military government.

A century ago the Ryukyus were a point of contact between the United States and Japan even as now they are an important factor in the relations between these two nations. Naha, present capital of Okinawa, was a base of operations for Commodore Perry during the entire year of his negotiations with Japan. No less than a fifth of Perry's distinguished 591-page *Narrative*[4] was devoted to a description of the government and people of these islands. Even before reaching the Ryukyus, Perry proposed their occupation by the United States because of the "strictest rules of moral law" and "laws of stern necessity."[5] The centenary of Perry's treaty with Japan finds a curiously fortuitous fulfillment of this zealous suggestion.

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[1] Fulfilling a promise made by Secretary of State Dulles in Tokyo August 8, 1953, the United States returned the Amami Ōshima group to Japan December 24, 1953. *New York Times*, December 25, 1953, pp. 1, 4. Discussion favoring immediate return of the Amami Ōshima group can be found in Douglas G. Haring, "Amami-Gunto: Forgotten Islands," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 21, pp. 170–72 (Nov. 19, 1952); and the author's "The Outlook for the Ryukyus," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 22, pp. 73–79 (June, 1953).

[2] See appended Bibliographical Note.

[3] That it is the intention of the Japanese government to press for the return of Okinawa was made clear by Prime Minister Yoshida in an address to the Diet on January 27, 1954. Full text in *Nippon Times*, January 8, 1954, p. 8. Extensive criticism of United States retention of the Ryukyus characterized the Diet debate on the Peace Treaty. See below, notes 58–63.

I

The rationale for the separation of the Ryukyu Islands from the rest of Japan is for the most part one of official silence and astute circumvention. The assumption seems to be that the islands fall within the last of three categories of territories described in the Declaration of the Cairo Conference made on December 31, 1943:

> . . . Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and . . . all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. *Japan will also be expelled from all other territories she has taken by violence and greed.* (Italics supplied.)

The agreement signed at Yalta, February 11, 1945 dealing with the cession of territories to the Soviet Union made no mention of the Ryukyus. The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 reaffirmed the Cairo policy and specifically limited the sovereignty of Japan to the four main islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku and such minor islands as the Allies "may determine." It is noteworthy that the Ryukyus are nowhere mentioned in the three foregoing policy statements or in the subsequent surrender terms to which Japan agreed on September 2, 1945. At the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951, the status of the Ryukyu group was discussed by several delegates, including those from Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union, and India,[6] but no reason for the separation of the islands from Japan Proper was advanced. The Peace Treaty states explicitly that the United States will exercise immediate control over the islands, implying that Japan retains "residual sovereignty,"[7] but is silent as to why the islands were treated differently from the four main islands of Japan. Nor was the silence broken in the discussion before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where only slight mention of the Ryukyus was made at the hearings on the Peace Treaty.[8] General Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggested the transcendence of military considerations in indicating that it would be difficult to ask the Congress for funds for security installations on Okinawa "unless we had a rather clear-cut right to be there and stay there for some time."[9] Mr. Dulles, stating that the trusteeship provision of Article 3 of the Peace Treaty was an option which need not be exercised by the United States, reasserted that considerations of national defense will determine the ultimate disposition of the islands. He refused, however, to hazard a guess as to what that disposition will be.[10] The questioning of General Bradley by Senator Alexander Wiley and of Mr. Dulles by Senator H. Alexander Smith, as well as the comments of Herbert Coston, a former missionary to Japan, implied some concern as to the advisability of our retention of the islands, but this concern seemed to be based solely on an awareness of adverse public opinion in Japan and the islands.[11] The most noteworthy feature of the discussion before the Senate committee is that *no member of the committee or witness once raised the question of the right of the United States to sever the islands from Japan*. There was not even a presentation of the rationale by which the decision of severance was made. Even less attention was given the Ryukyus when the Peace Treaty was discussed on the floor of the House and Senate.[12] The islands were mentioned only once when reference was made to an exchange of notes between India and the United States in which the position of the Ryukyus was discussed.

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[4] *Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan,* comp. Francis L. Hawks, 2 vols. (New York, 1856), Vol. 1. This is a commercial edition of the official report of the Perry expedition and includes an analysis of Ryukyuan government. Volume 2 of the report consists of miscellaneous letters, notes, and reports submitted to Perry by staff officers. Nearly 50 of the 414 pages of the second volume are concerned with the Ryukyus in the form of scientific reports. This volume also includes Perry's remarks "upon the probable future relations with Japan and Lew Chew." See *Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan,* Senate Ex. Doc. No. 79, 33d Cong., 2d sess., Vol. 2, pp. 15–64, 185–88. A second account of the Perry expedition is that of the official interpreter, S. Wells Williams, "A Journal of the Perry Expedition to Japan 1853–1854," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan,* Vol. 27, Part II, pp. 1–260 (1910).

[5] Writing from Madeira in a dispatch to the Secretary of the Navy December 14, 1952, Perry first proposed "occupation of the principal ports of those Islands [Ryukyus]." In a dispatch from Okinawa on January 25, 1854, Perry proposed putting "Great Lew Chew" [Okinawa] under "*surveillance* of the American Flag upon the *ground of reclamation for insults and injuries committed upon American Citizens* [by Japan]." (Perry's italics.) The Commodore's zeal was quietly restrained by return dispatches sent by Secretary of State Edward Everett and Navy Secretary J. C. Dobbin. Full text of the Madeira dispatch and Dobbin's answer as well as the complete Madeira correspondence are accessible in *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America,* ed. Hunter Miller (Washington, 1942), Vol. 6, pp. 758–59, 588–90.

Most of the territories taken from Japan at the end of the war meet one or more of the requirements specified at Cairo, Yalta, or Potsdam. The Ryukyus, the Kuriles, and the Bonins alone defy categorization with the other areas. They were not seized after 1914, nor were they "stolen" from China or the Soviet Union; neither were they taken—except in the most far-fetched sense—by "violence." In the case of the Kuriles it would appear that outright cession to the Soviet Union was premised on a gross misreading of history or on tacit acceptance of the ancient but no longer honorable practice of dividing territorial booty among the victors.[13] It is highly doubtful that the latter premise played any substantial part in the cession of the Ryukyus to the United States, not only because territorial acquisition ran counter to American affirmations and intentions, but also because the United States has clarified its policy so that ultimate reversion of the islands to Japan appears more certain than before. Although a shroud of mystery continues to envelop the original decision to truncate them from the homeland, there is now much less doubt as to the future status of the Ryukyus.

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[6] Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, *Record of Proceedings* (Washington, 1951), pp. 78, 93–94, 271, 277.

[7] Although not used in the treaty itself, the term "residual sovereignty" is mentioned in the discussion by both Secretary Dulles and Prime Minister Yoshida. *Record of Proceedings*, pp. 78, 277.

[8] United States Senate, *Japanese Peace Treaty and other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 82d Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1952).

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 23–24.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 51–52.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 100–16.

[12] The only reason for mention of the Ryukyus at all in the Senate and House debates was the occasion of Senator Knowland's brief discussion of the Indian note protesting disposition of the islands. *Congressional Record*, 82d Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 97, pp. 10663–64, 10742–43 (Aug. 27, 28, 1951). Indeed the debates in Congress do not deal comprehensively or expertly with the Japanese Peace Treaty as a whole. *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 1694, 3811, 4477, 9429–31, 10524–26, 10594, 10602, 11128, 11946, 12726–28, A5470–71.

II

The history of Japanese influence in the Ryukyus indicates that the formal integration of the islands with Japan Proper was but the natural culmination of a process of cultural, economic, and political assimilation which had extended over three centuries.[14] Whatever "violence" may have occurred in the process took the form of mild coercion quite acceptable in the international politics of the time. The first coercive nudge came as early as the seventeenth century, sometime before the more predatory thrusts which characterized the imperialism of Western nations.

The origins of the Ryukyu people[15] cannot be traced with a high degree of scientific precision, but it is probable that they were parts of certain tribes which migrated from the Asiatic mainland to Japan Proper.[16] An ancient legend first recorded in 1605 A.D. links the ruling family of the Ryukyus with royal blood in Japan. The legend is found in one of the earliest histories, *Chūzan Sekan*, compiled in 1650 by Chōshu Haneji,[17] and is repeated in subsequent histories. It is said that Tametomo, a distinguished warrior of the Minamoto clan and descendant of a former emperor, after defeat by the Taira clan in 1165, escaped to the Ryukyus. Here he married the sister of an official of Naha and became father of a gifted son who later became Shunten, first king of a new and able line of Ryukyuan rulers. The story, even though unsubstantiated by clear historical evidence, has nevertheless been regarded as history. Among people placing great value on lineage and unbroken imperial rule, this story has powerful emotional force in establishing cultural bonds between the Ryukyus and Japan Proper.[18]

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[13] A complete examination in Japanese of the question of ownership of the Kuriles is that of Toshio Ueda, *Ryōdo Kizoku Kankei-shi: Bonins, Sakhalin, Kuriles, Ryukyu* [*History of Territories Adjacent to Japan Proper: Bonins, Sakhalin, Kuriles, Ryukyu*], *Heiwa Jōyaku no sōgō Kenkyū* [*Peace Treaty with Japan: A Symposium*], 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1952), Vol. 1, pp. 121–96.

[14] For an account of this assimilation, see the chapter by Professor Nagao Ariga in *Japan by the Japanese*, ed. Alfred Stead (London, 1904), pp. 151–72.

[15] See appended Bibliographical Note.

[16] There is evidence to support the assumption that the Amabe tribe which settled in the Ryukyus was closely related to the tribes which migrated to Japan. The contemporary Okinawan historian, Kanjun Higaonna (Higaonna is the Okinawan rendition; Higashionna is the name by which he is now known in Tokyo) summarizes this evidence in *Outline of Okinawan History* (Tokyo, 1950), p. 1.

[17] Higaonna, *Outline of Okinawan History*, pp. 5–6. The ancient work *Chūzan Sekan* [*Mirror of the Generations of Chung Shan, i.e. Ryukyu*] is said to have been compiled in 1650 by Chōshu Haneji. A copy of this work was microfilmed by the Department of State and is reported in *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 28, p. 819 (June 8, 1953).

Japanese interest in the Ryukyus has been complicated by a maze of relations between the islands and China. The Chinese had tried, without success, to subject the Ryukyus to their control as early as 610 A.D. and again in 1291.[19] They were more successful after the Ryukyus were internally weakened by division into three separate kingdoms, and in 1373 an envoy was sent to pay tribute to China.[20] Chinese families began to arrive in 1391 and settled at Kumemura at the outskirts of Naha. These immigrants were a bridge for the infusion of Chinese culture, although they seem to have become assimilated into the indigenous society after a few generations.[21] For the next two centuries the Ryukyus existed as a nominally independent kingdom paying tribute to China. While this tributary relationship had some outward appearance of formal subordination to Chinese sovereignty, the actual relationship was quite different. The tributary concept in ancient Chinese international relations was unlike the modern concepts of imperialism, protectorates, or spheres of influence. Ancient

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[18] The Tametomo story can be neither substantiated nor disproved. Western as well as Japanese histories retell the story with no indication of the possibility of its legendary character. Among the standard Western historical works which do not distinguish it from more authenticated historical data are: James Murdoch, *A History of Japan*, 3 vols. (London, 1925), Vol. 1, pp. 311–12; Leavenworth, cited in appended Bibliographical Note, p. 107; Roy Hidemachi Akagi, *Japan's Foreign Relations* (Tokyo, 1936), p. 59. Commodore Perry repeats that "the race of kings reigning in Lew Chew is related to the imperial family of Japan. . . ." *Narrative*, Vol. 1, p. 253. Among those expressing doubt as to the authenticity of the story are: Higaonna, *Outline of Okinawan History*, p. 8, and Basil Hall Chamberlain, "The Luchu Islands and their inhabitants" *Geographical Journal*, Vol. 5, p. 316 (April, 1895). Professor Haring maintains that the Tametomo story is probably a deliberate fabrication by the Japanese to support their control over the islands. See Douglas G. Haring, *The Island of Amami Ōshima in the Northern Ryūkyūs*, pp. 74–75, (cited in appended Bibliographical Note).

[19] Henri Cordier, *Histoire Générale de la Chine*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1920), Vol. 1, pp. 398–99; Vol. 2, p. 315.

[20] S. Wells Williams, "Political Intercourse between China and Lewchew," *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 3 (new series), p. 83 (1866).

[21] In Western histories it is generally stated that "36 families" arrived from China. For example, Cordier, citing Leavenworth, states that ". . . l'empereur envoya 36 familles chinoises dans les îles." *Histoire Générale de la Chine*, Vol. 3, p. 8. Professor Higaonna, however, asserts that the term "36 family surnames" was metaphorical, and referred to the inhabitants of the lower reaches of the Min River in Fukien province. Moreover, he continues, they came over a period of years rather than as one group. Higaonna, *Outline of Okinawan History*, pp. 15–18.

China viewed the world as a unified brotherhood rather than as a group of warring, competing, independent states. When smaller kingdoms paid tribute to the Heavenly Kingdom, it was in acknowledgment of China's superior status as teacher rather than as legal sovereign.[22] The Chinese exerted no control over Ryukyuan government and maintained only infrequent contact with it. The looseness of the tribute relationship is indicated by the manner in which the investiture requirements were met. The Ryukyus were required to inform China of each new accession to the Ryukyuan throne so that the formality of a Chinese investiture could follow. But Ryukyuans often waited from three to twenty years before reporting to China a new accession, and sometimes the ruler died before China was informed he had ascended the throne.[23] As for the payment of tribute itself, this practice carried with it valuable trade privileges which were economically advantageous to the Ryukyus. Indeed, when China reduced the tribute payments to once every ten years, the anxious Ryukyuans succeeded in getting the Chinese to increase them to once every three years.[24] From this and other substantial evidence there is general agreement that tribute-payment was really a conveniently agreeable guise for profitable trade with China.[25]

During the time the Ryukyus paid tribute to China, they also did obeisance to Japan, regarding China as mother and Japan as father.[26] Although Japan's control of the islands varied—Okinawa being held chiefly by economic ties, Amami Oshima by rather heavy-handed political techniques—she exerted more effective sway over the islands than did China. The Satsuma clan of Kyushu sent an expedition to Okinawa in 1609 and took the Ryukyuan king and other officials to Japan. The reason for this expedition was presumably to force the resumption of tribute payments which had become too great for the Ryukyuans to meet during Japan's invasion of Korea (1592–98). The more important reason, however, was to recover profitable trade relations with China which the Celestial Empire had stopped in the middle of the sixteenth century.[27] The Ryukyuan king, Sho-nei, was allowed to return to Okinawa after a two-year sojourn in Japan, but he returned only after signing a statement clearly indicating that the Ryukyus were to be a dependency of Satsuma.[28] China, impressed by the recent display of Japanese strength in Korea, sent no military assistance to the Ryukyuan people and did not protest the Japanese conquest of the islands.

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[22] See especially an excellent statement on tribute-bearing by the American diplomatic representative in Japan in 1875 in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1875*, Vol. 1, p. 313. For a general study on tribute-bearing during the Ch'ing dynasty (1644–1838), see J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Têng, "On the Ch'ing Tributary System," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 6, pp. 135–246 (June, 1941).

[23] Kanjun Higaonna, *History of Foreign Relations of Okinawa* (Tokyo, 1951), p. 11.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[25] See documents as quoted in Yoshio S. Kuno, *Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent*, 2 vols. (Berkeley, 1940), Vol. 2, pp. 288–93. For a general analysis of trade relations between Japan and China during this period, see Wang Yi-t'ung, *Official Relations Between China and Japan 1368–1549* (Cambridge, 1953).

[26] Higaonna, *History of Foreign Relations of Okinawa*, p. 52.

[27] Translations of documents showing the desire for trade can be found in Kuno, *op. cit.*, pp. 290–93.

[28] See Kuno., pp. 288–89, for text of this signed statement.

The formal suzerainty exercised by Japan after 1609 accentuated the comic-opera position of the Ryukyus paying allegiance to its two Asian neighbors, regarding them metaphorically, at least, as parents. The Satsuma fief, anxious to tap trade relations between China and the Ryukyus, encouraged the Ryukyuans to continue their tribute relationship with China and to deny any formal relationship with Japan. The extreme to which this duplicity went is illustrated by an extract from an official notice posted by the Japanese on Okinawa at the time of the arrival of a coronation ship from China:

> In case ships arrive from Satsuma while the coronation ship is at anchor, the Okinawan authorities are required to hide from the Chinese the names of the Japanese era, names of the Japanese aboard the ships, Japanese books and any other things which it is undesirable to allow to come under the notice of the Chinese.
>
> You should refrain from singing Japanese songs or using the Japanese language. In case the Chinese speak to you in Japanese you should pretend not to understand.
>
> You should avoid Japanese-like customs.[29]

It is probable that this behavior was followed in dealing with Perry's expedition when it first arrived in 1853. That this may be so is suggested by the uncertainty which members of the expedition felt with respect to the status of the Ryukyus vis-à-vis Japan and China. Dr. Bettelheim assured Perry upon his arrival that the Ryukyus were "to all ends and purposes, an integral part of Japan." He supported this conclusion with five observations: (1) a Japanese garrison was stationed at Naha; (2) trade was entirely with Japan; (3) Japanese were numerous on Okinawa, had intermarried, and seemed completely at home; (4) Japanese officials were always present when he (Bettelheim) conferred with Okinawans; and (5) language, customs, "virtues and vices" corresponded to those of Japan.[30] The official interpreter, S. Wells Williams, seemed to share this view at first. He wrote on June 8, 1853: "I look upon Lewchew as a dependency of Satzuma [sic]. . . That principality monopolizes the trade and manages the relations and policy of the island . . . "[31] Earlier Perry had described the islands as " . . . said to be dependencies of Japan . . . [They come] . . . within the jurisdiction of the Prince of Satsuma, the most powerful of the Princes of the Empire . . . "[32] In a dispatch on January 25, 1854, he again described them as a "dependency of the Empire [Japan]."[33] Assuming as he did that the Japanese were dominant if not sovereign on the islands, it is easy to imagine his surprise when the Ryukyuans objected to being called an independent nation for fear of offending the emperor of China. Their objection arose from the preamble of a treaty draft in which Perry referred to the United States and Lew Chew as though they were two independent states. Describing this objection Williams states: "The admission of being tributary to China seemed to please them, rather than be a humiliation, and the real fealty they are in to Satsuma must be a sore subject and a grievous burden, or it would hardly be so mortifying to them to say aught respecting it."[34] Perry appeared to be less certain of the status of the Ryukyus than he was when he made his earlier statements. In his final expression of opinion on July 18, 1854, he stated:

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[29] As quoted in Higaonna, *History of Foreign Relations of Okinawa*, p. 33.

[30] *Narrative*, Vol. 1, pp. 254–55.

[31] Williams, "Political Intercourse between China and Lewchew" (cited in note 20), p. 26.

[32] As quoted in *Treaties and Other International Acts*, Vol. 6, p. 554.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 588.

> Lew Chew, it appears, is in a measure an independent sovereignty, holding only slight allegiance either to Japan or China, but preferring rather its relationship to the latter Empire; that the Islands stretching from Formosa to Kiusiu are all under its sovereignty, and are in such intercourse with the parent Island Great Lew Chew, as the imperfect character of their means of navigation will allow.[35]

Neither Perry nor Williams, astute observers though they were, could be expected to see through the remarkable "doublefaced allegiance" which Ryukyuans had been compelled to perfect in their every attitude and action. Their initial observations supported by Bettelheim's experience of eight years' residence on Okinawa were more accurate than their later conclusions. Power, in fact, was exercised by a Resident appointed by the Satsuma *daimyo* in Japan, and the statement signed by King Sho-nei, pledging allegiance to Satsuma, was enforced.[36]

The complete reorganization of government which marked the beginning of the Meiji Era in Japan profoundly affected the status of the Ryukyus. The Ryukyuan ruler, summoned as early as 1872, finally appeared in Tokyo in 1879 and his kingdom was given fief (*han*) status. In keeping with the treatment of other fief heads (*daimyo*), he was made a peer and given a residence in Tokyo and a sum of 30,000 *Yen*. The United States, mindful of the compact Perry had negotiated with the Ryukyuans in 1854, inquired if Japan would assume responsibility for carrying out its provisions. An exchange of diplomatic notes indicated that Japan would assume the Ryukyuans' obligations. In accepting this transfer of treaty obligations, the United States did not question the new status of the islands as an integral part of Japan Proper.[37] France and Holland, having concluded commercial treaties with the Ryukyus in October, 1855, and July, 1858, respectively,[38] similarly accepted Japan's assumption of these international obligations. Germany and Italy, shortly after March, 1873, asked Japan for the same commercial privileges in the Ryukyus which had been accorded other nations and the Japanese government assented.[39] Thus there was wide acceptance among Western powers of what was generally regarded as a consolidation and integration of a dependency of long standing. Indeed, this integration does not seem to differ much from the wholesale conversion of feudal states within Japan Proper to the status of prefectures under a strong central government and a restored Meiji Emperor.

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[34] Williams, p. 240.

[35] As quoted in *Treaties and Other International Acts*, Vol. 6, p. 753.

[36] Murdoch, *A History of Japan* (cited in note 18), Vol. 3, p. 534.

[37] *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1873–4*, Vol. 1, pp. 554–55, 564.

[38] Higaonna, *History of Foreign Relations of Okinawa*, pp. 46–47.

[39] For exchange of correspondence between Italy and Japan, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1873–4, Vol. 65, p. 740.

The problem of China's official recognition of the new status of the Ryukyus was more troublesome. Fortunately for Japan, a convenient incident provided an opportunity to raise the issue with China. In December, 1871 a junk had been stranded on the eastern coast of Formosa and 54 of the 66 Ryukyuans composing the crew had been killed by Formosan savages. Count Taneomi Soyejima went to Peking and in 1873 discussed the matter with the Chinese, asking how China planned to redress the wrong done to the Ryukyuans, who were Japanese subjects. China entered no objection when Sakimitsu Yanagiwara, representing Soyejima, referred to the Ryukyuan sailors as "Japanese subjects." This however, was unofficial, tacit recognition of their nationality rather than positive assurance.[40] Japan sent an expeditionary force to Formosa in May, 1874, and the result was an agreement signed at Peking on October 31, 1874, giving official documentary character to Japan's claims on the Ryukyus. The Tientsin Agreement acknowledged the Ryukyuan crew to be "Japanese subjects," committed China to recompense their families, and made no reference to the Ryukyus as dependencies of China.[41] Japan moved quickly further to consolidate this diplomatic advantage, objecting now even to a routine tribute mission which the Ryukyus sent to Peking early in 1875.[42] In May, 1875 Japan announced that it would assume complete control over the islands and integrate them into Japan Proper.[43] Finally, in 1879 King Sho-tai surrendered all rights to Japan and retired to Tokyo. Okinawa was made a prefecture in the same year and the long process of integration was complete.

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[40] The discussion between Yanagiwara and the Chinese foreign ministers is reported verbatim by Ariga in *Japan by the Japanese* (cited in note 14), pp. 161–63. The Japanese view of this discussion is that China tacitly assented to calling the Ryukyuans Japanese subjects. The Chinese view held that silence did not necessarily imply assent. See Shuhsi Hsū, *China and Her Political Entity* (New York, 1926), pp. 88–90 and Payson J. Treat, *Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan*, 2 vols. (Stanford, 1932), Vol. 1, pp. 497–98.

[41] This was the Japanese interpretation of the Tientsin Agreement. Although signed at Peking, this agreement is usually referred to as the Tientsin Agreement, named after the place where it was negotiated. For English and Chinese texts of the agreement see *China, The Maritime Customs, Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign States*, 2d ed., 2 vols. (Shanghai, 1917), Vol. 2, pp. 585–86. This treaty series refers to the 1874 agreement as the Peking (rather than Tientsin) agreement. Japanese text accessible in *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho* [*Japanese Diplomatic Documents*] (Tokyo), Vol. 7, p. 317. For detailed historical analysis of the Japanese position see Toshio Ueda, "Ryukyu no Kizoku o Meguru Nisshin Kōshō [Sino-Japanese Dispute over Sovereignty of the Ryuyku Islands]," *Tōyō Bunka Kenkyū Sho Kiyō* [*Journal of the Institute for Oriental Culture*], University of Tokyo, No. 2, pp. 151–201 (Sept., 1951). The Chinese interpretation of the agreement makes no such concession of Japanese sovereignty. Hsū, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–101; and Treat, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 568–69.

[42] An interesting exchange of Chinese and Japanese views on the presence of a Ryukyuan tribute mission in Peking can be found in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1875–6*, Vol. 1, pp. 314–16.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 313.

The complete annexation of the islands by Japan was not accomplished, however, without considerable diplomatic resistance by both China and the Ryukyuan monarch. An uncle of the deposed Ryukyuan king went to Peking and appealed for help.[44] Ryukyuan envoys went to Tokyo and asked the ministers of the United States, France, and Holland to intervene.[45] John A. Bingham, American minister to Japan, was disposed to take the Ryukyuan and Chinese side against the Japanese, but was cautioned by the State Department to regard this as a matter between China and Japan alone.[46] As tension between these two nations increased, the services of ex-President Grant, who was then in Japan, were sought. Grant had studied the matter earlier and after hearing both sides sent identical letters to Japan and China in which he made no proposals for direct solution of the Ryukyuan question but suggested that commissioners be appointed by both governments to resolve the question.[47] A plan for partitioning the islands, reputedly drawn up by Bingham, was rejected by China and the Ryukyuan envoys and in January, 1881 Tamaka Shishido, the Japanese member of the negotiating conference, left Peking, thus closing the efforts to prevent annexation.

The foregoing summary of diplomatic relations between the Ryukyus and Japan is hardly suggestive of territorial aggrandizement of the same character as Japanese actions in Korea and Manchuria. That the islands were taken after 1914 is, of course, manifestly untrue. That Japan used force in 1609, coerced the integration of the islands, and finally annexed them in 1879 is clear. In view of the character of the Chinese tribute relationship, the many Ryukyuan ties with Japan, and China's acknowledgement of the Tientsin Agreement of 1874, it cannot be said that they were taken from China.[48] That the United States would have based its action on the "violence and greed" concept of the Cairo Declaration is hardly credible in view of our own overseas expansion following the Spanish-American War. Such a rationale would be simply a disguise for the spoils of victory. It is difficult to avoid the conviction that seizure of the Ryukyus was based either on a misreading of history (as in the case of the Kuriles) or on a singularly prophetic wisdom, which, calculating the Soviet threat, provided us with a Pacific bastion of protection.

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[44] A translation of the Ryukyuan appeal to China can be found in Hsü, *op. cit.*, pp. 95–97.

[45] *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1879*, pp. 606–8, 637–38.

[46] Treat, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 73.

[47] See Treat, Vol. 2, pp. 101–3.

[48] This statement is made from the point of view of political and juridical concepts of Western international relations. Considering traditional Chinese diplomacy, however, the Japanese absorption of the islands was improper. Although China was too late in awakening to the concepts and realities of the Western power system, Japan learned and practiced Western diplomacy quickly. Professor Kublin asserts that the Ryukyuan problem was a case study in which ancient Chinese diplomacy and the new Western brand practiced by Japan came to grips and led to the collapse of the Chinese tributary system. See Hyman Kublin, "The Attitude of China during the Liu-ch'iu Controversy, 1871–1881," *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 18, pp. 213–31 (May, 1949).

III

While the decision to separate the Ryukyus from the rest of Japan may have been either error or prophesy, it cannot now be rectified or modified by a belated reversal. As the aspirations of the Soviet Union in the Pacific become more evident, restoration of the Ryukyus to Japan in the immediate future appears increasingly unwise. The problem of how best to resolve the dilemma of the status of the Ryukyus has been a formidable one. American administration of the islands was unguided by top-level policy regarding their ultimate disposition until the San Francisco Peace Conference discussions revealed that the Ryukyus were to be treated differently from Japan Proper. The terms of the Peace Treaty pointed to the possibility of trust status under the United Nations with the United States as the administering power.[49] This proposal, widely discussed in Japan particularly, seems to have been abandoned as early as April, 1953, for at that time the United States had not yet submitted a proposal for trusteeship to the United Nations.[50] In fact, no such proposal had been made as late as February, 1954.[51] The Dulles statement announcing the restitution of Amami Ōshima to Japan and discussing the future of the remaining islands makes no mention of trusteeship.[52] This silence is in marked contrast to the considerable discussion of trusteeship at the San Francisco Peace Conference two years earlier.

The Dulles statement of 1953 asserts a disposition on the part of the United States to continue "to exercise its present powers and rights in the remaining Ryukyu Islands . . . so long as conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East."[53] This is not a positive reaffirmation of the notion that Japan has "residual sovereignty" over the islands but it does not repudiate that assumption. The Dulles statement further asserts that the United States will "remain as custodian of these islands for the foreseeable future." Custodianship connotes considerably less than ownership and implies that sovereignty rests with other than the custodial power. This silence on the question of trusteeship and the description of our authority as being custodial and temporary constitute a substantial clarification of our policy in the Ryukyus. In the writer's opinion, this is the best policy which can be developed under existing circumstances in Asia and throughout the world.[54]

The principal alternative policy which has captured the attention of responsible Far Eastern analysts is that which would provide for immediate return of the entire Ryukyu chain of Japan.[55] A condition of the return would be provision for the maintenance of American military, naval, and air bases on Okinawa. Such a policy would resolve two factors in the Ryukyuan situation which have been troublesome. The first of these is the very serious concern of the United States in maintaining friendly relations with a newly sovereign and sensitive Japan. Since Japan has made abundantly clear her dissatisfaction with the disposition of the Ryukyus, Bonins, and Kuriles,[56] it seems appropriate to redress whatever grievances lie within our capacity for action. The second factor of tension is the growing strength of the "reversionist" movement among Ryukyuans, concomitant open resentment of American control, and manipulation of this situation by Communist elements both at home and abroad.

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[49] *Treaty of Peace with Japan*, Chapter II, Article 3.

[50] Correspondence between the writer and the United Nations Trusteeship Division, April 13, 1953, and between the writer and the United States Mission to the United Nations, April 24, 1953.

[51] Correspondence between the writer and the United Nations Trusteeship Division, February 8, 1954, and between the writer and the United States Mission to the United Nations, February 9, 1954.

[52] *New York Times*, December 25, 1953, p. 4.

[53] *Ibid.*, par. 3 of Dulles statement.

[54] For further elaboration see the author's article cited in note 1.

The Dulles policy, however, resolves these problems almost as well as would immediate restitution of all the islands to Japan. The return of Amami Ōshima gives evidence to Japan of American good faith and the abandonment of the trusteeship proposal suggests a much more temporary form of control by the United States. The dangers of an eruptive reversionist movement are met in large measure by the return of Amami Ōshima, for it was on this island that reversionist sentiment was strongest and most troublesome. Amamians have always identified themselves more closely with Japan than with the other islands of the Ryukyus.[57] Public opinion polls revealed that the desire to revert to Japan was much more intense among Amamians than among the inhabitants of Okinawa, Miyako, and Yaeyama. It was in Amami that the reversionist sentiment was whipped up by the People's party (allegedly Communist) and was so successfully manipulated that Amami elected one of the two People's party members to the Ryukyuan legislature on Okinawa. With the return of Amami to Japan, the reversionist movement has lost some of its propulsive force. The United States has now only to cope with the less intense and less organized reversionist sentiment on Okinawa and the other island groups.

If the alternative policy of returning immediately the entire Ryukyu chain to Japan were followed, it would raise problems more serious than those it would resolve. To maintain bases on Okinawa by agreement with a sovereign Japan would be to subject the security of our principal Pacific base to the uncertainties of our relations with Japan. Although official data relating to our military strength on Okinawa are not accessible, it is evident to careful observers that Okinawa has become our most important strategic base in the Pacific. Okinawa-based bombers played an important role in the Korean conflict with their daily "cocktail hour" sorties. It is possible that headquarters of the Far East Command located in Tokyo since the Japanese surrender may be moved to Okinawa. Indeed such a move might be a welcome solution to the embarrassing problem raised by Japan's growing resentment of the presence of American troops in the main islands. Certainly the extensive construction of concrete quarters, hospitals, and other installations on the southern third of Okinawa indicates a military base of first importance. At the moment, Okinawa is the locus of Western military, naval, and air might in the Pacific; if the Far East Command were moved there, it would become the strategic brain center as well. If the geography of Okinawa were like that of Japan Proper, joint control of this important base might be feasible. In reality however, the entire southern third of Okinawa is a vast network of American military installations intertwined with Okinawan economy and vitally affecting every aspect of Okinawa's life. To cut through this maze of relationships and isolate those elements which are essentially military and those which are civilian would be exceedingly difficult. If this network of administrative-civil-military relations were administered by Japanese, Okinawans, and Americans, the difficulties of language, differing cultural values, and clashing political and economic objectives would tend to make for a disarticulation which might spell the end of orderly, responsible government. Such a condition would constitute a grave threat to the strategic military power, the maintenance of which is really our sole purpose in retaining the Ryukyus. The situation would be even more precarious if the Japanese administrators and Ryukyuans were to combine in an anti-American obstructionism—an obstructionism which might be merely an involuntary reaction to the tensions of nearly a decade of military occupation by a Western power, or might be calculated. The motivations for such obstructionism would depend on many political factors, but the net result would be the same.

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[55] This point of view is cogently developed by Joseph W. Ballantine, "The Future of the Ryukyus," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 33, pp. 663–74 (July, 1953).

[56] See above, note 13, and below, notes 58–63.

[57] An explanation of this phenomenon is given in Douglas G. Haring, "Amami-Gunto: Forgotten Islands," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 21, pp. 170–72 (Nov. 19, 1952).

A final advantage of the Dulles policy should not be overlooked. The policy now provides a fair degree of predictability as to the future status of the islands. In the final analysis, the principal factor behind reversionist sentiment and anti-Americanism has been the uneasiness arising from uncertainty. The Ryukyus were, after all, severed from Japan, the fountainhead of their culture. They seemed to be permanently suspended in a cultureless vacuum, and the deep discontent arising from the sense of this void projected itself in the form of anti-American and reversionist sentiment. The Dulles policy, providing as much certainty to the Ryukyuan future as it is within our power to provide, is likely to give an assurance as to their national destiny that will give some satisfaction and encouragement to Ryukyuans. Certainly it will provide a central objective toward which American rehabilitation efforts can be directed.

Although Dulles' refinement of policy may clear the air in Japan and the Ryukyus, more energetic measures are needed to convince the peoples of both areas of our intentions. The anxieties of the Japanese with respect to our objectives in the Ryukyus is indicated by the extended discussion in 1951 of Article 3 of the Peace Treaty by the special committees appointed by both the Japanese House of Representatives and the House of Councillors to study the treaty provisions. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, questioned carefully by Hitoshi Ashida, formerly Prime Minister, asserted that he had no substantial evidence to prove that the Ryukyus would eventually be restored to Japan, but that he was convinced that this was the American intention.[58] Dr. Ashida indicated that the Ryukyus were not important as military bases, since the United States already had important bases in Japan and the Philippines, and that the real reason for their retention by the United States might be to keep watch over Japan.[59] A similar view was expressed by Representative Hanji Ogawa.[60] Apprehension concerning our purpose in keeping the islands was expressed also in a meeting of the Special Committee on the Peace Treaty of the House of Councillors by Councillor Goro Hani,[61] and at a plenary session of the House of Councillors by Councillor Eki Soné.[62]

In evaluating the comments made by Japanese members of the Diet, some discount must be made for a politically motivated desire to embarrass the Yoshida government. Yet it is not unreasonable to assume that sincere misunderstanding and apprehension existed at the time of the treaty ratification. The apparent elimination of the notion of trusteeship and the return of the Amami group may clarify our position; to bring our position into sharper focus, however, is exceedingly difficult. The Japanese interpretation that our reluctance to return Okinawa and retain military bases by administrative agreement is an indication of our lack of confidence and trust in Japan may, indeed, be valid. If we could be certain that our relations with Japan would always be without serious friction, all the Ryukyus could be returned immediately. But this is an assumption we cannot safely make. Yet in the face of a peace treaty predicated on mutual trust, we cannot officially articulate distrust. Certainly if Japan were to shift its allegiance to the Soviet sphere, the implications of "residual sovereignty" would be changed, and should open conflict break out within that changed pattern, Okinawa might indeed be used as a bastion against a hostile Japan. The threat of such developments dictates the need for greatest caution in formulating our policy toward the Ryukyus. Japanese sovereignty over the islands by implication is residual, but it seems also to be contingent upon continued Japanese friendship with the United States. It is doubtful if a wiser policy could be formulated at the moment, but perhaps more effective explanation of this policy would reduce Japanese fears.

[58] *Dai 12-kai Kokkai Shūgiin Heiwa Jōyaku oyobi Nichi-bei Anzen Hoshō Jōyaku Tokubetsu Iin Kaigi-roku [Twelfth National Diet, House of Representatives, Special Committee on the Peace Treaty and the Japanese-American Security Treaty], Record of Proceedings, No. 3,* October 18, 1951, p. 14.

[59] *Idem.*

[60] *Dai 12-kai Kokkai Shūgiin Heiwa Jōyaku oyobi Nichi-bei Anzen Hoshō Jōyaku Tokubetsu Iin Kaigi-roku [Twelfth National Diet, House of Representatives Special Committee on the Peace Treaty with the Japanese-American Security Treaty], Record of Proceedings, No. 9,* October 25, 1951, p. 6.

[61] *Dai 12-kai Kokkai Sangiin Heiwa Jōyaku oyobi Nichi-bei Anzen Hoshō Jōyaku Tokubetsu Iin Kaigi-roku, [Twelfth National Diet, House of Councillors, Special Committee on the Peace Treaty and the Japanese-American Security Treaty], Record of Proceedings, No. 12,* November 7, 1951, p. 17.

[62] *Dai 12-kai Kokkai Sangiin Kaigi-roku [Twelfth National Diet, House of Councillors], Record of Proceedings, No. 20,* November 18, 1951, p. 247.

The Dulles statement promised also that the United States would "do all in its power to improve the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of the Ryukyus." In concrete terms this means (1) that the ground should be prepared for future restitution of the islands to Japan and (2) that our own administration of the islands should be perfected so that discontent among Ryukyuans remains minimal. It would seem appropriate, therefore, to direct attention to some of the problems which face the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands.

IV

A policy vacuum in which the American occupation of the Ryukyus was carried on during the formative period from 1945 to 1953 resulted in the ambivalence of an administration without purpose. The failure to establish clear objectives was aggravated by the relative lack of attention given military government of the Ryukyus by the Far Eastern Command in Tokyo. From the invasion until July 1, 1946 the United States Navy governed the islands. Naval personnel in charge during this period were trained specifically for military government work. After July 1, 1946 the area was placed under Army control and the Far Eastern Commander was charged with responsibility for administration of the islands.[63] The importance of this obligation was eclipsed by the spectacular quality of the occupation of Japan Proper and, after 1950, by the pressing demands of the Korean conflict. After July 1, 1946 the Ryukyus seemed to be regarded as a kind of "Siberian outpost" of Japan. The net results were a generally lower competence of the people assigned there and the absence of the rigid command controls which distinguished the occupation of Japan.[64]

Under these circumstances it is surprising that the occupation progressed as well as it did. For the first five years the herculean task of physical rehabilitation of the islands commanded the attention and energies of American administration; hence the absence of long-range policy was not acutely felt. In public health and welfare, for example, the safety of our own troops dictated a policy of epidemic control and public health measures which moved on their own momentum without regard for ultimate objectives. Similarly in education the demands of physical rehabilitation overshadowed speculation as to the ultimate status of Ryukyuan schools. In developing a pattern for government, it was impossible to satisfy future needs since the future was unknown. Ryukyuan society itself was in trauma and this did not encourage abstractions as to the ultimate destiny of the islands. As the problems of physical rehabilitation were resolved, both Ryukyuan and American attention were directed to the need for adjusting further developments to a determination of the islands' status. The government which was developed in the Ryukyus under American guidance followed the general outlines of occupation policy in Japan. There were some important differences, however, which will have a bearing on the problem of restoring the islands to Japan. The opportunity for experimentation and indulgence in fads was greater in the Ryukyus than in Japan, since there was no well-established, sophisticated Ryukyuan government to temper the enthusiasm for reform with the natural restraints of tradition, culture, and experience.

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[63] The Far Eastern Commander in Tokyo also bears the title Military Governor of the Ryukyu Islands. The senior military commander present on the islands is designated as Deputy Military Governor and acts in the name of the Military Governor. The actual administration of the islands is delegated to a subordinate organization called United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR). In this article the general term "military government" is used to designate the American occupation administration carried on by the United States Army through the Military Governor, Deputy Military Governor, and USCAR. The term "military government" is used despite awareness that there was once a distinction between this term and "civil affairs." In contemporary usage these terms have lost precision, as is indicated by the use of both "military governor" and "civil affairs" in official titles for occupation officials in the Ryukyus.

[64] The early period of American military government of the Ryukyus has been almost untouched by extended analysis. For two brief but suggestive studies see Daniel D. Karasik, "Okinawa: A Problem in Administration and Reconstruction," *Far Eastern Quarterly* Vol. 7, pp. 254–68 (May, 1948) and Clellan S. Ford, "Occupation Experiences on Okinawa," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 267, pp. 175–83 (Jan., 1950).

A more important difference lies in the fact that the Ryukyuan occupation looked to changes in Japan's national rather than prefectural government. This departed sharply from the past, for Okinawa had been merely one of 47 prefectures subordinate to a highly centralized unitary government whose control center was in Tokyo. In the absence of any indication that the Ryukyus were ever again to have prefectural status in Japan, this overdevelopment of Ryukyuan government was inevitable. Indeed, had the Ryukyus become a trust territory (and before 1953 this seemed to be the most likely possibility), this development of the government would have been highly desirable, since it would have given the Ryukyus the quality of independence and experience suitable for a trust territory under United States administration.

Another factor which led to the establishment of a government of large dimensions was the incorporation of Amami-Ōshima into the all-Ryukyuan government. Since the restitution of Amami could not be foreseen, this could hardly be avoided. Yet it was a wedlock fraught with difficulties. It flew in the face of tradition, for Amami had no ties with Okinawa and had been a part of Kagoshima prefecture for some time. Amamians distrusted Okinawans and resented being placed under their domination. The reversion of Amami required an adjustment in Ryukyuan government. Even so, in the face of reversion of the remaining islands to Japan, the Ryukyuan government still seems somewhat out of scale. Yet it is unreasonable to expect American administration to have developed a prefectural type of government, for this would have required a network of relations with the Japanese government which would be possible only if the islands were part of Japan

This dimensional expansion of Ryukyuan government is likely to make difficult the reabsorption of the islands by Japan. The experience gained by Ryukyuan government and its close and long contact with American officials have developed a sense of responsibility and a competence surpassing anything the Ryukyuans knew under pre-occupation Japanese rule. It will probably be difficult for Ryukyuan leaders to submit again to the subordinate position of a kind of country-cousin prefecture under Japanese domination. Unless the Japanese government understands that the Ryukyus have developed in governmental competence to a position equalling at least a middle-rank prefecture in Japan Proper, the reintegration of the Ryukyus is likely to be marked by unnecessary tensions. There is very little that American administration of the islands can do to remedy this aspect of the predicament, and it is likely that some of our efforts will aggravate the situation. We must improve the character of Ryukyuan government simply to reduce the expense of the occupation; yet, paradoxically, as the government improves, the hiatus between the Ryukyuan government and Japan is widened.

There is much that can be done otherwise to prepare for the return of the islands to Japan. The pattern of government should be modified so that it resembles prefectural government in Japan as closely as possible. This would mean changing the parliamentary type of government which has been developed (and which resembles the National government of Japan) to a presidential type as in Japanese prefectures. Some changes cannot be made until Japan actually assumes responsibility for the islands. The tax structure, for example, would have to continue as a national tax structure until Japan assumed responsibility for the extensive pattern of grants-in-aid which gives fiscal sustenance to Japanese national-local relations. Similarly, the chief executive of the Ryukyus would not be able to exercise the national powers which are part of the responsibility of Japanese prefectural governors.[65] On the other hand, such a feature as the separate school tax found in the Ryukyus, but not in Japan, could probably be modified to correspond to the Japanese system without excessive stress. Adjustment of Ryukyuan government to the Japanese prefectural pattern would be complicated further by the changes which will probably occur in Japanese government during the next few years. For example, there are strong indications that the police system of Japan will again become nationalized, and that the decentralized government evolved under the occupation is reverting to prewar centralization. These changes in Japan may be viewed by many as dangerous retrogressive steps, and there may be a tendency among officials in American military government in the Ryukyus to preserve the "purer type" of government uncontaminated by post-treaty retrogressions in Japan. Such an attitude would aggravate the differences between Ryukyuan and Japanese government and would impede a smooth and uneventful restitution.

Another obstacle to redesigning the contours of Ryukyuan government is the natural tendency of American occupation officials to exaggerate in their own minds the importance of the islands. If this exaggeration found its expression exclusively in quiet devotion to the task, it could not be criticized. Its tendency, however, is to bloat the organization of government and to distort the perspective in which the whole task should be viewed. Ryukyuan society is essentially village society, as an occasional excursion within a mile of Naha should convince the most ambitious administrator. Of the 86 entities of government, 69 were classified as villages in 1952.[66] This fact alone is a rather telling indication that the islands are more comparable to a prefecture than to a major nation. Failure to study societal patterns of villages even more primitive than Japanese villages leads to American actions and patterns of control based on erroneous sociological assumptions and delusions of metropolitan grandeur. Distortion of the proportions of native government and of the character of native society produces a needlessly complex and overgrown Ryukyuan government and a correspondingly proliferate military government. Since salaries, civil service rank, and prestige of both Americans and Ryukyuans are involved in this expansive administration, uncommon courage and candor will be required if the dimensions of either organization are to be reduced.

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[65] See the author's "Executive Power in Japanese Prefectural Government," *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 9, pp. 231–45 (May, 1950).

One of the most effective ways of reorienting Ryukyuan affairs to Japan would be to clarify the citizenship of Ryukyuans and lift the restrictions on travel between the two areas. The present "statelessness" of Ryukyuans is bewildering and degrading. Citizens of neither Japan nor the United States, nor even of a Ryukyuan nation, Ryukyuans are subject to stringent travel restrictions. Japanese contractors and laborers working on Okinawa have been regarded as friendly nationals since the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty and have enjoyed various benefits, including higher wages and American Army post exchange privileges. It is disquieting to Ryukyuans to see the Japanese treated in this way while Ryukyuans are still regarded as enemy nationals. In the present circumstances it is unlikely that Japanese citizenship can be restored to Ryukyuans, but some interim status should be devised which will place them on exactly the same level with Japanese. This interim status should carry with it the right of unrestricted travel (except for permanent migration) to Japan and other nations. Improvement in the status of Ryukyuans would not only promote cultural relations with Japan but would also remove a source of serious dissatisfaction with American rule.

The exchange-of-persons program which has sponsored visits of Ryukyuans to the United States should be focused on Japan. The character of the program might also be improved. Formerly many students, teachers, government officials, and other leaders were sent to the United States, and while the results may have been statistically impressive, the actual effects on Ryukyuan conditions are somewhat doubtful.[67] The emphasis on numbers of people sent rather than quality of those selected seems to have made the program less successful cult for Ryukyuan leaders to submit again to the subordinate position of a kind of country-cousin prefecture under Japanese domination. Unless the Japanese government understands that the Ryukyus have developed in governmental competence to a position equalling at least a middle-rank prefecture in Japan Proper, the reintegration of the Ryukyus is likely to be marked by unnecessary tensions. There is very little that American administration of the islands can do to remedy this aspect of the predicament, and it is likely that some of our efforts will aggravate the situation. We must improve the character of Ryukyuan government simply to reduce the expense of the occupation; yet, paradoxically, as the government improves, the hiatus between the Ryukyuan government and Japan is widened.

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[66] The dimensions of Ryukyuan government can be even more clearly seen when this fact is compared to the organization of prefectures in Japan. The smallest (in terms of administrative divisions) prefecture in Japan in 1945 was Tokushima, which had one city, 42 towns, and 91 villages. *Administrative Subdivisions of Japan* (Department of State, 1946), p. 473.

[67] The Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs and Military Government, Department of the Army, has been publishing in January and July the *Semi-Annual Report of Stateside Activities Supporting the Reorientation Program in Japan and the Ryukyu Islands.* The last report was changed to an *Annual Report* and appeared for the period ending July, 1951. These reports indicate the extent of the exchange-of-persons program for the Ryukyus.

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The exchange-of-persons program which has sponsored visits of Ryukyuans to the United States should be focused on Japan. The character of the program might also be improved. Formerly many students, teachers, government officials, and other leaders were sent to the United States, and while the results may have been statistically impressive, the actual effects on Ryukyuan conditions are somewhat doubtful.[67] The emphasis on numbers of people sent rather than quality of those selected seems to have made the program less successful than spectacular. It would be more effective to send a few able Ryukyuans to Japanese schools or universities for four or five years than to send many mediocre people for shorter periods. If this shift from quantitative mediocrity to the cultivation of an elite leadership is to be made, American administrators in the Ryukyus, as elsewhere, will have to disentangle themselves from the quantitative egalitarian bias which infects much of American public education.

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The extensive use of Japanese experts in public administration would also facilitate the development of Ryukyuan government in a Japanese mold. This kind of help should be sought particularly in those activities which have departed excessively from the Japanese norm (as in the organization of the executive branch of the Ryukyuan government) and in other activities which urgently need strengthening (such as tax administration).

No single plan or technique thus far suggested is the real key to the problem of rendering Ryukyuan and Japanese government compatible. The crucial factor is wholehearted acceptance of a clearly-defined policy which asserts the inevitability of restoration of the islands to Japan.

V

One of the principal criticisms of American administration of the Ryukyus is that it continues to be of a military character. This allegation assumes that military organization, being authoritarian, cannot stimulate the growth of constitutional democratic forms. Yet since democratization was never more than a secondary objective in the Ryukyus, this theoretical problem of "democratization by force"[68] is not the point which exercises critics of the occupation. The military character of our control of the Ryukyus is attacked chiefly on the ground that civil Ryukyuan problems are subordinate to American military considerations. This trampling on Ryukyuan rights is injurious to Ryukyuan pride and dignity and, to the Ryukyuan at least, seems to be proof of the essentially selfish interest of the American occupation. Responsible Ryukyuan officials regard this as one of the chief sources of dissatisfaction with American control. The replacement of a uniformed general by a civilian commissioner in mufti, the argument continues, would rectify this deficiency in American administration.

To lay the problem of defective administration at the door of military brass is naively to oversimplify; yet this very quality of simplicity makes it an inviting panacea. Some Ryukyuans have cited as a model the eminently successful American administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific under the civilian leadership of the late ex-Senator Elbert D. Thomas.[69] Others have noted that even Japan used civilian administration in the control of annexed Korea after 1919.[70] Neither comparison is fair. The administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific, a responsibility of the Department of the Interior since its transfer from Navy control in 1951, is simpler than that of the Ryukyus. It embraces none of the military problems which derive from the strategic objectives of our control of Okinawa as our primary Pacific base.[71] Japan's use of a civilian governor-general after the 1919 reforms in Korean administration is deceptive, for the Japanese government itself was dominated by the military and the supremacy of the civilian governor-general over military forces in Korea was more illusory than real.

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[68] Elsewhere an effort was made to analyze the "paradox of democratization by force." In both Japan and the Ryukyus the character of occupation administration was considerably less military and much more civilian than is generally supposed. See the author's "The Role of Administration in the Occupation of Japan," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 267, pp. 154–63 (Jan., 1950).

[69] Conversations between the author and Ryukyuan government officials at Naha, Okinawa, in June, 1952.

Ryukyuans are not alone in advocating civilian control of their islands; responsible American officials in military government and in the Department of State, as well as private citizens, share this point of view.[72] Evoking latent American distrust of uniformed military rule, such criticism finds ready acceptance. Yet it is a criticism highly overgeneralized. Substitution of civilian for military rule is not necessarily the answer to the problem of improving our administration; indeed the advisability of civilian rule is open to serious question. The four factors discussed below bear on this criticism and deserve further exploration.

1. However sympathetic one may be to Ryukyuan problems, a simple, unpopular truth must be faced: our primary mission in the islands is strategic. Accordingly, military necessity must often trample over Ryukyuan interests. This happened in the appropriation of land for military and air bases, in the construction of highways, and in other activities. Indeed, our very presence in the islands is in violation of the wishes of the Ryukyuans. So long as our mission remains primarily that of Pacific security, the character of our administration must reflect the ascendancy of military considerations. It is possible that civilian control might be too sympathetic to native interests and would thereby jeopardize the internal military strength of the islands. To those deeply concerned with problems of national self-determination, and with personal rights and dignity, this will be a difficult fact to face. Yet it owes its derivation neither to a greedy military establishment nor to a national policy of aggrandizement, but rather to the grim dilemma posed by cold war.

The case for clear-cut military domination of the islands has greater cogency when it is linked to our total Pacific defense strategy. The importance of the Ryukyus as a military base increases with each successive crisis in Indochina, Quemoy, and elsewhere in Asia. It is important, therefore, that the command of the Ryukyus be lodged in military hands integrated closely with and subordinate to the Far East Command in Tokyo. To place the Ryukyus under civilian control at this juncture might loosen Pacific military organization by introducing elements of conflicting and overlapping responsibilities and muddied channels of command. In any event, whatever proposals are made to civilianize our control of the islands should be made in the context of our security mission there and of our total defense strategy for the Pacific.

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[70] *Idem.*

[71] Conversations between the author and the late Elbert D. Thomas, High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific, Honolulu, T. H., September, 1952.

[72] See, for example, a statement by a missionary on Okinawa: "It is the general opinion that the fault lies in the fact that our occupation is still of a military character. Let the army run its bases, but let a civilian administration be appointed to deal with the people." Otis W. Bell, "Play Fair with Okinawans!", *The Christian Century*, Vol. 71, pp. 76–77 (Jan. 20, 1954).

2. The assumption that an organization commanded by men in uniform is necessarily unsympathetic to native, civil problems must be suspect. There has been real and significant concern for Ryukyuan problems within the organization (United States Administration of the Ryukyu Islands—USCAR) specifically charged with responsibility for Ryukyuan affairs. This organization, though commanded by a military official, is staffed at such key policy posts as those in economics, education, finance, government, and public services by civilian officials. They tend, quite naturally, to be partisans (if not crusaders) for their clientele—the Ryukyuans. To the extent that this attitude is shared by the military officers of the organization, it becomes generalized as an institutional point of view. Despite frequent changes in commanding generals, USCAR had identified itself quite clearly with Ryukyuan interests. In this respect it has been all too frequently at loggerheads with its superior headquarters, the Ryukyus Command (RYCOM), whose commanding general is responsible for both military troop affairs and civilian Ryukyuan affairs. Most Ryukyuan and many American critics of American administration of the islands are unaware that USCAR's concern for Ryukyuan affairs has often led to considerable stress and bitterness between USCAR and RYCOM. The USCAR attitude shows the possibility of a military organization becoming infused with an essentially civilian point of view—a phenomenon earlier noticed in the conduct of the occupation of Japan.[73] The crucial factor is not whether American organization is essentially military or civilian, but rather whether the organization whose primary responsibility is civilian affairs is in a relationship equal or superior to the organization administering military affairs. While this juxtaposition of military and civilian considerations is not recommended by the present writer, it should be cited as a means of accomplishing ascendancy of civilian interests within a military occupation organization. Critics of our military control of the Ryukyus should note that the subordination of native interests is due less to the military character of our organization than to the status of USCAR as the echelon administering Ryukyuan affairs.

3. A weighing of the alternatives to military control may dampen the ardor of those who would propose drastic shift of responsibility to civilian authorities. Assume that a civil commissioner were appointed and military forces on Okinawa were subordinate to him. To what unit of government would the civil commissioner be responsible? If he were responsible to the Department of the Army, would he be subordinate to the Far East Command in Tokyo or would

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[73] See note 68.

he answer directly to either the Chief of Staff or Secretary of the Army in Washington? Certainly he could not be within the Department of the Army yet independent of the Far East Command without raising grave problems of lateral coordination and jeopardizing the unity of our over-all command of the Pacific. Such an alternative would raise problems greater than those which it purports to solve—the only advantage would be the specious one of having a commissioner in mufti rather than a general in khaki.

It is equally doubtful that any real improvement would result from appointment of a civil commissioner responsible to a civilian branch of government. This would require that the American military establishment in the Ryukyus be answerable to an authority different from that to which the civil commissioner would report. Coordination of military and civil affairs would be precarious at best. What civilian branch of government would be prepared to administer such an activity? In the face of established policy limiting its activities (quite rightly) to those of a diplomatic staff arm of the Chief Executive, the Department of State would not attempt to operate such a government. Nor is adequate guiding precedent to be found in the fact that the State Department has been directly involved in the occupation of Germany with John J. McCloy and James B. Conant as Commissioners. The German situation had complex elements of quadripartite administration and international diplomacy calling for the greatest diplomatic finesse. Moreover, the construction of a democratic Bonn government and the industrial rehabilitation of a major European industrial power within a quadrilateral context were tasks highly charged with diplomatic content. While elements of a diplomatic situation are found in the Ryukyus, the occupation is much simpler and much more military.

The only remaining branch of government with a legitimate historical interest in governing overseas areas is the Division of Territories and Island Possessions of the Department of the Interior. But if responsibility for the Ryukyus were lodged here, civilian and military responsibilities would again be divided in a manner potentially injurious to Pacific security.

Nor would the administration of the Ryukyus by a civilian agency assure a higher quality of personnel assigned to the islands. Lacking systematic experience in overseas administration, we have no cadre of dedicated civil servants trained in dealing with Asians who could be called upon to devote their professional talents to the rectification of Ryukyuan affairs. As careful as recruiting might be, well-established, successful, able men are difficult to attract. Many of those finally recruited are likely to be motivated by adventure, higher salary, or desire to escape some problem in American society. The net result of such a selection would probably not be an improvement over military personnel assigned arbitrarily to duty in the Ryukyus. In the face of such serious inadequacies in our own governmental capacity to deal with problems of overseas administration, it is difficult to find an alternative to army control so clearly superior as to outweigh the strategic considerations which, in this writer's opinion, require continued, unified military direction.

4. Advocates of conversion from military to civilian control should consider

that military government on the islands is already nearly ten years old. A substantial body of knowledge and experience has been developed. Such experience is best transmitted through a slowly evolving administration rather than one which would undergo radical reorganization. Some value should be placed on the merits of unbroken continuity as a means of insuring maximum security in the Pacific.

The foregoing arguments against the development of civilian control are merely suggestive of problems to be assessed; they are by no means conclusive. On the other side, it must be admitted that civilian control would have pleasant symbolic meaning to Ryukyuans and would probably make our administration somewhat more palatable. Certainly it is essential that some significant change in the conduct of our military government take place. While the return of Amami has apparently somewhat blunted native antagonism, there are indications that considerable dissatisfaction with American rule remains. A demonstration by Okinawans against the further appropriation of land for military use occurred on December 5, 1953. The demonstrating crowd of Okinawans[74] dispersed only after the intervention of American troops. This incident, although generally unreported in the United States press,[75] is of significance as an index of unrest. Villagers of Gushi-ku, Oroko-son assembled around construction operations which were to start the conversion of important cultivable lands to a new American air installation and housing for dependents. About 300 American troops were dispatched to the scene. After unsuccessfully urging the crowd to disperse, troops moved toward the Ryukyuans (without, however, establishing body contact). Only then did the crowd break up.

The immediate cause of the demonstration was the additional expropriation of land at inadequate rental prices. Gushi-ku, stated the *Ryukyu Shimpo*,[76] had 320,000 *tsubo* of land before the war. Expansion of American airfields reduced this to the present 60,000 *tsubo*. The villagers maintain that construction of the new airfield will reduce their land-holdings to 4,000 *tsubo*. Failure adequately to compensate Okinawans for their land continues to be a source of bitterness easily exploited by the allegedly Communist People's party. Its ultimate solution requires the appropriation of substantial sums of money for reimbursement of the owners at equitable rates.[77] Yet the usually cursory attention given by congressional committee review of Department of the Army appropriations for the Ryukyus is not likely to produce adequate analysis of this shameful condition. Indeed, in the 1953 hearings, not only was there no mention of this problem, but an impression was left with the committee that Ryukyuans are satisfied with American administration.[78]

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[74] Estimates of the size of the crowd vary. The official American publication, *The Ryukyu Review*, published in English jointly by the Ryukyus Command and the Twentieth Air Force and used as a medium for disseminating information to United States Forces personnel, estimates the size as 250 persons. *The Ryukyu Review*, December 6, 1953. An Okinawan paper, however, states both in its news account and in its editorial that at least 1,000 demonstrators were on hand. *Ryukyu Shimpo*, December 6, 1953.

[75] The only reference to this incident in the American press (to this author's knowledge) is in the article by the Rev. Otis W. Bell (cited in note 72) in which he discusses the land expropriation problem as the immediate cause of the demonstration.

[76] December 6, 1953.

[77] An editorial in the *Okinawa Times*, Japanese language paper published by Okinawans, December 8, 1953, states: "The land problem, at first, seems to be a difficult one, but it is not so complicated. The problem could be settled if the United States government

The seriousness of the real discontent which Okinawans feel toward the land problem is glossed over by many American officials who attribute the situation to Communist agitation. Thus the English language publication, *The Ryukyu Review*, in its news article on December 6, 1953 referred to the incident in these terms: "A small band of Communist-inspired demonstrators were peacefully ejected . . . "; "the Communist-led demonstration"; "Farmers refused to harvest their crops at the incessant urging of the Senaga-led Communists"; and "the village people, duped by Communist promises." Granted that the Communists have probably exploited the circumstances, the causes are rooted not in Communist antics but in legitimate dissatisfaction with an inequitable process of land seizure. The head of Gushi-ku stated: "The military is anxious about the interference of the People's party, but there is no such thing. If we lose this area, we have only 4,000 *tsubo* of land left for cultivation. The trouble was a natural explosion for the sake of living. I wish the work could have been suspended. I wonder if the military has ever cared for our future livelihood. We didn't rebel against the military, but it is regrettable that the military sent armed soldiers."[79]

A further symptom of dissatisfaction among Ryukyuans is the success of the allegedly Communist Ryukyu People's party in the elections held early in 1954. Despite military government's clearly expressed dislike of the People's party,[80] that party succeeded in electing two of its candidates to the Ryukyuan legislature in the 1954 spring election. This represents an increase in the strength of

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would consent to disburse from 10 to 15 million dollars for rental fees from her abundant budget. This is far easier for the United States than it is for the Ryukyuan government to disburse ¥100,000. The United States government and not Okinawan landowners makes the problem difficult to solve."

[78] Hearings Before Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations, *The Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1954*, House of Representatives, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953), Pt. I, pp. 1–37, especially p. 25.

[79] *Ryukyu Shimpo*, December 6, 1953, news account. See also *Okinawa Times*, December 8, 1953 for similar expression of regret that troops were used in a situation that could have been handled by Okinawan police.

[80] For example, Major General Robert S. Beightler in an address to the first session of the Ryukyuan legislature in 1952 forcefully and directly condemned the Ryukyus People's party as a party "which, if allowed to continue unchecked, can lead to the establishment of a communist dominated regime in these islands." Cautioning the people of the Ryukyus, he continued, "I hope that you will recognize the leaders of the Ryukyus People's party for what they are and do everything within your power to prevent the spread of the dread scourge which they are sowing and which they trust will reach into every mura of the Ryukyus." Public Relations Office, Ryukyus Command, *Address by Major General Robert S. Beightler to Members of the Legislature, GRI, 10 a.m., Tuesday, 19 August 1952* (Mimeographed, 13 pp.).

the People's party, because in the previous election one of the two candidates elected was from Amami-Ōshima. The 1954 election, held after the return of Amami to Japan, resulted in the election of two People's party candidates from Okinawa alone. The composition of the new Ryukyuan legislature gives the People's party a strategic advantage. The 12 members of the Socialist Masses party, the two People's party members, and somewhat less frequently the three Independents, often vote in a block against the 12 members of the Democratic party. Their position is strengthened by the fact that the Speaker and Vice-Speaker of this unicameral legislature are also members of the Socialist Masses party. The current legislature, thus composed, is likely to become a focal point for the expression of embarrassing anti-American sentiments. It appears, therefore, that the military government of the Ryukyus will continue to be faced with political problems not usually found within the province of the military establishment. Some change in organization is needed, but the change should not depart from the requirement of exclusive military control of the situation.

The changes required are subtle rather than spectacular and should probably occur at the policy levels in Washington rather than in the Ryukyus. Army administration of the islands should be subject to some measure of extraordinary scrutiny, since the situation in this last major area under American military control can easily be placed under the spotlight of Communist publicity. Some special recognition, both by the Congress and by the executive branch, seems indicated. Perhaps through congressional action, or at least by executive order, the unusual nature of the Army's mission in the Ryukyus should be acknowledged. Assignment of military personnel to the islands should be reviewed by an agency higher than the Department of the Army and should be exempt from the usual limitations of length of tour and rotation which Army personnel policy ordinarily requires. Only mature officers of demonstrated administrative capacity, with excellent records, unusual education, and temperamental qualifications for political work should be assigned. Commanding generals should be selected for experience and skill in civil government administration and for intellectual capacity to deal with complex social and political problems. They should not necessarily be limited to short tours of duty, which have averaged less than two years.

Top-level guidance of the occupation should be given by an inter-departmental committee which includes the Defense, State, and Army Departments and other members to be appointed by the President. Adequate review of budgetary requirements should be made both by the Bureau of the Budget and by appropriate committees of the Congress. Where deficiencies in our administration of the islands can be remedied by fiscal action (as in the case of reimbursing Okinawan landowners for compulsory "rental" of their lands), appropriate weight should be given to the increasingly sensitive nature of our position in the islands and to the corresponding need for scrupulously correct behavior in administering the islands' affairs. The interdepartmental committee should be served by a permanent secretariat adequate to conduct necessary research and to systematize historical experience so that continuity of policy can be facilitated. The committee should exert positive rather than nominal guidance and should constantly impress upon the Department of the Army the need for adequate attention to native Ryukyuan affairs. It should lend the weight of its support to Army requests of an extraordinary nature requiring congressional sanction. A plan such as this would preserve the integrity, cohesion, and exclusiveness of control by the military; yet inter-departmental supervision would increase the possibility that civilian Ryukyuan affairs would be adequately considered. Some such recognition of the Ryukyuan situation should be given. The integrity of American constitutional government as exported to the Ryukyus is resisted by Ryukyuans, challenged by Japanese, flouted by less favorably disposed Asians. Carefully considered action by the policy levels of government is required if we are to salvage our perilous ten-year adventure.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Extensive accounts of the Ryukyus appeared in scholarly publications as early as the first part of the 18th century. The bibliographical comments which follow, while not comprehensive, attempt to survey the principal contributions which have been made.

I. *General and Historical Works*

Although nearly a hundred items concerning the Ryukyus are recorded in standard bibliographies, almost all are technical studies in such subjects as botany, biology, and topography. See Friedrich Von Wenckstern, *Bibliography of the Japanese Empire*, 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1907) and succeeding volumes of the same series: Oskar Nachod, *Bibliography of the Japanese Empire*, Vols. 1–2 (London, 1928), pp. 651–52; *Bibliographie von Japan*, Vol. 3 (Leipzig, 1931), pp. 349–50, Vol. 4 (Leipzig, 1935), p. 294, Praesent and Haenisch, *Bibliographie von Japan*, Vol. 5 (Leipzig, 1937), p. 361. See also Henri Cordier, *Bibliotheca Sinica*, 2d ed. (Paris, 1906–7), Vols. 3–4, pp. 3007–18, and *Bibliotheca Sinica*, Supplement and Index, 2d ed. (Paris, 1924), p. 4427. George H. Kerr, of the staff of the University of California's Institute of East Asiatic Studies, has compiled a bibliography of some 3000 items on the Ryukyus which is being prepared for publication.

Englebert Kaempfer had mentioned the Ryukyus several times in the first edition of his classic work published in 1727. Kaempfer, *History of Japan*, 3 vols. (Glasgow, 1906), Vol. 2, p. 257; Vol. 3, p. 336. Probably the earliest lengthy description of the Ryukyus first available to Western scholarship was an account by Supoa-kouang (transliteration by Gaubil), a Chinese scholar sent as an emissary to the Ryukyus in 1719. A translation of this account by the French Jesuit missionary, Père Antoine Gaubil, appeared under the title "Memoire sur les Isles que les Chinois appellent isles de Lieou-kieou," which constituted part (pp. 182–245) of the 23rd volume of a long series of letters from missionaries published under the title *Lettres Édifiantes et Curieuses Écrites des Missions Étrangères*, nouvelle edition (Paris, 1781). Early British explorers relied heavily on this account and one, John McLeod, included an English translation of part of the Gaubil memoir in his own book, *Voyage of His Majesty's Ship Alceste, along the Coast of Corea, to the Island of Lew Chew*, 2d ed. (London, 1818), pp. 79–97.

The attention of the British was directed to the Islands in 1797 by the shipwreck of H.M.S. Providence under command of Captain William R. Broughton, who later wrote an account of his voyage. Other seafaring accounts appeared, but few devoted much attention to the political and social institutions of the Ryukyus.

The earliest lengthy account in English was that of Captain Basil Hall, whose *Account of a Voyage of Discovery to the West Coast of Corea, and the Great Loo-Choo Island* (London, 1818) remains a fascinating narrative. Another British naval officer, Captain Beechey, prepared an account of the islands and included in his study an historical summary based on the earlier works of Kaempfer, Gaubil, Hall, and Klaproth. F. W. Beechey, *Narrative of a Voyage to the Pacific*, 2 vols. (London, 1831), Vol. 2, pp. 143–227.

The British medical missionary, Dr. B. J. Bettelheim, who had been on Okinawa from 1846 until he sailed away with Perry in 1854, also wrote valuable commentaries. See "Letter from B. J. Bettelheim, M.D.," *Chinese Repository* (Canton, 1852), Vol. 19, pp. 17–49, 57–90. For additional materials on Bettelheim see William Leonard Schwartz, "Commodore Perry at Okinawa, from the Unpublished Diary of a British Missionary," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 51, pp. 262–76 (Jan., 1946). See also W. G. Beasley, *Great Britain and the Opening of Japan 1834–1858* (London, 1951), pp. 77–82.

Professor Basil Hall Chamberlain added substantially to his grandfather's contribution by further exploration and by bibliographical and linguistic studies. He listed and described Japanese and Ryukyuan sources in his "Contributions to a Bibliography of Luchu" *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. 24, pp. 1–12 (1896). His longer account, "The Luchu Islands and Their Inhabitants," appeared in the *Geographical Journal*, Vol. 5, pp. 289–319, 446–62, 534–45 (April, May, June, 1895). Another early British study was that of George Smith, *Lewchew and the Lewchewans; Being a Narrative of a Visit to Lewchew, or Loo Choo, in October, 1850* (London, 1853). A brief but competent history is that of Charles S. Leavenworth, "The History of the Loochoo Islands," *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society of Japan for the Year 1905*, Vol. 36 (new series), pp. 103–20 (1905).

II. *Anthropological Studies*

Several studies conducted under terms of a United States Army contract administered by the Pacific Science Board of the National Research Council and designated as Scientific Investigation in the Ryukyu Islands (SIRI) have been prepared in mimeographed form. See especially Clarence J. Glacken, *Studies in Okinawan Village Life* (Washington, D. C.: Pacific Science Board, National Research Council, 1950, 382 pp., mimeo.). Dr. Glacken also has in preparation a study entitled *The Great Loochoo Life in Three Okinawan Villages*. See also Douglas G. Haring, *The Island of Amami Ōshima in the Northern Ryūkyūs* (Washington, D. C.: Pacific Science Board, National Research Council, October 1952, 85 pp., mimeographed). George H. Kerr's historical summary, *Ryukyu, Kingdom and Province before 1945* (Washington, D. C.: Pacific Science Board, National Research Council, June, 1952, 240 pp., mimeo.) will probably soon be published in a shortened English edition.

Since Basil Hall Chamberlain's 1895 study cited above deals with cultural characteristics of the people as well as the geography of the islands, it serves as a valuable source of information pertinent to anthropology. Among more recent studies are the following: Marshall T. Newman and Ransom L. Eng, *The Ryukyu People: A Cultural Appraisal* (Washington, D. C., The Smithsonian Institution, 1948), and "The Ryukyu People: A Biological Appraisal," *American Journal of Physical Anthropology*, Vol. 5 (new series), pp. 112–57 (June, 1947); Harold Fink, "The Distribution of Blood Groups in Ryukyuans," *ibid.*, pp. 159–63. Douglas G. Haring presents some provocative hypotheses on the relationship between the culture of Amami-Ōshima and that of Tokugawa Japan in "Japanese National Character," *The Yale Review*, pp. 388–92 (Spring, 1953). The studies in English of indigenous religious practices are: Robert Stewart Spencer, "The Noro, or Priestesses of Loo Choo," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. 8 (second series), pp. 94–112 (Dec., 1931); and Douglas G. Haring, "The Noro Cult of Amami Ōshima: Divine Priestesses of the Ryukyu Islands," *Sociologus* (Berlin), Vol. 3 (new series), pp. 108–21 (1953).

HUME AND CONSERVATISM

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Although David Hume's stature as a philosopher has rarely been questioned, his claims as a political theorist have fared less well. Jefferson showed deep hostility towards Hume's ideas, while John Adams could find agreement with only a few points.[1] Later opinion has been less vehement but still reserved. Thomas Huxley thought Hume's political writings suggestive, but on the whole marred by an unabashed desire for literary success.[2] In Sir Leslie Stephen's judgment Hume was guilty of a "cynical conservatism" that was at once superficial and unhistorical.[3]

More recent studies, such as those of Sabine and Halévy, have established more securely Hume's place in political thought but have left certain ambiguities. Sabine has coupled Hume with Burke as an opponent of eighteenth-century rationalism, while Halévy viewed him as a forerunner of the "philosophical radicalism" of Bentham, Adam Smith, James Mill, and Ricardo.[4] To have fathered squabbling children is always something of an embarrassment, but particularly so when one is, like Hume, temperamentally averse to taking sides. It is true, nonetheless, that if a temporary distinction is made between Hume's doctrine and his influence, it is possible to maintain that his influence worked in two quite different directions. His inquires into causation, the role of reason, and the nature of moral judgments helped eventually to undermine the natural law structure of eighteenth-century liberalism, while his emphasis on utility as the test of institutions contributed an important ingredient to Benthamite liberalism. On the other hand, his attack on reason and its claims to universal truths helped to relieve eighteenth-century conservatives of a potent enemy and prepared the way for the authority of sentiment and feeling. Hume's labors, then, worked to alter the future course of both liberalism and conservatism.

This double aspect of Hume's influence, however, has served to obscure his own political doctrines. The latter warrant some attention because in doctrine, as well as in personal inclination, he was a conservative, but of a distinctive kind. While the character of his conservatism was somewhat colored by its being formulated in the more placid era which preceded the French Revolution, its distinctiveness had its roots in Hume's peculiar relationship to the Enlightenment. Later conservatives tended to lump together the Enlightenment with the Revolution and to damn the former because of its presumed relation to the latter. Rationalism and *sans-culottism* were viewed as two sides of the same coin. "The eighteenth century," declared De Maistre, "which distrusted itself in nothing, hesitated at nothing."

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[1] *The Works of John Adams*, ed. Charles Francis Adams, 10 vols. (Boston, 1865), Vol. 4, pp. 466–68; Adrienne Koch and William Peden, *Selected Writings of John and John Quincy Adams* (New York, 1946), p. 120; *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert E. Bergh, 20 vols. (Washington, 1903), Vol. 11, p. 223; Vol. 12, pp. 405–7; Vol. 16, pp. 44, 125–26. John Stuart Mill declared Hume to be "the profoundest negative thinker on record," *Mill on Bentham and Coleridge*, ed. F. R. Leavis (New York, 1950), p. 43.

[2] Thomas Huxley, *Hume* (New York, n.d.), pp. 10–11.

[3] Leslie Stephen, *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1949), Vol. 2, p. 181.

[4] George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1950), pp. 597–606; Elie Halévy, *Growth of Philosophic Radicalism* (London, 1934), pp. 9–13, 42–45, 131–33; John Plamenatz, *The English Utilitarians* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 22–44; *Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy*, ed. Henry D. Aiken (New York, 1948), Introduction; *David Hume, Theory of Politics*, ed. Frederick M. Watkins (Edinburgh, 1951), Introduction.

The so-called "crisis of the eighteenth century," when the full impact of seventeenth-century rationalist and scientific modes of thought was felt, constituted a watershed for modern political thought. And the attack on the authority of accepted ideas was soon accompanied by an attack on the legitimacy of accepted institutions. "Rude establishments," wrote Bentham, must be brought "to the test of polished reason." Under the impress of revolutionary events set in motion in America and Europe, modern conservatism was formed. In its origins, conservatism was not so much a defense of the existing order, which had been breached by the establishment of revolutionary regimes, as a sustained attack on the rationalist currents which had come to dominate much of European thinking since the days of Hobbes, Descartes, and Newton. Whatever else may be said of the conservative response, it cannot be held to have disagreed about the identity of its enemy. Burke's strictures against "men of theory," Hegel's condemnation of the "abstract reason" of the French revolutionaries, and Metternich's sarcasms about the "presumptuous man" were all testimony to an almost unanimous rejection of the claims of reason to be the ultimate arbiter in political questions. According to the conservative indictment, the Enlightenment, inspired by a destructive rationalism, had succeeded in loosening the cohesive ties of society; it had insisted that slumbering beliefs and institutions, which men had unthinkingly and naturally "accepted," be made to undergo the ordeal of conscious, rational acceptance.

Given this view of the Enlightenment as a kind of extended orgy of rationalism, conservatives were irresistibly drawn to some form of political supernaturalism. For, as De Maistre put it, the rationalist has engaged in "an insurrection against God" whereby "the trowel believes himself the architect." The political community, according to the conservatives, was part of the time dimension of history to which "political geometry" could never do justice. History, in turn, was "the great drama of an ever-unfolding Providence,"[5] or, in Burke's phrase, an expression of the "divine tactic" which men could only faintly comprehend. Of the political community, men could only know that it was part of a providential pattern; they could not know its ultimate basis. The last resort of conservatism, then, was to invoke a veil of mystery and to warn that men plumb the origins of society at their peril; the "natural" forces of society, in response to a divine imperative, worked in a wondrous fashion beside which the cleverest political contrivances stood as pale imitations.

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[5] *The Political Thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. R. J. White (London, 1938), p. 93.

I

These constitute some of the main elements in the conservative tradition as it developed near the end of the eighteenth century. It is against this background that the earlier conservatism of Hume assumes some significance. The first fundamental respect in which his position differed from that outlined above was that his was a conservatism without benefit of mystery. There was no recourse to a "divine tactic," a *Weltgeist;* nor any disposition, such as displayed by Coleridge, to revive Scripture as a "statesman's manual." Hume's conclusions were stubbornly rooted in a strictly secular analysis with experience as the final court of appeal. Secondly, Hume's conservatism was constructed from the very materials of the Enlightenment: its quest for objective analysis, its distrust of obscurantism, its faith in empirical data, its disdain for the *a priori*, and its strong emphasis on the criterion of utility. He employed the Enlightenment methods of analysis to probe the roots of established pieties and institutions, and he carried it out with the sort of dispassion that Coleridge was to call "cold-blooded." Thirdly, his was a conservatism which owed no inspiration to catastrophe, impending or past, but rather reflected the "peace of the Augustans." Consequently, Hume exhibited none of the heightened sensitivity of later conservatives to the necessity for strong authority as the main guarantor of unity. Where later De Bonald was to assert that "outside religious and political unity man can find no truth and society no salvation," Hume was content with the matter-of-fact judgment that society was a product of human interests whose satisfaction provided the requisite amount of social cohesion.

Nevertheless, Hume was something more than the Enlightenment incarnate, for his significance is that he turned against the Enlightenment its own weapons. And herein lies his importance as a conservative thinker. His starting-point is to be found in *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739–40) which bears the subtitle "An attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects." The first book illustrates Hume's tactic: to whittle down the claims of reason by the use of rational analysis. Reason, he contended, was admittedly an instrument for advancing our knowledge, but it was an instrument with a circumscribed sphere of activity:

> Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the *real* relations of ideas, or to *real* existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of reason.[6]

The consequence of this conclusion was to stake off an important realm either impervious to reason or within which reason played only a derivative role. Thus what men described as cause-and-effect was not a deductive conclusion of reason but the product of experience: we have become accustomed to seeing a certain effect follow from a given cause, but, strictly speaking, there existed no logically necessary connection between the two. Facts were derived from observation, not from reason; hence reason could not be employed to prove or disprove the existence of a fact. Human behavior, in turn, was governed largely by unanalyzed experience or habits. "Custom," Hume concluded, "is the great guide of human life."[7]

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[6] *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. III, Pt. I, sec. 1. Hereafter this will be cited as *Human Nature.*

The significance of Hume's argument was not merely that it greatly extended the reign of custom at the expense of reason, but that it undercut the whole idea of an underlying rational harmony in nature, a harmony from which eighteenth-century rationalists had deduced the existence of universal moral imperatives. Hume destroyed this assumption, not by a frontal assault, but by the contention that the external order was not a discovery of reason but was rooted in "the principles of human nature." The 'order' that we attribute to the phenomenal world rests really on a conviction and not on a process of logical validation; it is the "force and vivacity" which the idea of an 'order' exerts on our imagination that explains its hold.[8]

Equally modest was the role assigned reason by Hume in matters of morals. Reason functioned as a calculator, an instrument of analysis. It was "perfectly inert" in the sense that it provided neither the springs of human action nor the final judgment in questions of moral controversy. In Hume's view, human actions were stimulated initially by the passions, which were a response to a direct emotional experience. The passions, in short, were the active, generating factor in human behavior. Consequently, they could not be yoked or restrained by reason, as the rationalists maintained, because this would be to argue that an inert principle could control an active one. Hence the famous conclusion: "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."[9] Passions were thus outside the range of rational criticism, except as they might be based on a false supposition about objects which had no existence, or as the passions selected inadequate means for the fulfillment of their ends. Reason could indicate the tendencies and consequences of certain actions, but sentiment or feeling alone could actively stimulate us to follow one choice rather than another. Again, reason dealt with facts and relations, but moral concepts, such as 'crime' or 'ingratitude,' were not analyzable as facts or relations except by ignoring the original source of the concept itself in our sentiments or feelings. For example, certain elements of a 'crime' could be analyzed by the understanding into components, but the totality of these did not equal a 'crime'; it was only as our feelings affixed such a designation that certain actions took on a moral meaning. "The approbation or blame which then ensues cannot be the work of judgment, but of the heart. . . ."[10] Thus, since morals were linked to the passions or feelings, and since reason was unable to master the latter, it followed that morals could never be designated true or false, reasonable or unreasonable.

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[7] *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, sec. 5. Hereafter this will be cited as *Human Understanding*.

[8] *Human Nature*, Bk. I, Pt. III, secs. 7–8.

[9] *Human Nature*, Bk. II, Pt. III, sec. 3.

The net effect of this argument was, of course, to undermine the whole theory of natural law with its immutable values discoverable by rational inquiry. Having withdrawn morals from the jurisdiction of reason, Hume was prepared to maintain that morality was "more properly felt than judged of."[11] Morality derived from a moral sense which received impressions; these might be either pleasing or displeasing. Actions or situations which cause pleasing impressions men have identified as good or virtuous, their contraries as bad. When it is asked, what is it that renders some impressions pleasurable and others painful, Hume's reply was that in some instances it was "natural" for men to feel delight or aversion; in other cases the response was due to habit or conditioning. Morals were, then, a product of nature *or* convention, but, as Hume pointed out in his discussion of justice:

> Mankind is an inventive species; and where an invention is obvious and absolutely necessary, it may as properly be said to be natural as anything that proceeds immediately from original principles, without the intervention of thought and reflection. Though the rules of justice be *artificial*, they are not *arbitrary*.[12]

Thus art could be fused with nature, and when innovation became overlain with habit the distinction between the artificial and the natural vanished.

There existed, in this line of argument, a subtle difference between Hume and later conservatives. Some conservatives, Sir William Blackstone for example, were to maintain that a rational institution or law could be declared "natural" on the grounds that its long existence demonstrated its rationality and naturalness. Hume, however, in denying the relationship between the rational and the natural, was asserting quite another basis for the validity of institutions: an arrangement might, through usage, become habitual and therefore "natural," but this had nothing to do with its rationality and rationality had nothing to do with it.

The full implications of Hume's analysis were not to be realized until after the revolutionary events in America and France had made their mark. Prior to that time little difference existed between conservative and radical theorists in the approach taken to political problems. The points of disagreement between John Adams and Jefferson in America, Blackstone and Priestley in England, or D'Argenson and Diderot in France were less striking than the degree to which they shared a common premise that the test of a political system or a particular policy was a matter of rational demonstration. The influence of Hume's iconoclasm, however, was to dissolve this area of agreement by showing that ultimate truths could not be proven by rational methods. And after 1789 both sides were to become increasingly preoccupied with ultimate truths. By restricting reason to a narrow zone between experience and the passions, Hume cleared the way for political romanticism. "Nothing is freer," he wrote, "than the imagination of man. . . . The difference between *fiction* and *belief* lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure."[13]

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[10] *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,* Open Court ed. (La Salle, Ill., n.d.), Appendix I, p. 131.

[11] *Human Nature,* Bk. III, Pt. I, sec. 2. See also the discussion in D. G. C. MacNabb, *David Hume, His Theory of Knowledge and Morality* (London, 1951), pp. 159 ff.

[12] *Human Nature,* Bk. III, Pt. II, sec. 1.

In fairness to Hume it should be noted that his remarks cannot be turned into a justification for some of the later extravagances of the romantics. Habit, emotion, and imagination did not constitute political values in his system, but belonged to the catalog of descriptive facts concerning human behavior. They might, and often did, have valuable consequences, yet they were not values in themselves. It was true that on occasion Hume might casually remark that in philosophy, as in music and poetry, "we must follow our taste and sentiment,"[14] but he was aware that this might prove too much. After all, he cautioned, there was a clear difference between "a poetical enthusiasm" and "a serious conviction" resting on "reflexion and general rules."[15] Negatively, however, Hume's labors worked towards the alteration of the future course of conservatism. With reason discredited, new premises could be fashioned from custom and sentiment.

II

The quest for a science of politics was one of the great intellectual adventures of the Enlightenment.[16] It was believed, perhaps not logically, that a science of this kind would be a natural ally of reform and progress. It was almost inevitable, given the cautious disposition of conservatives towards political and social change, that a deep hostility towards a science of politics should color conservative thought of the late eighteenth century. Here again Hume took a different tack. While sharing the conservative distrust of reform, he was still convinced that the study of politics could achieve the status of a science. At the same time, he demonstrated that there was no inherent necessity that such a science led to radical conclusions.

Although Hume remarked in one place that "the world is still too young to fix many general truths in politics which will remain true to the latest posterity,"[17] his works were studded with references to "causes and principles eternal and immutable" and to "universal axioms." While he admitted that social sciences, dealing as they did with matters of fact, could not aspire to the same degree of certitude as mathematics, dealing as it did with relations between ideas, Hume did go so far as to assert that the social sciences were capable of the same degree of certitude as the physical sciences. He further maintained that "politics, natural philosophy, physics, chemistry, etc.," which employ "moral reasoning," were more securely grounded than the study of morals or aesthetics; the latter were "not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment." This was not to imply that politics, any more than the other sciences, could transcend experience or explain "ultimate principles."[18] Nor was it meant to deny that "irregular and extraordinary appearances" might defy attempts to reduce political phenomena to near-mathematical axioms.[19]

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[13] *Human Understanding*, sec. V, pts. I–II.

[14] *Human Nature*, Bk. I, Pt. III, sec. 8.

[15] John Arthur Passmore, *Hume's Intentions* (Cambridge, 1952), p. 10.

[16] On this point see John H. Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind*, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1940), pp. 334 ff.; Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (Princeton, 1951), pp. 253 ff.

[17] "Of Civil Liberty," *The Philosophical Works of David Hume*, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 4 vols. (London, 1875), Vol. 3, p. 156. Hereafter this will be cited as *Works*.

Despite these qualifications, Hume's conviction remained unshaken that, as the title of one of his essays suggested, "politics may be reduced to a science" if it adheres to "experimental" procedures rather than the methods of traditional logic. Logic, which relied on demonstrations founded on the understanding, was useless for dealing with the probabilities which were of the essence of man's actual life in society. A science of politics, therefore, must be grounded in experience supplied by historical inquiry and observation of existing societies. Essentially, it was to be an investigation into the interaction between institutions and human nature From an historical point of view, the function of political institutions had been to channel and control human behavior. Institutions were, in short, artificial contrivances which exerted an independent force and were not merely a reflex or simple reaction to human drives. "So great is the force of laws and particular forms of government, and so little dependence have they on the humours and tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them as any which the mathematical sciences afford us."[20]

Hume's method of political analysis, as noted earlier, was grounded in the typical Enlightenment technique of "analytic dissection," which, to borrow Cassirer's description, "dissolves everything merely factual . . . and everything believed on the evidence of revelation, tradition and authority" as preliminary to the ultimate goal of "synthetic reconstruction."[21] Hume pressed this approach with devastating effect against the state-of-nature hypothesis present in some social contract theorizing. He pointed out the slippery logic which sought to justify rebellion against authority on the basis of a "mere philosophical fiction" like the state of nature; he denied that society was simply the product of a voluntary agreement aimed at eliminating certain "inconveniences" present in the pre-social condition. The arrangement called society represented an accumulated set of responses to human needs and drives: to the "natural appetite betwixt the sexes" and to man's oscillation between altruism—which diminishes in force as it is extended through the concentric circles of self, family, friends, and strangers—and selfishness—which increases as societal demands become more abstract and remote. Furthermore, as man found himself situated amidst circumstances of material scarcity his insecurity deepened, leading him to invade the material possessions of his fellows. This "natural" condition could be overcome by artificial arrangements which would restrain man's "heedless and impetuous passion" and gratify his instinct for self-interest.[22] "After that interest is once established and acknowledged, the sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows naturally and of itself."[23]

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[18] *Human Nature*, Introduction.

[19] "Of Some Remarkable Customs," *Works*, Vol. 3, p. 374.

[20] "That Politics may be reduced to a Science," *Works*, Vol. 3, p. 99.

[21] Cassirer, *Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, pp. 13–16.

In his explanation Hume made no sharp distinction between government and society. Government was viewed as the instrument whereby society's arrangements were protected and society's purposes executed. Consequently, when Hume came to discuss the problem of political obligation his argument paralleled to a large extent his explanation of society. His aim, in both cases, was to demonstrate that neither society nor government had emerged full-blown from a sudden agreement. The basis of government was traceable to consent only in the sense that every government required that its subjects agree to its existence. To label this obvious truism a contractual agreement only worked to distort the element of truth contained in the idea of contract, namely, that "it is on opinion only . . . that government is founded. . . ."[24] "Opinion," in turn, was composed of several aspects. First, there was "opinion of interest" which referred to the "sense of the general advantage which is reaped from government, together with the persuasion that the particular government which is established is equally advantageous with any other that could easily be settled." Second, there was "opinion of right" which comprehended (a) the "right to power" or the prevalent disposition of men to believe that governments which have endured over a long period of time were legitimate governments; and (b) the "right to property" or the general desire of men to secure their possessions.

Such were the "principles" which supported government. Viewed from this perspective, the "ought" element in political obligation was reduced to a secondary consequence following from certain naturalistic considerations. Men obeyed because the interests which they sought to protect and promote necessitated obedience to authority. "Society could not otherwise subsist."[25]

According to Hume's view, all of the rules of society were "artificial" in that they represented conscious contrivances designed to meet human needs and problems. As rules of convenience they could not be expected to satisfy the demands of morality or strict logic. For example, the rules of justice might result in a wicked miser winning a legal judgment against a virtuous peasant, yet the necessity and value of a general rule excludes consideration of the "fitness or unfitness of objects to particular persons."[26] The essential point was that there was no sharp contrast between an "artificial" rule and a "natural" one.

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[22] *Human Nature*, Bk. III, Pt. II, sec. 2.

[23] *Ibid.*, sec. 6.

[24] "Of the First Principles of Government," *Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 110 ff.

[25] "Of the Original Contract," *Works*, Vol. 3, p. 456.

[26] *Human Nature*, Bk. III, Pt. II, sec. 3.

Through the passage of time men became accustomed to social expedients, and what was once artifical soon became natural. It followed that the "natural" was not necessarily the primitive or the original condition. Hume strongly inferred that the opposite was more likely: that the truly unnatural situation was to be found in the state of nature.

The significant element in Hume's political ideas lies not so much in the particular arguments employed, but rather in the sensitivity displayed towards the workings of actual institutions. Like his contemporaries, he appeared to use the analytical method to dissect institutions, to peel off layer after layer of historical accretion. Yet, unlike that of many of his contemporaries, Hume's method proceeded on the belief that a particular institution was to be viewed as a whole possessing subtle interconnections with other institutional wholes.

Implicit in this approach were two ideas which were to play a central role in later conservative thinking in England. Institutions were to be understood in terms of human needs, but institutions were not merely the product of human needs. The two elements became intertwined and inseparable by virtue of their common root in historical time. It followed that there was no necessary opposition between what was useful and what existed; the desirable and the factual were not out of joint. In this way Hume indicated to later conservatives that the strongest arguments for the existing order were to be found within the facts of that order; that under an empirical approach utility could be located as an immanent value dwelling within the interstices of actual social arrangements, not as a grim measuring rod contrived to reveal the shortcomings of institutions.

Moreover, institutions were developments over a period of time. Their purpose and nature could not be correctly understood without a sense of time. The concept of time, then, was closely associated with the blending of fact and utility. Historical time imparted to social arrangements a qualitative element. Time implied experience, and experience in turn provided the motive for gradual adjustment. Conversely, the greatest calamity was violent change, which worked to snap the close union which history had fashioned between an institution, its utility, and its duration. In contradicting the nature of time and experience, sweeping change could not adapt institutions according to utility; for utility, in political matters, was inseparable from time and experience.

Students of political theory have, as yet, paid insufficient attention to the concept of time and the part that it has played in the shaping of political theory. To the eighteenth-century liberal reformer, time appeared as a kind of quantitative duration, a series of succeeding points without any particular value, except of a negative character. Future time alone held the promise of a qualitative character. To the conservatives who followed Burke, however, time lent an essentially qualitative element to existing arrangements. Past time had not really been superseded, but merged into the present in the form of institutions and values. Drastic change, in the same way that it had contradicted utility, contradicted time. In seeking to sever past time from present and future time, in order to impute a negative value to the past and a positive value only to the present or future, drastic change stood condemned of being unhistorical and therefore unavailing.

While it would be claiming too much to attribute the whole of the conservative conceptions of time and utility to Hume, it is important to recognize that, within the limits imposed by his own methods and temper, he had glimpsed something of the conservative case.

III

Hume's conservatism was given more concrete expression when he turned from his philosophical writings to his informal essays on society, government, and economics. His detachment was, if anything, reenforced by the complexities which he pronounced present in any political question.[27]

Although his temperament made him unwilling to join in the party battles of the period, it did not prevent him from making thrusts at both sides, at Tory sentiments about divine right and the royal prerogative, as well as at the precious tenets of Whiggism. But in common with the conservatives of the period Hume had a hearty disdain for that type of radical reformer who thought that every morning the world was an open question:

> Did one generation of men go off the stage at once, and another succeed, as in the case with silkworms and butterflies, the new race, if they had sense enough to choose their government, which surely is never the case with men, might voluntarily and by general consent, establish their own form of civil polity, without any regard to the laws or precedents which prevailed among their ancestors. But as human society is in perpetual flux, one man every hour going out of the world, another coming into it, it is necessary, in order to preserve stability in government, that the new brood should conform themselves to the established constitution, and nearly follow the path which their fathers, treading in the footsteps of theirs, had marked out to them. Some innovations must necessarily have place in every human institution . . . but violent innovations no individual is entitled to make.[28]

Hume's scorn of "novelties" also rested on the conviction that settled forms and institutions carried a momentum which often nullified the efforts of evil men and happily compensated for the meager talents of others:

> In the smallest court or office, the stated forms and methods by which business must be conducted are found to be a considerable check on the natural depravity of mankind. . . . And so little dependence has this affair on the humours and education of particular men that one part of the same republic may be wisely conducted and another weakly by the same men, merely on account of the differences of the forms and institutions by which these parts are regulated. . . . Good laws may beget order and moderation in the government where the manners and customs have instilled little humanity or justice into the tempers of men.[29]

But where Burke would have looked for some divine cunning to account for these phenomena, Hume was content to point out the utilitarian basis of institutions and the strong support which they found in human habits. He was at one with Burke in being sceptical of man's ability to effect reforms that would be both wide-sweeping and beneficial, but where Burke, at the time of the French Revolution, inveighed against "men of theory" who sought political solutions by "geometrical demonstration,"[30] Hume, writing during the calm of the Augustan age, reserved his contempt for what the age called "enthusiasm." In his eyes religious "enthusiasm" or fanaticism had split seventeenth-century England into warring sects and had paved the way for rebellion, a state of affairs which Hume abhorred even more than tyranny.[31]

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[27] For a statement about the detached observer, see "Of the Protestant Succession," *Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 474–75.

[28] "Of the Original Contract," *Works*, Vol. 3, p. 452.

[29] "That Politics may be reduced to a Science," *Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 105–6.

This fear and distrust of violent antagonisms underlay Hume's analysis of party politics, for this analysis was motivated by a practical purpose: to prevent in his time the recrudescence of the seventeenth-century struggles by showing the many points of agreement between Tories and Whigs, or, as he more accurately called them, the "court" and "country" parties. Although the method which he adopted, which was to apportion praise and blame impartially to both sides, rested on the hope that sweet reasonableness would prevent both parties from adopting mutually exclusive positions, this was of less significance than the realistic analysis of the nature of parties which preceded his conclusions. To be sure, earlier political writers, like Halifax, Bolingbroke, Swift, and Defoe, had all been aware of the increasingly important role played by "factions" or parties in the constitutional system. Yet among these writers there remained a lingering reluctance to accept "party" as anything but a distasteful necessity. "The best Party," wrote Halifax, "is but a kind of Conspiracy against the rest of the Nation."[32]

In his discusssion of parties or factions—the terms were used interchangeably—Hume began from a position similar to that of James Madison in Number 10 of the *Federalist Papers:* since it was not possible to eliminate parties under a free government, some means must be found of limiting their disruptive and predatory tendencies. It was necessary, then, to draw a distinction between those parties which posed a threat to the very existence of a political system and those whose activities, while not always salutary, were confined within reasonable bounds. In the former category Hume placed the fanatical group with uncompromising tenets, a type which had been spawned in abundance during the bitter religious controversies of the last century. Extremist groups, reflecting the dogmatic tempers of their members, were perfectly willing to sacrifice peace and order for the achievement of their objectives: *fiat justitia, ruat caelum.* Furthermore, the tendency to exaggerate principles into unyielding absolutes was a peculiarly modern phenomenon: "Parties from *principle*, especially abstract speculative principle, are known only to modern times, and are, perhaps, the most extraordinary and unaccountable phenomenon that has yet appeared in human affairs."[33] Although such parties constituted the exception, they represented a pathological condition to which all parties were susceptible. Traces of these symptoms could be found in both the Whigs and Tories. Hume, writing in a period when the uproar over the Hanoverian succession had not completely died down and when Jacobite memories and hopes were still strong, repeatedly warned of the consequences that would follow if party distinctions were allowed to harden. That this eventuality need not come about was the whole lesson of Hume's analysis of parties.

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[30] Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the French Revolution*, Everyman ed. (London, 1910), pp. 38, 170.

[31] "Whether the British Government inclines more to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic?", *Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 124–26.

[32] *The Complete Works of George Savile, First Marquis of Halifax*, ed. Walter Raleigh (Oxford, 1912), p. 225.

[33] "Of Parties in General," *Works*, Vol. 3, p. 130.

In his dissection of the anatomy of party, Hume found a compound of interests, principles, and sentimental attachment to certain leaders. Two broad types of parties existed: those founded on the personal attraction of a particular leader or group of leaders, and those founded on "real" differences of opinions or of interests.[34] Most parties were a compound of the two and this was fortunate, for it meant that principles, interests, and personal ambitions tended to offset each other. In particular, the tugs of personal rivalry and economic interests lessened the possibility of conflicts over questions of political or religious principles. To a sceptic and a moderate like Hume, the disputes over principle were largely meaningless, because the historic quarrels which had given birth to the conflicting ideas had long since been settled. The Whigs, Hume noted, regarded themselves as the sole heirs of the revolutionary traditions of 1688 and their arguments implied that the revolutionary settlement stood in constant danger of being overthrown. The Tories, on the other side, responded in the opposite vein: they represented the sole defenders of a monarchy that had been temporarily abolished by the forerunners of the Whigs; it was the Tory mission to insist on the primacy of the allegiance owed by subject to sovereign. In actuality, Hume commented, these antics were largely absurd because of the fundamental similarity between both parties. Both had accepted the results of 1688; neither wanted to abolish the monarchy. The division between them rested on a matter of emphasis. It lay in the shades of meaning which each side attached to certain accepted fundamentals. "A TORY, therefore, since the revolution . . . [is] a lover of monarchy, though without abandoning liberty; and a partisan of the family of Stuart. A WHIG may be defined to be a lover of liberty without renouncing monarchy, and a friend to the settlement in the Protestant line."[35] His advice to both parties was to be moderate, accept the present situation, and pursue the public good. There were, he remarked dryly, "enough zealots on both sides."[36]

In emphasizing that a substantial area of agreement existed between the two parties Hume put his finger on the most singular aspect of the modern British party system. From it he drew the conclusion that it was both desirable and possible to create "a coalition of parties" which would govern England with a minimum of discord. "The transition from a moderate opposition against an establishment, to an entire acquiescence in it, is easy and insensible."[37] "Coalition" thus implied an agreement between the parties to exclude the fundamentals of the system from the range of controversy. As Hume acutely noted, "the only dangerous parties are such as entertain opposite views with regard to the essentials of government."[38] His hope was that the area of friction between the parties could be reduced once they had recognized their agreement on fundamentals. When this actually became the case in Britain a century and a half later, Hume would have welcomed Balfour's remark that the nation "is so at one that we can safely afford to bicker."

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[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 128–30.

[35] "Of the Parties of Great Britain," *Works*, Vol. 3, p. 139.

[36] "That Politics may be reduced to a Science," *Works*, Vol. 3, p. 107.

[37] "Of the Coalition of Parties," *Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 469–70.

IV

From the death of Queen Anne in 1714 until the outbreak of the American Revolution, England enjoyed a period of comparative harmony unruffled by any deep antagonisms or sharp controversies. The Jacobite uprisings were the only major exceptions. The stability of England had become one of the wonders of Europe, for such had not been her reputation in the preceding century, when the turmoil of revolutionary events had made her name a by-word for political instability. The era of good feeling prevalent at this time received its intellectual expression in the admiration for balance and proportion. The classic lines with which Newton had sketched in his picture of an harmonious universe were duplicated in the ordered couplets of Pope. English political writers, not unmindful of the almost universal praise for their institutions, explained that the key to the riddle of stability was in the balanced nature of the system. The idea of balance became the central starting point, the key concept in British constitutional thought until the appearance of Bentham's *Fragment on Government* in 1776.[39] Its classic formulation was to be found in Blackstone's *Commentaries:*

> And herein indeed consists the true excellence of the English government, that all the parts of it form a mutual check upon each other. In the Legislature the people are a check upon the nobility, and the nobility a check upon the people; by the mutual privilege of rejecting what the other has resolved: while the king is a check upon both, which preserves the executive power from encroachments. . . . Thus every branch of our civil polity supports and is supported, regulates and is regulated, by the rest: for the two houses naturally drawing in two directions of opposite interest, and the prerogative in another still different from them both, they mutually keep each other from exceeding their proper limits; while the whole is prevented from separation, and artificially connected together by the mixed nature of the Crown, which is a part of the legislative, and the sole executive magistrate. Like three distinct powers in mechanics, they jointly impel the machinery of government in a direction different from what either, acting by itself, would have done; but at the same time in a direction partaking of each, and formed out of all; a direction which constitutes the true line of the liberty and happiness of the community.[40]

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[38] *Ibid.*, p. 464.

[39] Examples of this concept can be found in the following: *The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift,* ed. Temple Scott, 12 vols. (London, 1898), Vol. 1, pp. 231–235; Chancellor Hardwicke in Lord John Campbell's, *Lives of the Lord Chancellors,* 7 vols., 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, 1851), Vol. 5, p. 127; *Parliamentary History of England,* ed. William Cobbett (London, 1813–20), Vol. 15, cols. 481–82, 506; Vol. 66, cols. 43–44.

[40] William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England,* ed. Christian, 4 vols., 12th ed. (London, 1793), Vol. 1, Bk. I, ch. 2, pp. 154–55.

Although the importance of the concept of balance might be admitted for the realm of constitutional theory, the query arises: how much was this idea a creation existing solely in the minds of closet philosophers and how closely did it correspond to the actual workings of the constitution of the time? Although the dominant theme of parliamentary supremacy was obtrusive at certain times,[41] there was, by and large, an implicit cooperation between the various branches of government. Hence, there is no paradox in the statement by Sir William Holdsworth that during the period of Whig supremacy from roughly 1720 until 1760 the constitutional system resembled a partnership, but not on equal terms, of King, Lords, and Commons.[42]

When it is asked, by what means was this semblance of balance maintained, the answer is to be found largely in the conventions interwoven in the general constitutional fabric.[43] As contemporary British historians, under the inspiration of Sir Lewis Namier, have demonstrated, the nucleus about which these conventions clustered was the system of "influence," that is, the ties of family, patronage, contracts, bribes, and corruption through which the King and his ministers managed the parliamentary machinery.[44] This system, developed by Walpole and Newcastle and perfected later by George III, was not incidental to the politics of the period, but was a crucial element. Without it, the British constitution would have too closely resembled the nicely compartmented separation of powers that Montesquieu imagined in his *Esprit des Lois*. The conventions of the period, including the system of "influence," supplied the lubrication necessary to insure that the machinery of government would work in coordinated fashion and with a degree of central direction provided by the Crown.

Although many writers and politicians were aware of the part played by "influence" in preserving an area of royal initiative, Hume, perhaps alone, had grasped the tactical role of this system in preserving the constitutional balance.[45] He began by raising doubts about the validity of Harrington's widely-accepted thesis that political stability depended upon a coincidence between property and political power.[46] The paradox of the British system, Hume contended, was that although property and power had gravitated from the King to the House of Commons, there was no evident disposition on the part of the House to usurp all the powers of government so as to leave the King helpless. It was apparent that the House could not be considered as a kind of passive funnel through which the propertied interests exerted overwhelming mastery. The question then became: what were the means by which the dominant partner of the constitution was confined within its proper limits? His answer was that

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[41] *E.g.*, the Act of Settlement, the Regency Bill (1788–89), and the dispute over parliamentary privileges during the Wilkes affair.

[42] William Holdsworth, *A History of English Law*, 12 vols., 3rd ed. (London, 1922–38), Vol. 10, p. 55; Sir David Keir, *The Constitutional History of Modern Britain*, 3rd ed. (London, 1948), pp. 293–99.

[43] Holdsworth, p. 464.

[44] Sir Lewis B. Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III*, 2 vols. (London, 1922); *England in the Age of the American Revolution* (London, 1930); *The Parliamentary Papers of John Robinson, 1774–1784*, ed. William T. Laprade (London, 1922); Richard Pares, *King George III and the Politicians* (Oxford, 1953); George H. Guttridge, *English Whiggism and the American Revolution* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1942).

[45] In this connection it should be noted that Burke, for all of his concern for the "nice equipoise" of the Constitution, was unaware of the degree to which the system of "influence" contributed towards that result. See his proposals for "economical reform" designed to implement Dunning's resolution of 1780 which warned against the Crown's system of "influence." *Works*, 12 vols. (London, 1815), Vol. 2, pp. 69–70.

> the interest of the body is here restrained by that of the individuals, and that of the house of commons stretches not its power, because such an usurpation would be contrary to the interest of the majority of its members. The crown has so many offices at its disposal, that, when assisted by the honest and disinterested part of the house, it will always command the resolutions of the whole, so far, at least, as to preserve the ancient constitution from danger.[47]

Rail as men may at the "invidious appellations of *corruption* and *dependence*," it must not be forgotten, as men are apt to do in the heat of party strife, that "some degree and some kind of it are inseparable from the very nature of the constitution, and necessary to the preservation of our mixed government."[48] The proper course for the zealots of liberty and parliamentary independence was not one of demanding a root-and-branch extirpation of patronage and its attendant evils, but of exercising prudent vigilance over "the proper degree of this dependence, beyond which it became dangerous to liberty."[49]

More than any other observer, Hume saw that whatever balance there was in the constitution resembled less the mechanical equipoise of Newtonian forces than a restless equilibrium whose components were hidden from the prevailing formal and legalistic types of analysis. It followed that it was unrealistic to define rigidly the boundaries of power between the three main participants of the constitutional system.[50] Custom and expediency, not speculative reason, had shaped the constitution. Accordingly, these highly artificial political arrangements could not be measured by the rigors of abstract theory. Furthermore, as the system had demonstrated its ability to combine both liberty and order and had behind it the inertia of the settled habits of a nation, it was folly "to tamper . . . or try experiments upon the credit of supposed argument and philosophy. . . ." The "wise magistrate . . . though he may attempt some improvements for the public good, yet will he adjust his innovations as much as possible to the ancient fabric, and preserve entire the chief pillars and supports of the constitution."[51]

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[46] Hume's criticisms of Harrington are scattered throughout the following essays: "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth," "On the Independence of Parliament," and "Whether the British Monarchy inclines more to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic?"

[47] "Of the Independence of Parliament," *Works*, Vol. 3, p. 120.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 121. [49] *Ibid.* [50] *Ibid.*, pp. 121–22.

[51] "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth," *Works*, Vol. 3, p. 480. Hume was careful to preface this admittedly utopian essay with several remarks intended to underline his own affection for an established system which worked tolerably well.

V

Hume's "analytical conservatism" prepared the way for Burke in many respects. Although the latter possessed a conviction and passion which Hume lacked, many of the same materials had been worked over in Hume's writings. The emphasis on traditionalism, the importance of habit and sentiment, a disdain for "political projectors" (as Hume called them), and a fine feeling for the complexities of government were all to be found in Hume. Yet Hume's true uniqueness rested on his analysis of parties and the hidden conventions of the constitution. It was by far the keenest discussion of the century and far overshadowed in insight the partisan tracts of Bolingbroke and Burke. At the same time, his critique struck a note of realism that contributed in an important way to the decline of Locke's influence. Hume saw clearly, as the later philosophic radicals did not, that the arena of practical politics was not peopled by individuals pursuing their own aims in the splendid isolation of self-interest. Rather, the basic elements were political groups held together by individual leaders and by the cement of common interests and professed principles. This approach, reminiscent of the sociological methods of Montesquieu, also differed significantly from the legalism which pervaded the political thought of England at that time. The dominant tendency was to argue issues like electoral reform, representation, and colonial matters on the basis of law and precedent. The influence of Hardwicke, Mansfield, and Blackstone symbolized the alliance that had sprung up between law and politics.

Although Hume's appreciation of existing institutions and his realization of the long, painful, and largely unconscious process by which society is shaped led him in the same general direction as the lawyers, the journey was accomplished by his effecting a minor revolution in political thought. Politics was now to be conceived in psychological rather than juridical categories. Earlier writers, like Locke and Hobbes, while emphasizing the importance of human nature for the understanding of politics, had nevertheless approached this element as preliminary to the central juridical concept of contract. In this way, the political categories of allegiance, obligation, and justice assumed the status of logical derivatives from the basic concept of sovereignty (or as Locke preferred to call it, "supreme power") established by the contract. Hume, on the other hand, turned the procedure around: justice, obligation, and authority were consequences of human attitudes and expectations. These concepts were to be explained on psychological, not juridical grounds.

The psychologism of Hume was part of his general legacy to later conservatism, a legacy of empiricism in which the useful and the factual were made to cohere in subtle fashion. Yet it was also a legacy which later events superseded. Hume, appropriately enough, died in 1776, and from this point on revolutionary events worked to make a mockery of Hume's comfortable conclusions. The realm of fact provided cold comfort for conservatives; it was now controlled by the revolutionaries. The central fact of revolution could not be explained away, although a Burke might attribute it to intellectual perversity and a De Maistre to an avenging Deity. But if it could not be ignored, it could be transcended. So it was that conservatives began to turn to transcendental norms in order to combat the revolutionary appeal to reason; to weave from the diverse elements of irrationalism, romanticism, religion, and history a new vision of an older order; to replace an analytical conservatism by a metaphysical conservatism. In so doing they rejected much of Hume's naturalistic approach and substituted in its stead a philosophy of history, the idea that history had a "course" whose main outlines were determined by a divine hand operating from outside the confines of human time.

The final assessment of Hume raises certain difficulties. In some respects he typified conservatism, in others liberalism, and in still others he belonged to no school but his own. His conclusions in political matters carried strong overtones of conservatism, yet most conservatives of the period felt too uncomfortable with Hume's scepticism to welcome him as one of their own. Nevertheless, his conclusions were conservative for the reason that Hume never probed past a certain point nor carried his scepticism to its ultimate conclusions. He held too much respect for custom and tradition, and for their importance as social cements, to subject them to the kind of devastating critique which Voltaire and his allies were employing in France. With later conservatives he shared a distrust of reform, an hostility toward abstractions, and a scepticism of the claims of reason.

On the other hand, Hume stood close to the liberals of the century in the respect he accorded to liberty and property, and in his decided coolness toward religion and anything bordering on obscurantism. Above all, his political thought contained no traces of the particularist bent which was to play such an important role in later conservative thought. National history, national peculiarities and values had not yet replaced the universalist or European assumptions of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rationalism.[52]

It would be easy to conclude from these remarks that the categories of "liberal" and "conservative" were irrelevant when applied to Hume. This, however, would be misleading. The significant point is that Hume's position was symptomatic of the change that was taking place in English liberalism around the middle of the eighteenth century. Liberalism was becoming conservatized. Seventeenth-century liberalism, which had been compounded from the criticisms and protests of the Civil War period and then reshaped in more moderate fashion by the Glorious Revolution, had been transformed. It had lost its status as a challenge to the established order and had become the order itself. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, England was committed to the idea of government under law, the superiority of Parliament, and the rights of Englishmen. The incorporation of liberal elements into the political structure worked to rid liberal thought of one of its central themes: its revolt against the idea of the organic community. The idea of a corporate society—compact, graded, deeply-niched by place and privilege—had been a commonplace in Tudor thought, as well as in the royalist doctrines of the seventeenth century.[53] The reaction to this belief in a close community, with all that it implied in social and political policies, can be traced not only in the radical doctrines of the Civil War, but also in such diverse thinkers as Hobbes and Locke. The systems of Hobbes and Locke began with abstractions which cut through the communal bonds of class, status, and hierarchy, leaving only unattached and undifferentiated individuals. In neither system was there a "sense of community."

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[52] The exception to this point was Hume's interest in "national character." Although he suggested that certain common traits, such as similar manners and habits, could be discovered in a people who had been associated over a long period of time, this idea was not employed to prove any qualitative differences among peoples. Note also the statement in *Human Understanding*, sec. 8, pt. 1: "Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English: You cannot be much mistaken in transferring tc the former *most* of the observations which you have made with regard to the latter. Mankind are so much the same in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular."

Once English society was modified by the revolutionary changes of the seventeenth century, the theme of revolt was gradually replaced by a growing "sense of society," a quickening appreciation of the extent to which the values established by protest and revolt had become deeply dependent on communal arrangements of an unwritten and informal nature. Hume was representative of this changing temper, which prized the gains made possible by the upheavals of the previous century, and sought to preserve both the institutional achievements and their social undergirding. In this way, the assumption of an organic community, which had been cast aside during the seventeenth century, was being recaptured.

These developments form a background for Hume, as well as for English conservatism. For the uniqueness of this form of conservatism lies in the extent to which it had incorporated the results of the revolutionary experience of the seventeenth century. The master example here was Burke's pamphlet, *An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs;* in it he conservatized the revolution of 1688, while at the same time liberalizing conservatism.

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[53] John W. Allen, *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century*, 2nd ed. (London, 1940), pp. 134ff; Christopher Morris, *Political Thought in England: Tyndale to Hooker* (London, 1953), pp. 68–126; Sheldon S. Wolin, "Richard Hooker and English Conservatism," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 6, pp. 28–47 (March, 1953); Francis D. Wormuth, *The Royal Prerogative, 1603–1649* (Ithaca, 1939), pp. 83 ff.

THE CONSERVATIVE DILEMMA: REFLECTIONS ON THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF METTERNICH

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I

The conservative in a revolutionary period always represents somewhat of an anomaly. Were society still cohesive, it would occur to no one to be a conservative for a serious alternative to the existing structure would be inconceivable. But a revolutionary period is a symptom precisely of the fact that the self-evidence of the goals of the social effort has disintegrated, that a significant segment of society holds values which either cannot or will not be assimilated. What had been taken for granted must now be defended and the act of defense introduces rigidity. The deeper the fissure, the more inflexible the contending positions and the greater the temptation to dogmatism. Were the "legitimate" structure still universally accepted, it would not be necessary to demonstrate its validity; but the act of defense exhibits the possibility of an alternative.

Once the existing legitimacy has been challenged, no real discourse between the contenders is possible any longer, for they cease to speak the same language. It is not the adjustment of differences *within* a political system which is now at issue, but the political system itself. Henceforth stability and reform, liberty and authority, come to appear as antithetical, and political contests turn doctrinal instead of empirical. When there is no consensus on what is considered "legitimate," no basis for agreement exists. Adjustments may occur but they will be conceived as tactical in order to consolidate positions for the inevitable showdown or as tools in the primary task of undermining the pattern of legitimacy of the antagonist.

This has nothing to do with the label of political parties. There have been societies, such as the United States or Britain in the nineteenth century, which have been basically conservative, so that existing parties could be considered at once conservative and progressive. There have been others, such as France for over a century, where all issues have been basically revolutionary, however the parties consider themselves, because of the existence of a fundamental social schism. The motivation of a stable social order is a concept of *duty*—the assertion of the self-evidence of the social maxims—where an alternative to the existing order is not rejected, but inconceivable. The motivation of a revolutionary period is a concept of *loyalty*, where the act of submitting the will acquires a symbolic and even ritualistic significance because alternatives seem ever present. An ethic of duty involves a notion of *responsibility* which judges actions by the orientation of the will. It is for this reason an ethic of *motivation*, striving for an identification of the individual code with a standard of morality which, no matter how rigid, must become individually accepted in order to be meaningful. An ethic of loyalty involves a notion of *orthodoxy*, because it is a means to achieve a group identity. It is therefore an ethic of *relation* to group standards which may be validated in any number of ways: by rationality, tradition, charisma, etc. It does not exclude the identity of the individual with the social code, but it does not require it. "My country right or wrong"—this is the language of loyalty. "So act that your actions could become by your will universal laws of nature"—this is the language of duty. Duty expresses the aspect of universality, loyalty that of contingency.

But what is the conservative to do in a revolutionary situation? A stable social order lives with an intuition of permanence and opposition to it is either ignored or attempted to be assimilated. The fundamental conservative position, therefore, involves a denial of the validity of the revolutionary's question regarding the legitimacy of authority, but the question if capable of exacting a reply has indicated a kind of validity. Thus conservatism, whenever it ceases to be a way of life and emerges as a political movement, runs the risk of becoming the symbol of a revolutionary period. For what does it profit a conservative to emerge victorious in a battle of wills, in a struggle which only deepens the fissures and accelerates the revolutionary development? It is no accident that in revolutionary contests the conservative position comes to be dominated by its reactionary—that is, counterrevolutionary—wing, the group which fights in terms of will and with an ethic of loyalty. For the true conservative is not at home in social struggle. He will attempt to avoid an unbridgeable schism, because he knows that a stable social structure thrives not on triumphs but on reconciliations.

How then can the conservative rescue his position from the contingency of conflicting claims? How can that which *is* persuade when its self-evidence has disintegrated? By fighting as anonymously as possible, has been the classic conservative reply, so that if the answer must be given it will transcend the will, so that the contest occurs at least on a plane beyond the individual, so that obligation can become *duty* and not *loyalty*. To fight for conservatism in the name of history, to reject the validity of the revolutionary challenge because of its denial of the temporal aspect of society and the social contract—this was the answer of Burke. To fight for conservatism in the name of reason, to deny the validity of the revolutionary question on epistemological grounds, as contrary to the structure of the universe—this was the answer of Metternich.

The difference between the two conservative positions, although in many respects a question of emphasis, proved fundamental in application. To Burke the ultimate standard of social obligation was history; to Metternich it was reason. To Burke history was the expression of the "ethos" of a people; to Metternich it was a force to be dealt with, more important than most social forces but of no greater moral validity. Burke denied the revolutionaries' premise that reason supplied the sufficient basis for social obligation and his challenge was therefore destined to have no immediate effect. Metternich fought his battles in the name of the very Enlightenment that had produced his opponents and his was therefore a mortal challenge. To Burke, a revolution was an offense against social morality, the violation of the sacred contract of a nation's historical constitution. To Metternich, it was a violation of the dictates of reason, to be combatted not because it was immoral, but because it was disastrous. Historical conservatism abhors revolution as undermining the *individual* expression of a nation's tradition; rationalist conservatism fights it as preventing the implementation of *universal* social maxims.

It was this rationalist conception of conservatism which imparted the rigidity to Metternich's policy and to his interpretation of the complementary issues of the nature of freedom and the meaning of authority which shape all political thought. The West has produced two basic replies: freedom as the absence of restraint and freedom as the voluntary acceptance of authority. The former position considers freedom to reside outside of the sphere of authority; the latter conceives freedom as a *quality* of authority. The negative version of freedom is the expression of a society transcending its political structure, a society which, as in Locke, exists prior to the state and whose political organization becomes like a company of limited liability organized for the achievement of determinate goals. In such a society the issue of conservatism against reform tends to appear as a question of emphasis, of greater or lesser change on problems of determinate form and content. Since the significant field of activity occurs outside the governmental sphere, politics has a utilitarian, but not an ethical function; it is useful, not moral. A society implementing Locke's concept of freedom is always conservative, whatever form its political contests take. Were it not, it could not operate a system whose strength resides in its social cohesiveness, in the things which are "taken for granted." Burke's defense of conservatism had for this reason no applicability to the British domestic scene, but was directed against its misapprehension by foreigners.

But the Continent has never been able to accept the Anglo-Saxon version of freedom. Before the French Revolution, this was because Locke's became the philosophy of an *accomplished* revolution, a doctrine of reconciliation which lacked the logical rigor of a call to action. Afterwards it was because the French Revolution, unlike the British, had produced a fundamental social schism. Cohesive societies can regulate themselves through custom which reveals that disputes are peripheral. Societies which contain fundamental schisms must rely on law, the definition of a *compulsory* relationship. Thus Kant and Rousseau, not Locke, were the representatives of the Continental version of liberty which sought freedom in the identification of the will with the general interest and considered government freest not when it governed least, but when it governed justly. To the British conservative, the social problem was one of adjustment, to protect the social sphere by timely political concession. But to his Continental counterpart, the problem was one of conservation in the literal sense, because to him political concession was equivalent to social surrender. For one can make concessions only *to* something. When state and society are two different entities, this is no problem. But when they are identical, a concession is a confession of failure, an avowal of the end of the conservative structure, a recognition of an unbridgeable social schism. Thus even at the end of his life, after his era had long ended, Metternich could still object to a speech by a British

Peelite, Sir James Graham, that the statesman's wisdom consisted of recognizing the proper moment for making concessions: "My conception of statesmanship differs completely. The true merit of a statesman . . . consists of governing so as to avoid a situation in which concessions become necessary."[1] Therefore, too, Metternich's characteristic pose of the philosopher-king who stood above the plane where personal feelings rule, cool, composed, superior.

Had Metternich been born fifty years earlier, he would still have been a conservative, but there would have been no need to write pedantic disquisitions about the nature of his conservatism. He would have moved through the salons of the fashionable world with his undeniable charm and grace, subtly conducting his diplomacy with the fine indirection which is itself the symbol of certainty, of a world in which everybody understands intangibles in the same manner. He would still have played at philosophy, for this was the vogue of the 18th century, but he would not have considered it a tool of policy. But in a period of permanent revolution, philosophy was the only means of rescuing universality from contingent claims. It was for this reason that Metternich fought so insistently against the identification of his name with his period, an attitude seemingly so inconsistent with his vanity. If there was a "Metternich system" his achievements would be personal, his battle meaningless. "My 'system,' " he maintained, "is nothing but the dictates of right reason."[2] And at the end of his life, he still could write:

> For thirty-nine years I played the role of rock from which the waves recoil . . . until finally they succeed in engulfing it. They did not become calm however, afterwards, for what caused their turmoil was not the rock but their inherent unrest. The removal of the obstacle did not alter the situation, nor could it have. . . . I would like to call out to the representatives of social upheaval: "Citizen of a world that exists but in your dreams, nothing is altered. On March 14[3] nothing happened save the elimination of a single man."[4]

It was thus that the Enlightenment retained deep into the nineteenth century its last champion, who judged actions by their "truth," not by their success, an advocate of reason in an age of philosophical materialism, who never surrendered his belief that morality could be known and that virtue was teachable. "These maxims have been proved true," he maintained in 1822. "Policy is based not on novels, but on history; not on faith, but on knowledge."[5] "The world," he wrote to the Tsar in 1817, "is suffering from a very special disease, which, as all epidemics, will pass away, that of mysticism. . . . It would be easier today to renew the sermons of Peter the Hermit than to make clear to the afflicted that God demands another service than the shedding of blood and that no man can judge the conscience of his fellows."[6] When another Napoleon appeared on the scene, thirty-five years after the defeat of his great predecessor, Metternich considered this not a personal failure but the illustration of a philosophical insight: "The millions of votes for Louis Napoleon are only the expression of an instinctive feeling that without order there can exist no social life and without authority no order. Today this truth calls itself Napoleon; so old has the world become that truth must assume a personal name, because all other roads have been closed to it."[7] Truth must assume a personal name—this is the tragedy of the rationalist conservative, just as history with a personal name is that of the historical conservative. And the anonymity of the truth was also the paradox of the Enlightenment. When truth is strong, its foundation is faith, if only in a theory of knowledge. When truth is challenged, it becomes a dogma.

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[1] Metternich, *Aus Metternich's Nachgelassenen Papieren*, 8 vols. (Vienna, 1881), Vol. 8, p. 562. This collection will be hereinafter cited as *NP*.

[2] *NP*, Vol. 8, p. 235.

[3] March 14, 1848, the day of Metternich's resignation as Staatskanzler.

[4] *NP*, Vol. 8, p. 232. [5] *NP*, Vol. 3, p. 542. [6] *NP*, Vol. 3, pp. 52ff.

So it came about that Metternich in his never-ending battle against revolution went back to the doctrines of the age in which he had been brought up, but interpreted them with an inflexibility totally unnecessary when they were still taken for granted and which distorted their essence in application. He was still of the generation to whom the "great clockwork" or the "golden age" was more than an idle dream. There was a fitness in the universe which corresponded to man's noblest aspirations, a well-ordered mechanism the understanding of which ensured success and whose laws could not be violated with impunity: "States, just as human beings, often transgress laws; the only difference is the severity of their penalty."[8] "Society has its laws just as nature and man. It is with old institutions as with old men: they can never be young again. . . . This is the way of the social order and it cannot be different because it is the law of nature . . . the moral world has its storms just like the material one."[9] Metternich used these truisms of eighteenth-century philosophy to oppose revolution and liberalism not because they were wicked, but because they were wrong; not only because he did not wish to live in the world his opponents attempted to create, but also because this world was doomed to failure. Revolution was an assertion of will and of power, but the essence of existence was proportion, its expression law, and its mechanism an equilibrium.

For these reasons the conservative statesman was the supreme realist and his opponents the "visionaries." "I am a man of prose," Metternich insisted in his political testament, "and not of poetry." "My point of departure is the quiet contemplation of the affairs of this world, not those of the other of which I know nothing and which are the object of faith, which is in strict opposition to knowledge. . . . In the social world . . . one must act cold-bloodedly, based on careful observation and without hatred or prejudice. . . . I was born to make history, not to write novels, and if I *guess* correctly this is because I *know*. Invention is the enemy of history, which knows only discoveries, and only that which exists can be discovered."[10] Statesmanship was the science of the interests of states[11] subject to laws entirely analogous to the laws of the physical world. The statesman was a philosopher who understood these maxims, who performed his tasks but reluctantly, for they deflected him from the source of the only real enjoy-

[7] *NP*, Vol. 8, p. 197.

[8] *NP*, Vol. 1, p. 35.

[9] *NP*, Vol. 3, p. 322.

[10] *NP*, Vol. 8, p. 184.

[11] *NP*, Vol. 1, p. 33.

ment, the contemplation of truth,[12] who was responsible only to his conscience and to history—to the former because it contained his vision of truth, to the latter because it provided the only test of its validity.[13]

II

What then were the insights which Metternich's maxims revealed to him? They showed a universe governed by law, not in the modern sense of an *interpretation* of events but as their *attribute*. To disregard the law and its dictates of harmony and equilibrium was not so much morally wrong as physically disastrous:

> Isolated states exist only as the abstractions of so-called philosophers. In the society of states each state has interests . . . which connect it with the others. The great axioms of political science derive from the recognition of the true interests of *all* states; it is in the general interest that the guarantee of existence is to be found, while particular interests—the cultivation of which is considered political wisdom by restless and short-sighted men—have only a secondary importance. Modern history demonstrates the application of the principle of solidarity and equilibrium . . . and of the united efforts of states . . . to force a return to the common law.[14]

And just as in the political world the equilibrium reflected a balance between the forces of aggression and the forces of resistance, so the social order revealed an uneasy tension between the conserving and the destructive tendencies inherent in any body social. It was the task of statesmanship to distinguish the form and the substance of this contest and to create the moral foundation of an order on which only time could confer spontaneity. This led to another distinction, so often considered by the rationalist as the solution and not the definition of a problem: Man can only create *Chartes*, which have the value of programmatic announcements; it is time which makes constitutions.[15]

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[12] *NP*, Vol. 3, p. 242, or p. 357, among many examples.

[13] That Catholic Austria should have as its First Minister an intellectual contemporary of Kant and Voltaire may appear a paradox. But the relationship of the Holy Roman Empire to the Pope was not uninfluenced by the memory of five hundred years of struggle. Nor had the reforms of Joseph II, who had expelled the Jesuits and broken the political influence of the Church, ever been repealed. Moreover, the Pope was to Metternich not only a spiritual ruler but a second-class Italian prince and Metternich was determined that Austria dominate the Italian peninsula. At the Congress of Vienna his treatment of the Papal Secretary of State was peremptory and in 1817 he even toyed with the idea of making an Austrian archduke a Cardinal, the better to cement his position at the Vatican. Not religious ties but philosophical and political agreement characterizes Metternich's correspondence with the Papal Secretary of State when the Church and Austria marched hand in hand. See *Metternich et Consalvi, Correspondence*, ed. Charles van Duerem (Louvain, 1899). The following letter by Metternich to Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister, makes clear his attitude towards the Church: " . . . No Catholic power is more independent, . . . of the views of the Court of Rome than we. The heir of so many Holy Roman Emperors and the nephew of Joseph II knows what he owes God and what to his honor: our ecclesiastical departments may extend their dogma regarding the rights of the Crown too far, and if it is too far it is surely not in favor of the Court of Rome that they tip the scale." *NP*, Vol. 3, p. 57. Metternich was not irreligious, but he admired the Church more for its utility and its civilizing influence than for its "truth."

[14] *NP*, Vol. 1, p. 334.

[15] *NP*, Vol. 7, p. 636, Vol. 8, p. 525.

Metternich therefore opposed the efforts of his contemporaries to construct ideal constitutions for two reasons. They overlooked the factor of time, not in Burke's sense of an almost hallowed entity, but as one of the most potent social forces. And they were unrealistic because they took no account of the differing requirements of the national character:

> That constitution is best which most completely corresponds to the material and moral requirements of the national character. . . . There is no universal recipe for constitutions, any more than for the advancement of health. . . . That constitutions influence national character is undeniable truth, but its counterpart is no less true, that lasting constitutions must be a product of this character, and not of an excited, and therefore fleeting, public opinion.[16]

The whole discussion about constitutions was in any case beside the point. Anything that existed was subject to law and the expression of law in the political world is a constitution: "A state without a constitution is an abstraction just as an individual without a corresponding psyche."[17]

It was for this reason contradictory to attempt to achieve freedom by means of constitutional guarantees: "Rights," according to Metternich, could not be created, they existed. Whether they were affirmed or not was an incidental, essentially technical, question and had nothing to do with freedom. Nobody could transgress laws, not even kings—reminiscent of Grotius' classic phrase that not even God could make two plus two equal five. To guarantee rights was therefore a paradox; it was to clothe in the language of power what can only be a statement of fact, to endow with an arbitrary existence what has eternal validity:

> Things which ought to be taken for granted lose their force when they emerge in the form of arbitrary pronouncements. . . . The mania of law-making is a symptom of the disease which has ravaged the world for sixty-two years. . . . Natural, moral or material forces are not fit subjects of *human* regulation. What would one say of a *Charte* which side by side with the Rights of Man exhibited the laws of gravitation? . . . If there is no God, He will not be created by pronouncements; if He exists, He will not require human recognition to achieve divinity. . . . Objects mistakenly made subject to legislation result only in the limitation, if not the complete annulment, of that which is attempted to be safeguarded.[18]

Here, then, was the rationalist belief in rights as an attribute of the universe, the aristocrat's vision of the inseparability of power and responsibility, the Enlightenment's faith in the connection between order and freedom. While it asserted the existence of "rights" transcending any human construction, indeed from which human construction could only detract, it emphasized a fundamental contradiction of democratic theory: the view of human nature which insisted on man's capacity for self-government was combined in the same theory with another view of human nature which limited the scope of this government. Why, if man is conscious of arbitrary oppression, should he wish to oppress others? Why should universal rights be guaranteed? This has, of course, never been a problem in Anglo-Saxon countries where the relation between state and society has had a juristic, not an ethical foundation. In such cases constitutional guarantees have had the value of the differences between explicit and implicit limitations on a government in any case understood as limited. But in an "ethical state" an explicit limitation on government is meaningless. If the state justifies itself not by its utility but by its morality, there exists no tribunal before which to appeal its measures. If the sanction is not juridic but ethical, limitation can come about only by self-restraint, not by constitutional guarantees.

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[16] *NP*, Vol. 7, p. 637.

[17] *NP*, Vol. 7, p. 635.

[18] *NP*, Vol. 8, p. 557f.

This was the challenge of the conservative statesman to his liberal opponents: if the conservative became an unwilling symbol of a revolutionary period by being forced into a definition of the nature of authority, the liberal contradicted himself by identifying freedom with constitutional guarantees. To be sure, Metternich did not have a solution of his own to the query regarding the nature of freedom, because he thought it inseparable from the notion of authority. But, equally, his opponents had not really dealt with the problem of authority which they thought exhausted in the definition of freedom. And yet they were closer than they realized, for had one asked Metternich as to the limits of authority and his opponents as to the limits of freedom, both would have answered with one word which indicated that to them the question was essentially meaningless: reason, self-evident and sovereign, which contained its applicability in its very conception, would trace the boundary of freedom as well as of necessity. That the categorical imperative was capable of contingent interpretation was inconceivable to Kant. That a sovereign should substitute force for law was not inconceivable to Metternich, but he considered it suicidal and therefore unlikely. It is this which gave the dispute between Metternich and the liberals the bitterness of a civil war, at least on the "democratic" side. For Metternich was an opponent who fought liberalism in the name of the very universality it claimed for itself, whose mode of argument represented as much of a challenge to his opponents as their existence did to him. It is difficult, indeed, for a rationalistic philosophy to survive the demonstration that the same premise can lead to two diametrically opposed conclusions.

III

If Metternich considered the quest for formal constitutions chimerical, he saw in revolutions a physical disaster. In a universe characterized by the balance between the forces of conservation and those of destruction, revolution was due to a disturbance of the equilibrium in favor of the latter. But since the equilibrium was the "natural" condition, a revolution could achieve no more than a dislocation straining towards a new integration. The disorders attendant on revolutions were therefore symptoms of a transitional period and their violence a reflection of the ignorance of their advocates: "Revolutions are temporary disturbances in the life of states . . . . Order always ends up by reclaiming its own: states do not die like individuals, they transform themselves. It is the task of statesmanship . . . to guide this transformation and to supervise its direction."[19] The difference between a conservative and a revolutionary order was not the fact of change but its mode:

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[19] *NP*, Vol. 8, p. 468.

> A consideration the liberal spirit usually ignores . . . is the difference in the life of states, as of individuals, between progress by measured steps or by leaps. In the first case, conditions develop with the consequence of natural law; while the latter disrupts this connection. . . . Nature *is* development, the ordered succession of appearances; only such a course can eliminate the evil and foster the good. But leaping transitions wind up by requiring entirely new creations—and it is not given to man to create out of nothingness.[20]

Civilization, then, was the degree to which change could come about "naturally," to which the tension between the forces of destruction and of conservation was submerged in a spontaneous pattern of obligation. Thus true civilization had come only with the advent of Christianity, which made authority inviolable, obedience sacrosanct, and self-abnegation divine[21]—the rationalist's functional interpretation of religion.

It is expressive of the conservative dilemma that Metternich's pronouncements on the nature of authority are truistic—because a conservative takes it for granted; and that those on the meaning of freedom are skimpy—because he considered the question meaningless. But his analysis of the nature of revolutions is lucid and powerful. In 1820, while arranging the series of congresses designed to defeat revolutions in Germany and Italy, Metternich wrote a "profession of faith" which coupled an analysis of the nature of revolution with a philosophy of history.[22] Up to the sixteenth century, Metternich maintained, the forces of conservation and of destruction had been in an increasingly spontaneous balance. But then there occurred three events which, in time, caused civilization to be supplanted by violence and order by chaos: the invention of printing, the development of gun powder, and the discovery of America. Printing facilitated the exchange of ideas which thereby became vulgarized; the invention of gun powder changed the balance between offensive and defensive weapons; and the discovery of America transformed the situation both materially and psychologically. By the influx of precious metals it produced a sudden change in the value of landed property, which is the foundation of a conservative order, and by the prospect of rapid fortunes it brought about a spirit of adventure and a dissatisfaction with existing conditions. And then the reformation completed the process by overturning the moral world and exalting man above the forces of history.

All this gave rise to a type of individual who symbolized the revolutionary era: the presumptuous man, the natural product of a too-rapid march of the human spirit towards seeming perfection:

> Religion, morality, legislation, economics, politics, administration, all seem to have become a common good and accessible to everyone. Science appears intuitive, experience has no value for the presumptuous; faith means nothing to him and he substitutes for it the pretense of a personal conviction, to arrive at which, however, he dispenses with analysis or study, for these seem too subordinate activities to a mind which believes itself capable of embracing at one blow the whole ensemble of issues. Laws have no value for him because he did not contribute to their preparation and it is below the dignity of a man of his quality to recognize limits traced by ignorant and brute generations. Power resides in himself; why submit to what can have use only to men deprived . . . of insight? That

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[20] *NP*, Vol. 7, p. 638.

[21] *NP*, Vol. 8, p. 242.

[22] *NP*, Vol. 3, pp. 400 ff.

> which was appropriate for an age of weakness is no longer adequate for that of reason . . . [All this] tends to an order of things which individualizes all the elements which compose society. . . .[33]

It would be difficult to find a more tragic statement or one more symbolic of the nature of revolutions. For its significance lay not in its content but in the fact that it was beside the point. What was intended as sarcasm—the exhibition of an incommensurability between pretense and reality—amounted to no more then the description of the objectives of his opponents. That which Metternich believed he merely needed to exhibit to reduce to absurdity, his opponents thought required only an affirmation in order to be validated. It was the inevitable revolutionary misunderstanding, the reluctance to admit that "truth" may not be self-evident. While Metternich desperately attempted to protect "reality" against its enemies, the issue became increasingly a debate about its nature and the nature of "truth." Had "reality" still proved unambiguous, he would not have needed to affirm it. By the increasing insistence of his affirmation, he testified to its disintegration.

Metternich next distinguished the presumptuous by type and by origin. They were composed of levellers and theoreticians: the former, men of powerful wills and strong determination; the latter, theoreticians living in a world of their own. But whatever guise presumption assumed, its place of origin was the middle class. The revolutionary aristocrat was a lost soul, destined to become the victim of the Revolution or to be degraded by being forced to play the role of courtier to his inferiors. And the mass of the population always distrusted change and craved only the equal protection of laws in order to pursue their hard calling. But the middle class—the lawyers, the writers, the bureaucrats, the half-educated, owning the means of communication, ambitious but without goal, dissatisfied but unable to offer an alternative—this was the real organ of revolution. It was no accident, concluded Metternich, that the revolution occurred not in the poorest, but in the richest country of Europe, not in the most backward but in the most advanced state, so demoralized that "the revolution had already triumphed in the palace of the kings and in the boudoirs of the towns before it even began to prepare itself in the mass of the people."

The Revolution could not have triumphed then but for the weakness of the government and for having at its disposal a myth whose literal application proved ruinous: the attempt to transplant British institutions to the continent. "Among the causes of the tremendous confusion characterizing present-day Europe," wrote Metternich in later life, paralleling his "profession of faith," "is the transplantation of British institutions to the Continent, where they are in complete contradiction to existing conditions, so that their application becomes either illusory or distorted. The so-called 'British school' has been the cause of the French Revolution and the consequences of this revolution, so anti-British in tendency, devastate Europe today. The concepts of freedom and order are so inseparable in the British mind that the last stable-boy would laugh in the face of the reformers if they appeared by preaching his freedom. . . This is because the English are only concerned with the substance, never with the form."[24] The wars of the French Revolution had spread these principles across Europe and only the hatred of Bonaparte delayed, for a little while, their baneful impact, largely through a misunderstanding. For the war, fought by the kings against Napoleon, was fought by the people in part against their own masters in the hope of obtaining from them the realization of the promises of the French Revolution. The wise peace concluded in 1814 might have inaugurated a period of tranquility, but Napoleon's return from Elba undid in one hundred days his work of fourteen years of power. By unleashing the revolution in France, he exposed Europe to unending social strife.[25]

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[33] *NP*, Vol. 3, p. 405.

IV

This was a powerful analysis of the cause of the unrest sweeping across Europe. But its power was at the same time its bane. For if the revolutionary spirit was so widespread, how could it be combatted? If the causes of the revolution were so fundamental, dating so far back in history, what possible remedy could exist? If the middle class was so potent, how could it be dealt with? By gradual integration, by learning moderation and the need for adaptation, a Burke might have answered. Even Castlereagh could still advise Louis XVIII that revolutionaries "are nowhere so little to be dreaded as in office, mixed up with other material. Tyrants may poison an obnoxious character but the only means a constitutional monarch has to restrain him is to employ him."[26] But to Metternich, the rationalist conservative, this solution was a dangerous evasion. To the product of the Enlightenment, political problems had to assume the precision of logical antinomies and he therefore sharpened the differences instead of smoothing them over. If the forces of destruction were rampant, it was the task of the conservative to strengthen those of order. If the cry for reform was universal, it was all the more imperative to resist in the name of authority.

In this manner the equation, freedom = voluntary submission to order, became in practice a definition of sterility and unexceptional maxims, justifications for inaction. So it happened that Metternich never tired of comparing concessions to popular clamor to squandering capital; therefore the basic maxim "that in the middle of agitated passions one can not think of reforming; wisdom in such situations confines itself to maintaining."[27] Therefore the increasingly rigid opposition to *any* change, for change symbolized the possibility of yielding to pressure: "Where everything is tottering, it is above all necessary that something, no matter what, remain steadfast, so that the lost can find a connection and the strayed a refuge."[28] This accounted for the preference for Napoleon over the

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[24] *NP*, Vol. 8, p. 218 [25] *NP*, Vol. 3, p. 409.

[26] Charles K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, 2 vols. (London, 1931), Vol. 1, p. 547.

[27] *NP*, Vol. 3, p. 415.

[28] Heinrich Sbrik, *Metternich, der Staatsmann und der Mensch*, 2 vols. (Munich, 1925), Vol. 1, p. 354.

Bourbons, despite the "legitimacy" of the latter; to Metternich, legitimacy was not an end but a tool, and when it conflicted with the requirements of stability, it had to yield. Therefore, paradoxically, Metternich became a defender of existing institutions, however much he might deplore them, because their overthrow would be an even more dangerous symbol. When in the panic of 1820 the Grand-Duke of Baden offered to abolish his constitution, Metternich replied: "Every order lawfully established bears within itself the principle of a better system. . . A *Charte*, in any case, is not a constitution. It is up to the government to separate good and evil, to strengthen public authority and to protect the repose and the happiness of nations against hostile attack."[29]

It was a futile contest, a tour de force leading to self-destruction, this effort to bring about change through order and to identify order with tranquility in the middle of a revolutionary period. It was really, despite its protestations to the contrary, an effort to recapture a lost innocence, a quest for a period when obligation was spontaneous, an aristocratic notion of government as the reciprocal execution of duties. The "Metternich system" answered the question of the cause of the revolution, but gave no indication of a solution once the revolution had occurred. It spoke abstractly of its readiness to reform, but never discussed what specific measures it would consider appropriate. As late as 1851, Metternich could give no better advice to the then Minister, Schwarzenberg, than to strengthen the landed aristocracy, as if the middle class could still be crushed. The assertion that revolutions were always the fault of governments, that only action could conserve, was unexceptionable. But in practice it led to a vicious circle because Metternich, although not opposed to reform in principle, wanted it as an emanation of order, while his opponents desired the same thing in the name of change. The result was a stalemate, a triumph of form over substance.

Metternich's thus became a never-ending quest for a moment of tranquility, for a suspension, if only for an instant, of the flux of life, so that what happened, perhaps inevitably, could be represented as a universal principle instead of an assertion of will and of indeterminacy. It was as if a physicist, unable to measure both position and velocity of the electron accurately, bent all his energies to making the electron hold still, if only a fraction of a second, because this would enable him to chart its course for eternity. Or like the driver of a car heading out of control in an unknown direction down a precipitate mountain road, too narrow for turning around; if he could but capture the wheel, he would still have to descend the mountain, but it would represent will and not chance. So it happened that Metternich's insights, however powerful, became increasingly dogmatic. While he might have been right in asserting that those who have never had a past cannot own the future, one must add that those who *have* had a past may doom themselves by seeking it in the future.

And still in all this obtuseness there was an element of grandeur. For Metternich had no illusions about the probable developments; he saw his task in ameliorating their inevitable consequences:

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[29] *NP*, Vol. 3, p. 375.

> The existing society is on the decline. Nothing ever stands still . . . and society has reached its zenith. Under such conditions to advance means to descend. . . . Such periods appear interminable to contemporaries, but what are two to three hundred years in the annals of history? . . . My life has fallen into a terrible period. I was born either too soon or too late. . . . Formerly I would have enjoyed life, later I could have helped in the reconstruction. Now I spend my time shoring up decaying buildings.[30]

He fought the revolution not because it was impossible but because it was "unnatural." And he combatted democracy because "authority is an expression of the power of permanence; while in [parliamentary government] power appears under the aspect of transitoriness . . . I understand that little minds like to think of themselves as the expression of power, but it is equally without doubt that the opponents of *all* authority like to see it reduced to personal terms, because it will facilitate their effort to eliminate it . . . "[31] Because he considered order the expression of the equilibrium and equilibrium the reflection of the structure of the universe, he was certain that the "basic interests" of states would reassert themselves in the end. But he predicted that the revolutionaries would be horrified by the world they were bringing about.[32] The greater the dislocation, the more violent the interregnum of chaos. Despotism, to Metternich, was not the absence of guaranteed rights, but government without universal maxims. Tyranny was not the cause of revolutions, but their likely result. And the more the forces of destruction succeeded in undermining the social order, the more authority—the inevitable expression of society—would have to assume personal shape, the conservative's vision of arbitrariness: "The word freedom," Metternich wrote in his political testament, "has for me never had the character of a point of departure but of a goal. The point of departure is order, which alone can produce freedom. Without order the appeal to freedom is no more than the quest of some specific party for its special objectives and will in practice always lead to tyranny. Because I have been a man of order, my efforts were directed towards the attainment of a real, not a deceptive freedom. . . I have always considered despotism of any kind a symptom of weakness. Where it appears it condemns itself; most intolerably where it appears behind the mask of advancing the cause of liberty."[33]

It was thus that Metternich posed the conservative challenge as the need to transcend the assertion of exclusive validity of the will and as the requirement to limit the claims of power. It was a redefinition of the classic theological version of humility, "Thy will be done," with reason taking the place of God. It represented an effort to deal with the most fundamental problem of politics, which is not the control of wickedness but the limitation of righteousness. To "punish" the wicked is a relatively easy matter because it is a simple expression of public morality. To restrain the exercise of righteous power is more difficult because it asserts that right exists in time as well as in space; that volition, however noble, is limited by forces transcending the will; that the achievement of self-restraint is the ultimate challenge of the social order. Metternich dealt with this problem by asserting that excess in any direction was disruptive of society. The individual will was contingent because man was an aspect of forces transcending him, of society and its historical expression, the state, which were products of nature as surely as man himself, for they reflected his basic needs for justice and order. Because they were "natural," states had a life cycle just as human beings, only they were incapable of the ultimate human solace: they could not die, they had to pay the price of *all* their transgressions.[34]

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[30] *NP*, Vol. 3, pp. 347 ff.

[31] *NP*, Vol. 8, p. 467. He did not apply this to Great Britain, where he saw the permanence of authority expressed in the phrase "His Majesty's Government."

[32] *NP*, Vol. 8, p. 235. [33] *NP*, Vol. 7, pp. 633 ff.

It was only appropriate, therefore, that the last act of the conservative statesman was of a symbolic nature, a plea for the anonymity which alone could justify his maxims. When, in 1848, a deputation of the victorious revolution called his resignation "generous," the aged Metternich replied: "I protest solemnly against this term. Only a Sovereign can be generous; my action is the result of my sense of right and my concept of duty." Thus the final gesture of the "doctor of Revolutions" was a last desperate assertion of order, of the precedence of right over will even in defeat after half a century of struggle. And when one of the deputies insisted on using the term "generous" Metternich replied: "In resigning I anticipate another claim, that I have carried the monarchy away with me. But this is not the case. No individual has shoulders strong enough to carry an Empire; if states disappear, it is because they lose faith in themselves."[35] This was Metternich's personal tragedy: history can illustrate logic but not prove it and although it teaches its lessons surely, it does not do so in a single lifetime. And it was also the final symbolization of the conservative dilemma: that it is the task of the conservative not to defeat but to forestall revolutions, that a society which cannot *prevent* a revolution, the disintegration of whose values has been demonstrated by the *fact* of revolution, will not be able to defeat it by conservative means, that order once shattered can be restored only by the experience of chaos.

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[34] *NP*, Vol. 1, p. 334.

[35] *NP*, Vol. 7, p. 626; Vol. 8, p. 212.

THE CONTEMPORARY DOCTRINE OF THE SOVIET STATE AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

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I. THE REPUDIATION OF THE MARXIST THEORY OF THE STATE IN THE SOVIET UNION

"The problem of the 'dying away' of the state," observed A. Y. Vyshinsky rather sarcastically in a recent monograph, "is a purely theoretical problem."[1] Within the context of contemporary Soviet political theory, the accuracy of this observation is beyond question, although Vyshinsky would have been the first to admit that a "theoretical problem," no matter how pristine, always reflects a practical quandary within the methodological precepts of Marxist-Leninist ideology. This particular theoretical problem conceals an important chapter in the profound transmutation of Marxist political theory and its philosophical substructure in the Soviet Union, for it was the failure to cope adequately with this utopian legacy which led to the abandonment of the eschatological categories of the Marxist doctrine and the erection of a totally new theoretical edifice supported by new philosophical foundations.

Contrary to widespread impression, the theoretical problem of the Soviet state was not satisfactorily resolved at the 18th Party Congress in 1939, although the view is prevalent that Stalin was able to provide an adequate rationalization for the existence of the state in Soviet society. It was on this occasion that the late Soviet leader explained that the state was a necessary institution because of "capitalist encirclement" and that it would persist in socialist and communist society until this encirclement was finally liquidated.[2] Pragmatic expedients, unconnected with basic philosophical premises, however, do not constitute an exegesis of Marxist political doctrine, for Stalin's pontifications constituted not a new theory of the state—nor even a revised theory—but nothing more than a formal and open repudiation of Marxist political theory.

One of the outstanding facts of this Congress was Stalin's candid confession that Soviet political theory had reached a nadir in its evolution. The case could hardly have been otherwise, since Stalin in 1930 had embarked on a steady course of systematically rejecting Marxist political formulae and of purging his associates who differed with him on the theory of the state, notably Bukharin.[3] Utter confusion reigned in the minds of the surviving party intelligentsia concerning the question of the state. The Soviet state was a psychological burden that weighed upon them like a bad dream. Engels had said that "the state is the admission that this society . . . is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms, which it is powerless to exorcise,"[4] and Lenin taught that "the existence of the state proves that class antagonisms *are* irreconcilable."[5] These views contrasted violently with Stalin's commentary on the new Constitution, wherein he stated that all class antagonisms had disappeared in Soviet society, yet promised "The transformation of the dictatorship into . . . a more powerful system of guidance of society by the state."[6] Clearly the Soviet intelligentsia had good reason to suffer from creative inadequacies in the field of political theory, as charged by Stalin, who cavalierly accused them of refusing to recognize that certain of the general propositions of the Marxist doctrine of the state were incompletely worked out and were inadequate.[7]

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[1] A. Y. Vyshinsky, *The Teachings of Lenin and Stalin on the Proletarian Revolution and the State* (London, 1948), pp. 115–16.

[2] J. V. Stalin, *Leninism: Selected Writings* (New York, 1942), p. 474.

[3] See Stalin, *Political Report to the Sixteenth Congress* (London, 1930), pp. 171–72; *Leninism: Selected Writings*, pp. 77–133 (for Stalin's attacks on Bukharin's views on the withering away of the state), and pp. 267, 340–41, 395 (for the various reservations introduced into the withering away theory between the years 1930 and 1939).

Stalin explicitly abandoned traditional Marxist theory by proclaiming the Soviet state a state *de novo*, completely unforeseen by Marx, Engels, or Lenin; consequently, it could not be analyzed in accordance with traditional Marxist categories. Unlike historical states, the Soviet state was unencumbered with functions of exploitation; it was engaged in purely benevolent activities such as protecting the new society, devoid of class conflict, from capitalist aggression abroad and resurgence at home, and preparing the economic and ideological foundations for the transition to the promised land of communism.[8] Thus the state was transformed from the Marxist image of a class-cleft society into a symbol of class harmony; from an institution representing the interests of a specific ruling class to one representing the interests of society as a whole, even in an epoch of admitted class distinctions;[9] and from a symbol of social immorality and oppression into one of high ethical value. With this transformation, the entire question of the state's abolition was indeed "purely academic," and in fact irrelevant, since the original impulse for its eradication—its oppressive and malevolent character—evaporated with Stalin's conversion of the state into the incarnation of social progress and benevolence.

Neither Stalin's tendentious arguments at this Congress, nor his bombast, too familiar to bear repetition here, nor his pragmatic rationalizations, based on existing international tensions, nor his succulent observations on the coercive apparatus of the state, constituted either an innovation in Marxist theory or a new theory.[10] This qualitative transformation of the Soviet state implicitly required equally fundamental alterations in the basic dogma of Marxism, dialectical and historical materialism, upon which rested the now-repudiated Marxist theory of the state. Since the interconnection of Marxist social, economic, and political categories is one of absolute, but dynamic, interdependence, the repudiation of the political categories moved Stalin's new state clearly out of focus with the basic philosophy of Marxism. The new state required not only a new theory, but a new philosophical and epistemological foundation as well.

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[4] Friedrich Engels, *The Origin of the Family, State and Private Property* (New York, 1942), p. 155.

[5] V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, 12 vols. (New York, various dates), Vol. 7, p. 8.

[6] Stalin, *Leninism: Selected Writings*, p. 395.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 470. [8] *Ibid.*, pp. 473–74.

[9] It will be recalled that Soviet society was not purged of class distinctions, but of class antagonisms. Two classes, peasants and workers, and one "stratum," the intelligentsia, are officially recognized. See Stalin, *Leninism: Selected Writings*, pp. 382–84.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 468–74. See Hans Kelsen, *The Political Theory of Bolshevism* (Berkeley, 1949), and Calvin B. Hoover, "The Soviet State Fails to Wither," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 31, pp. 114–27 (Oct., 1952), for extended discussions of Stalin's pronouncements on the theory of the state before the 18th Party Congress.

Three fundamental questions, vital to the canons of dialectical and historical materialism, remained unanswered as a consequence of Stalin's pontifications in 1939. These were: (1) What replaces the class struggle as the motive force of historical progress in the dialectical movement in Soviet society? (2) What interests does the Soviet state represent, if not that of a ruling class, and how are these interests manifested? (3) How does the state accord with the pattern of dialectical progress within the context of contradictory forces?

These questions were eventually resolved, allegedly in accordance with the internal self-regulating characteristic of the Marxist system, which dictates its own inner transmutation under the impact of qualitatively changing historical circumstances. A complete shift of emphasis in the original equilibrium established by Marx between the voluntaristic and deterministic factors in the dialectical process was clearly involved. The reconstruction of Soviet political theory and Soviet philosophy, substantially performed between 1948 and 1952, rests, in effect, upon a re-inversion of the Marxist epistemological formula, which establishes the relationship between social consciousness and social existence.

II. FROM STALIN TO HEGEL

The failure of the Soviet state to dissolve into the dialectical limbo of history once the material conditions for its existence had vanished, forced the dialectic out of its materialistic shell back towards its Hegelian origins. Stalin's conversion of the Soviet state from an institution spawned by irreconcilable class conflict into one representing total class harmony and monolithic collective unity can be fully understood only by examining the basic incompatibilities inherent in the Marxist system and their Hegelian inheritance. These inconsistencies are responsible for the enormous gulf between reality and philosophy which developed in contemporary Soviet life once the doctrine went beyond the phase of a mere untried hypothesis.

The fundamental antinomy originated in Marx's attempt to unite the dynamic activism of Hegel's idealism with the passive perception of Feuerbach's materialism. This union of voluntarism and determinism was accomplished, so Marx thought, by striking a dynamic equilibrium between man's will (social consciousness) and nature's implacability (social existence) in which the latter would assume epistemological priority under the conditions of capitalism, whereas the formula would be reversed once the state had "withered away."[11]

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[11] Engels, *The Anti-Duehring* (New York, 1939), pp. 309–10. Bukharin writes that "some bourgeois scholars inferred that Engels meant that determinism would lose its validity in communist society," but he maintains that "this view is based on a crude distortion of Marxism," *Historical Materialism* (New York, 1925), p. 42.

The imperative of a deterministic nature was necessary to allow scientific prediction of the future, whereas the imperative of voluntaristic man was required to guarantee that this future would be an optimistic one. The relationship between these two forces was relative, but the unifying element was to be the single absolute and independent abstraction—the inscrutable dialectical movement, which Marx felt could take care of its own internal contradictions in triadic simplicity.

By uniting voluntarism and determinism, Marx thought he had established an absolute logical interconnection between reality and utopia—between the world of fact and the world of value. Undoubtedly this claim is one of the most attractive features of the Marxist philosophy, for it pretends to support social purpose with scientific analysis, thus satisfying two basic yearnings of the 19th and 20th centuries. Marxism, as a system compounded of both perceptive and active categories, was never more boldy stated than in Marx's critique of Feuerbach, wherein he boasted that the function of his system was not merely to explain the world, but more importantly, to change it.[12] This duality of Marxism was first reflected in a causal-analytical system which analyzed capitalist society (contemporary reality), dissecting it into its antagonistic components, and thereby exposing the basis upon which to predict its doom. Secondly, Marxism consisted of a pragmatic-normative system which purported to predict the evolution of society through successive stages in accordance with the inexorable operation of "laws," which were supposed to be objective and scientifically determinable, but which were, in fact, normative categories to be achieved by an active process disguised as man working in concert with the objective historical laws of the dialectical process.

Unlike Hegel, Marx did not purport to rationalize an existing social order, since he was interested essentially in rationalizing revolution. The absence of an ideological function (in the Mannheim sense) distinguished Marx from both Hegel and Stalin, but the system was potentially ideological by its very structure. The social function of Hegel's dialectic was to provide an articulate rationalization for the *status quo* as the expression of Divine Will on earth working its way to sublime perfection, whereas Marx used the identical dialectic, with inverted categories, to expose the inequities of the same social order and as a basis for predicting its violent demise. Stalin's theory embraced both functions. With respect to Soviet society, it serves the same integrative function as Hegel's —to rationalize the Soviet social order and provide for an orderly transition to the communist utopia. But outside the Soviet Union Stalin accepts the essentially disintegrative social function of Marx in his attitude to the non-Soviet world. In Stalin's case, the latter function serves to reinforce the first.

Hegel's philosophy served to establish the eternity of the state as a divine organism symbolizing the apotheosis of societal harmony and divine ethic, while the same philosopy, inverted by Marx, declared the state to be the ephemeral repository of social misery and oppression—a wicked machine to be destroyed. These diametrically opposed conceptions required diametrically opposed attitudes toward the state—for Hegel, exaltation; for Marx, denunciation. The failure of the Soviet state to wither forced Stalin to embrace both conceptions, for if the state resists abolition in accordance with the Marxist dictate, the subtle distinctions between Marx and Hegel vanish, and the state survives in accordance with the re-inverted dialectic—an absolute process driving to absolute order. However, Stalin retains the Marxist conception of the state insofar as the bourgeois world is concerned. Even if Hans Kelsen's remark[13] that "nothing can show more clearly the futility of the dialectical method than the fact that it enables Hegel to praise the state . . . and Marx to curse it," is true, it does not refute Stalin's eloquent demonstration of its utility, for he employs the identical dialectic simultaneously to exalt the Soviet state and damn the bourgeois.

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[12] Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," *Selected Works*, 2 vols. (New York, n.d.), Vol. 1, p. 473. This work also contains selections from the writings of Engels.

III. FROM DETERMINISM TO VOLUNTARISM: THE TRANSMUTATION OF DIALECTICAL AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

The Voluntarism of Lenin: Revolution from Below. During Marx's lifetime, and throughout all of his writings, the deterministic factor in his philosophy was everywhere emphasized in an endeavor to stress its scientific character. One of the consequences of this disproportionate emphasis was the apparent deprecation of the role of political power and its subordination to the economic forces operating in human history. Although Engels, in later years,[14] tried to reestablish an equilibrium between politics and economics by denying that either he or Marx asserted that political power was supinely dependent upon the protean economic forces operating in society, it remains incontestable that the Marxist doctrine as a whole was understood by protagonists and antagonists alike as teaching not only the deprecation of political power, but its ultimate superfluity as well. Actually, Engels so vigorously denied the purely subsidiary role of political power as to elevate it to a significance which virtually emasculated the materialistic basis of the Marxist system.[15]

This shift of emphasis to the voluntaristic aspect of Marxism was accelerated by Marx's Russian admirers, especially George Plekhanov and Lenin, because the facts of revolutionary life in Russia put a premium on human action. Actually, the antipodal elements of voluntarism and determinism were at the basis of the split of the Russian Marxists into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. This is attested to by no less an authority than Lenin, who wrote that "the disagreement concerning the estimation of the *relative* importance of the spontaneous and the consciously 'methodical' elements" is "the quintessence of the present-day theoretical and political differences that exist among the Russian Social Democrats."[16]

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[13] Kelsen, *The Political Theory of Bolshevism*, p. 19 (cited in note 10).

[14] See Engels' letter to J. Bloch in *Selected Correspondence of Marx and Engels* (New York, 1942), p. 477.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 475–76 (Engels to Bloch); pp. 483–84 (Engels to C. Schmidt); pp. 516–19 (Engels to Starkenburg).

[16] Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?* (New York, 1929), p. 31.

Lenin, of course, received his initial and most profound introduction to Marx via George Plekhanov, and although Lenin and his master eventually split over the determinism-voluntarism dilemma, it was Plekhanov who, in a series of brilliant expositions, amplified the active side of Marxism in order to refute the charge of "fatal determinism" levelled against it by critics. "Men make history," Plekhanov wrote, "and, therefore, the activities of individuals cannot help being important in history."[17] In another work, Plekhanov wrote:

> If I know in what direction social relations are changing . . . I am able to influence it . . . Hence in a sense I *can make history* and there is no need for me to wait while "it is being made." . . . The change never takes place "by itself"; it always needs the intervention of *men*.[18]

Marx admitted that man could discover the dialectical laws governing social development; Engels and Plekhanov preached the idea that men could influence the acceleration of these laws; Lenin maintained that their direction could be guided. It was in his *What Is To Be Done*? that Lenin clearly embraced "consciousness" as against what he called "subservience to spontaneity" and "belittling of the conscious element."[19] Rejecting the view that "politics always obediently follow economics," he boasted: "Give me an organization of revolutionists and we shall overturn the whole of Russia."[20]

"Politics," said Lenin after the Bolshevik Revolution, "cannot but have precedence over economics. To argue differently means forgetting the ABC of Marxism."[21] This was an affirmation of the supremacy of voluntaristic man over deterministic nature, yet Lenin's writings would seem to restrict this relationship to the revolutionary process itself. It did, however, provide a convenient methodological springboard for his pupil Stalin. For if it was Lenin who decreed the primacy of politics and consciousness over economics and spontaneity in the revolutionary struggle, it was Stalin who developed the doctrine that Russia was a mound of clay, waiting to be molded into a communist society with political instruments at the disposal of men with the necessary will and persistence to dictate the course of history in the illusion that they were following its objective and implacable mandate! Although some evidence suggests that Lenin was also partial to this view, his writings on the subject remain fairly ambiguous and implicit at best. Whether Lenin would have embarked on a program of socialism and communism in one country is highly debatable.[22]

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[17] George Plekhanov, *The Role of the Individual in History* (New York, 1940), p. 23.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 61. See also his *Materialist Conception of History*, in which he draws a distinction between "economic materialists" and "dialectical materialists," the chief distinguishing factor being the denial of the "conscious" element by the former; and his *In Defense of Materialism* (London, 1947). Plekhanov constitutes a "voluntaristic bridge" between the later views of Engels and those of Lenin.

[19] See especially pp. 31–44; 105–6; 117–19.

[20] *What Is To Be Done?* pp. 43, 119.

[21] Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 54.

[22] Stalin, of course, ascribed the "theory of socialism in one country" to Lenin, but as his opponents were to point out, Lenin's position was ambiguous on this point. Cf. Stalin's *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow, 1947), pp. 156–66 and Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 141; Vol. 9, p. 403.

Stalin's Voluntarism: "Revolution from Above." "In order to transform the world," Stalin told an incredulous H. G. Wells in 1934, "it is necessary to have political power . . . as a lever of change." When Wells retorted that "perhaps I believe more strongly in the economic interpretation of politics than you do," Stalin accused him of "greatly underestimating the question of political power."[23] Certainly this is a sin to which Stalin could never plead guilty.

The first systematic articulation of Stalin's voluntarist views made its appearance in a short philosophical précis, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, written for inclusion in the new official *History of the Communist Party*, published in 1938.[24] Thus, a full year before his formal repudiation of the Marxist theory of the state, Stalin had already forged the first link in the chain of philosophical transmutations that were to support his new political formulae. This initial step took the form of placing greater emphasis on the role of ideas in shaping the historical process, that is, placing a greater emphasis on the voluntaristic factors in the Marxist-Leninist dogma, and conceptualizing this voluntaristic formula into a specific theory of controlled change, called "revolution from above."[25]

In this work, Stalin still quoted with approval Marx's famous dictum on consciousness and existence, but this apparently was one of the "examples in the history of revisionism pretending agreement with the fundamental tenets of the teaching that is being revised," that Zhdanov was to warn the philosophers against a decade later.[26] Lip service was still accorded to the theme that the significance of social ideas does not lie in the ideas *per se*, "but in the conditions of the material life of society . . . of which these . . . are the reflections," although ideas are now elevated to a position clearly superior to that of mere catalytic agents.[27] "As regards the significance of social ideas, theories, views and political institutions," Stalin wrote, "historical materialism, far from denying them, stresses the role and importance of these factors in the life of society, in its history."[28] These social ideas arise, however, he continued:

> only after the development of the material life of society has set new tasks for society. But once they have arisen they become a most potent force which facilitates the carrying out of the new tasks set by the material life of society, a force which facilitates the progress of society . . . because it is *impossible* to carry out the urgent tasks of development of the material life of society without their organizing, mobilizing, and transforming action.[29]

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[23] Stalin and H. G. Wells, *Marxism vs. Liberalism* (New York, 1934), pp. 14, 20.

[24] *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1939). Hereinafter cited as *History*. This particular edition notes that it was "edited by a commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B)," whereas since 1946, with the inclusion of the entire book in Stalin's collected works [*Sochineniya*], complete authorship has been ascribed to Stalin. The section on Dialectical and Historical Materialism was from the beginning attributed to Stalin personally. However, the idea of "revolution from above" does not appear in this section. Since what was at first considered to be the work of collective anonymity has been converted, *mutatis mutandis*, into Holy Writ, the effort must be viewed as the integrated work of a single mind and is so treated here.

[25] *History*, p. 305.

[26] *History*, p. 115.

[27] A. Zhdanov, *Essays on Literature, Philosophy and Music* (New York, 1950), p. 82. Hereinafter cited as *Essays*.

[28] *History*, p. 116.

[29] *History*, pp. 116–17.

Human consciousness, however, takes a long leap forward during periods of revolutionary upheaval, when it actually, for a brief moment of history, assumes primacy over the objective laws of social existence; the conscious efforts of man replace the blind and inexorable laws of nature:

> Out of the conflict between the new productive forces and the old relations of production . . . there arise new social ideas; these new ideas organize and mobilize the masses; the masses become welded into a new political army, and make use of it to abolish the old system of relations of production and finally establish the new system. The spontaneous process of development yields place to the conscious activity of man, peaceful development to violent upheaval, evolution to revolution.[30]

These social ideas, theories, and political institutions, Stalin continued, "having arisen on the basis of the urgent tasks of the development of society, the development of social being, themselves react upon social being, upon the material life of society . . . rendering its further development possible."[31] These conceptions were not mere abstractions for Stalin, but rather a rationalization for the socio-economic changes wrought by conscious political design during the preceding decade, a process which he captioned "revolution from above."

According to Stalinist dogma, the period of the so-called "second revolution" took place in 1930–1935, but at the time of the "revolution" itself there appeared no coherent theoretical justification, but merely the pragmatic insistence that the collectivization of agriculture and the liquidation of the kulaks were objective material prerequisites for a socialist society. In 1938, with the appearance of the *History*, it was determined *ex post facto* that what transpired was in essence a second revolution carried out "from above" and supported "from below."

> This was a profound revolution, a leap from an old qualitative state of society to a new qualitative state, equivalent in its consequences to the revolution of October 1917. The distinguishing feature of this revolution is that it was accomplished from above, on the initiative of the state, and directly supported from below by the millions of peasants who were fighting to throw off kulak bondage and to live in freedom in the collective farms.[32]

To assert the fact of a "revolution from above" is to confess that the external world can be forcibly adjusted to the ideas conceived in the brain of man. The fundamental nature of such a process can be comprehended only within the context of the social norms dominating those who exercise political power in the community and are in control of its organs of coercion and persuasion, and not by examining the alleged objective demands of the material forces of history. A revolution of this type cannot be analyzed within Marxist categories, because the Marxist conception of a revolution is rather precisely defined in terms of the shift of political power from one class to another.[33] No such shift took place in this instance, because the revolution was not an upheaval directed against the existing political power or the ruling class. It was, in fact, an act of the ruling class against a class already deprived of participation in political rule. It is true that ruling groups would hardly initiate "revolutions" of the classical Marxist vintage, since this would be a suicidal act leading to their own destruction as the dominant class in society.

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[30] *History*, p. 130.

[31] *History*, p. 117.

[32] *History*, p. 305.

[33] The impossibility of defining "revolutions from above" within Marxist categories is demonstrated by the following rationalization by Rudolph Schlesinger: "Action may be taken with the intention of changing the social framework (or, if some 'gradual' change in the existing framework has taken place, to adapt the institutional framework to the changed needs). Such action is usually described as a 'revolution' only if it originates from

For over twelve years, this so-called revolution remained only a quaint descriptive phrase, accepted perhaps largely in an allegorical sense without consideration of its profound philosophical implications. If the "revolution" referred merely to the action of the state in making its final assault against the last remnants of the old order as a prelude to its own disappearance, the idea would certainly conform to the Marxist-Leninist pattern. But, apparently, this was not the case. Not only did the state survive the final destruction of the exploiters, but it emerged in a qualitatively different form. Stalin clearly recognized this anomalous situation in 1950, when he amplified the theory of "revolution from above." It emerged as a system of "controlled revolution," something like controlled fission, because it is described as a revolution "without explosions," a phenomenon which can occur only in a society devoid of class antagonisms—a sociological application of the Hegelian-Marxist "law of the transformation of quantity into quality:"

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groups other than the ruling one, so that its success results in a change not only of institutions, but also of that ruling group. Marxism argues that ruling groups are characterized by their very place in economic structure and therefore are unlikely to initiate changes in the structure from which they profit. However, *we must allow ample space for possibilities of 'revolution from above' where such procedure provides the only chance for the ruling group to survive as such.*" (My italics.) *Marx, His Times and Ours* (New York, 1950), p. 6. Schlesinger's conception of 'revolution' becomes a tool for preserving the political *status quo*, rather than overturning it. This line of argument compels him to accept any reform taken by the existing political system to preserve itself, such as the "reforms from the top" carried out by the Tsars, and the overthrow of the Japanese Shogunate, to be "revolutions from above." While this conception may have validity, it is a non-Marxist one, and certainly is not the type of "revolution from above" defined by Soviet theorists, who maintain that revolutions of this nature can materialize only in a society divested of all class antagonisms. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Stalinist conception of "revolution from above" is not a mere amplification of the theories of "permanent" and "uninterrupted" revolution advanced by Trotsky and Lenin. Both revolutions visualized the state as an instrument of class rule and as a weapon in the hands of the masses against the exploiters. For Lenin, revolution was a sort of continuum, whereby "bourgeois-democratic" and "national-colonial" revolutions could be converted into proletarian upheavals, if the revolutionary momentum were maintained. Trotsky's theory of "permanent" revolution pertains to the use of the proletarian state to support revolutions in other countries. In both cases, the revolutions referred to are proletarian in nature and do not constitute a point of departure from which to rationalize fundamental socio-economic changes wrought by a state which does not represent class interests. The theories of Lenin and Trotsky are not incompatible with the view that it is the function of the new proletarian state to continue the economic revolution by eliminating the old classes and laying the foundations for a socialist society, but by doing this, the state prepares the conditions for its automatic abolition, whereas for Stalin, once socialism is achieved the state enters into a higher phase of development.

> The law of transition from the old to the new quality by way of explosion does not . . . always apply to . . . social phenomena related to the foundation or the superstructure. It is obligatory for a society divided into antagonistic classes. But it is not at all obligatory for a society which has no antagonistic classes. In the course of 8–10 years we effected in the agriculture of our country a transition from the bourgeois individual peasant system to the socialist collective farm system. . . . However, this upheaval took place not by way of explosion, that is, not by the overthrow of the existing power and the establishment of a new power, but by means of gradual transition from the old bourgeois system . . . And it was possible to do so because this was a revolution from above, an upheaval carried out on the initiative of the existing power with the support of the bulk of the peasantry.[34]

The full significance of this dialectical excursus is discussed below,[35] but a few words are in order here. According to this idea of revolution, the economic substructure of society can be overturned without demolishing the political superstructure which is its mere reflection. The superstructure, therefore, is controlled by man, not by objective history, for it can alter is own foundation without threatening its own immediate survival and that of its ruling element. Hence the state is emancipated from its dependence upon the economic system and its existence is no longer at the mercy of external objective laws. The theory is logically inconsistent, since this so-called "revolution from above" can take place only in a society bereft of class antagonisms; yet it is incontestable that the first "revolution" of this type was undertaken to eliminate class distinctions and antagonisms and hence preceded their eradication. Thus what Stalin lays down as a *conditio sine qua non* for this "revolution" was, in fact, a consequence of it. This is blandly admitted by the Soviet ideologist, B. Kedrov, in his commentary on Stalin's "brilliant thesis." "Through the collectivization of agriculture," he writes, "the kulaks were also eliminated as a class, that is, the antagonistic contradictions within society were overcome."[36] The question of why no "explosion" occurred, if the theory is applicable only in a society unencumbered with class struggles, is conveniently ignored.

Although the theory of "controlled revolution" is an inaccurate conceptualization of the past action, resting as it does upon distorted, falsified, or fabricated history, it is designed as a philosophical rationalization not so much of the past as of the future. The revolution from above is the concrete manifestation of the voluntaristic nature of modern Soviet philosophy and represents the supremacy of will over fact, consciousness over existence, and politics over economics. This theory is designed to rationalize all future changes in Soviet society and justifies the imposition of social norms conceived by the ruling elite upon society and its members as a means for solidifying its power structure, perpetuating its rule in the face of internal and external adversities, and maintaining the necessary autocratic centralization and ideological infallibility which the self-imposed universal messianic purpose of the Soviet Union makes mandatory. The dialectic is thus employed to put a halt to all further revolutions in the Soviet Union, except those officially inspired, by declaring them "scientifically" impossible, or ideologically illegitimate.

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[34] Stalin, "Concerning Marxism in Linguistics," *Pravda*, June 20, 1950. For an English translation, see the booklet of the same title published in London by Soviet News in 1950. All citations will refer to the booklet, although the translations in this article may deviate in some particulars, since the rendering in the booklet appears to the author to be awkward and irregular in some instances.

[35] See *infra*, pp. 1047–51.

[36] B. Kedrov, "On Forms of Leaps in the Development of Nature and Society," *Bolshevik* (No. 15), pp. 8–20 (Aug., 1951).

From Necessity to Freedom: Motive Forces in a Socialist-Communist Society. Stalin's theory of the "revolution from above" and his assertion that the Soviet state functioned to preserve the harmonious social order and guarantee its evolution to communism signified the first stages in the final abdication of objective determinism in favor of subjective voluntarism. Actually, as pointed out earlier, Marx's dynamic equilibrium between these two aspects of his system permitted this transition to be made, but only within the context of a millenial society in which man leaps from the clutches of necessity into the sphere of freedom; where man transforms nature from stubborn master into willing slave. For Marx and Engels what impeded man's progress to the promised land was the state, which would first have to be expunged from society;[37] for Stalin on the other hand, the state becomes the key to the earthly paradise.

Progress in the evolution of systematic theoretical reconstruction was impeded after 1939 due to the war, when the international situation forced Stalin to dispense with the luxury of theorizing in favor of more pressing practical problems. After the war, the tremendous lacunae in Soviet theory again became an object of serious attention. The task of systematizing Stalin's crude theoretical statements into a coherent body of philosophy, free from logical inconsistencies and unprofessional crudities, was assigned to the philosophers. Since Marxism is conspicuous for the gap that it registers in the realm of normative political theory, its political categories constituting a critical analysis of historical states in general and bourgeois states in particular, Soviet philosophers were afforded only a minimum of guidance. Marx did not provide a theory of the socialist or communist state, and neither did Lenin, precisely because they were political nihilists in their ultimate teleology, repudiating the state as a morally incompatible and superfluous, if not objectively impossible, institution in their apocalyptic vision of a classless society. Freedom was possible only without the state. This is why Soviet ideology registered a vacuum in the area of political theory while the mightiest leviathan in all history was bearing down upon society like a nightmare.

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[37] Engels' view is stated with unambiguous clarity in *The Anti-Duehring* (pp. 309–10): "The conditions of existence forming man's environment, which up to now have dominated man, at this point [i.e., after the state withers away] pass under the dominion and control of man, who now for the first time becomes the real conscious master of Nature, because and in so far as his own social activity, which has hitherto confronted him as external, dominating laws of Nature, will then be applied by man with complete understanding and hence will be dominated by man. . . . The objective, external forces which have hitherto dominated history, will then pass under the control of men themselves. It is only from this point that men, with full consciousness, will fashion their own history; it is only from this point that men will have, predominantly and in constantly increasing measure, the effects willed by men. It is humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom."

The failure of the state to wither away left the philosophers the single alternative of justifying it as the central institution of progress and freedom. Engels' idyllic stateless society was to be symbolized by the Soviet state. In effect, it was their task to unravel the three dialectical riddles bequeathed to them by Stalin as a result of his pronouncements on the state at the 18th Party Congress.

The reluctance of the philosophers to demonstrate initiative in this direction prompted Andrei Zhdanov to excoriate them for their intellectual cowardice at the famous Party Conference on Philosophy convened in June, 1947. He called on them "to advance more courageously the theory of Soviet society, of the Soviet state,"[38] specifically commissioning the philosophers to discover the elusive dialectical law motivating progress in Soviet society:

> Since, as the dialectic teaches us, the inner content of the process of development is the struggle of opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between the dying and the rising, between the decaying and the developing, our Soviet philosophy must show how that law of dialectics operates in socialist society and what are the specific characteristics of its operation. We know that in a society divided into classes that law operates otherwise than in our Soviet society. Here is a broad field for investigation and none of our philosophers have cultivated that field.[39]

The philosophers were confronted with no ordinary challenge. The nature of the motive force that was to replace the class struggle in human history constitutes one of the most enigmatic omissions in the Marxist philosophy. Since the logic of the dialectic dictates that it must constantly derive its propulsive force from the contradictory impulses inherently operating in nature, the expiration of the class struggle, contrary to widespread impression, does not signify that the Marxist dialectic spins its final contradiction. The dialectic is conceived as an eternal movement, an absolute abstraction independent of substance, whose inner laws dictate that contradictions are transmuted into higher forms once the class struggle ends.[40] Marx was consistent in deliberately refusing to predict future forms of contradication since it would be undialectical and in direct opposition to his materialistic epistemology to conceptualize historical laws before their material foundations had become manifest.

The cautious Soviet philosophers—perhaps well aware of the fundamental nature of the revisionism involved—were content to dig out of their libraries old and faded slogans uttered by Stalin in the past in the desperate hope that they could accidentally trip upon some forgotten platitude and consecrate it into a new dialectical law. This, at any rate, was the impression they received from Zhdanov, who pompously told them that the motive force of Soviet society was the shopworn cliché, criticism and self-criticism:

> Our Party long ago discovered . . . that particular form of revealing and overcoming the contradictions of socialist society (such contradictions of socialist society exist and

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[38] Zhdanov, *Essays*, p. 71.

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] See Marx, *Poverty of Philosophy* (New York, n.d.), p. 93 and *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 421–22.

> philosophy cannot avoid dealing with them). . . . In our Soviet society, where antagonistic classes have been liquidated, the struggle between the old and the new, and consequently the development from the lower to the higher, proceeds not in the form of struggle between antagonistic classes and cataclysms, as is the case under capitalism, but in the form of criticism and self-criticism, which is the real motive force of our development. . . . This is incontestably a new aspect of movement, a new type of development, a new dialectical law.[41]

The philosophers unearthed such startling motive forces as socialist competition, unity, amity of nations, Soviet patriotism, public interest, and peace. These substitutes, however, appeared to be clearly inadequate, since most of them did not even meet the canon of contradiction. What was mandatory was a single great motive force, as transcendent in its cosmic simplicity as the class struggle, but as harmonious and integrative in its exfoliation as the class struggle is cataclysmic and disintegrative. The character of its operation necessitated that it be grand enough in its conception to establish the relationship between state and society; analytic enough to rationalize the existing *status quo*, and yet sufficiently dynamic in its normative aspects to allow future alterations in policy; and pragmatic and flexible enough in its application to be adaptable to all tactical situations.

From Utopia to Ideology: The Supremacy of Social Consciousness over Social Being. One immediate result of Zhdanov's criticism was the publication, in the following year, of the symposium, *O Sovetskom Sotsialisticheskom Obshchestve* [On Soviet Socialist Society], edited by philosophers Konstantinov, Kammari, and Glezerman.[42] Containing contributions by the leading philosophical lights of the Soviet Union, this collection of panegyrics painted Soviet society in such succulent fashion that its editors were later reprimanded for conveniently glossing over the contradictions in the Soviet Union instead of discovering and unraveling them.

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[41] Zhdanov, *Essays*, pp. 71–72. All Soviet writers now stress the dichotomy between "antagonistic" contradictions and "non-antagonistic." It is claimed that under Socialism contradictions are of the latter variety because the state is able to foresee developing contradictions and intervene so as to mitigate them and bring them into harmonious synthesis. "The Marxist dialectic recognizes two fundamental types of contradictions: antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions. Antagonistic contradictions are by their nature insoluble within the framework of the existing old quality; they can be solved only by the annihilation (overthrow, destruction) of the old, which is the foundation of one of the elements of the contradiction. Here the annihilation of the old begins with an explosion. Consequently, the explosion is the peculiar and typical form of the solution of antagonistic contradictions. . . . Non-antagonistic contradictions are of a fundamentally different character; they are perfectly soluble within the framework of the existing quality, and the solution can take place in a planned and organized manner by the gradual replacing of elements of the old quality with elements of the new. . . . In such cases there is no necessity whatsoever for an explosion." Kedrov, *op. cit.*, pp. 8–20. "Contradictions of capitalism are contradictions leading to its doom, are *catastrophic* contradictions. . . . All contradictions . . . in Soviet society are contradictions of growth, of progress." P. F. Yudin, *The Prime Source of the Development of Soviet Society* (Moscow, 1949), pp. 30–33; see also pp. 34–41.

[42] Published in Moscow, 1948. The more significant and relevant of the contributions are the following: F. V. Konstantinov, *The Role of Socialist Consciousness in the Development of Soviet Society;* P. F. Yudin, *The Prime Source of the Development of Soviet Society;* M. B. Mitin, *Soviet Democracy and Bourgeois Democracy;* M. D. Kammari, *Socialism and the Individual;* Ts. Stepanyan, *On the Conditions and the Ways of the Transition from Socialism to Communism.* Some of these works are available in English translation as pamphlets. Wherever possible, citations will be made to the translations.

Perhaps the most germane and seminal contribution to this symposium was that made by Konstantinov, entitled *The Role of Socialist Consciousness in the Development of Soviet Society.* His contribution is especially relevant because it not only represents a further development of Stalin's views in the *History,* but also adumbrates some of the central themes that Stalin was to pronounce *ex cathedra* two years later. In this work, four pertinent points are made: (1) Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union has been converted from a revolutionary-disintegrative doctrine into a rationalizing-integrative system, or, to use the special terminology of Karl Mannheim, has made the transition from utopia to ideology; (2) this transmutation of Marxism-Leninism has made it into the highest form of social consciousness in Soviet society, where the forces of nature have been completely subordinated to the will of man; (3) dialectical progress is motivated by the continuous interaction between mass social consciousness and the economic structure of society; and (4) in a society without class antagonisms, the social consciousness of the masses is monolithically expressed in its collective capacity by the Communist party and its leadership.

The conversion of Marxism-Leninism from utopian to ideological categories is possible because of the dual characteristic of Marxism as a theory of both analysis and action:

> From the very outset, Marxism-Leninism set itself the task of not simply interpreting the world . . . but of showing how, by means of these laws, it is possible to abolish capitalism and build a new, communist society. . . . In the course of applying this theory to the revolutionary transformation of society, its role changes with the changes in the character of the social system. . . . Under capitalism, Marxism-Leninism is the ideology of the oppressed, exploited class, the class that is spiritually down-trodden by the bourgeoisie. . . . In socialist society, the ideas of Marxism-Leninism are the ruling ideas; Marxism-Leninism is the theoretical weapon of the Party that guides the Soviet state, the whole of socialist society. . . . Hence Marxism-Leninism directly influences the whole course of social life, because under socialism, the ideas of Marxism-Leninism are backed by the entire might . . . of the Socialist state and of the Communist Party. . . . Embodied in life, materialized in the new social system, the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, of Socialism, become a still more mighty motive force of social development.[43]

From a transcendental social theory which seeks to overturn the bourgeois social order, Marxism-Leninism passes to a social theory which explains and justifies the new social system, yet sedulously provides for its own future retransmutation as the existing order (socialism) gives way to a still higher one (communism) by means of orderly evolutionary development along a path illuminated by the Communist party and the state.

The orderly progression to communism is possible because in a society devoid of class conflict the consciousness of the masses is a monolithic whole in its comprehension of the laws of the dialectic. Under capitalism, society is governed by blindly operating objective social laws which are oblivious to the will of man except for short and spectacular periods of revolutionary upheaval, when for brief moments in the eternity of history the social consciousness of the masses asserts itself and supplants the objective laws of history in the dialectical movement. Under socialism, however, social consciousness becomes solidified under the leadership of the Communist party and emerges as the dominant force in the historical movement:

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[43] Konstantinov, *The Role of Socialist Consciousness in the Development of Soviet Society* (Moscow, 1949), pp. 7–9.

> In the development of socialist society, however, consciousness plays a different role from that which it played in all the forms of society that preceded Socialism. Under Socialism, the role of consciousness in social life not only grows quantitatively; it also acquires a different quality; the very relation between spontaneity and consciousness in historical development undergoes a radical change. . . . In the past, it was only for short periods, i.e., in periods of revolution, that the spontaneous development of society gave way to the conscious action of the masses who were making their own history. It was only with the victory of the socialist revolution that the conscious actions of millions of working people acquired decisive importance in social life, in the development of society. . . . Under Socialism, for the first time in history, the most progressive consciousness, i.e., socialist consciousness . . . achieved a decisive victory over spontaneity in social life, subordinated the operation of social laws to their power. This was a great leap out of the realm of blind necessity into the realm of freedom. The history of mankind has no record of anything more magnificent.[44]

Although Konstantinov attempts to remain consistent with the sociological determinism of Marx by insisting that social consciousness in the Soviet Union is a reflection of its socialist environment, he also asserts that this same environment was brought about by the social will of the masses, apparently at a time when it reflected a pre-socialist society. This dilemma is never satisfactorily resolved and the basic conundrum as to what comes first, social will or social fact, is subsumed in a cloud of dialectical obfuscation.[45]

Thus, according to this conception of the dialectical movement, there exists at any particular time in Soviet society a harmonious contradiction between the economic productive forces and the needs and requirements of the Soviet masses. The latter spawn a consciousness on the basis of these needs which reacts upon the economic structure of society, causing it to change and thereby altering the entire superstructure, including Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Dialectical interaction between the economic forces of Soviet society and its superstructure of social and political ideas is sufficient to propel society along the road of everlasting progress, but not explosive enough to rip society asunder with every qualitative change. This interaction becomes the mainspring of the dialectical movement and emerges as Konstantinov's implicit surrogate for the class struggle in the Soviet Union. The dialectical duel between these two forces constitutes an unending process of mutual transformation in the crucible of dialectical fission and fusion.

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[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

[45] "In order fundamentally to change the old views, ethics, habits and customs . . . it was necessary to change the material conditions of life of the masses . . . to remold them on the basis of socialism, because the material conditions of life mold social consciousness. And in order fundamentally to change the material conditions of life on a socialist basis it was necessary that the masses should display . . . a high level of socialist consciousness. It looked as though an insoluble contradiction, a vicious circle had arisen. Various philistines and utopians did actually think that it was an insoluble contradiction. . . . Historically, the contradiction . . . was solved in the course of the socialist revolution." *Ibid.*, pp. 48–49. This is hardly an explanation, much less a solution, but merely an assertion.

"The *socialist consciousness of the Soviet people,*" Konstantinov informs us, is not spontaneous, but "*is moulded under the guidance of the Communist Party on* the basis of its scientific world outlook."[46] The relationship between the party and the masses is one not of rule, but of leadership; as the advanced detachment of the masses, the party, because of its scientific competence, manifests the will of the masses in its monolithic purity with cerebral precision:

> The political and ideological inspirer, the organizer and leader of the conscious building of the new society is the Communist Party, which is armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism. . . . Socialism . . . requires the wills of millions to be united into a single, conscious will directed towards the achievement of a single great aim—communism. And this singleness of will for the building of socialism can be achieved only on the basis of the great socialist consciousness of the masses. . . . This singleness of will of millions can be and is being secured only under the authoritative and tried leadership of the Communist Party . . . by virtue of its knowledge of the laws governing the building of Communism.[47]

Konstantinov, however, carefully avoided a full integration of the state in Soviet social theory, substituting for it the collective anonymity of the party, and assigning to the state primarily indoctrination functions. His version of a conscious unified and distinct collective will, superior to the will of the individual, is reminiscent of Rousseau and Hegel, although the theory of the "general will" was repudiated at one time by Vyshinsky.[48] Apparently, the full integration of the Soviet state in the basic philosophy of Marxism-Leninism required the personal intervention of the Georgian oracle.

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[46] *Ibid.*, p. 67.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 35. The Communist party is described as "being the most advanced and most politically conscious section of the Soviet people." *Ibid.*, p. 95. See also M. B. Mitin, *op. cit.*, pp. 43, 45–56; M. D. Kammari, *op. cit.*, p. 44. According to Yudin: "The Soviet state is the principal instrument through which the Communist Party . . . directs society's entire development. . . . The planned guidance of the country's entire economic development by the Soviet State is an historical necessity. . . . This is a fully objective law of the development of Soviet society." *The Prime Source*, pp. 20–22.

[48] See A. Y. Vyshinsky, *The Law of the Soviet State* (New York, 1948), p. 169, where he expostulates: "In conditions of capitalism the so-called 'general will,' which Rousseau advanced as the basic motive power of the democratic state, remains and cannot but remain—a fiction." On the other hand, "The victory of socialism . . . signalizes . . . the will of the entire Soviet people. Speaking of will in the social or political sense, we have in view neither the mechanical 'sum total of wills' of separate persons, nor the mythical 'national will.' . . . Following the Marx-Lenin doctrine, we have in mind the will of social classes. . . . In the Soviet Socialist state the single will of the people is the single will of all the peoples of the U.S.S.R. . . . Soviet authority in the U.S.S.R. . . . expresses and realizes the will of the entire multinational single people." *Ibid.*, pp. 171–72.

IV. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOVIET POLITICAL THEORY: THE EPOCH OF STATE WORSHIP

"The Soviet concept," writes John Somerville, "far from representing the state as the locus of all human and spiritual values, actually regards it as a kind of necessary evil."[49] The idea that the Soviet state is an evil of any variety, eternal or ephemeral, was already unfashionable in 1930, when the leader of the cult of state hatred in the Soviet Union, Nicolai Bukharin, was ideologically decapitated by Stalin.[50] Since then, Vyshinsky has branded all state haters as "unprincipled traitors and doubledealers."[51] The Soviet state in contemporary Soviet thought is venerated as a positive and constructive force whose creative mission it is to produce the environmental influences which will spawn and preserve the human and spiritual values of future Soviet man. "The Soviet state," according to *Uchitelskaya Gazeta*, "is the force which engenders in the masses the standards of Communist morality."[52] Since the ethical purpose of the state is to fulfill the scientific prediction of a communist society, the state has become the hub around which revolve all human and spiritual values in the Soviet land.

In the Soviet Union, professional philosophers, no matter how articulate, are not important enough to alter the basic scriptures of the Marxist-Leninist dogma. Only the High Priest of Soviet communism can perform this function, although he is free to appropriate and adapt for his own purposes the intellectual ruminations of his scholastic minions and convert them into Holy Writ. By 1950, the philosophers had performed their task of preliminary exploration and Stalin felt that the time had come to tie together the loose threads of his pontifical utterances on the state and on dialectical and historical materialism. An opportunity was provided by a so-called "crisis" in linguistics, when the difficulties that plagued philologists in their scholastic endeavors to adjust the theory of language to Marxist epistemology gave rise to awkward irregularities.

Is language part of the "base" or "superstructure" of society? This was the worldshaking question that Stalin was called upon to answer. In the process of answering it, he delivered a series of *obiter dicta* on the state and the more basic aspects of Marxist philosophy. In his collected Socratisms, entitled *Concerning Marxism in Linguistics*, Stalin proceeded to demolish the materialistic pillar supporting Marxism and unleashed an avalanche of voluntaristic ideas into Soviet philosophy. Three basic revisions were made in Marxist philosophy: (1) the Marxist epistemological formula was formally inverted, so that social existence was subordinated to social consciousness and the economic "base" was left at the mercy of its political "superstructure"; (2) the state was re-defined outside orthodox Marxist categories, and the Hegelian concept of the state as the expression of the coordinated interests of society as a whole, rather than of a single class, was resurrected; and (3) the dialectical process was reformulated as expressing harmonious conflict between the base and superstructure of society and as manifested through a series of "revolutions from above." In effect, Stalin removed thesis and antithesis from the famous triad, leaving Soviet philosophy in a condition of permanent synthesis.

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[49] John Somerville, *Soviet Philosophy* (New York, 1947), p. 79.

[50] Bukharin was the ideological leader of an important group of Soviet intellectuals and jurists, who in the years immediately preceding the 16th Party Congress (1930) were preparing for the imminent "withering away" of the state. It was Bukharin's contention that in order to guarantee the state's oblivion, the working class should cultivate an attitude of hostility against all states, in principle, including the Soviet, because of the "wholesale exaltation of the bourgeois state by the Social Democrats" had insinuated itself into the psychology of the proletariat. It was apparently Bukharin's fear that exaltation of even the Soviet state might be enough to perpetuate it. Cf. Stalin, *Leninism: Selected Writings*, pp. 115–22.

[51] Vyshinsky, *The Teachings of Lenin and Stalin* (cited in note 1), p. 115.

[52] "Bourgeois Morality and Communist Morality," *Uchitelskaya Gazeta* (No. 43), p. 4 (Sept. 14, 1946), See also "The Role of Soviet Law in the Education of Communist Consciousness," *Bolshevik* (No. 4), 1947, p. 4.

Base and Superstructure: The Triumph of Voluntarism. Language, Stalin told his philologists, is part of neither the "base," "superstructure," nor any mythical "intermediate" category of society, but is a tool which "serves society as a means of intercourse between people . . . as a means of enabling people to understand each other."[53] It is independent of class distinctions and transcends them. Up to this time it had been accepted by Soviet philosophers that all social phenomena represented either base or superstructure. Stalin thus abandoned Marx's sociological epistemology by recognizing elements in society which cut across classes, uniting rather than dividing them. Aside from providing a convenient rationale for justifying Russian as the language of socialism, this observation was significant in that the new Soviet state was also viewed as independent of class distinctions, representing society in its integrated capacity rather than manifesting the rule of a single class.

The base, according to Stalin in this theoretical statement, "is the economic system of society at a given stage in its development," whereas "the superstructure is the political, legal, religious, artistic, philosophical views of society and the corresponding political, legal, and other institutions."[54] Each economic foundation has its corresponding superstructure, and both are ephemeral in nature in any particular form, varying in their content in accordance with the dialectical rhythm. "The superstructure," he declared, "is the product of a single epoch, in the course of which a given economic foundation lives and functions" and "consequently, the superstructure is not of long duration; it is destroyed and vanishes with the destruction and disappearance of that given foundation."[55] To support this canon of the historical dialectic, Stalin cited the Russian Revolution as an example of how a political superstructure crumbled in ruins upon the destruction of the old capitalist mode of production. By rewriting history and re-shuffling the actual sequence of events, adjusting facts to theory, Stalin was able to say:

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[53] Stalin, *Marxism and Linguistics*, p. 5. "Language . . . was created not by any one class, but by the whole of society, by all the classes of society, by the efforts of hundreds of generations. It was created for the satisfaction of the needs not of one class, but of the whole of society, of all classes of society." *Ibid.*

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[55] *Ibid.*

> During the past thirty years in Russia, the old capitalist foundation was abolished and a new socialist foundation erected. Accordingly, the superstructure of the capitalist base was abolished and a new superstructure corresponding to the socialist base was created.[56]

Orthodox Marxism teaches—and presumably the old categories are still considered valid for the pre-socialist Soviet society—that the internal contradictions of capitalism lead inevitably to its doom, but only after the social relations of production come into collision with the imperatives of technological change and productive efficiency. This did not happen in Russia; rather, the elevation of a new political power preceded the new economic complex, destroying it and replacing it with a new one. As a matter of fact, this was at one time Stalin's principal justification for arbitrary state power. Only after the consolidation of a new political superstructure (the dictatorship of the proletariat), was the economic base altered from the old forms to socialism. This observation is pertinent because the Stalinist conception of a superstructure with the capacity to reconstruct its own foundations, without bringing about its collapse, applies only in a society without class antagonisms. Stalin's entire dialectical scheme hinges on this qualitative transformation of the state, since this type of state presumably is dialectically impossible under capitalism.

Thus Stalin is reluctant to admit the supremacy of politics over economics in bourgeois societies, but asserts it as a dominant phenomenon in socialist society. The new socialist superstructure, a species *de novo*, plays a positive and creative role in societal development, and, in fact, determines its direction and growth. Unlike the bourgeois superstructure, which becomes the prison of its own economic system, because the interests of the ruling class conflict with the imperative of maximum productive efficiency, the new socialist superstructure cannot come into antagonistic conflict with its foundation because the expiration of the class struggle has removed all constrictive social relationships dedicated to the perpetuation of the old order:

> The superstructure in a socialist society differs radically from all others. Whereas in an exploitative society the superstructure serves the interests of the exploiting classes, the superstructure in a socialist society serves the interests of the working people by means of entirely new political, legal, philosophic and other ideas and theories and correspondingly creates for society completely new political, legal and other institutions.[57]

It is unnecessary to outline in detail Stalin's differences with Marx and Lenin on the conception of the superstructure, since Stalin claims to be analyzing a state *sui generis*. At the risk of being dogmatic, it should be pointed out that Marx and Lenin held that all superstructures, including the dictatorship of the proletariat, reflected class interests and not the interests of all society. Lenin visualized the proletarian state as the supreme coercive instrument of the masses in their struggle to extirpate the exploiters and as a tool for laying the foundations of socialism. The state was necessary as long as even a small residual element of the old ruling class was still thriving. But Stalin's superstructure reflects the interests of all classes in Soviet society because "in socialist society, where public ownership is the basic form, these relationships become relationships of friendly cooperation of all strata of society, workers, peasants and intelligentsia."[58] No ruling class exists, no class antagonisms flourish, although distinctions persist. Since the state is preserved, it cannot but represent society as an integrated entity. Lenin, however, was never confronted with the theoretical problem of a state surviving in a society bereft of class conflict, and standing as an institution expressing the total will of society, because he considered this to be an impossibility. Like Engels, Lenin adhered to the orthodox view that "when ultimately it [the state] becomes really representative of society as a whole, it makes itself superfluous."[59]

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[56] *Ibid.*

[57] "Concerning Base and Superstructure," an unsigned commentary in *Pravda*, Oct. 5, 1950.

"The Superstructure," writes Stalin, "having emerged . . . becomes a great active force, actively helping its foundation to take shape and gain strength, takes all measures in order to help the new system finish off and destroy the old foundation and the old classes."[60] Here enters the process of "revolution from above," which is explained by the Soviet dialectician, B. Kedrov:

> The question of the relationship of the existing state regime to the revolutionary upheaval taking place in the country is a question of whether this regime is an obstacle to the birth of the new order (as is the case in the rule of the bourgeoisie) or whether, on the contrary, this regime itself carries out the upheaval from above with the support of the masses (as is the case in the Soviet order). . . . The socialist revolution begins with an explosion, with the overthrow of the old regime. But when the new revolutionary regime, the dictatorship of the proletariat, has been established, it prepares further revolutionary changes in a planned manner. . . . It is thus that in our country there were prepared and carried out such revolutionary leaps as the industrialization of the country and the collectivization of agriculture.[61]

Future progress, according to Kedrov, will continue to take place in the form of a series of "revolutions from above," carried out by the state:

> The gradual transition from socialism to communism represents a gigantic historical leap in the development of society which occurs gradually and contains a whole series of leaps in different spheres of social life. . . . All these leaps . . . take place gradually because they are put through from above . . . by the Soviet power with the support and initiative of the whole people from below.[62]

The mainspring of dialectical progress in the Soviet Union, according to Stalin, is the mutual interaction between the political superstructure and the economic base. The state manifests the collective consciousness of society as a whole in its impact upon the base. As it transforms the economic foundations of society in conformity with the will of the masses, it undergoes a transformation itself, and is again ready to introduce new economic changes in response to further needs of society. This interaction is continuous:

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[58] *Ibid.* [59] Engels, *Anti-Duehring*, p. 306.

[60] *Marxism and Linguistics*, p. 4.

[61] Kedrov, "On Leaps" (cited in note 36), pp. 8–20. [62] *Ibid.*

> Comrade Stalin has pointed out that in our country a new base and superstructure have replaced the old. The superstructure which corresponds to the socialist base is primarily the mighty Soviet state in its final form. The Soviet state helps destroy the old base; in doing so, the state itself undergoes substantial changes and becomes a constantly improved tool for building communist society. This dialectic of the development of the state has found expression in the Stalin constitution and Stalin's teaching concerning the stage of development and the functions of the Soviet state.[63]

Thus it was that Stalin's discourses on linguistics closed the principal gaps in contemporary Soviet political theory. The dependence of the Soviet state for its existence on capitalist encirclement gave way to a more philosophical rationale. The moral problem of the state, i.e., as the supreme embodiment of repression, was solved by shearing away its oppressive qualities and assigning to it purely creative and constructive functions, transforming it into a *summum bonum.*

Stalin's new theory of the state resulted in the abdication of the materialistic conception of history and Soviet theoreticians interpreted it as such. Commentaries on Stalin's "brilliant thesis" flooded newspapers and periodicals. For all Soviet philosophers, the epoch of state-worship was officially given holy sanction. The state became the prime mover, the guide, the inspirer, the agent of dialectical progress; it was "all powerful"; it could "do anything." It had to be protected like the apple of one's eye, constantly strengthened and allowed greater freedom for expansion. Thus, Stepanyan wrote that "as the economic foundation of a communist society develops, the activity of the Soviet state in economic organization and cultural indoctrination will constantly expand."[64]

Retreat from Voluntarism? Commentaries on Stalin's disquisition on linguistics apparently got out of control, for, in October, 1952, Stalin issued his *Economic Problems of Socialism,* in which he charged Soviet intellectuals with perverting his conception of the role and capabilities of the Soviet state and drawing unwarranted inferences concerning dialectical and historical materialism. Especially did he denounce those who held that the Soviet state was capable of "creating," "shaping," or "abolishing" the objective laws of political economy:

> Certain comrades deny the objective character of the laws of science, especially laws of political economy under socialism. They deny that the laws of political economy express conformity with the laws of processes carried out independently of the will of the people. They consider that, in view of the special role granted by history to the Soviet state, the Soviet state and its leaders can repeal existing laws of political economy, can "shape" new laws, "create" new laws. These comrades are deeply mistaken.[65]

Although the formula "on reforming laws has long been in circulation here," he admitted, "we must renounce it in the interests of exactitude." It was possible, he said, to "limit the sphere of action of some or another economic laws," and one can even prevent "their ruinous action," but it is impossible to destroy them.[66] Some writers, pursuing Stalin's logic, concluded that the possibility of conflict between productive forces and productive relations in Soviet society did not exist. This view Stalin condemned:

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[63] Ts. Stepanyan, "On the Organization of the Soviet State in Economic Organization and in Cultural Education," *Izvestiya,* Aug. 3, 1950. Cf. G. Glezerman, "Base and Superstructure," *Bolshevik* (No. 18), Sept., 1950. An English translation can be found in *Communist Review* (theoretical journal of the British Communist party), Jan., 1951.

[64] Stepanyan, *op. cit.;* cf. also Stepanyan, "From Socialism to Communism," *Komsomolskaya Pravda,* Oct. 16, 1952 and G. Glezerman, "The Socialist State—Mighty Instrumentality for Building Communism," *Izvestiya,* Oct. 12, 1952.

[65] Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* Citations are from the translation published in the *New York Times,* Oct. 4, 1952.

> Comrade Yaroshenko is mistaken in affirming that under socialism there is no conflict between productive relations and productive forces in society. Of course, our present productive relations are going through that period when they, in full correspondence to the growth of productive forces, are moving forward in seven-league strides. But it would be incorrect to grow complacent about this and think that there do not exist any conflicts between our productive forces and productive relations. Conflicts unconditionally do exist, and will, in as much as the development of productive relations is behind and will be behind the development of productive forces. . . . Therefore the task of the leading organs consists in noting in good time growing contradictions and taking measures in time to overcome them by means of adoption of productive relations to the growth of productive forces.[67]

Stalin's assertion that the Soviet state can neither create nor destroy objective laws of political economy or historical development is not a fundamental change from the position he adopted in 1950, although, on the surface, the two positions appear contradictory. Nor are the views expressed by Soviet philosophers, whom he condemned for distorting his views, essentially in conflict with his. Stalin's insistence that the state cannot create or abolish laws at will is a pure technicality, for he does not deny that the state can abolish and create the economic conditions which give rise or decay to these laws. Thus, by direction and manipulation of the economic foundations of society, the state, in effect, does create and abolish laws of political economy, for these "laws" are nothing but the abstract generalizations of the handiwork of the state. Stalin's distinction is without substantial difference; it appears mainly as a formal attempt to remain within the Marxist materialistic philosophy.

His attack, however, served an important policy function, for it was really aimed at those writers who had so vulgarized his propositions as to commit the Soviet state to satisfying the immediate and voracious economic needs of the people, and at the notion that the entire economic system could be operated on a "push-button" basis and be converted into a cornucopia overnight. His theory was meant to be viewed in long range perspective, as meaning only that eventually the state could freely direct and manipulate the economy of the country so as to meet the demands of the people. What Stalin laid down as a theory, the propagandists tried to convert into an immediate policy. His intellectual myrmidons were portraying the capabilities of the Soviet state in such rosy terms that the vast difference between promise and actuality could prove embarrassing, and even threatening, to the regime. Stalin remains the chief culprit in this drama, however, for his transmutation of Soviet ideology into a voluntaristic system will continue to breed unwarranted optimism, and periodical attempts will continue to be made to stem the tide.

[66] *Ibid.* [67] *Ibid.*

As a result of Stalin's criticisms, writers heaped abuse upon one another and fingers of accusation were pointed all around. Writers who preached the supremacy of social consciousness over social existence were accused of perverting materialism into an idealist system. Thus P. F. Yudin, himself a sinner, indignantly denounced his colleagues for their mistakes:

> These scientific workers began to argue thus: since the anarchy of production and competition have disappeared as laws of social development, since the spontaneous character of social life was replaced by the planned development of the economy while the role of the organs leading society—the Party, the state—increased in great extent, society in the person of the state is, therefore, capable of organizing the economic life according to its will, without considering the objective laws of economic development. The strengthening of the opposite reaction of the superstructure on the base in the conditions of socialism, served many of the scholars as an excuse to regard the economic-organizational activity of the state as the source, as the primary reason for economic development; and they started considering the economic development of society, i.e., the primary, material basis of the life of society, as secondary, as completely dependent upon the will of the state. Comrade Stalin inflicted a crushing blow to these idealistic views.[68]

Even Voznesensky, who had long vanished from the councils of the Politbureau, was condemned for offering "a potpourri of voluntarist views on the role of the state," and *Pravda* gravely warned writers who "ignore the Marxist premise of the determining role of economics in social development."[69]

Stalin's caveat in the *Economic Problems* appeared on cursory observation to have arrested the trend from determinism to voluntarism. Actually, these vociferous declamations were in the nature of an admission that the transition was all but complete. These basic modifications are so rooted in Soviet ideology that to repudiate them *de facto* would mean the repudiation of the entire Soviet system. They cannot be abjured by mere verbal fiat. Stalin did not vitiate his theory of the "revolution from above" as the central concept of dialectical change, and as long as this concept remains established, it is an admission of the "idealistic" and voluntaristic character of Soviet ideology, for as long as "revolutions" are conducted by the state, Soviet ideology cannot be deterministic in its conception.

Need the State Wither Away? "As soon as there is no longer any class of society to be held in subjection," wrote Engels, "there is nothing more to be suppressed which would make . . . a state necessary."[70] Thus Engels presents the moral imperative for the state's abolition. According to Lenin, the state is not merely morally objectionable in a society without class conflict; its existence in such a society is physically impossible:

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[68] P. F. Yudin, "J. V. Stalin's Work 'The Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.'," *Kommunist* (No. 3), 1953, pp. 44–45.

[69] A. Sobolev, "Completely Overcome Subjectivistic Errors in Economics," *Pravda*, Jan. 12, 1953. It was Voznesensky's thesis that Soviet war economy "was marked by the operation of specific economic laws" and that "the theory of the war economy of socialism has been created by the work of our leader, the great Stalin." *Soviet Economy during the Second World War* (New York, 1949), p. 13. Cf. his "voluntarist" views, pp. 118–24.

[70] Engels, *The Anti-Duehring*, pp. 306–7.

> The bourgeois, and particularly the petty bourgeois, ideologists . . . "correct" Marx in such a way as to make it appear that the state is an organ for *reconciling* the classes. According to Marx, the state could neither arise nor maintain itself if a reconciliation of classes was possible. But with the petty-bourgeois and philistine professors and publicists, the state . . . becomes a conciliation of classes.[71]

Obviously the root problem of contemporary Soviet political theory is Stalin's insistence that it must be constructed on the basis of the non-existence of class conflict in Soviet society. Upon this social abstraction are erected still further abstractions, but it becomes abundantly clear that the validity of the Soviet doctrine of the state can never rise above the validity of the premise upon which it is constructed. The new theory of the Soviet state naturally brings up the question of the state's ultimate superfluity. Soviet doctrine is extremely ambiguous on this point. Although the "withering away" theory has never been explicitly disavowed, it is difficult to find any extended discussion of it in recent Soviet literature. In 1939, Stalin explained that the abolition of the state was postponed until the termination of capitalist encirclement and in his discourse on linguistics he still accepted the validity of Engel's dictum that "after the victory of the socialist revolution, the state is bound to wither away" provided that it applies "for the period when the consecutive victory of Socialism. . . in most countries" is a reality.[72] Most Soviet writers are content to observe vaguely that the state will persist in Soviet society until the liquidation of capitalist encirclement, but almost total emphasis is on the need for constantly strengthening the power of the existing state. The tendency for Soviet writers to steer clear of the problem is understandable in view of the fact that Vyshinsky and members of the highest Party councils issue thinly veiled warnings to Soviet intellectuals that exaggerated emphasis of the "withering away" theory is misplaced and apt to constitute *prima facie* evidence of "objective" treason. The statement of Malenkov in his address to the 19th Party Congress that "the enemies and vulgarizers of Marxism advocated the theory. . . of the weakening and withering away of the Soviet state," is rather typical.[73] Even when Soviet writers do venture to deal with the question, their observations are frequently qualified by ambiguities. Thus, Stepanyan writes that "even if capitalist encirclement is liquidated and the state withers away, a perfected machinery for administering economic and cultural life will remain," and Yudin holds that with the final world-wide victory of communism, "the administration of society will lose its *political* character."[74]

The "withering away" thesis in Soviet ideology is conspicuous for its irrelevance. It no longer even serves as an important utopian category, the emphasis being on communist society. The vitality of this idea has been sapped principally because it is really unnecessary for the state to disappear. With Stalin's conversion of the state into an ethical instrument of progress and as the institutionalized expression of society's will, the original impulses for its abolition have vanished, and the thesis that the state will wither away once capitalist encirclement is liquidated cannot be taken seriously. On the contrary, if precedent is any criterion, the liquidation of capitalist encirclement, on the basis of Stalin's earlier views, could require the greater strengthening of the state, since it would now be confronted with the Herculean task of cleansing the entire world of the exploiting classes. This is in conformity with Stalin's theory that the resistance of the residual exploiters intensifies as their end approaches, and hence the power of the state must reach its zenith in order to deliver the final *coup de grace*, as a prelude to its mythical disappearance. This has been eloquently demonstrated on a restricted international scale in the areas of Eastern Europe and the Far East, where a socialist periphery supplanted a bourgeois one.[75] This doctrine is essentially an aggressive one, for it dictates the progressive strengthening of the state as long as capitalism exists, and at the same time insists that the progressive weakening of international capitalism automatically accelerates the power of the state.

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[71] Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 7, p. 9.

[72] Stalin, *Marxism and Linguistics*, pp. 36–37.

[73] The complete text of Malenkov's address to the 19th Party Congress is reprinted in Martin Ebon, *Malenkov, Stalin's Successor* (New York, 1953). The quotation cited is at p. 229. Cf. Vyshinsky, *Teachings*, pp. 114–16.

[74] Stepanyan, "From Socialism to Communism," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Oct. 16, 1952; Yudin, *The Prime Source*, pp. 22–23.

V. THE CRISIS IN CONTEMPORARY SOVIET IDEOLOGY

From Ideology to "False Consciousness." "Dialectics," Lenin warned, "*is not reducible* to relativism," for "to make relativism the basis of the theory of knowledge is inevitably to condemn oneself either to absolute scepticism, agnosticism and sophistry, or to subjectivism," enabling one to "justify any sophistry."[76]

The relativism of contemporary Soviet ideology, in its abstract conception, has compelled it to outrun its "material foundations," that is, it is no longer even in remote focus with Soviet reality. It represents a completed metamorphosis from utopia to "false consciousness."[77] A substantial part of Soviet doctrine consists of abstract categories drawn from what are officially decreed "facts of existence," through a process which can only be described as institutionalized self-delusion. Since fictions like the "monolithic will" of society, and the doctrine of "no class antagonisms" must be accepted as reality, any theory based on these "facts" merely compounds the delusion by raising it to a higher level. With the periodic revisions of history, a corpus of official mythology recorded in Stalin's *History* has been erected, from which a scientific theory is abstracted. As long as Soviet philosophy is postulated on this basis, its epistemological categories can offer only a distorted image of the Soviet world. This rigor mortis has not intruded to any serious degree into the ideological prism used to view the outside world (except for the satellite states, in which case ideological distortion has assumed alarming proportions). Once this transpires, the consequences of distorted analysis in international politics can be catastrophic, since myths in this arena cannot be fully controlled or manipulated. The capacity of Soviet ideology to comprehend its own world adequately has been seriously impaired, for as long as it is constructed in this manner, Soviet philosophers will have no other function but to pontificate on official myths, not as myths or utopias, but as reality. This process has been pungently described by Milovan Djilas, Yugoslavia's fallen theoretician:

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[75] Cf. Stalin, *Leninism*, 2 vols. (New York, 1933), Vol. 1, p. 50 and *Mastering Bolshevism* (New York, 1946), pp. 21–22.

[76] Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 199.

[77] The terms "utopia" and "false consciousness" are here used in the special sense in which Karl Mannheim employs them. "Only those orientations transcending reality will be referred to by us as utopian which, when they pass over into conduct, tend to shatter, either partially or wholly, the order of things prevailing at the time." *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1949), p. 173. "False consciousness" or "ideological distortion" occurs when "persons try to cover up their 'real' relations to themselves and to the world, and falsify to themselves the elementary facts of human existence by deifying, romanticizing, or idealizing them . . . and thereby conjuring up false interpretations of experience. . . . Knowledge is distorted when it fails to take account of new realities applying to a situation, and when it attempts to conceal them by thinking of them in categories which are inappropriate." *Ibid.*, pp. 85–86.

> Thence subjective idealism—despite its materialistic and dialectical methodology—in the philosophy and science of the U.S.S.R. which is unfolding on the basis of untrue and undialectical proclamations that there are no more internal contradictions there. . . . The principle of this methodology is as follows: since we have no social contradictions, the consciousness of the leaders accurately reflects reality, and, accordingly, what they say is not only accurate and infallible but also a law of the development of society, that is, the material world.[78]

Since "material reality" in the Soviet Union is not perceived through the sense organs, but is manufactured by decree, Soviet ideologists will continually find themselves in the same "idealistic" *cul de sac.* As long as the mythmakers are in power, the dangers of distorted analysis are minimized, but the future ruling hierarchy in the Soviet Union, weaned on a steady diet of myths, may well be victimized by the false images of Soviet society bequeathed them by their predecessors, for Soviet philosophy, then as now, rationalizes not an existing social order, but a non-existent one.

The Crisis in Soviet Leadership Theory. One area in which the gulf between image and reality is seriously affecting the Soviet system is that of leadership theory. For more than two decades, Soviet leadership theory has been based on the collective principle, whereas one-man control has been the practice. "Junta rule" has always collapsed in the Soviet Union, because the idea of an inflexible party line was never in tune with the conception of collective leadership. With the metamorphosis of the party line into "a monolithic collective will of society," as expressed through the state, the problem of adjusting to collective rule is made almost impossible. A political theory which relies for its implementation on a discoverable concept of general will or monolithic collective consciousness must personalize this expression in a single identifiable personality who has the power and responsibility, without challenge, to coordinate this will authoritatively and infallibly with the inscrutable immanent laws of the dialectic.

[78] Milovan Djilas, *New Roads to Socialism* (Belgrade, 1950), p. 18. See also p. 11.

Just prior to Stalin's death, evidence was mounting that indicated a revision of Marxist leadership formulas. The appearance of writings reformulating the Marxist-Leninist views on the role of the "great personality" in history, together with the synthetic charisma which was being spun around the figure of Stalin, indicated a trend in the direction of a possible Soviet *Fuehrerprinzip* theory.[79] This trend was arrested by Stalin's death and was supplanted with denunciations of the "cult of the leader," and "one-man rule."[80] These conspicuous disavowals served to demonstrate vividly the failure of the collective principle to work, for, theoretically, collective rule was always the only recognized principle of leadership.

The lack of a systematic theory of leadership which accords with the realities of Soviet politics and is consistent with its ideology represents a serious deficiency. The monolithic will of society is one; there exist nine possible wills at the party summit and only one can be identical to that of society. Each major policy question requiring a subtle ideological interpretation or an infinitely precise decision will accelerate the breakdown of collective rule. One-man rule simplifies the decision-making problem in a system where only a single authoritative interpretation of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and of the policies that flow therefrom is permissible at any particular time. Historical precedent makes this a tempting situation for leaders raised in the Stalinist tradition. The "great personality" remains a potent symbol, but his identity is temporarily obscured by the fig leaf of collective rule.

[79] See "Pravda Articles," (London, 1950), which contains panegyrics delivered on the occasion of Stalin's 70th birthday by Malenkov, Beriya, Molotov, Voroshilov, and Mikoyan, for representative illustrations of the "cult of Stalin." For more fundamental trends in the revision of Marxist theory on the role of the individual in history, see I. S. Kron's praise of Kammari's book, *Marxism-Leninism on the Role of the Individual in History*, in *Voprosy Istorii* (No. 2), Feb., 1953. After Stalin's death, the book was severely criticized for "un-Marxist" treatment of the individual. Kammari's views were repudiated in F. V. Konstantinov's article, "The People—Makers of History," in *Pravda*, June 28, 1953, with the denunciation of the "great personality" theory of history which Kammari was disseminating.

[80] See "Fifty Years of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1903–1953," *Pravda*, July 26, 1953; L. Slepov, "Collectivity Is the Highest Principle of Party Leadership," *Izvestiya*, April 16, 1953; "The Collegium Principle in Soviet Executive Committee Work," *Izvestiya*, June 7, 1953.

THE LOGICAL AND THE REAL IN POLITICAL THEORY: PLATO, ARISTOTLE, AND MARX

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An immediate and important insight into the significance of Greek political philosophy may be gained by examining an observation made upon it by Karl Marx. The fact that Marx's observation is fundamentally erroneous does not prevent it from being profoundly suggestive. Marx observed, in the course of his doctoral dissertation, *On the Differences between the Natural Philosophy of Democritus and Epicurus*, that the character of the philosophical world after the death of Aristotle in the Fourth Century B.C. was similar to that of the philosophical world after the death of Hegel in the Nineteenth Century.[1] What was this similarity of which Marx speaks? We may best understand it if we know that Marx had considered that his own achievement had been to break through the "completed, total world" of Hegel's "pure theory, theology, philosophy, ethics etc.," and to have resolved the "absolute metaphysical spirit into the real man standing on the foundation of nature."[2] Evidently, then, Hegel's system of philosophy had separated human thought from the "real man," and had gone off into "pure theory," unconnected with the real world. Aristotle, too, Marx contended, had, by the same kind of misconception, freed the theoretical mind from mundane reality. But there was an extremely important difference between Hegel and Aristotle, a difference of which Marx had to avail himself by a special indebtedness to each. The difference was this: in Aristotle's "pure theory, theology, philosophy, ethics etc.," the material world had a real existence independent of man; in Hegel's "pure theory, theology, philosophy, ethics etc.," the material world did not exist independently of man's thought, and hence it existed in "pure thought and in abstraction."[3] In Hegel's philosophy, the material world is "reclaimed" for man, but it is at the same time negated in its material existence. Now if Marx wished to convert this Hegelian speculative conquest of the world of nature into a real, practical conquest, it was necessary that he make some return to the Aristotelian conception of a theoretical mind that recognized the reality of the material world. This he did, as we shall see when we consider Marx's political theory.

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[1] It has been pointed out that Marx expressly mentions the fact that the subject for his doctoral dissertation was suggested by his awareness of the parallel between the post-Aristotelian philosophy and the post-Hegelian philosophy. See Eric Voegelin, "The Formation of the Marxian Revolutionary Idea," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 12, pp. 275–302 (July, 1950). Marx's observation may be found in *Über die Differenzen der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie*, in Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, Sec. II, Vol. 1, Pt. I, p. 131.

[2] Quoted by Otto Rühle, *Karl Marx, His Life and Work* (London, 1929), p. 33. Marx is here acknowledging his indebtedness to Ludwig Feuerbach. See my "Ludwig Feuerbach and the Formation of the Marxian Revolutionary Idea," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, Vol. 7, pp. 218–48 (No. 2, 1951).

[3] *Oekonomische-philosophische Manuskript* 1844, Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe* Sec. I, Vol. 3, p. 155.

Now the curious thing, and a thing of utmost importance to observe, is that it was precisely by having shown that the order of reality and the order of logic (the order of the human mind) are not identical, that Aristotle was able to assure, against Plato, the real, independent existence of the material world. For Plato, as we shall see, differed from both Aristotle and Hegel: he thought that the material world existed independently of the human mind, but that its real existence was an essentially immaterial one. Aristotle's achievement was, indeed, the very foundation of his philosophy, including his political philosophy; it is the ultimate explanation of the realist, natural, and non-totalitarian character of his political science.

We can understand this basic contribution of Aristotle only by seeing it in relation to the earlier speculations of Greek thinkers on the nature of the physical universe. It is not necessary to relate here the history of the early Greek cosmological speculations. It is enough if we try to understand the state of thought at the conclusion of the cosmological period in the Fifth Century B.C.

The efforts of the Greek thinkers in the realm of physics had culminated in a condition of intellectual paralysis. This condition was perhaps best reflected in the conflicting theories of two of the greatest of the early thinkers, Heraclitus and Parmenides. It was the teaching of Heraclitus that the only reality is change; there is no underlying substratum that may be said to undergo change, and therefore Heraclitus was saying that science is impossible, for science ought to be certain and necessary, at least in part. Parmenides of Elea had succeeded in transcending the world of physical bodies and even that of mathematical forms, and had attained the notion of *being* as such. But since, according to Parmenides, *that which is* is, and *that which is not* is not, there is only one science possible: the science of being. The distinction of things is an illusion because the only difference between two beings must necessarily be non-being, and non-being is not; hence all things are one, without distinction and without change. The philosophy of Parmenides found its most brilliant apologist in Zeno, and the arguments of Zeno appeared to his opponents to be unanswerable. The paradoxes of Zeno became famous; they were designed to show the impossibility of change and plurality. He argued, for example, that motion cannot possibly begin because a body in motion cannot arrive at another place until it has passed half the distance between its point of departure and its goal; but the number of intermediate places is not just one but is infinite; therefore, since an infinite space cannot be traversed in a finite time, motion is obviously an illusion of the senses.

This impasse in Greek philosophy ushered in a period of crisis in Greek thought. The man who was to initiate the rescue of philosophy from its parlous state was Socrates. Socrates committed none of his teachings to writing; our knowledge of him is chiefly had from the accounts of Xenophon, one of his students, and above all from Plato, his great disciple. It is from Aristotle, however, that we have the most valuable information on the teaching of Socrates, and in the Thirteenth Book of his *Metaphysics* he tells us that Socrates was the first of the Greek thinkers to raise the problem of universal definition. "For of the physicists," Aristotle writes, "Democritus only touched on the subject to a small extent. . . ."[4] "But it was natural," continues Aristotle, "that Socrates should be seeking the essence, for he was seeking to syllogize, and 'what a thing is' is the starting point of syllogisms; . . . for two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates—inductive argument and universal definition, both of which are concerned with the starting point of science."[5] The method which Socrates employed, called "maieutic," the art of intellectual midwifery, sought to aid the intellect in bringing forth its proper object by seeking the essences of things and expressing them in definitions. Philosophy had advanced beyond the stage where it had sought some one universal nature—water, air, fire, numbers, or even absolute being—as the ultimate substance of everything. Socrates had, on the contrary, engaged it in the task of determining and defining the essence of each thing by genus and difference, by a concept proper to itself alone. If we wish to see the Socratic method in operation we have only to study the masterly use of it in the great Dialogues of Plato.

It was the very merit and value of the Socratic discovery that contained a latent danger: the discovery of definition involved the possibility of identifying the real order with the logical order, of identifying the real existence of things defined with their existence in the mind. It was to this error that Plato, by an understandable inadvertence, succumbed. Having observed that knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude, and that the things understood in the mind are understood under conditions of immateriality and immobility, Plato was led to suppose that things existed in themselves under such conditions. Plato's theory that the essences of things were necessarily immaterial was further determined by his Heraclitean discipleship. As Aristotle tells us:

> For having in his youth first become familiar with . . . the Heraclitean doctrines [that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them], these views Plato held even in later years. Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole, but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions; Plato accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied not to sensible things but to entities of another kind—for this reason, that the common definition could not be a definition of any sensible thing, as they were always changing. Things of this other sort, then, he called Ideas, and sensible things, he said, were all named after these, and in virtue of a relation to these; for the many existed by participation in the Ideas that have the same name as they.[6]

The philosophy of Plato, including his political philosophy, was formed, then, by the confluence of two streams of thought: the speculations of Heraclitus on the problem of being and becoming, and the discovery by Socrates of inductive argument and definition. The solution which Plato worked out, known as the Doctrine of Ideas, enabled him to account for the nature of science in a better way, however inadequate, than had hitherto been possible. Its inadequacy lay exactly in its achievement: it had found the possibility of defining and classifying things—a task initial and indispensable to science—but it could not distinguish the real existence of things from the mode of their existence in the logical order. The logical universal, insofar as it is predicable of many—as, for example, "man" is predicable of John, James, and Paul—is neither a principle of existence nor a substance. "Man" is not something apart from John, James, and Paul who are men. But Plato supposed this universal to be a principle of existence; he gave to this universal a separate existence. For Plato the universal "man" exists, and the individual men whom we know through our senses are merely weak participations in the idea Man. We must observe that in the logical order the more universal concept is imposed on the less universal as if it were a form determining matter; thus, in "man is an animal," and "dog is an animal," the terms "man" and "dog" are as variable matter with respect to the imposition of the determining form "animal." But actually, in the real order, "animal" is not the determining form of "man" and "dog"; in the real order, "animal" is an indeterminate and confused concept compared with "man" and "dog." For there is no animal in general: there is no animal except dog which is an animal and man who is an animal, etc. St. Thomas Aquinas, the clearest and greatest of the commentators on the philosophy of Aristotle, explains this point as follows:

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[4] *Metaphysics*, Bk. XIII, ch. 3, 1078^b, 20.

[5] *Ibid.*, 1078^b, 24.

[6] *Metaphysics*, Bk. I, ch. 6, 987^a, 31–987^b, 10.

> That which is common to many is not something besides those many except . . . logically: thus animal is not something besides Socrates and Plato and other animals except as considered by the mind, which apprehends the form of animal as divested of all that specifies and individualizes it: for man is that which is truly animal, else it would follow that in Socrates and Plato there are several animals, namely animal in general, man in general, and Plato himself.[7]

For Plato, on the contrary, the more universal concept in the logical order was looked upon as more real, more determinate, more "rich," and it was thought by him to contain actually, and not merely potentially, its subjective parts. If this were the case, if the subjective parts "man" and "dog" were in the genus "animal" actually and not merely potentially, it would follow that these parts would have no determinate, specific existence; they would be absorbed in the genus. Thus it was that Plato supposed John Smith and Paul Jones to be almost nothing, nothing but weak participations in the idea Man.

It was this identification of the logical order with the real order that was responsible for the absorption, in Plato's political philosophy, of the real parts of political society in the whole.[8] "But what?" he asks, "the nature of a large house and that of a small city, are they different with regard to government? Not at all."[9] Indeed, he tells us that the state is nothing but the individual writ large. The mistake of identifying the logical order with the real order accounts for the extreme unity that Plato seeks to achieve for the ideal Republic. This effort at the greatest possible unity is manifest in all the striking features of the Republic. The "parts" or classes of the Republic—rulers, warriors, and artisans—are conceived quite independently of the natural parts of society, especially of the family. These latter have as much reality, in Plato's view, as John Smith has in relation to "Man." With Plato the individual, the family, and the quasi-natural associations are absorbed as much as possible in the state. That their activity is considered to be principally that of the whole state is evident from what he has to say on the abolition of private property and the family among the guardians. Loyalty to the common good is hindered by loyalty to one's family and by interest in one's property. Plato supposes that family affection is incompatible with the affection that should obtain in that larger "family" which is the whole society of the state, where all children are sons of all, and all men are brothers, "all men saying mine and not mine at the same instant of time." But as Aristotle will point out:

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[7] *Contra Gentiles*, I, ch. 26.

[8] See Jacques de Monleon, "Petites notes autour de la famille et de la cité," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, Vol. 3, pp. 262–89 (No. 2, 1947).

[9] *The Statesman*, 258E–259D.

> This is not the way in which people would speak who had their wives and children in common; they would say "all" but not "each." In like manner their property would be described as belonging to them, not severally but collectively. . . . That all persons call the same thing mine in the sense in which each does so may be a fine thing, but it is an impracticable one; or if the words are taken in the other sense, such a unity in no way conduces to harmony.[10]

The observation of Marx on the outcome of Greek philosophy, to which we alluded at the beginning of this paper, is sufficiently verified in the case of Plato: Plato separated human thought from the "real man" and had gone off into "pure theory" unconnected with the real world. But Marx's target was not Plato; the object of his comment was the condition of philosophy after Aristotle had completed his correction of Plato's thought. Now we must not suppose that Marx had any deep sympathy for the communism of Plato, because for Marx "the real life is no more the reality of man based on the suppression of private property" than it is the reality of man based on any negation: "Communism poses the negation as a negation; . . . but communism is not in itself the goal of human education, . . . the form of human society."[11] No, the fundamental affinity between Marx and Plato, as the disaffinity between Plato and Aristotle, is found in the Platonic assumption that the individual is nothing if not the species. Of course Plato maintained that the individual was not the species, and therefore he reduced the individual to mere "shadow." Marx will maintain, as we shall point out more fully later, that the individual *is* the species because the species is nothing if it is not the individual. It is precisely the confusion between the logical order and the real order that allows Marx to identify the material individual, John Smith, with the species man, just as it allowed Plato to give separate existence to the universal "man." It is exactly in this way that Marx claims to have resolved "the absolute metaphysical spirit into the real man standing on the foundation of nature."[12] The "antagonism between . . . the individual and the species" is resolved by the "generic natural relation," in which man is seen as a "conscious generic being, a being which relates itself to the species as to his own proper being, or which relates itself to itself as a generic being."[13]

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[10] *Politics*, Bk. 2, 1261^b, 23–33.

[11] *Oekonomische-philosophische Manuskript* (cited in note 3), Vol. 3, pp. 125–26.

In distinguishing the real order from the logical order, Aristotle makes it clear that the universal "man," insofar as it is predicable of many, has no being outside the reason. No man identifies himself with human nature itself; what he may well know is that he is *a* man, but not that he is *man*. It is true that the species has no existence except in John Smith, in Paul Jones, etc. But John Smith is not the species; he is of the species and belongs to it. It is only when we consider the abstract species that we have a "one toward many": man can be said of John Smith, of Paul Jones, etc. But we cannot say that man is John Smith, nor that man is Paul Jones. Insofar as Aristotle makes clear that this "universal of predication" has no being outside of the reason, he may be said to have separated human thought from the "real man"; this was to guarantee the "real man" in the real order. Insofar, on the other hand, as he denied, against Plato, that this logical universal has a separate existence, he did not separate human thought from the real man: "man" is not something besides John Smith and Paul Jones.

When Aristotle says that the logical universal has no being outside of the reason, he does not mean that it is not essential to our knowledge of the real nature of things. The logical universal does not, it is true, exist as such, outside of the reason; but it is a universal verity rooted in material individual things, as is clear from the fact that what we say of "animal" in general is true of every animal in particular. It is, for example, true that every man has sense knowledge, but that is true of cat and dog and every other animal as well. The general definition of "animal" expresses at least that which the different species of animal have in common. In speaking of the general definition of "soul," Aristotle makes the matter clear:

> It is now evident that a general notion can be given of soul only in the same sense as one can be given of figure. For, as in that case there is no figure distinguishable and apart from triangle, etc., so here there is no soul apart from the forms of soul just enumerated. It is true that a highly general definition can be given for figure which will fit all figures without expressing the peculiar nature of any figure. So here in the case of soul and its specific forms. Hence it is absurd in this and similar cases to seek a common definition which will fail to express the peculiar nature of anything that *is*. . . . The cases of figure and soul are exactly parallel; for the particulars subsumed under the common name in both cases—figures and living beings—constitute a series, each successive term of which potentially contains its predecessor, e.g. the square the triangle, and the sensory power the self-nutritive. Hence we must ask in the case of each class of living things, What is its soul, i.e. What is the soul of plant, animal, man?[14]

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[12] Quoted by Rühle, *Karl Marx, His Life and Work* (cited in note 2), p. 33.

[13] *Manuscript economico-philosophique*, XXIV. Cited in *De Marx au Marxisme*, ed. Robert Aron et al., (Paris, 1948), p. 95.

[14] *De Anima*, II. ch. 3, 414^b-415^a.

It is in this same vein that Aristotle begins the consideration of political matters. He introduces the subject by observing that "every state is a community *of some kind*."[15] It is the real order that Aristotle investigates, using logic as an instrument only. Just as there is little profit in seeking a common definition of soul, so there is little profit in attempting to find a general definition of community which will fail to express the peculiar nature of any community that *is*. But some people—and he refers to Plato—think that there is no difference between a great household and a small state. "But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the method which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole."[16]

For our present purpose we need observe only that Aristotle proceeds, in accordance with the intention of the method he has announced, to distinguish the natural parts of political society and the different kinds of rule that they imply. We are made to see at once that the family and property are natural to man in a much more primordial way than is political society: the family and private property are designed primarily to safeguard the very being of men, and property is an instrument of the household. The naturalness of the relationship between man and woman is found in the intention of nature to generate the species, thus making this relationship of persons primary in the sense precisely that it is found also among other animals and in plants. After the natural difference between man and woman, Aristotle speaks of a natural difference founded upon the nature which is proper to man, namely, the rational. And here the primary distinction is not in terms of any ability of the reason, but in terms of the minimum of the reason's ability with respect to the ordering of human acts to the whole end of human life: that is, the distinction is in terms of the practical reason or prudence. Finally, the naturalness of political society is distinguished from that of the family in terms of the final intention of human nature to perfection in the virtues and the arts. Although Aristotle finds in the relationships of persons in the household certain analogues of civil rule, it must not be imagined that the government of a king over his subjects is natural in the same sense that a father's government over his children is natural. The father's rule over his children is like royal rule in civil society because the father rules over his children by love and for their own good; but the rule in political society is over freemen, that is, over men who by their knowledge and will choose their form of government. The nature of a large household and that of a small state are different in regard to government.

It is now possible to see why, from Marx's point of view, Aristotle even more than Plato is guilty of separating human thought from the real man. For with Aristotle, the universal of predication, although having no real existence as a universal, does say something true about all the particulars subsumed under it: community in general does not exist, but of the kinds of community that do exist, the notion of common good is applicable. Hence according to Aristotle the individual man participates in a good which, while it is indeed his own good, is one of which he himself is not the absolute measure: he participates in a common good which is essentially communicable to many, whether it is the common good of that kind of community known as the family, or the common good of that kind of community known as the state. Aristotle indeed affirms the real individual man; it is precisely because he does so that Marx will complain that the good of the individual is alienated by Aristotle allowing that there is a series of common good of which the individual man as such is not the absolute measure. Plato, on the contrary, by holding that the universal of predication has real existence—man in general exists, society in general exists—makes more easily possible the conclusion that Marx will draw: not that the universal of predication does not exist as such, but that it exists as such in every individual man—that every individual man is conscious of himself as being both individual and species.[17] It is in this way that Marx understands the necessity of not separating human thought (which knows the universal) from the real man (the material, sensible individual). Marx is ready to declare that the difference between man and brute animal is precisely that man is conscious of himself as being both individual and species. By the same line of reasoning he declares, at the other extreme from Plato, that it is the individual man who is the whole of society:

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[15] *Politics*, I, ch. 1, 1252ª, 1.

[16] *Ibid.*, 1252ª, 7.

> Man—to whatever degree . . . that he may be a particular individual . . . is as much at the same time the totality, the ideal totality, the subjective existence of society thought and felt for itself.[18]

What Aristotle suggests by way of irony in criticizing Plato—that if he wants the simplest possible unity he ought to reduce the state to the family and the family to the individual—is true of Marx without irony. Indeed, the individual man becomes the totality of *being*: "Socialism . . . takes its departure from the *theoretically and practically sensible conscience* of man in nature, considered as *being*." It is because of this premise that "it becomes impossible practically to ask if there exists a being outside of man. . . ."[19] It follows too, from this obverse-Platonic confusion of the logical with the real order, that any and all forms of social life that do not find and receive their absolute measure in the individual as such, are alienations of his "generic being," and must all be destroyed before man can recover his "initial independence"—that independence which purports to resolve "the antagonisms between man and nature, origin and being, liberty and necessity, individual and species."[20] It becomes evident how the "new man" will be created—the man for whom "the necessity of observing the simple and fundamental rules of human society will pass very rapidly into a state of habitude."[21] The phase of totalitarian suppression of every natural social form will give way to the "higher phase" of communism in which the suppression itself will have become wholly "natural":

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[17] *Manuscript economico-philosophique* (cited in note 13), XXIV, p. 95.

[18] *Oekonomische-philosophische Manuskript*, p. 117.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 125. [20] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

[21] V. Lenin, *The State and Revolution* (Detroit, Michigan), p. 108.

> Communism poses the negation as a negation: it is consequently the *real* element, and indispensable to the historic development of the future, to human emancipation, and the recovery of human dignity. Communism is the necessary form and organic principle of the immediate future, but communism is not itself the goal of human education,—the form of human society.[22]

It should now be clear how this basic matter of the relation of the logical order to the real order affects the whole structure of political theory. Plato's confusion was understandable, for it came at the very beginning of Western speculative efforts. But to confuse the logical order with the real order after Greek philosophy had carefullly distinguished them, seems rather an error on the part of man's will than on the part of his mind. Marx simply completed a modern trend—that of transposing the whole order of nature to the domination of man: its accomplishment by revolutionary "practise" is preceded by a speculative conquest in identifying the order of things in nature with the order which reason puts in its own acts. To do this is to destroy science and to replace it with myth—the myth of Plato's philosopher-king or the myth of the dicatorship of the proletariat. For Aristotle logic is indeed the art of arts, but it is not a magic art; it is employed as an instrument to guide man in an orderly way, with ease and without error, in the construction of true science.

[22] *Oekonomische-philosophische Manuskript*, p. 125.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

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Who handles American foreign relations?

The question has been answered and discussed in terms of the Executive and the Congress in several recent books.[1] We shall attempt here to answer the question in terms of the people who occupy the higher, or policy-making, positions in the Department of State and Foreign Service. Biographical data is published for individuals in this group in the *Biographic Register of the Department of State* and its supplements.

This type of "Who's Who" sketch is limited, of course, to the bare skeletons of men's lives and is worthless as a test of faith and gumption. One of the tragedies, indeed, in the public service since the loyalty program began in 1947 is the fact that loyalty and security risk cannot be proved by social analysis in a time when loyalty and safeness in matters of security are the great questions that overshadow other concerns in any consideration of public personnel. Of the main reasons for finding an employee a poor security risk—wrong political association, bad character, sexual deviation, excessive drinking, or talking too much—none can be measured by any objective standard. Guilt is a matter of degree, and the degree is a matter of opinion among security officers and others who are urged by their climate to be as suspicious as possible.

Skeleton biographies can, nevertheless, answer some questions about the people who handle American foreign affairs. They can tell us the regions of birth, the ages of officials, the types of schools attended, the types of experience prior to government service, and the duration of experience in government.[2] All such answers are relevant to an objective analysis of where we stand for personnel in at least the Department of State and the Foreign Service. We need

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[1] For review articles dealing with the recent literature in this field see Arthur W. Macmahon, "The Administration of Foreign Affairs," this REVIEW, Vol. 45, pp. 836–66 (Sept., 1951); Royden Dangerfield, "Studies in the Administration of United States Foreign Affairs," *Public Administration Review,* Vol. 40, pp. 275–82 (Autumn, 1951). Two important books that have appeared since these review articles were written are Professor Macmahon's *Administration in Foreign Affairs* (University, Ala., 1953); and William Yandell Elliot, *United States Foreign Policy, Its Organization and Control* (New York, 1952).

[2] An analysis similar to the one to follow appears in James L. McCamy, *The Administration of American Foreign Affairs* (New York, 1950), chs. 4 and 8, based upon data of 1948. The main differences between the present study and the earlier one are: (a) The new data are for April, 1952; (b) the new analysis of the Foreign Service covers all Foreign Service Officers and Reserve and all higher officials of the Foreign Service Staff, while the earlier study was based upon a sample of one-third of Foreign Service Officers only. The Foreign Service Staff and Reserve, created by the Foreign Service Act of 1946, were not sufficiently settled in 1948 to permit fruitful analysis.

The work was supported by a grant from the Research Committee of the Graduate School, University of Wisconsin.

the same type of analysis, of course, for other parts of the government, particularly the military, but the data is not easily available.

In the following pages we shall present the analysis of biographical sketches of 7,302 persons as they appeared in the *Biographic Register of the Department of State*, April 1, 1951, and its *Supplement*, April 1, 1952.

The 7,302 persons are divided thus: Foreign Service Officers (career), 1,475; Foreign Service Staff Officers (above Class 9), 2,893; Foreign Service Reserve Officers, 512; Technical Cooperation Administration staff, 100; and Departmental officers, General Schedule Grade 12 and above, 2,322. Included in the total for the Department of State, on duty in Washington, are 179 Foreign Service Officers, 70 Foreign Service Staff Officers, and eight Foreign Service Reserve Officers who are counted twice, in effect, because they also appear under their respective Foreign Service categories. These few individuals do not, we feel, distort the evidence enough to matter. We have not anywhere included 58 non-career or political appointees and 31 officers of the Institute for Inter-American Affairs who do not fall into any of the above categories.

Obviously we are assuming here that persons holding ranks above certain grades and all persons in the career Foreign Service are influential in policy-making. This is defensible. These people do occupy the higher posts and receive the higher salaries. From experience and observation we know that, with the usual few exceptions, persons in the upper half of the federal service and in all the Foreign Service are in positions where they can influence policy.

One common error, for example, is to assume that administrative management officers, such as accountants, budget officers, personnel officers, and those who handle purchases and services, are outside "policy-making." No policy can be executed without their help. Their discretion is broad within their own areas of work. If they want to thwart a program, they can do so easily; and if they want to make one succeed, they can do that too. The wise executive who wants to see his policies reach practice remembers this and consults the management officials at all stages. Similarly the young vice-consul in the Foreign Service, eager-eyed but far from the distant middle age when he will begin to be in charge of some of the work abroad, may in his tender years be placed in charge of immigration cases, at least in their first development. Immigration is delicate foreign policy.

Finally, in introduction, we should define the categories of personnel employed in the Department of State and Foreign Service in 1952.[3]

Foreign Service Officers (career) are a tight inner elite of rigidly selected men (and 20 women) who occupy the key posts in most embassies, legations, and consulates. Ordinarily entering the service just after finishing college, they may, if they rise steadily, end as Career Ministers, eligible to head missions or to hold high posts in the Department of State.

Foreign Service Staff Officers (above Class 9) are for the most part specialists, in contrast to Foreign Service Officers, who are expected to be able to handle any kind of work in a mission. Clerks, stenographers, and other non-policy makers are also in the Staff but are usually below Class 9. Above Class 9, within the group counted here, are the administrative management officials and numerous specialists in labor, agriculture, trade, culture, and other subjects of relevance to the work of a mission. In many cases Staff Officers do the same work as career Foreign Service Officers, although they are not chosen by the same examination and may never reach the peak of rank of Career Minister unless they are admitted to the career service.

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[3] The groups of the Foreign Service were established in the Foreign Service Act of 1946, *Public Law* 724, Chap. 957, 79th Cong., 2nd sess.

Foreign Service Reserve Officers are appointed for temporary tenure. The original purpose was to borrow specialists from other government agencies and from private institutions and to place them in the Reserve for non-career appointments in missions abroad. The chief distinction between this group and the Foreign Service Staff is that appointment to the Reserve is limited to a maximum of four years, although after an interval another appointment is possible. Ranks in the Reserve are the same as in the Foreign Service, except that a Reserve Officer may not become a Career Minister. Only a Foreign Service Officer may become a Career Minister.

Technical Cooperation Administration staff is distinguished here because it was set apart in the missions abroad. Since 1953 it has been a part of the Foreign Operations Administration, not under the Department of State.

Departmental Officers, General Schedule Grade 12 and above is the category that includes those who work in the Department of State in Washington. At the time the data for this analysis was collected, anyone in Grade 12 was paid at least $7,040. The lowest salary in the General Schedule then was $2,500; the highest was $14,800 in Grade 18. An employee in Grade 12 or above was in the upper ranks.

I. REGION OF BIRTH

Is the handling of foreign affairs dominated by persons from the isolationist Midwest, the internationalist South, or any other region? In Table I we compare by region of birth the percentages of personnel in each of the categories with the percentage of white population for the region in the census of 1920, the census year closest to the time when most present higher officials were born. White population alone is chosen because of the insignificant number of Ne-

TABLE I. REGION OF BIRTH: PERCENTAGE OF OFFICIALS BORN IN VARIOUS REGIONS

	FSO	FSS	FSR	TCA	Dept.	Region's White Popul. in 1920 as % of Total U.S. White Population
Northeastern States	37.4	36.5	40.3	28.2	40.3	30.5
North Central States	29.1	29.7	29.3	31.0	28.4	35.0
South	22.5	22.9	19.4	28.2	23.1	25.5
West	11.0	10.9	11.0	12.6	8.2	9.0

groes in these positions. The regions used here are combinations of smaller census regions: the Northeast includes the Middle Atlantic and New England; the North Central, the East and West North Central states; the South, the West and East South Central states and the South Atlantic; and the West includes the Mountain and Pacific states.

Clearly the Northeast has contributed more to the group of permanent officials in foreign affairs than its share of population. For all categories save the Technical Cooperation group, it has contributed an average of 8.1 percentage points more permanent officials than its share of the 1920 white population. The West too has sent a few more people—an average of 1.7 percentage points—into foreign affairs than its share of white population. The North Central Region has contributed an average of 4.0 percentage points lower than its share of white population. The South, including the District of Columbia, has sent to this work an average of 3.5 percentage points less than its share of white population in all categories save Technical Cooperation work, where it showed 2.7 percentage points above its share of white population. Some correction is necessary in the case of the South, however, since the District of Columbia is not typically a part of the South, being more a home of government employees from many regions. If we remove the District of Columbia from the South, the South's deficit rises to an average of 6.3 percentage points except for Technical Cooperation personnel where there is a surplus unchanged of 2.7 percentage points.

Relatively more people from the Northeastern United States and from the West have reached the higher positions in foreign affairs. These two regions, by Ralph Smuckler's analysis, have tended to be more internationalist than isolationist.[4] Proportionately fewer people have entered this work from the North Central region and from the South. Of these regions, the North Central has tended to be isolationist; the South has tended to be internationalist.

Certainly no cause and effect can be established from such evidence. Probably no conclusion is warranted. The data, shall we say, simply show that, with the exception of the South, persons born in the more internationalist regions have tended more than those in the North Central region to occupy the higher posts in the Department of State and Foreign Service. No one region is so dominant that it need cause alarm.

II. AGE

Are our policy-makers in foreign relations too young to have good judgment? Or too old to have imagination and initiative? Table II shows the percentage of higher officials in each of five age groups.

Young men of age 20–30 form a larger percentage of the career Foreign Service Officer group because all Foreign Service Officers are counted here as pol-

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[4] Ralph Smuckler, "The Region of Isolationism," this REVIEW, Vol. 47, pp. 386–401 (June, 1953). While the nation is not divided as neatly as most conversation has it, Professor Smuckler does find that according to votes in Congress the North Central region is more isolationist than other regions. See also George L. Grassmuck, *Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Vol. 78, 1951).

TABLE II. AGE: PERCENTAGE OF POLICY-MAKING OFFICIALS IN EACH GROUP

	FSO	FSS	FSR	TCA	Dept.
20–30 years	16.8	7.6	3.0	2.0	1.9
31–40	42.0	44.0	36.7	31.3	43.7
41–50	24.1	30.5	39.0	41.4	37.0
51–60	15.8	14.3	17.5	19.2	13.9
61 or more	1.3	3.6	3.8	6.1	3.5

icy-makers. Younger men in the other categories have not yet reached the higher ranks where policy-makers reside in this analysis. Relatively few young men, below the age of 30, occupy higher posts in the Department of State and Foreign Service, with the exception of the group of career Foreign Service Officers. Most officials bunch in the two decades of 31 to 50 years. For whatever reasons (death, illness, early retirement, resignation), there is a sharp drop in the percentage of ages above 51. Only small, insignificant percentages are above 61 years of age.

If the executives of the rank of division chief and higher in the Department of State are analyzed separately, they are somewhat older than the whole group. Thus 45.5 per cent of these top executives are 41–50 years old compared to 37.0 per cent of all the Department's officials, and 17.3 per cent are 51–60 years old compared to 13.9 per cent for the whole group. There is no difference in the age group of 61 and more; 3.6 per cent of the top executives and 3.5 per cent of the whole group are 61 years old or older.

Older men and women in many societies are considered to have learned more and to be wiser than middle-aged or younger people. In our own society we often use older people as leaders in Congress and in business. We use very few above 61 years of age in the Department of State and Foreign Service.

III. THE EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN

As one might expect in our culture, few women are admitted to the Foreign Service or the higher posts of the Department of State. The lowest percentage is found in the group of career Foreign Service Officers, where only 1.3 per cent of all officers are women. The highest percentage is found in the Foreign Service Staff, where 13.5 per cent of the higher employees are women. The Department of State has 11.8 per cent women among its officials; the Foreign Service Reserve 5.1 per cent, and Technical Cooperation Administration 3.0 per cent. For all groups together 9.8 per cent are women.

IV. EDUCATION

Preparatory School. We now reach the delicate question of whether the people who handle foreign relations are typical of the whole population in the type of schooling they received. It is delicate because some would argue that atypical education is better than public, or typical, education and hence produces better trained public officials. Others argue that private schooling encourages snobbism and is removed from the democratic elbow-rubbing of public high schools. First, the facts: 39.8 per cent of Foreign Service Officers, 34.2 per cent of Foreign Service staff, 35.7 per cent of the Foreign Service Reserve, and 34.3 per cent of Department of State Officials went to private preparatory schools. Comparable data were not available for Technical Cooperation Administration.

Private schools in the United States were identified in Porter Sargent's *A Handbook of Private Schools, 1951–1952*. All training in schools abroad was assumed to be private. If the individuals educated abroad are removed from the total, however, some considerable differences appear for all groups except the career Foreign Service Officers. Omitting foreign schools the percentages are: Foreign Service Officers, 36.0; Foreign Service Staff, 19.5; Foreign Service Reserve, 22.6; Technical Cooperation Administration, no data; and Department of State, 26.6. We believe that, regardless of these differences, the percentages based upon the inclusion of individuals trained abroad is the more descriptive. Those who went to high school abroad, whether public or private, were trained in a different manner and different climate than were those educated in American public high schools. If we are seeking light on the type of schooling, the foreign schools are distinct.

In 1938, when a person born in 1920 would have been ready to leave high school, only 7.08 per cent of the total of all high school graduates in the nation came from private schools. In that year enrollment in private high schools was divided 69.4 per cent in Catholic schools, 11.9 per cent in other denominational schools, and 18.7 per cent in non-sectarian schools.[5] It is not within our present resources to say how many officials came from Catholic, other denominational, or non-sectarian private high schools.

Without question the heavy weight of private schooling is significant. This tendency toward the employment of private school graduates has a long history in the Foreign Service, at least, and shows no sign of changing. When we compare the various classes, or by inference age groups, from the youngest recruits in the beginning class to the older officers at the top, we find that the percentages are fairly evenly distributed from youngest to oldest officials in all three branches of the Foreign Service: Officers, Staff, and Reserve.

One can only speculate concerning why private school graduates are more prevalent in this work than in the population. Perhaps private school graduates are more travelled and more interested in work abroad. Perhaps they come from families where diplomatic work carries more prestige than work in the vineyards of business or professions or government agencies not equally concerned with foreign relations. Perhaps private schools create more interest in careers in diplomacy. Whatever the reason, the fact is that private schools are represented in the Foreign Service and in the Department of State in a much higher proportion than in the total population.

Colleges and Universities Attended. As is shown in Table III, many colleges and universities have contributed graduates and former students to the ranks of officials who handle foreign affairs. (In this sense a college gives only the first degree; a university gives the first and also advanced degrees.)

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[5] U. S. Office of Education, *Biennial Survey of Education, 1937–38* (Washington, G.P.O. 1940).

TABLE III. NUMBER OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES IN WHICH POLICY-MAKING OFFICIALS TOOK UNDERGRADUATE AND GRADUATE WORK

	FSO	FSS	FSR	TCA	Dept.
American Colleges	125	298	79	36	229
American Universities	121	179	90	48	142
Foreign Colleges	21	23	8	—	20
Foreign Universities	57	109	48	3	113
Totals	324	609	225	87	504

The next question is whether the greater number of these officials come from a relatively small number of institutions. To answer this—except in the case of the Department of State officials, for whom the data was certain only for college attendance in general—we have chosen undergraduate training as the most typical. It can be taken in more institutions. Graduate work and professional training are available in fewer places, and the circumstance of studying while working at a job often dictates the choice of a school.

One way to show the distribution is to list those institutions which have contributed half of the total of policy-making officials (Tables IV–VII). Technical Cooperation can be eliminated from this consideration. Only six institutions were represented by more than one graduate among its officials, and none by more than four officials. For all other groups, the percentage contributed declines steadily once the schools at the top have been passed: Harvard, Princeton, and Yale for the Foreign Service Officers; California and Harvard for the Foreign Service Staff; Harvard for the Foreign Service Reserve; and Columbia, Harvard, and George Washington for Department of State officials.

TABLE IV. PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS WHO RECEIVED UNDERGRADUATE TRAINING IN INSTITUTIONS THAT TRAINED ONE-HALF OF ALL OFFICERS IN THIS GROUP

(Total Who Received Bachelor's Degree or Equivalent = 1,306)

	Number	Per Cent		Number	Per Cent
Harvard	128	9.8	Columbia	25	1.9
Princeton	101	7.7	Dartmouth	25	1.9
Yale	96	7.3	Chicago	20	1.5
Georgetown	61	4.7	Wisconsin	20	1.5
California	56	4.3	Virginia	19	1.5
Stanford	38	2.9	U. of Washington	17	1.3
George Washington	32	2.4	City College, N.Y.	16	1.3
			Totals	654	50.0

TABLE V. PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN SERVICE STAFF OFFICERS WHO RECEIVED UNDERGRADUATE TRAINING IN INSTITUTIONS THAT TRAINED ONE-HALF OF ALL OFFICERS IN THIS GROUP

(Total Who Received Bachelor's Degree or Equivalent=1,282)

	Number	Per Cent		Number	Per Cent
California	54	4.2	Cornell	21	1.6
Harvard	49	3.9	Illinois	21	1.6
Yale	34	2.7	Texas	19	1.5
Georgetown	33	2.6	Stanford	17	1.3
George Washington	31	2.4	U. of Washington	16	1.2
Michigan	31	2.4	City College, N.Y.	14	1.0
Princeton	28	2.2	Ohio State	14	1.0
Columbia	24	1.9	Pennsylvania	14	1.0
Chicago	23	1.8	Dartmouth	13	1.0
Minnesota	23	1.8	Other*	148	11.5
Wisconsin	22	1.7			
			Totals	649	50.3

* Includes 26 institutions, none of which contributed more than .9 per cent of the total.

TABLE VI. PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN SERVICE RESERVE OFFICERS WHO RECEIVED UNDERGRADUATE TRAINING IN INSTITUTIONS THAT TRAINED ONE-HALF OF ALL OFFICERS IN THIS GROUP

(Total Who Received Bachelor's Degree or Equivalent=293)

	Number	Per Cent		Number	Per Cent
Harvard	21	7.2	Columbia	5	1.7
Princeton	14	4.8	Georgetown	5	1.7
California	12	4.0	Illinois	5	1.7
Stanford	10	3.4	Pennsylvania	5	1.7
Wisconsin	10	3.4	Michigan	4	1.3
Dartmouth	9	3.0	North Carolina	4	1.3
Yale	9	3.0	Virginia	4	1.3
Chicago	7	2.4	U. of Washington	4	1.3
George Washington	7	2.4	Other*	12	4.1
			Totals	147	50.0

* Includes five institutions, none of which contributed more than 1.0 per cent.

The first conclusion to be drawn from these tables is that the education of Foreign Service Officers is more concentrated in a few institutions than is that of the Foreign Service Staff, Foreign Service Reserve, or Department of State higher officials. Fourteen institutions trained half of the 1,306 career Foreign Service Officers, while 46 institutions trained half of the 1,282 Foreign Service Staff, 22 institutions half of the 293 Foreign Service Reserve officers, and 24 institutions half of the 3,451 higher officials of the Department of State.

TABLE VII. PERCENTAGE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICIALS WHO ATTENDED INSTITUTIONS REPORTED BY HALF OF THIS GROUP

(Total Attendances at Institutions=3,451)*

	Number	Per Cent		Number	Per Cent
Columbia	254	7.4	Wisconsin	51	1.5
Harvard	236	6.8	Michigan	49	1.4
George Washington	180	5.2	Stanford	45	1.3
Yale	101	2.9	City College, N.Y.	44	1.3
Georgetown	99	2.9	Pennsylvania	42	1.2
American Univ.	98	2.8	Cornell	38	1.1
Chicago	89	2.6	Fletcher School	36	1.0
New York Univ.	75	2.2	Minnesota	34	1.0
Princeton	68	2.0	Other†	176	5.1
California	64	1.9			
			Totals	1,779	51.6

* Note that this list differs from the others. It represents attendance at institutions for any kind of degree or sometimes for no degree at all, while the other lists reflect receipt of the bachelor's degree or its equivalent.

† Includes six institutions, none of which contributed more than .9 per cent.

A second conclusion is that the same institutions recur in all the lists with striking regularity. Of the 14 that trained half of the career Foreign Service Officers, 10 appear in all the other lists. They are Harvard, California, Stanford, Yale, Princeton, Georgetown, George Washington, Columbia, Chicago, and Wisconsin. Dartmouth and City College of New York appear in all the lists save one.

The third conclusion is that no easy generalization can be made about the types of institutions that stand out, if that term can be applied to those which appear near the top of the lists although they do not contribute percentages large enough to be dominant. Location means little. Some of the Northeastern institutions draw students from all over the nation. In any case, of the 10 institutions that appear in all the lists, four are in the Northeast, two in the North Central region, and two in the West. Two are in the District of Columbia and their location may attract students who are already at work in government or who want to be near government while they attend college. Enrollment has no relevance. Perhaps two generalizations can be suggested. First, most of these institutions have reputations for strong social studies departments and especially for strong political science and international relations departments. Second, the training in most of them is broad in the liberal arts rather than narrowly vocational in the field of social studies, although Georgetown is known for a curriculum designed to prepare students especially for foreign affairs.

Degrees and College Attendance. Finally, under the heading of education, the biographies reveal the types of degrees received and attendance at college or university even though no degrees were received. Table VIII shows the percentage of officials in each category holding various degrees or attending college without receiving degrees. Since the same individual may hold more than one degree or may hold a degree and still attend a college without taking further degrees, the percentages do not add up to 100.0.

TABLE VIII. PERCENTAGE OF OFFICIALS WITH COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY TRAINING

	FSO	FSS	FSR	TCA	Dept.
B.A. or Equivalent	88.5	72.3	83.2	82.6	81.7
Law Degrees	5.3	13.8	13.1	2.9	14.8
Other Degrees	2.5	2.0	2.3	10.1	3.6
Attended College, No Degree	7.7	22.5	11.4	13.0	13.8
M.A. or Equivalent	28.8	23.3	37.7	43.5	35.8
Ph.D. Degree	4.6	6.5	17.6	13.0	13.7
Graduate Work, No Degree	25.1	17.1	20.5	21.7	23.9

The striking conclusion from Table VIII is that graduate work is so prevalent. The master's degree is held by 28.8 per cent of career Foreign Service Officers, by 23.3 per cent of Staff Officers, and by a much higher percentage of Reserve and Technical Cooperation officers and of officials of the Department of State. Ph.D. degrees are held by 17.6 per cent of the Foreign Service Reserve Officers. Probably this higher showing of graduate degrees in the Foreign Service Reserve and Technical Cooperation Administration is the result of specialization in commodities, techniques, or fields to be expected of these branches of the Foreign Service.

On the whole, one can conclude that insofar as schooling and degrees represent education, these officials are highly educated.

V. EXPERIENCE OUTSIDE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Equally significant with education is the type of experience foreign affairs officials have had. From the data available we can tell, for example, what proportion have known no other trade; what proportion have had more experience outside government than in it; how many have had only a few and how many a variety of experiences outside government; how many have had experience in other types of government work; and how many have lived abroad in one area long enough to become expert in the area.

First, in Table IX, we can see grossly the percentages of employees in the various categories who have had experience outside the federal government of more than five years, less than five years, or none at all. Five years is used not only to simplify the presentation but also because it perhaps represents on the average the length of time necessary to acquire the experience that counts in so many professions. Less than five years in professional work is almost transient labor; more than five is more maturing; five years is just about the time necessary to gain assurance in the knowledge and the practices of a professional vocation. At least we have so assumed in these calculations.

Education, i.e. school and college teaching or administration, stands out for

TABLE IX. PERCENTAGES OF OFFICIALS WITH EXPERIENCE OUTSIDE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, BY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE

	FSO	FSS	FSR	TCA	Dept.
More than 5 yrs.	20.8	25.3	31.7	62.0	32.3
Less than 5 yrs.	44.7	37.3	32.9	15.0	33.7
No Experience	34.5	37.4	35.4	23.0	34.0

Table X shows how varied are the fields in which officials have had experience outside the federal government.

TABLE X. FIELDS OF EXPERIENCE OUTSIDE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICIALS WITH ANY EXPERIENCE

	FSO	FSS	FSR	TCA	Dept.
Education	26.4	19.4	27.5	18.0	26.7
Films, Press, Radio	11.0	15.1	21.5	.7	21.9
Business	16.8	14.2	13.7	13.7	9.7
Professions	10.0	11.2	10.2	18.7	16.4
Clerical Work	13.3	18.5	7.3	12.2	17.9
Banking	5.5	5.0	4.2	.7	3.9
Research	2.9	1.8	5.1	1.5	*
Foreign Governments & International Organization	4.3	2.0	4.2	7.2	*
State & Local Governments	2.8	5.6	3.3	17.3	*
Agriculture, Mining, Lumber	1.7	2.0	.5	4.3	*
Social Work	2.9	3.3	1.8	5.0	*
Other	2.4	1.9	.7	.7	3.5

* Included in "Other" category because too small to be significant.

all of the groups of officials, so much so that it is perhaps the only single field that can be said to be a main source of experience outside the federal government. Film, press, and radio work, second on the list, appears here because at the time the analysis was made the United States Information Agency, which administered the overseas information program, was a part of the Department of State. It became an independent agency in 1953. The significance of this experience remains as true for this new agency as when it was in the Department. Officials directing propaganda work might be expected to be drawn from work with the mass media.

Except in the case of these two fields, foreign affairs officials who have had any experience outside of government come from such a variety of experience that it is impossible to say that they are predominantly from any one field. Not even education can be said to be dominant. Only about a fourth of the officials have had experience in education. On the whole our officials do not come mainly from business, banking, law, or any other field.

Add to the variety of outside experience the fact that a majority have had either no experience or less than five years experience in any of the fields, as shown in Table IX, and it becomes clear that no one vocational group dominates the handling of American foreign affairs. We have instead a group of public officials experienced mainly in government but some with experience in a variety of nongovernmental fields.

VI. EXPERIENCE IN OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES

Also relevant to the kind of experience officials have had is the extent of their work in federal agencies other than the Department of State and the Foreign Service. Foreign affairs are to some degree a concern of all federal agencies. The Department of State and the Foreign Service are expected to represent the whole federal executive when they conduct foreign relations. If they draw their higher officials from other agencies, more inter-agency understanding might be expected or, on the contrary, the use of people from other agencies might dilute the expertness of long-experienced and trained specialists in foreign affairs.

TABLE XI. DISTRIBUTION OF POSITIONS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES OTHER THAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE OR FOREIGN SERVICE

	FSO	FSS	FSR	TCA	Dept.
Number of Positions	537	1,835	357	81	2,042
Number of Officials	1,475	2,893	512	100	2,322
Number of Positions per 100 Officials	36.4	63.4	69.7	81.0	87.8

The data in Table XI show that Foreign Service Officers have had relatively less experience in other federal agencies than have the Staff, Reserve, Technical Cooperation, or Department of State officials.

The duration of experience is also relevant. Without going into detail, we can say that in most cases experience in federal agencies other than the Department of State and Foreign Service was for periods of less than five years.

In the case of Foreign Service Officers, we should point out that in addition to the work in other federal agencies shown above, 61 officers, or 4.1 per cent of the officers for whom data on this point were available, had been detailed to the National War College or other service schools; and 103, or 7.0 per cent, had been assigned to the Foreign Service Institute or to universities for training.

Military service is a special kind of experience. Usually it has little relevance to work in civilian life, but sometimes it does. In any case it is experience in the lives of men and women and has its lessons. We should record it without comment or conclusion concerning what it means. The percentages of veterans, the majority from World War II, are: Foreign Service Officers 50.7; Foreign Service Staff 40.8; Foreign Service Reserve 38.0; and Department of State 36.8. Sufficient data were not available for Technical Cooperation Administration.

VII. EXPERIENCE IN AREAS

One reason for having a career foreign service is that its officers can become expert in the cultures, politics, and economies of other areas. In Table XII we examine the duration of assignment of Foreign Service Officers in the various regions of the world. This analysis is limited to the career Foreign Service Officers because the other branches of the Foreign Service have not yet been in existence long enough to permit analysis. For a similar reason the analysis is confined to career officers of Class IV and above. Officers in Classes V and VI have not been in the service long enough to become expert. Note that again a five-year term in one region is assumed to be the reasonable time required to become a specialist. This can be argued with added conviction when we are speaking, as here, mainly about areas, or regions that include usually more than one nation. They are the areas by which the Department of State's work in political relations is organized. Only in a few instances, for geographical or political reasons, is there a division in Washington devoted to relations with a single nation.

TABLE XII. NUMBER OF ASSIGNMENTS ABROAD OF FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS, CLASS IV AND ABOVE, BY REGION

Region	0–5 Yrs.	6–10 Yrs.	11 or More Yrs.
Eastern Europe	113	12	2
Central Europe	137	22	6
Southern Europe	159	18	4
Northern Europe	151	11	4
Western Europe	287	77	20
China	80	28	27
Northeast Asia	61	25	2
Southeast Asia	95	9	1
Philippines	38	2	1
Greece, Turkey, Iran	86	7	1
Near East	78	13	3
Southern Asia	92	7	1
Africa	137	21	9
Mexico	125	20	3
Caribbean	153	14	1
Central America	146	16	1
Brazil	84	10	2
River Plate	103	12	1
North & West Coast, South America	162	17	4
Australia & New Zealand	58	11	1
Canada	167	23	2
Total Assignments	2,512	375	96

We are dealing in Table XII, to repeat, with assignments and not men. In other words, the number of assignments received by all Foreign Service Officers of Class IV and above is distributed in the above table according to the duration of time spent in each area. The result is a reflection of the relatively few area specialists developed by more than five years spent consecutively in an area. In percentages, 84.2 per cent of all the assignments in the careers of these officers of Class IV and above has been for less than six years in any area; 12.6 per cent for 6–10 years; and 3.2 per cent for 11 years or more.

At best only those officers who have received assignments of six, or more years' duration in an area can be called specialists in that area. Such officers made up just about 15 per cent of the total at work in April, 1952. All officers may have acquired skills in the routine work of a mission, in the writing of reports, or in the administration of immigration laws, but they are not skilled in knowledge of the sort that comes from prolonged observation or study of an area.

VIII. YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A final clue which the skeleton biographies afford as to the kind of foreign officials we have is the amount of experience these officials have had in this kind of work. Some of them have had experience in foreign relations, no doubt, in their work outside government or in their work with federal agencies other than the Department of State or the Foreign Service. We cannot identify these individuals, however, from their biographies. One group we can say with assurance is devoted to work in foreign relations: the one enfolded by the Department of State and the Foreign Service. In Table XII we presented data on the duration of area assignments of Foreign Service Officers. In Table XIII we report the length of service within the Department of State of those for whom the information is available. This can be called the measure of experience in foreign affairs for those in Washington rather than abroad.[6]

TABLE XIII. YEARS OF SERVICE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Years	Number Reported	Percentage of Total	Cumulative Percentage
0–1	412	17.8	—
2	344	14.8	32.6
3	289	12.4	45.0
4	176	7.6	52.6
5	139	6.0	58.6
6–10	754	32.5	91.1
11–15	67	2.9	94.0
16–20	46	2.0	96.0
21–25	37	1.6	97.6
26–30	27	1.1	98.7
31 or more	31	1.3	100.0
Totals	2,322	100.0	

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[6] The United States is one of the few nations that still separates its "foreign office" personnel from its foreign service. Surveyors in recent years, the Hoover Commission, the Rowe Committee, the Wriston Committee, have recommended a merger. By the time this appears, a merger may have been started. On the other hand, it may not. Much can happen, as it has happened, between the issuance of a report with recommendations and the final outcome. For the recommendations, see Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Foreign Affairs, A Report to the Congress* (Washington,

The most striking revelation in Table XIII is that 58.6 per cent of the policy-making officials of the Department of State have been working in this department only five years or less. Even so, this is fewer than the 80 per cent who were found in the similar computation of officials listed in 1948.

We might ask whether the topmost among these officials are not long experienced; for if they are, then as leaders they may supply the knowledge and poise that comes from long experience in foreign relations. Top executives for this purpose are defined as chiefs of divisions or higher in the hierarchy. These top executives do tend to have more experience than all policy-making officials as a group, but it is still true that many do not have much experience in the Department. Almost half of the top executives have had 6–10 years experience in the Department, compared to about one-third of all the officials. Still 41.3 per cent of the top executives have had five years or less of total service in the Department of State. While this is a smaller percentage than the 58.6 per cent of all officials who have had the same brief experience, it indicates nonetheless that a considerable number of the top executives have had relatively slight experience in the Department.

IX. CONCLUSION

The people who handle American foreign affairs in the Department of State and Foreign Service may be characterized as follows:

1. They come from a variety of regional and educational backgrounds, with the exception that the private preparatory school is represented among them in larger proportion than in the total population. The wide distribution of their college training tones down any emphasis that might be given to the rather high percentage of officials trained in private preparatory schools. The facts do not support the assumption that our officials in this work are predominantly the products of "finishing schools" and a few Ivy League colleges.
2. Very few women have reached higher levels in this field.
3. Generally speaking these officials are relatively young or middle-aged. Only about 15 per cent are between 50 and 60 years of age and only about 3 per cent are above age 60. This work is handled neither by older men who might have become tired, infirm, or too set in their ways, nor by elder statesmen who might have gained in acquaintance, poise, and wisdom.
4. One-third of these officials have had no experience at all outside the Department of State and Foreign Service. Of the two-thirds who have had some experience, somewhat more than one-half have had less than five years of such experience. The fields in which these officials have had experience are widely varied, from education to banking, from professions to clerical work, from press, radio, and films to international organizations and foreign governments. Experience in other federal agencies is about the same in amount and variety as in non-

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G.P.O., Feb., 1949), pp. 61–68; James H. Rowe *et al.*, *An Improved Personnel System for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs* (Washington, Dept. of State, 1950); U.S. Dept. of State Publication 5458, *Toward A Stronger Foreign Service* (Washington, G.P.O., June, 1954), pp. 25–35.

governmental fields. We can conclude, therefore, that American officials in foreign affairs bring to their present work a variety of experience from other fields. This fact is an asset when we consider the great variety of subjects that make up present-day foreign relations. Officials who have had varied experiences may well be more resourceful in their work in foreign affairs than those who have not.

5. At the same time, as an offset to the variety of background, it must be concluded that we have no long-experienced, highly skilled group of professional diplomats in charge of American foreign relations. We have instead in the Department of State and Foreign Service (in a majority of the policy-making positions) officials who are new in this kind of work; who must learn as much as possible while rushing headlong in the job, making decisions as they run; and who do not have many elder statesmen to guide them.

For the Department of State, brief experience in the Department is conspicuous. For the Foreign Service Staff and Reserve, both new since 1946, brief experience might be expected, although some of these officers were in the Foreign Service Auxiliary or in other federal agencies abroad during World War II.

If we turn to the career Foreign Service Officers to discover expertness, we find that their terms of service in particular world areas are usually too short to allow them to become area specialists in any true definition of the term. Career officers may know the practices of diplomatic and consular work, but with few exceptions they can hardly claim to be experts in areas or in the large politics of general international relations. A mere knowledge of techniques is not enough to justify calling most Foreign Service Officers skilled professional diplomats; or at any rate they are not experts in the same sense as are specialists in internal medicine, professors of science or letters, or lawyers, all of whom, to be qualified, must go far beyond an understanding of the techniques of diagnosis, research, or the preparation of briefs to an understanding of both the details and the totality of their subjects. Perhaps the strongest reason for merging domestic and overseas personnel and for wiping out the present distinctions in the foreign service is the fact that, except for a knowledge of routine techniques, not enough difference exists between Foreign Service Officers and other people in foreign affairs to justify keeping the groups separate.

One can argue on both sides as to the desirability of having inexperienced people in charge of our foreign affairs. In a large sense, the amateur may be more reflective of popular will and thus more democratic. He may be more adaptable to new needs. He may also, on the other hand, make repeated errors of judgment because he has not learned his work in the depth required for sound decisions. But no matter what position one takes on the merits, it is pointless to argue at present that the *experts in foreign relations* should be given much more voice than they have in the making of policy decisions. The evidence shows that we really have only a minority of officials who can be called experts in foreign affairs.

CHARISMA IN THE 1952 CAMPAIGN*

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I

The term charisma—miraculously-given power—was transferred by Max Weber from its original religious meaning to politics. He described it as "the absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual leadership."[1] He contrasts charisma with leadership based on custom and tradition or on competence related to "rationally created rules" of law. The charismatic leader is thus the one whose claim to rule is neither as a perpetuator of traditional values nor as one who resolves conflicting interests by reasonable and just means but as one endowed with superhuman powers to solve political problems. In the abstract, pure case he is seen by his followers as being *all*-powerful, *all*-wise, and morally *perfect*.

One of the outstanding characteristics of charismatic rule is its mass base. Unlike the palace revolutionary or the condottiere, the charismatic ruler is not content with gaining and maintaining control merely over the machinery of government—the police, administrative offices, legislature, and courts. He consciously seeks to gain control over the individual citizen, not just by the threat of force but perhaps more significantly by appealing for affirmative and enthusiastic devotion. The leader seeks not passive acceptance of his rule but an active identification of the citizens' needs and expectations with his own and those of the nation. The political demands of individuals become uniform, at least on the manifest level, and are absorbed in and merged with the economic, social, and ethnic demands of the nation, as these are expressed by the leader. A greater portion of the individual's life finds its expression in politics. The charismatic follower becomes an undifferentiated, cancerous cell in the body politic.

Charisma is therefore not a characteristic of leaders as such but a relationship between leader and followers. It depends both on the construction by a leader and his associates of an image of him as infallible, omniscient, and incorruptible and on a positive, active response to this kind of image-building by those who are predisposed toward such leadership. The "compleat" charismatic follower is oriented in politics toward candidates in a particular way, rather than toward parties or issues. He tends to divide political figures on the basis of strength or weakness, omnicompetence or utter incompetence, righteousness or iniquity. He is unable to see any but good qualities in the leader he accepts or to see any good qualities in the one he rejects. Although strong liking for a candidate is not in itself evidential, for charismatics the emotional attraction of a candidate is predominant and is coupled with the feeling that the leader is the incarnation of all virtues.

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* This analysis is derived from data gathered in the study of the 1952 presidential campaign and election that was made by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. The general study was under the sponsorship of the Committee on Political Behavior of the Social Science Research Council under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation. The study is published as *The Voter Decides*, by Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren H. Miller (Evanston, Ill., 1954). I wish simultaneously to thank very warmly these three people and others who advised on and facilitated this analysis and to free them, the SSRC Committee on Political Behavior, and the Carnegie Corporation of any responsibility for the data and conclusions herein presented.

[1] *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (New York, 1946), p. 79.

In contrast, the non-charismatic person who is nevertheless oriented toward leader rather than party or issues tends to evaluate candidates quantitatively, saying that one is generally better than the other—rather than that one is good, the other bad—and assessing them in terms of specific characteristics indicative of relative competence, skill, experience, or integrity.

Pure charismatic leaders and followers are ideal types unlikely to be found in actual situations. There are doubtless some charismatic tendencies in all candidates for popularly elected office above the level of sanitation supervisor. The well-known panegyrics of those who introduce candidates at public gatherings as often as not are full of hackneyed phrases suggesting the power of their men to move mountains, stop the tides, and gain or regain Utopia within two weeks of taking office. There are doubtless some tendencies in all voters to believe that the candidate of their choice is superhuman and that his opponent is infrahuman. For, campaign hyperbole aside, the phenomenon of strong leadership is perhaps only rarely divorced completely from the will to be or to follow a leader who will make no mistakes and suffer no defeat at the hands of malignant, real enemies and hostile, shadowy forces. In politics, neither St. George nor the dragon is ever quite dead.

Charisma in a nation becomes crucial when it is the dominant characteristic of leaders and a "substantial" number of followers. It is hard to say how large a proportion of followers "substantial" is. Without the interposition of other political forces, a majority of the voting population would be needed to establish government by charisma. The tendency of strongly charismatic leaders to seek power by the use of violence, intimidation, and fraud indicates their deep-seated reluctance to rely even primarily on persuasion and their recognition, perhaps, that in no society at any time can enough people be trusted to believe in the infallibility of any one man.

The political institutions, the degree of territorial integration, and the facilities for communication are also related to the incidence of charisma. Thus, in periods of the Middle Ages when vast numbers of people were in despair because of depredations of famine and disease, the absence of the basis for mass political mobilization of the populace effectively precluded the emergence of charismatic political leaders on more than an immediate, essentially face-to-face level in towns and cities. In those modern Western states where both political traditions of orderly solution of problems and the institutionalized patterns of limited government are strong and effective, again the emergence of charisma is made difficult despite the fact that a mass base is available.

Because of the great variability of leaders, followers, and the situations in which they interact, the same leader may be seen by particular individuals as charismatic or non-charismatic. During crisis, when more individuals are more uncertain of what should be done in politics, the number of individuals searching for charismatic leaders will increase. A charismatic leader in non-critical times will have relatively less chance to gain political power because of the dearth of individuals who will respond to his clarion call. The failure of charismatic leaders to appear during a crisis period will also frustrate the spread of charisma.

The charismatic phenomenon in a large modern state may therefore be regarded as a function of the interaction of at least these five determinants: (1) the existence of leaders predisposed to make a charismatic appeal; (2) the prevalence of followers predisposed to respond to this appeal; (3) the weakness or strength of political traditions and institutions that inhibit the solution of problems through supermen; (4) a degree of political integration that causes people to turn to the government rather than other institutions (such as family, church, union, service club, or local government) for problem solution; and (5) the existence of crisis.

This last determinant, which has already been mentioned, merits further elaboration. Crisis that has political relevance may arise from at least three different kinds of source. It may result from a feeling of insecurity or anxiety with respect to basic human needs such as food, shelter, health, and physical survival. Chronic failure to satisfy these needs may result in such complete individual preoccupation with staying alive and well as to preclude effective joint political action. The situation in which these needs are satisfied to the extent that time and energy are available for political action, but in which there is persistent fear of the failure to meet these needs, is much more portentous of crisis.

Crisis may also result from a sense of frustration of demands on a level different from that related to the support of life. Despite relative prosperity and health, there may, for example, arise a situation in which there is widespread dissatisfaction with the control structure of the society. Even though there may be basic physical security for most individuals, if a substantial portion of them feel that they are deprived of a fair share of the goods produced in the economy by those who control goods distribution, they may unite politically for the overthrow of the governors. They may unite primarily to overthrow political domination by foreigners, as in the case of colonies rebelling against the mother country—even though economic hegemony by foreigners may continue to be tolerated or ignored.

A third source of crisis is the persistence of unresolved conflict between forces seeking dominance intra- or internationally. This source, which is distinguishable from but perhaps ordinarily associated with one or both of the others mentioned, produces crisis to the extent that people and leaders feel no longer able or willing to tolerate political irresolution. A prolonged internal revolutionary situation or one in which a reform government fails to end deeply divisive conflict within the country may create a crisis. A prolonged conflict between governments, with or without intermittent periods of peace, may have like effect.

One feature of crisis—particularly of the third sort mentioned—that merits emphasis is that it need not involve conflict which divides the society into two warring camps on an economic, class, or other basis. The conflict may not be between capital and labor, tenant farmers and landlords, one region and another but between two small factions struggling for control of the government—factions operating outside the accustomed or the legal techniques of seeking such control. Or the conflict may be a quiet one within individuals themselves who, regardless of class or religious or traditional party differences, are united in their growing intolerance of perceived incompetence or inadequacy of established rulers and established political rules. These individuals are torn within themselves as to whether to turn to new leaders operating in accord with traditional or rational patterns of political action or new leaders whose appeal is: follow me and turn over to me irrevocably the responsibility for making the decisions on those problems which I say are problems and on which I shall establish and administer policy through control of the government, for I am strong and through me you will get strength.

The political phenomenon of charisma is new only in name. Its demagogic and irrational basis was described by Plato in the discussion of rhetoric in the *Gorgias*. The tyrants in the Greek city-states, Alexander the Great and the succession of Roman Emperors starting with Augustus, were to some extent dependent on charisma for their rule. Augustus appears to have tolerated and unofficially encouraged the building of his popular image as a superhuman. Three centuries later the Emperor Aurelian had medals of himself struck with the inscriptions "Lord" and "God." More recent charismatic rulers, like Napoleon I, Hitler, Stalin, and Huey Long have avoided the label "god," being content with possessing, in the minds of their followers, more than mortal but perhaps only demigodly powers.

Charisma seems most likely to occur during periods when the force of neither tradition nor reason appears to be adequate to cope with mounting political crisis. In the course of the French Revolution, when ancient monarchical tradition had failed and its successor, Reason, brought only evident anarchy, a superman was able to unite France in the pursuit of its supposed destiny to rule all of Europe. Similarly, in Germany, after the breakdown of Imperial rule and even pre-Bismarckian tradition, came the seemingly impotent Republic with its rule of law through the Weimar constitution and parliament. Again a superman gained control, in the pursuit of a similar, even more ambitious destiny.

II

The domestic and international situation during the 1952 national election campaign was a crisis of the sort resulting from persistent, unresolved conflict. There was relatively little insecurity about basic needs of food, shelter, and health—and only the memory of the depression. There was no great outcry to put down malefactors or even accumulators of great wealth. But war, the threat of war, and the memory of two wars which was reinforced by the ongoing Korean conflict, were all factors gnawing at individuals' peace of mind like an eagle plucking daily the liver of Prometheus, the Titan who stole fire from the gods to benefit mankind. A comparison of this crisis period with others in the United States and elsewhere is impossible in terms of its psychic impact on the general public. One can hazard the guess that as a crisis the years after World War II and the Korean conflict do not seem so capable of producing a sense of individual insecurity as the shock of the depression years. Nevertheless the vagueness and pervasiveness of the current conflict, involving as it does the fear of all-out war, the fear of Communist encirclement, the real and—even worse—the imaginable danger of domestic subversion, and the socio-economic threat implicit in the term communism itself, are strong enough to elicit more than the minimum number of charismatic responses that normalcy would entail.

The 1952 candidates for the presidency offered considerable opportunity for charismatic response. Unlike Truman and Dewey in 1948, Stevenson and Eisenhower were dramatic candidates, both expressing a sense of destiny and both successful—as the size of the vote indicates—in evoking widespread and enthusiastic support. Eisenhower in particular had characteristics which made it possible for those in search of an infallible leader to find comfort in attaching themselves to him. His record as supreme commander of allied forces during World War II, after a swift rise from relative military obscurity; his prestigeful presidency of Columbia University; and his successful inauguration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—all indicated a capacity for leadership in such diverse fields as military command, educational administration, and diplomacy. For those who so chose to regard his record, these and other achievements could be the evidence for gifts of leadership far beyond those of any mere mortal.

The study of the 1952 election undertaken by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan provided an opportunity for analysis of charisma as a factor influencing the way people voted for president. On the basis of a sample drawn by area probability techniques, 1799 adults[2] living in private dwellings were interviewed between mid-September and the election on November 4. Of these 1799 individuals, 1644 were successfully reinterviewed after the election. Among the many questions asked in the pre-election interview was a battery of four on the candidates. These four questions asked what there was about Stevenson and Eisenhower that might make the respondent want to vote for or against each of the candidates. When combined with responses to several other questions, it was possible by a process outlined below to select those cases[3] in which the factor of charismatic perception of one candidate or the other was evidently predominant over other grounds for evaluating the candidates.[4]

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[2] An additional 222 in the Far West were interviewed before the election but were deliberately dropped from the post-election sample. These 222 are not here considered because of the need for information available only in the post-election questionnaire.

[3] The selection procedure is described in the Note on Method at the end of this article.

[4] The interview questions used to derive evidence of charismatic responses toward the

Out of this sample of 1799 respondents, who within the limits of sampling error constitute a representative national cross-section of the adult population living in private dwellings, there were only 32 cases in which three judges agreed unanimously that charisma was predominant in the candidate perceptions.

The fact that less than two per cent of even a carefully chosen national sample gave clear evidence of a charismatic orientation is of only tentative significance. Latent charisma may be considerably more widespread among the general public. The responses available in the interviews may have for various reasons failed adequately to report the phenomenon. For one thing, analysis of charisma was not a primary objective of the election study undertaken by the Survey Research Center. For another, there is considerable variation in the fullness of the recorded responses, reflecting presumably some variation in the proportion of the spoken answers that were put down on paper and some variation in the degree of rapport between interviewer and respondent. It is also possible that some respondents felt strongly a charismatic attachment to one or the other of the candidates but were unable or unwilling to express such feeling.

Nevertheless, the predicted relationships that are described below in most instances proved to be considerably closer, considerably more significant statistically, on the basis of the 32 cases finally selected for analysis than on the basis of a preliminary analysis using 252 cases chosen solely because respondents used such expressions as "he is a real leader," or "he is strong and

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candidates were:

a. "I'd like to ask you what you think are the good and bad points about the two parties. Is there anything in particular that you like (don't like) about the Democratic (Republican) party?" If necessary: "What is that?" (This is a condensed version of the four actual questions.)

b. "Do you think it will make a good deal of difference to the country whether the Democrats or the Republicans win the elections this November or that it won't make much difference which side wins?" If the answer was "Yes": "Why is that?" If "No": "Why do you feel it won't make much difference?"

c. "Now I'd like to ask you about the good and bad points of the two candidates for president. Is there anything in particular about Stevenson (Eisenhower) that might make you want to vote for (against) him?" If necessary: "What is it?" (This version is similarly condensed from the actual.)

d. "Now, adding up the good points and the bad points about the two candidates, and forgetting for a minute the parties they belong to, which one do you think would make the best president?"

e. "Some people say that Eisenhower is not a real Republican. What do you think about this? Is he the kind of man that *you* think of as being a real Republican?"

f. "What about Eisenhower's ideas and the things he stands for? Do you think that he is pretty much the same as most other Republicans or is he different from them?" If necessary: "Why do you say that?"

g. (After asking for whom the respondent planned to vote:) "What would you say is the *most important reason* why you are going to vote for Stevenson (Eisenhower)?"

h. (If the respondent has said he was not going to vote:) "What would you say is the most important reason why you would vote for Stevenson (Eisenhower)?"

decisive," or "I have confidence in him." The 32 cases, in other words, gave evidence of being a much more homogeneous category on the charisma dimension than a category eight times as large chosen because of the use of words and phrases that could have—but in fact did not have—clearly charismatic connotation. The evidence is strong that charisma, at least in a manifest form, was not a major factor determining the candidate choice of the very large majority of the respondents interviewed.

All 32 of the cases involved charismatic perceptions of Eisenhower. No clear-cut cases of Stevenson-oriented charisma were found. Of these 32 cases, 26 voted for Eisenhower, four said they would have voted for him but failed to vote. One of the 32 voted for Stevenson.[5] (And one was not reinterviewed after the election.) For those who were charisma-prone, it is therefore evident on two scores that Eisenhower and not Stevenson was overwhelmingly the candidate to whom they turned. By no means all of these 32 individuals were traditional Republicans. Nine reported voting Democratic in 1948, 14 said they voted Republican, and nine either didn't vote in 1948 or their vote was not ascertained.

It is possible that additional charisma-oriented people would have been found on the basis of responses to the interview question about vice-presidential candidates. This was not attempted because probably few people see the vice-presidential nominee as a potential president and there was only one question in the interview on the basis of which perceptions of Nixon could be assessed.[6] It would thus be difficult to determine whether Nixon's popularity among a fourth of the sample was charismatic or was of the relatively apolitical sort that might be accorded any national hero.

III

To explain why some individuals have a relatively stronger need than others for infallible political leaders, we must hypothesize differences in individual personality structure and environment that will produce differential reactions to aspects of politics other than leadership as such. Being exposed by and large to substantially the same political phenomena—the same threat of war, the same threat of Communist encirclement and subversion, the same issues of inflation, taxes, corruption, etc.—those who react charismatically to leaders must do so because they differ from others in relatively basic needs and in ways of structuring the external world.

The determinants of these differences are doubtless numerous. Among the causal factors may be a deep-seated sense of insecurity because of a particular kind of upbringing or other formative experiences with parents and others during childhood and adolescence, unusual upward social mobility aggravated by a failure to achieve actual status corresponding to aspirations, or even traumatic experiences such as prolonged unemployment or the loss of son or spouse in consequence of war or automobile accident. Determinants such as these, or actual socio-economic status (including income, education, and occupation), could not be examined because of the complete absence of such data in the interviews or the quite meaningless distribution of these variables among the 32 cases analyzed.

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[5] Eleven additional borderline cases (nine pro-Eisenhower and two pro-Stevenson) were rejected because the evidence satisfied only two of the three judges that charisma was the chief factor in the respondent's perception of the candidates. Thirty more cases (all pro-Eisenhower) were rejected because only one judge regarded the evidence of charisma to be adequate. See the Note on Method for further explanation. The Stevenson voter is discussed in note 10 below.

[6] The question was: "How about the candidates for vice-president: aside from their parties, do you have any strong opinions about either of them?" If necessary: "How is that?"

But it is unnecessary to find the causes for a particular aspect of personality structure which results in charisma in order to recognize that the pattern exists and has manifestations in politics other than in the reaction to leaders. The following hypotheses as to the charismatic aspect of personality structure are suggested.

1. The individual with charismatic tendencies is less able to tolerate indecision and crisis.
2. He is less able to maintain ambiguous perceptions—the phenomena he observes must be classified. He is, in other words, more likely to make categoric judgments.[7]
3. He is more likely to believe that other people share his opinions and act as he acts.
4. He is less likely, because of his preoccupation with leaders, to have strong ties to political parties.

These are hypotheses on which data are available from the election study.

The relative intolerance of the charismatic follower for indecision and crisis is posited on the assumption that he is an exceptionally insecure, anxious, or frustrated individual and in consequence incapable of tolerating political conditions which aggravate his sense of insecurity or frustration. There is a sort of restlessness about uncertain situations, a relatively strong demand that something be done to alleviate the uncertainty. The demand is in part for action as such rather than for a particular kind of action. This is not to say that the charismatic person is unconcerned with the kind of action taken, but that his tensions will be *more* relieved if any action is taken and that he will be *less* concerned with appraising the possible consequences of alternative kinds of action than will non-charismatic individuals.

The most striking evidence of this phenomenon appears in comparing the attitude of charismatic and non-charismatic people on the question of what should be our current policy in Korea. In contrast to the 44 per cent of the Republican non-charismatics who said we should take a stronger stand and bomb Manchuria and China and the 38 per cent of these who said we should keep on trying to get a peaceful settlement, 63 per cent of the Republican charismatics said we should take a stronger stand and 17 per cent favored continued efforts toward a peaceful settlement.[8] Table I presents the total picture.[9]

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[7] See Else Frenkel-Brunswik, "Intolerance of Ambiguity as an Emotional and Perceptual Personality Variable," *Journal of Personality*, Vol. 18, pp. 108–43 (Sept., 1949).

TABLE I. RESPONDENT'S PREFERENCE FOR U.S. POLICY IN KOREA*

	Republican Charismatics (N = 30)	Republican Non-charismatics (N = 544)
Pull out	7%	10%
Keep trying for peaceful settlement	17	38
Take stronger stand	63	44
Either pull out or take stronger stand, respondent refusing to make choice	7	1
Don't know	0	4
Not ascertained	7	3

* The question asked was: "Which of the following things do you think it would be best for us to do *now* in Korea? Should we: (1) Pull out of Korea entirely? (2) Keep on trying to get a peaceful settlement? (3) Take a stronger stand and bomb Manchuria and China?"

Note: Because of rounding, percentages do not always add to 100.

Further evidence of intolerance for indecision among the charismatic respondents comes from an examination of the relative promptness with which they made up their minds on the candidates. The promptness is apparent and highly significant whether one considers only Republican charismatics or the entire category. Four out of five of the charismatics after the election reported having decided to vote for Eisenhower before or during the Chicago conventions; only about half of the non-charismatics had decided by then.

Similarly, far fewer of the charismatics reported that they had considered voting for the candidate they rejected at the election. Although one out of five non-charismatic Republican voters said he had considered Stevenson, only one charismatic Republican respondent out of 26 who voted for Eisenhower said he had considered Stevenson. The difference is again highly signifi-

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[8] Despite the small number of cases, these differences are highly significant statistically; significant, that is, at the one per cent level of confidence using a Chi-square test. This means that there is only one chance in a hundred that the differences between the two categories of individuals are due to chance. The Chi-square formula used here and elsewhere in this article, except where another formula is given, is the basic one of $\chi^2 = (o-e)^2/e$. Since both difference between the two categories and the direction of difference were predicted here, the level of significance is doubled here and elsewhere in the article where direction was predicted.

[9] Respondents who voted or would have voted Republican tended more often than Democrats either to say we should pull out of Korea or to say we should take a stronger stand. Since being Republican in terms of the 1952 vote is thus related to this policy issue, this factor was controlled in Table I by eliminating Democrats and comparing only Republican charismatics and non-charismatics. This practice is followed in all comparisons where there is evidence that voting or intending to vote Republican is related to the response given to a particular question. In such cases, the charismatics and non-charismatics are labeled Republican in the tables.

TABLE II. TIME OF VOTING DECISION*

	Republican Charismatics (N=30)	Republican Non-charismatics (N=544)	All Charismatics (N=31)	All Non-charismatics (N=830)
Before or during the Chicago conventions	80%	53%	77%	51%
After the convention	7	22	10	24
Didn't vote	13	21	13	23
Don't know	0	†	0	†
Not ascertained	0	3	0	2

* The question was: "How long before the election did you decide that you were going to vote the way you did?"

† Less than one-half of 1 per cent.

Note: Because of rounding, percentages do not always add to 100.

cant and the proportions are about the same for all charismatic and non-charismatic voters.[10]

The second hypothesis concerns the intolerance of the charismatic follower for ambiguity of perception, just as the first concerns his intolerance for am-

TABLE III. CONSIDERATION OF OTHER CANDIDATES*

	Republican Charismatics (N=30)	Republican Non-charismatics (N=544)	All Charismatics (N=31)	All Non-charismatics (N=830)
Voted for Eisenhower, considered Stevenson	3%	15%	3%	10%
Voted for Eisenhower, did not consider Stevenson	83	63	81	42
Voted for Stevenson, considered Eisenhower	0	0	0	9
Voted for Stevenson, did not consider Eisenhower	0	0	3	15
Other voting possibilities	0	1	0	1
Didn't vote	13	21	13	23
Don't know or not ascertained	0	†	0	†

* The question was: "Did you ever think during the campaign that you might vote for (opposite candidate)?"

† Less than one-half of 1 per cent.

Note: Because of rounding, percentages do not always add to 100.

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[10] Curiously, but consistently with this hypothesis, the one charismatic respondent who voted for Stevenson said after the election that he had never considered voting for Eisenhower and that he had decided to vote as he did "three months at least" before the election. When he was first interviewed on September 25, just six weeks before the election, he said he was going to vote Republican, had only favorable things to say about Eisenhower, and unfavorable things about Stevenson.

biguity of action or for what he regards as inaction or indecision. The two hypotheses are as related to and as separate from each other as are action and perception in the individual. Table III, discussed above, represents the borderline between perception and action and is relevant to both hypotheses. The second hypothesis relates more strictly to the way the charismatic follower goes about forming his judgments. It says that he tends to see the world in blacks-and-whites, to fit persons and ideas into compartments, and generally to regard the withholding of judgment as being as unpleasant as the withholding of action.

The general tendency to view the political world in blacks-and-whites was measurable in the election study by a comparison of the pattern of responses on the general party and candidate questions in which the respondent was asked to state what he regarded as the good and bad points about each party and candidate.[11] As might be expected, some respondents had favorable and unfavorable things to say about both parties and both candidates. Others had only favorable things to say about one candidate or one party. Others had only unfavorable things to say about one candidate or party. The different patterns are presumably related to several things, including level of political interest and information, political involvement, party preference and voting preference for example. The patterns are related also to charisma.

For present purposes, those charismatic and non-charismatic respondents (labelled least black-and-white in the tables to follow) who had both good and bad things to say about both Stevenson and Eisenhower were compared with those (labelled most black-and-white) who had only good things to say about one candidate and bad about the other. A similar comparison is presented on

TABLE IV. PATTERN OF RESPONSE ON CANDIDATES

	Republican Charismatics (N=30)	Republican Non-charismatics (N=544)
Least black-and-white	3%	13%
Most black-and-white	50	27
Other response patterns	47	60

TABLE V. PATTERN OF RESPONSE ON PARTIES

	Republican Charismatics (N=30)	Republican Non-charismatics (N=544)
Least black-and-white	10%	18%
Most black-and-white	47	29
Other response patterns	43	53

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[11] The wording of these questions is given in footnote 4, items a and c.

the parties. In both comparisons, only those who voted or would have voted Republican are considered, to eliminate the distorting influence of the relationship between vote and pattern of response.

The charismatics are clearly much more inclined to judge both candidates and parties on a cops-and-robbers basis.[12] On candidates, the charismatic Republicans are 16 to 1 most black-and-white, as contrasted with a 2 to 1 ratio among non-charismatics. On parties, the corresponding ratios are 4½ to 1 and 1½ to 1.

Another indication of the charismatic person's relative inability to sustain perceptual uncertainty appears in the forecast respondents made before the election on how close the national race for the presidency would be. As the following table indicates, charismatics were about evenly divided as to whether the race would be close or would approach a landslide. The non-charismatics were about 3 to 1 inclined to think the election would be close. The difference is highly significant.

TABLE VI. PREDICTION OF CLOSENESS OF PRESIDENTIAL RACE*

	Republican Charismatics (N=30)	Republican Non-charismatics (N=544)	All Charismatics (N=32)	All Non-charismatics (N=922)
(Very) close race	50%	68%	53%	68%
One candidate will win by (quite) a lot	46	21	44	19
Respondent answered but gave no clear-cut prediction	0	7	0	7
Don't know or not ascertained	4	4	3	6

* The question was: "Who do you think will be elected president in November? Do you think it will be a close race or will (respondent's choice) win by quite a bit?"

The intolerance for perceptual ambiguity is evidenced also in the discrepancy between the candidate respondents voted for and the one they said would make the best President aside from the party. Few people can be expected to believe or to state that in their opinion there is a difference between the candidate of their choice and the best potential President. Nevertheless, here again the charismatic Republicans differ from the non-charismatics; there is slightly

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[12] The difference is significant in both cases at the five per cent level of confidence. In Table IV, because the expected frequency among the least black-and-white charismatics was less than five, the following formula was used:

$$x^2 = \frac{N\left(/AD - BC/ - \frac{N}{2}\right)^2}{(A+B)(C+D)(A+C)(B+D)}$$

See Quinn McNemar, *Psychological Statistics* (New York, 1949), p. 207.

more than one chance in twenty that the difference is due to chance. The difference therefore falls short of statistical significance.

The third hypothesis—that the charismatic individual is more likely to believe that other people share his opinions and act as he acts—is related to the second in that the inability to maintain ambiguous perceptions is presumably part of the same psychic inability to tolerate diversity. The third hypothesis, however, introduces the additional factor of the charismatic's need for group support for his own judgments, his relative inability to stand alone. In the preelection interview respondents were asked how they thought various groups would vote. The groups in question were farmers, the working class, Negroes, the middle class, big businessmen, union members, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. The Republican charismatic respondents were much more likely to believe that farmers, working class, and middle class would vote Republican. There were slight differences also between charismatic and non-charismatic respondents on the other groups, but the differences were generally so small that they must be attributed to other factors or to chance.

TABLE VII. CANDIDATE BEST SUITED FOR THE PRESIDENCY*

	Republican Charismatics (N = 30)	Republican Non-charismatics (N = 544)
Eisenhower	97%	83%
Stevenson	3	10
Either; neither; it depends	0	2
Don't know or not ascertained	0	5

* The question was: "Now, adding up the good points and the bad points about the two candidates, and forgetting for a minute the parties they belong to, which one do you think would make the best president?"

The fourth hypothesis states that the charismatic follower will have weaker ties to party than others because his main concern is to attach himself to an

TABLE VIII. PREDICTION OF VOTE OF VARIOUS GROUPS OF REPUBLICANS

	Farmers		Working Class		Middle Class	
	Charismatics (N = 30)	Non-charismatics (N = 544)	Charismatics (N = 30)	Non-charismatics (N = 544)	Charismatics (N = 30)	Non-charismatics (N = 544)
Will vote Democratic	17%	24%	23%	38%	3%	11%
Will vote Republican	40	20	27	14	47	35
Will split	30	33	30	32	30	31
Don't know and not ascertained	13	23	20	16	20	23

infallible leader. The evidence in support of this notion is not so strong as for the other hypotheses. In terms of classifying themselves as either strong or weak Republicans or Democrats rather than as Independents with or without leanings toward one or the other of the parties, there is some evidence—which falls slightly short of statistical significance at the five per cent level—that charismatics are more likely than the non-charismatics to attach themselves to party.

But when asked what they would do if confronted with voting for a candidate of their own party whom they liked less than the candidate of the other party, the charismatics differ markedly from the non-charismatics. Three-fourths of the former would vote for the candidate rather than the party of their preference, while less than half of the latter would do so. Only one out of eight of the charismatics in such a conflict situation would stick by his party or else not vote at all, whereas one out of four of the non-charismatics would choose one or the other of these alternatives that maintain his party ties. The relationship is evident whether one contrasts all charismatics or only those who voted or would have voted Republican in 1952.

TABLE IX. VOTING FOR CANDIDATE OR PARTY*

	Republican Charismatics (N=30)	Republican Non-charismatics (N=544)	All Charismatics (N=32)	All Non-charismatics (N=922)
Would vote for candidate of other party	74%	49%	72%	42%
Would vote for candidate of own party	10	10	9	14
Would not vote for either candidate	3	14	3	17
Don't know or not ascertained	13	27	16	27

* The question was: "Suppose there was an election where your party was running a candidate that you didn't like or you didn't agree with. Which of the following things comes closest to what you think you would do? (1) I probably would vote for him anyway because a person should be loyal to his party. (2) I probably would not vote for either candidate in that election. (3) I probably would vote for the other party's candidate."

The interesting aspect of this information is that, if charismatics are indeed more likely to attach a party label to themselves, the label means less for them than for non-charismatics. The former may declare rather more strongly or more often their loyalty to party, but this loyalty means less to them than the attraction of a strong candidate. One can speculate on an explanation for this, saying that conventional loyalties are prominent among charismatics but that the convention is honored mostly on the verbal level and will be flouted in action—without the flouters being particularly aware that their party loyalty is largely sham. The available evidence from the election study, however, offers no clue other than the data presented to explain a phenomenon—apparent real weakness of verbally strong party ties—that is by no means self-explanatory.

IV

One of the most important broad questions about charisma-oriented individuals is the amount and kind of their political activity. If they are relatively active politically, their importance is of course greater than their numbers. If their orientation toward political issues differs from more common patterns, this too may be portentous. The inconclusiveness of relevant data from the election study makes improper any testing of hypotheses. But some of the material is suggestive and merits brief mention.

The charismatic respondents reported being "very much" or "somewhat" interested in the 1952 campaign much more often than did the non-charismatics.[13] Nine out of ten of the charismatics compared with three out of four non-charismatics expressed such interest. (And less than a tenth of the charismatics said they were not much interested, compared with about a fourth of the non-charismatics.) Furthermore, three out of four of the charismatics said the differences between the parties were such as to make it important or very important to the country which party won the election; somewhat more than half of the non-charismatics said so.[14] Statistically, these differences are significant.

But these differences in reported strong political feelings among the charismatics are not so clearly evident in the differences in reported action. There is either no difference between charismatics and non-charismatics on the reported regularity of their actual voting, or a difference indicating that the charismatics are somewhat less likely to vote in all or most presidential elections.[15] On the other hand, charismatics slightly more often than non-charismatics reported having voted in both 1952 and 1948 elections. In both cases the differences fall short of statistical significance. The only reasonable conclusion from these data is that charismatics by and large vote neither more nor less often than non-charismatics.

Aside from voting, charismatics are in some ways apparently more active than non-charismatics. Respondents were asked after the election whether they had (a) talked to people, trying to persuade them how to vote, (b) given money, (c) attended meetings or rallies, (d) done any party campaign work, or (e) belonged to any political club or organization. On two scores the charismatics were significantly more active than non-charismatics—talking to people and doing campaign work. In the other kinds of political activity they were either as active or possibly slightly more so. Republicans generally are more active politically than Democrats, so part of the charismatic's activity may be related to being Republican. But when all Democrats were eliminated, the remaining charismatics were still in the ways described more active than Republican non-charismatics.

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[13] The question was: "Some people don't pay much attention to the political campaigns. How about you, would you say that you have been very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political campaigns so far this year?"

[14] The question was: "Do you think it will make a good deal of difference to the country whether the Democrats or the Republicans win the election this November, or that it won't make much difference which side wins?"

[15] The question was: "In the elections for president since you have been old enough to vote, would you say that you have voted in all of them, most of them, some of them, or none of them?"

The orientation of charismatics toward partisan issues is substantially the same as that of non-charismatics. On the three domestic issues used in the election study to test partisanship of orientation—government welfare activities, FEPC, and the Taft-Hartley Act—charismatics did not significantly differ from non-charismatics, although they may lean very slightly more toward the Democratic position on welfare legislation and slightly more toward the Republican view on FEPC. On two of the four foreign issues—Have we gone too far in foreign involvement? Was it right to go into Korea in 1950?—the difference is microscopic. On the issue of whether it was our fault China went Communist, charismatics are inclined to blame this country more than do non-charismatic Republicans. If charismatics are adopting a partisan view on our China policy, it is so extreme as to indicate more zealous Republicanism than most Republicans themselves exhibit.

A more likely explanation than partisanship is that this belief in our blame for China's going Communist is associated with the characteristically charismatic attitude toward the fourth of the foreign issues—what should we do in Korea now? The strong tendency of charismatics either to say we should pull out of Korea or to say we should bomb Manchuria and China has been explained above in connection with Table I as evidence of intolerance of sustained political indecision and crisis.

V

The foregoing analysis of charisma in the 1952 campaign was undertaken for three reasons: to assess the researchability of an important political phenomenon which heretofore has remained largely in the intuitive realm of thought, to find out how prevalent the phenomenon is in contemporary American politics, and to test the validity of certain intuitive hypotheses as to the way charismatic followers will act.

The analysis presented is neither exhaustive nor deeply etiological. Because of the broad scope of the election study undertaken by the Survey Research Center, it was not possible to insert in the interview questions which could be designed to explore in depth the causes and in breadth the manifestations of charisma. The absence of prior research that is of directly probative value would have made imprudent the large expenditure necessary to gather a large national sample for the sole or primary purpose of research in patterns of leadership perception. But it was in fact possible by relatively exact, though crude, techniques to isolate a category of respondents whose primary orientation to politics indicated a strong predilection for a particular kind of leadership. And meaningful as well as statistically significant relationships between this predilection and kinds of political attitude and action did in fact emerge. I believe the analysis does indicate that a concept which up to now has been confined largely to intuitive observation can be subjected to empirical observation and test.

As we have noted, less than two per cent of the very precisely representative and random sample of the national adult population gave clear evidence of a primarily charismatic orientation. This fact is indeed significant, in more than a statistical sense, but its significance should not be overestimated. There is evidence in the interviews suggesting that more than such a tiny fraction of the general public has some charismatic reactions to politics. There is indeed no evidence that only about one person in fifty would actively support a man with a halo on a white horse. However, the fact that 32 cases produced striking relationships whereas more cases less precisely selected did not—despite the pronounced statistical advantage of large numbers—indicates rather clearly that charisma judged by fairly clear-cut criteria and exhibiting specific behavioral manifestations is not now epidemic in our society.

The four intuitive hypotheses stated at the beginning of Section III find considerable support in the data presented. It does seem clear that charisma-oriented individuals are relatively intolerant of political crisis, incapable of maintaining ambiguous perceptions, and more likely to see others as sharing their opinions and actions. The fourth hypothesis on relative weakness of party ties among the charismatics is supported by less convincing evidence. The hypotheses are by no means proven, but they state differences which are theoretically consistent, and the relevant data are consistent with the hypotheses. Further research should not only test anew such hypotheses as these but also seek to examine in greater depth and breadth the causes and political consequences of charisma.

As is true with all research, a danger of investigations in charisma is that they lead the analyst and the reader to believe that the concept is the sole one having portent for our political future. Social analysts having an established set of work interests are prone to see charisma or anomie or authoritarianism or class struggle as *the* crucial concept, in terms of which the past can be explained and the future predicted with a confident sadness. No claim is here made for the primacy of charisma. Liberal and democratic political institutions are surely fostered or destroyed in consequence of a wide range of phenomena operating together and during the same time period. The isolation and abstraction of a particular phase of political life is necessary but should not lead to the crowning of kings when it seems clear that causal regency is plural.

We have noted that certain hypothesized relationships exist between underlying behavior patterns and charisma. Those who are looking for an omnipotent leader are doing so because they cannot tolerate either ambiguous thought or uncertain action. They tend to seek group support for their judgments and perhaps to be less firmly attached to political parties than others. More elaborate analysis would surely produce a wider range of knowledge about the dynamics of charisma.

The major caveat I would make is that there is danger of inferring from general behavior patterns to political behavior and vice versa. No claim can legitimately be made that, because charismatics cannot tolerate ambiguous thought and action, all those who cannot tolerate such ambiguity are charismatics. The term charisma refers to a particular pattern of political behavior and not to a general characterological type. The charismatic individual is not a personality type any more than the person with cancer is an organic type. Charisma is in this paper conceived of as a characteristic of a particular aspect of the individual's total pattern of behavior—the political aspect. No more is asserted than one would say in describing a person as having cancer when he had a cancerous lung or liver. As a political behavior pattern, charisma is probably more fundamental than Republican or Democratic, but much less basic psychologically than, let us say, sado-masochistic or paranoid.

There is a growing tendency in current social research to jump with verbal ease from political to psychological concepts and back again. This saltatory process is presumably designed to establish profound relationships between the two areas of investigation. Profound relationships do exist, and are researchable, but the facile leap is likely to impede rather than facilitate the growth of our knowledge of political behavior. Until such time as we can demonstrate that all those who are insecure or intolerant of ambiguity or paranoid are of a single political type (whether charismatic or authoritarian or anomic) and can demonstrate that all charismatics or authoritarians can be subsumed under a particular broad psychological type, it seems likely that progress in knowledge can be more rapid the more cautiously we generalize. All individuals who are characterologically intolerant of ambiguous thought and action may share a political predisposition not to tolerate indecision and crisis in politics. But for some of them, family tradition or community pressure may preclude identification with candidates in a charismatic manner. Some political non-charismatics may have a strong tendency to attach themselves charismatically to leaders in business or trade union or to religious fanatics or even to their spouses. Preliminary efforts to establish relationships between general and specifically political behavior patterns must be recognized as such and regarded as initial efforts to appraise the significance of only some of the wide range of determinants of people's political attitudes and actions.

The broader context in which charisma is here conceptualized is the irrational tendency not to solve but to suppress major political problems of the age. Isaiah Berlin has said that the new belief of the 20th century "consists, not in developing the logical implications and elucidating the meaning, the context, or the relevance and origin of a specific problem . . . but in altering the outlook which gave rise to it in the first place. . . . "[16] Charisma is regarded as only one of the major forms which this tendency takes. The evidence here presented indicates that the factor is not now prevalent on the manifest level. The extent to which it is a latent disease in the body politic cannot here be judged. If our political institutions remain strong and prove generally though falteringly able to handle the crises of our times or if the crises abate, charismatic leaders and followers alike may be frustrated in their combined search for power and glory.

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[16] Isaiah Berlin, "Political Ideas in the 20th Century," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 28, pp. 351–85, at p. 371 (April, 1950).

NOTE ON METHOD

The central methodological problem was selection of the charismatic cases. This process went through three stages. The first stage was facilitated by the elaborate code established for appraising respondents' perception of Stevenson and Eisenhower. A range of over a hundred different kinds of responses favorable to each of the candidates and about the same number of unfavorable responses was established in the code. From this range of possible responses were selected those that indicated some possibility of charismatic content, such as the one that he is a natural leader, he is above politics, people have confidence in him, etc. A machine sorting produced a total of 252 interviews in which one or more such possibly charismatic remarks had been made about Eisenhower or Stevenson. I then read through each of these interviews to determine which contained defensible evidence of charisma and which did not. This reduced the number to 50. The final sifting process involved having two other judges independently read through the 252 interviews and apply the criteria described in the next paragraph. There was some difference of opinion among the two independent judges and myself. Cases on which agreement was not unanimous among the three of us were discussed. Those on which there was not final unanimous agreement were discarded. On 32 cases there was final unanimous agreement, and this group provided the basis for analysis.

The criteria used in judging were established in a four-page, single-spaced "code." It described the concept of charisma, specified the questions in the interview (those listed in footnote 4) that were to be first examined for evidence of the characteristic and the questions that specifically were not to be examined (such as the one on vice-presidential candidates and how the respondent expected to vote), and gave examples of responses which did and did not meet minimal standards for charisma. Since the examples were so important in establishing a cutting point, the most relevant responses in three different interviews are given below:

1. An interview classified as not sufficiently charismatic to be included:

   (What do you like about the Republican party?) "Nothing except their choice of candidate, General Eisenhower. I'm a particular admirer of him." (What do you like about Eisenhower?) "His qualities of leadership. His ability to accept responsibility and make up his mind."

The respondent says he is "a particular admirer" of Eisenhower and praises his qualities of leadership, but speaks of his ability to accept responsibility and make up his own mind, which are not uniquely charismatic qualities.

2. An interview classified as minimally charismatic:

   (Why will it make a difference if the Republicans win?) " . . . I am trusting to the Republicans and Ike to end this awful war."
   (What do you dislike about Stevenson?)
   "Truman got the nomination for him, and, instead of being himself, Stevenson is being a little second Truman. We don't need a weak sister now . . . "
   (What do you like about Eisenhower?)
   "His past record has shown him a man of decision and honor. He will do the wise thing about Korea and get our boys out of there . . . "
   (Is Eisenhower a real Republican?)
   " . . . In some ways he may differ, but only in ways he feels it best for the country, and then the Republicans will listen, as they know they have a wise man to listen to."

The charismatic clues are: (1) Stevenson is "a little second Truman" and "a weak sister"; (2) Eisenhower is trusted to end the Korean war; (3) Eisenhower is "a man of decision"; (4) the Republicans will listen to "a wise man"; (5) there is belief in the *certainty* that Eisenhower will end the war and that he will lead the Republicans.

3. An interview classified as clearly charismatic:

   (What do you like about Eisenhower?)

> "I think Eisenhower is God-sent in our moment of strife. He will, I believe, get us out of this turmoil and back on our feet again. He is a leader of men, and he can do the job if anyone can."
>
> (Are Eisenhower's ideas pretty much the same as other Republicans?)
>
> "I'd say a little different, maybe. His ideals of right and wrong are much higher than most politicians. He has been at the head of an army, a college, and men all over have looked up to him and respected him. Why, he is just the man to lead this country and put it on a firm footing."

The belief in Eisenhower's omnipotence and moral excellence are rather clear-cut here.

There were inevitably some borderline cases. It was because our primary interest was in assessing the characteristics found to be clearly associated with charisma rather than in reaching a firm conclusion on the number of individuals whose approach to politics is charismatic, that we excluded all cases on which the three judges could not agree. This proved to be sound because the predicted relationships were more clear-cut among the 32 cases than among the 50 that I had chosen without the aid of judges—despite the fact that the criteria used by the other two judges were my own.

A statistical measure of the amount of agreement between the three judges indicated reliability of judgments considerably above the level of chance. Using a measure of agreement between judges labeled π by its author, William A. Scott,[17] we found that the completely independent classification of interviews as charismatic by the three judges (including myself) had a π of .40, where 0 indicates only chance agreement and 1 indicates complete agreement. The π score for agreement between the two independent judges, who had no part in preparing the criteria for charisma, was higher (.53) than the agreement scores .32 and .36) between each of them separately and me. If I had gone through the 50 interviews I originally classified as charismatic and judged them in accordance with the more rigorous formal criteria used by the two judges, agreement would have been statistically higher but would have needlessly involved my being both judge and jury.

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[17] Wherein $\pi = P_0 - P_e/1 - P_e$. P_0 signifies observed per cent of agreement between two or more judges selecting a particular characteristic out of a group. P_e signifies expected or chance per cent of agreement between two or more judges selecting such cases.

THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION*

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There are two aspects of the relation between government and interest groups which are of primary significance for the political scientist. One is the realistic approach to the study of interest groups, which gives attention to the demands of groups, their pressure on government, and the ways government yields to or tries to accommodate their conflicting demands. The other is the idealist tradition that the purpose of the state is the common weal, which has been expressed diversely, as for example, in the concepts of *salus populi suprema lex* and "public office is a public trust." If these two were necessarily in conflict, we should have to choose between ethical nihilism and utopianism. This paper moves from the assumptions that realism and idealism both have a place in the study of political science, today as in ancient tradition, and that in the study of the particular problem of government control of the economy, analysis of the upward impact of interest pressures and their accommodation through government policies should be supplemented by a search for the best means of strengthening the impact of the concept of the common weal in the decision-making process.

I

An initial problem is the difficult one of accuracy in use of concepts. The term "group," as Leiserson has told us, has two connotations: one is that of persons associated in organizations or associations; "the other is that of a category of persons presumed or observed by the investigator to possess attributes in common."[1] So defined a group can include members of a family, a labor union, the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, all wheat farmers, or all citizens of the U. S. Each group is a kind of public, but the term "public" has special connotations when applied to the association of men in geographical areas, i.e., in states and their subdivisions. The special connotations are not only those associated with the concept of "sovereignty," but also those associated with the fact of inclusiveness. For my purposes here the term "public" refers only to these particular types of inclusive associations, and the term "group" to other associations or categories of persons within the "publics."

This says no more than the "public interest" is the interest of people living within a politically organized society. It can be added, however, that the terms "group interest" and "public interest" assume some identity of interest among those within the group or public. The search for a "group" interest or a "public interest" is therefore a search for the common interest. This would be true even if the common interest were no more than the ability to reach a compromise among special interests. But the common interest often includes more. That it has substantive content even for our diversified publics can easily be illustrated. Peace, jobs for employables, education for children are obvious examples in our day. That these may be qualified by other interests, or that we cannot be positive that we know their precise limits, does not mean that their existence as elements of public interest need be denied.

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* This paper was presented at the fiftieth annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Chicago, September 10, 1954.

[1] Avery Leiserson, *Administrative Regulation: A Study in Representation of Interests* (Chicago, 1942), p. 6.

We can say, then, that one element in the idea of public interest is that of broad, inclusive, or widely-shared interests, called variously general, common, or public interests. Another is the idea of enduring interests. For social as well as individual units a drunken debauch at the moment which erupts ulcers tomorrow is hardly deemed in the interest of the subject.

The identification of these two elements does not mean that there are not others which would enter into the determination of the public interest in a particular instance. Widely-shared interests may have to be compromised with existing or emerging special interests, of either a functional or a geographical nature, and long-run interests compromised with immediate interests. Moreover, the best attainable in the pursuit of the public interest may be a compromise among varied and perhaps conflicting interests, subsumed possibly under some standard of community purpose.

We are brought then to the conclusion that the geographical units forming states or subdivisions thereof are publics, and that within these publics there are public interests, *which may be identical interests of large portions of the public, or compromises of different interests, or some of both.* It should be added that the only constituent of the public interest which can be accepted is the interests of individuals as human beings, for those in whom the Western tradition has sunk its taproots will recognize no interests of groups or institutions except as these are bearers of the interests of men. No concessions need to be made to those who talk as though there were some separate and mystic interest in states, groups, or institutions, as such.

II

In recent years discussions of the public interest have become more realistic by reason of two developments in thought about group interests. The first is the expanded emphasis on the significance of group organization and group identities. Recently in an article in this journal Earl Latham summarized this development and argued the need for recognition of the fact in political theory.[2]

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[2] "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory," this Review, Vol. 46, pp. 376–97 (June, 1952). Latham's bibliographical notes range comprehensively through the several academic disciplines.

It has become clear that "a plurality of social groupings"[3] does exist, and that consideration of their place in the governmental process must supplement, though not supplant, the attention given to man and the state.

The second development is the emphasis on compromise of group interests as the essence of the process of government. This idea has been expressed in various ways[4] by some of our most perceptive thinkers: by Bentley in his group process theory, according to which "All phenomena of government are phenomena of groups pressing one another, forming one another, and pushing out new groups and group representatives (the organs or agencies of government) to mediate the adjustments;"[5] by Herring in his reconciliation theory, according to which "the purpose of the democratic state is the free reconciliation of group interests;"[6] by Leiserson in his acceptance theory of the public interest, according to which "a satisfactory criterion of the public interest is the preponderant acceptance of administrative action by politically influential groups;"[7] by those who have advocated a "new democracy" in which the interests participate in the actual process of government.[8] In addition to these, T. V. Smith has glorified compromise as the essence of the democratic way of life.[9]

One of the most significant modes of generalization is Herring's statement of a reconciliation theory. Herring even says that a harmonious working relationship must be established between the bureaucrats and the special interests.[10] There is validity in his argument. Especially is this true of government regulation of economic enterprise, where law often sets a standard which conflicts with the interests of affected industries, and where some compromise has to be effected between the purpose of the law and the interest of the groups. There are limitations on attainment of public ends through a system of overhead public controls of private enterprisers, arising out of the interests of the latter.

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[3] John Dewey's phrase, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York, 1927), p. 73.

[4] For a fuller summary see my *Administration of National Economic Control* (New York, 1952), pp. 220–25.

[5] Arthur E. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago, 1908), p. 269.

[6] E. Pendleton Herring, *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (New York, 1936), p. 9.

[7] *Administrative Regulation* (cited in note 1), p. 16.

[8] The term "new democracy" was used, for example, by John D. Lewis in "Democratic Planning in Agriculture," this Review, Vol. 35, pp. 232–49, 454–69, at p. 469 (April, June, 1941). Walter Gellhorn succinctly stated the point of view expressed in the text when, in discussing lay participation in administration, he concluded: "affected private interests are shaping the course of action. It is Democracy at work." *Federal Administrative Proceedings* (Baltimore, 1941), p. 130. But Gellhorn stresses advice as the proper means of participation. *Ibid.*, p. 133. Ordway Tead sets forth "*the principle of the representation of interests*, which says that every group which has a clearly identifiable set of interests is safeguarded in its dealings with other groups only as it has the opportunity for an explicit voicing of its interests in councils where the common problems of the several groups are under consideration." *New Adventures in Democracy: Practical Applications of the Democratic Idea* (New York, 1939), p. 5.

[9] See particularly *The Legislative Way of Life* (Chicago, 1940); *The Democratic Tradition in America* (New York, 1951); *Discipline for Democracy* (Chapel Hill, 1942); *The Compromise Principle in Politics* ("Edmund J. James Lectures on Government: Second Series" [Urbana, 1941]); "Compromise: Its Context and Limits," *Ethics*, Vol. 53, pp. 1–13 (Oct., 1942). For a recent analysis of Smith's theory, by one who opposes it, see John H. Hallowell, *The Moral Foundation of Democracy* (Chicago, 1954), ch. 2.

[10] *Public Administration and the Public Interest*, especially p. 16.

There is much validity in the arguments of the interest group theorists, and much guide for the administrator in the practice of his art. It may still be argued, however, that there is danger that the emphasis on interest groups will lead us to overlook other factors which are important in policy making. Other factors are recognized in broadly-gauged discussions, as for example in Herring's and Leiserson's, but repetition of the fact of group interest in many places may obscure them.

We may note three types of additional factors. First, the interests of men are not fully represented in group associations. American group structure is complex and so also are the life and loyalties of individuals. There is much lack of identity of interest among members of groups, much overlapping of interests across group lines, great variation in the extent to which interests are represented in groups, and considerable sharing of interests among men as men and as members of the large society.[11] We can easily be misled into believing that group interest is something concrete in contrast to a public interest which is elusive and vague. Second, value concepts determine choices among competing interests. Each of us has an interest in the security of our nation and an interest in personal liberty. Our separate judgments on many current measures of legislation will depend upon the value we have placed on each of these two interests. We may differ in our conclusions even though we have the same interests. In Texas I have recently seen men with identical interests take opposed positions on candidates for governor because they had formed different value judgments on segregation. One defect I find in the group interest theory as developed by some is that insufficient emphasis is given to the role of value judgments. Third, the interests of men must be interpreted in the light of developments in society. There is a certain "logic of events," from which the interests of men arise.[12] For example, the interest of men in government provision for security for old age arises out of changes in conditions, and the policy makers must look to the trend and tendency of events to determine the legitimacy of claims of interest.

Those who search for the public interest should look for the common denominators in group and individual interests and value judgments, and for the imperatives in specific situations. To the extent that their search involves compromise of interests, the efforts would be mechanical if centered on this factor alone. The process of government itself would be threatened with stalemate if based at every turn on the adjustment of the separate interests rather than on the discovery of the common interests and ideals, and the necessities arising from circumstances.

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[11] See the analysis by David Truman in *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York, 1951), particularly ch. 16.

[12] Compare John M. Gaus' discussion of "The Ecology of Government," in his *Reflections on Public Administration* (University, Ala., 1947), ch. 1.

There is danger that the social scientist will overlook the varied nature of social engineering. First, in certain situations decision is appropriately based on presentation and analysis of opposed interests. In courts decision is reached by this process. Second, occasionally decision must be made by a process of bargaining. Third, in other situations research and analysis, perhaps with the aim of forestalling or minimizing advocacy or bargaining roles, is the initial and perhaps the main step toward decision. The joinder-of-interests and advocacy techniques, characteristic of the so-called judicial state, and the bargaining technique, characteristic of certain bipartite or tripartite agencies, appear to be of less value than the problem-solving techniques for the modern legislative-administrative state. In my opinion the early belief that regulation was a judicial process led to excessive use of the joinder-of-interest technique, and thus to overemphasis on compromise of interests. And bipartisan representation of labor and management in government can be a dangerous expedient if not held within proper bounds.

The *primary* needs, in my judgment, are to recognize the complexity of problems which must be faced and to emphasize the part that creative intelligence can play in the solution of problems.

Creative intelligence may supply a standard or solution to a problem which will be acceptable to interest groups. This step may be taken in advance of the crystallization of views of group interests or may result in modification of views already developed. The effect of creative intelligence is to raise the search for solutions to a different level where factors other than compromise of notions of special interest may be influential. Leiserson has referred to the "independence of administrative initiative,"[13] and Herring has said, "The offering of positive proposals by a responsible administration is then the first goal to seek."[14]

One reason creative intelligence can be effective is because it provides accurate appraisal of situational factors and of ways of responding to these with workable and acceptable solutions. In regard to situational factors I have said elsewhere that the economic organism "is a complex of technologies, institutional framework, and behavior patterns. Within this complex the administrator finds points of resistance and pliability. *Expert analysis consists in the discovery of the areas of pliability and the means of manipulating* these."[15]

The demands of the interest groups is only one of the situational factors which limit pliability. The policy maker will be limited in many ways. In the regulation of the oil industry, for example, "he cannot change the geology of formation and lift of oil, nor change the technology of drilling and transportation, nor ignore the law of capture and the correlative rights of men, nor move without recognition of the ways men will react to what he does."[16] On the other hand, some factors can be manipulated, including frequently or perhaps usually, in some degree, the pressures of interest groups.

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[13] *Administrative Regulation*, p. 284.

[14] *Public Administration and the Public Interest*, p. 383.

[15] *Administration of National Economic Control*, p. 230.

In the application of creative intelligence much depends upon the orientation of the policy-making crew. The directives of law will be some guide to an administrator and he must recognize these as governing standards for the moment. But he may recommend amendments to these or find that they leave a wide area of free discretion. It becomes important therefore whether he is oriented to think in terms of the broader identities of social interest and purpose.

Such identities, it may be repeated, do exist. Pound spent many years developing a list of the social interests embodied in the law, and his list reveals the existence of many social interests.[17] No one has made such a search in our legislation, but if made it might uncover more identities of interest and purpose than we are immediately conscious of. It would help reveal, in Pound's phrase, the "received ideals" of the nation, which political scientists have sought too exclusively in judicial decisions. But though our tools of instruction are inadequate, it can be stated that the conditioning of the administrator to look for common and enduring interests is an essential safeguard for the public interest, at least in a society which has accepted the ideal of democracy as fully as ours has.

We can at this point broaden the definition of the public interest: *it may be defined as the best response to a situation in terms of all the interests and of the concepts of value which are generally accepted in our society.* Each of the elements in the definition—situation, all the interests, concepts of value—is a complex of many strands. It is this complexity which provides the opportunity for the "manipulative power" which Fainsod has said is within the capacity of the "wielders" of regulatory instruments.[18]

III

In a pluralistic society with strong and assertive group organizations which furnish opportunities for multiple approaches to a disintegrated government, the great problem in policy making is to develop policies which reflect a broad and long view of social interests. There is little chance that the immediate interests of organized groups will not receive adequate attention. The real danger is that the interests of the unorganized and weak, the shared interests of men generally, and the interests of men for tomorrow will not have proper weight in government councils.

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[16] *Ibid.*, p. 232.

[17] See particularly Roscoe Pound, *Outlines of Lectures on Jurisprudence*, 5th ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1943) and "A Survey of Social Interests," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 57, pp. 1–39 (1943).

[18] Merle Fainsod, "Some Reflections on the Nature of the Regulatory Process," in *Public Policy*, ed. C. J. Friedrich and Edward S. Mason, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), pp. 298–99. Since writing this paper I have seen Don K. Price's statement of the reasons why he wrote *Government and Science: Their Dynamic Relation in American Democracy* (New York, 1954), p. v.: "The deeper reason was a notion that had been developing in my mind for several years (not a particularly original one) that the development of public policy and of the methods of its administration owed less in the long run to the processes of conflict among political parties and social or economic pressure groups than to the more objective processes of research and discussion among professional groups."

If this be true, the challenge to the political scientist is to ascertain what arrangements in government *will facilitate the inclusive view in policy making.* This is a task similar to that undertaken by Madison in Federalist Paper No. 10. He accepted faction and sought ways of moderating its effects and preventing damage to society by group interests. Today the political scientist must accept the fact of group interests and pressure and seek ways of preventing this from destroying the search for a common weal. Madison had more fears of majority than of minority interests, but in our day the dangers in the latter as well as the former are evident. Also, Madison and the men of his day could place faith in checks on action as a safeguard against dominance of a particular interest, but in our day the rapid flux of economic factors and of movement on the international checkerboard call for arrangements in government to facilitate decision.

Both the literature of political science and trends in law seem to reveal some arrangements which may facilitate the discovery and advancement of the public interest. There is, therefore, nothing novel in the suggestions to be advanced here, except in their association with the basic aim of promoting the common good.

The first need is to adopt every expedient which promises to increase the amount and to raise the quality of creative intelligence available to government. Political scientists have long recognized that the complexity of modern problems requires experts of various types in government, and governments generally have quite unavoidably reached for experts in successive problem areas. The justification which has been offered is efficiency, but a deeper justification is moral. It is through the expert that we can expect to find ways of preventing the use of government for narrow aims, for only an expert can have the competence to discover workable solutions and thus show the ways to manipulate discordant elements toward public ends.

I am using the word "expert" comprehensively to include every form of intelligence which can be employed efficiently in the solution of problems. There are experts in technical detail, experts in analysis of facets of problems, experts in synthesis and the choice that forms decision, and experts in human (including group) relations. The highest level of expertness is the point where synthesis is reached as a result of juncture of analysis of the obstinacies and flexibilities of organic factors with analysis of the obstinacies and amenabilities of people. This gets close to or includes the expertness of the statesman, whether administrative or political.[19] I would not say politician when speaking of this function in politics, for there are variations in politicians. T. V. Smith has told us that the politician is "The secular saint of a sinful society."[20] But I would not want to raise to sainthood the politician who looks only one way, as a leader of the French revolution who is reputed to have said, "There goes the crowd. I am its leader. I must follow." If he looks the other way, also, at the diverse knowledge which experts can give him on what is possible and what is best and grasps in his synthesizing role the highest measure of the best that will be accepted by the people, then he may merit the appellation of saint.

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[19] Or even judicial, as in the case of the next step of the Supreme Court on segregation in education.

There are areas in which the work of the expert is conclusive. In my city I have never witnessed significant controversy over traffic engineering. The experts in placement and timing of traffic signals, choice of one-way streets, etc., are of course compromising the interests of people going south, north, east, and west, but they are doing this not directly at all times but ofttimes by a search for ways of moving traffic. There are areas of public convenience and of public necessity where men yield to the expert, or fail to yield only because they have not been told the reasons for his decisions.

There are other areas in which the divisions of men become more significant influences in the determination of policy. For this reason it is desirable to consider ways of keeping the creative intelligence within government oriented toward the inclusive interests of men. This requires special arrangements in personnel policies and organization.

The arrangements in personnel policies are those designed to maintain remoteness from particularistic viewpoints and an attachment to general interests. To attain these ends the following guides[21] are suggested:

1. Avoid representation of the interests in the composition of public authority (as on regulatory boards) or occupational qualifications which are equivalent, except where necessary to obtain consent of parties to a mediatory process (as in some aspects of labor relations).
2. Strive to preserve the principle that officers of government should have no interests save as members of the public in matters within their jurisdiction, except as emergencies require temporary departures from the principle.
3. Give continued emphasis to the task of developing a flexible, transferable group of experts for service at top levels in administration, a group of "experts in social engineering—the men *who are skilled in the process of finding, within the framework of institutional organization and process, solution to public problems.*"[22]

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[20] The statement was recorded from one of his speeches. Smith informs me that it appears in his writings as follows: "The politician is the secular saint of our sinful society one of whose sad businesses it is to keep the self-advertised saints from cutting each others' throats out of the very excess of their saintliness." *The Political Way of Life* (Pamphlet of the California Bar Association, 1948), p. 18.

[21] For fuller discussion see my *Administration of National Economic Control* (cited in note 4), pp. 236–51, 255–57, 270–71, 369–71. For other discussions of personnel problems in regulation see E. Pendleton Herring, *Federal Commissioners: A Study of Their Careers and Qualifications* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), and Avery Leiserson's discussion in Fritz Morstein Marx, *The Elements of Public Administration* (New York, 1946), ch. 14.

[22] *Administration of National Economic Control*, p. 369.

4. Develop a code of ethics for public office holders, containing rules on improper associations and guides on administrative practice, among which the following are suggestive: "conduct business in public offices, get the matter on the record, require clearances by professional staff members, prepare for particular pressures by developing a general policy, sink decisions on matters affecting persons or concerns individually deep enough in the administrative heirarchy and procedure to insulate against political direction on particulars."[23] The code could also outline the ideals of public office, e.g., nondiscriminatory action toward persons and groups, the independence of public office, the obligation to defend and promote the public interest. The ethics of public office might even be a section in in-service or pre-service training courses.

Arrangements in organization[24] should have, negatively, the aim of preventing too much identity of viewpoint between the regulator and the regulated and, positively, the aim of channeling the creative intelligence within the government toward a large, publicly-oriented consideration of social problems. In my opinion, our present knowledge points toward certain expedients of organization which will contribute to these ends.

First, in economic regulation there should be a predisposition toward cautiousness about establishing units of organization which deal continuously with the same industry or industry group. It must be recognized that there are some advantages in organizing on the basis of clientele served or commodity or industry controlled, and that it is even necessary sometimes to organize on such bases. But wherever it is necessary to establish clientele- or industry-oriented agencies, these should be subordinated to policy-forming echelons representing more inclusive viewpoints. This rule is suggested: for every use of the clientele or industry principle of organization, there should be compensating arrangements for consideration of other viewpoints.

Second, enlargement of the units of administration may force consideration of policy from broader viewpoints. The establishment of the Department of National Defense set the stage for the development of comprehensive planning for national defense, such as would not have been possible in the three separate services. Consolidation of agencies should be considered in many other areas: banking regulation and the Treasury, fuel, water, resources development, transportation. Ultimately the needs discussed in this paper and the need for reducing the President's span of control may require the establishment of even larger units of planning, coordination, and direction.[25]

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[23] *Ibid.* See also relative to a code of ethics, *Ethical Standards in Government*, Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U. S. Senate, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. (1951); Phillip Monypenny, "A Code of Ethics for Public Administration," *George Washington Law Review*, Vol. 21, pp. 423–44 (March, 1953) and "A Code of Ethics as a Means of Controlling Administrative Conduct," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 13, pp. 184–87 (Summer, 1953); "A Code of Public Ethics: Excerpts from a Code Prepared by the Citizens Commission on Ethics in Government, Arlington County, Virginia," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 13, pp. 120–22 (Spring, 1953).

[24] For fuller discussion of these see pp. 251–57, 272-324, 361–64, *ibid.* A good discussion of the relation of interest groups and organization, based upon experience in wage stabilization in World War II, is Murray Edelman, "Governmental Organization and Public Policy," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 12, pp. 276-83 (Autumn, 1952).

Third, assuming the integration of regulatory activities in large agencies, units for staff aid could be created in the top offices of each agency. The creative intelligence within such units could be applied to the broad problems which cut across industry or other lines of group interest.

Fourth, the whole executive branch should be integrated under the President so as to give him opportunities for influencing the direction of policy. I mean by this to attack the principle of independence of regulatory agencies as it developed in this country. Independence, if it was ever justified, is now an anachronism: it arose in a day when men assumed that regulation could be judicialized and when courts were saying that legislative power could not be delegated. Independence and plural headship have prevented the development of normal relationships between political and permanent officials. The two together have fostered traditionalism in approach and close affinities between the regulators and the regulated, and have insulated regulatory agencies against a responsible exercise of democratic control.

Fortunately, the idea of independence is dwindling on the vine, but unfortunately we have not yet adjusted our theory to the basic need. For half a century reformists have argued for integration as a means of saving money and gaining efficiency. But integration is more than a budgeteer's gadget or a technician's toy: it has a moral purpose. Integration is an instrument through which the related ideals of democracy and the common weal can have a chance to prevail in the practice of government: the former through a channel of control over the wielders of public power, the latter by raising the basic issues of public policy to a level where men may be forced to think inclusively.

The same moral purpose justifies geographical centralization on matters affecting the whole nation. Madison argued for centralized power in government as a means of preventing one faction from dominating society. Today we can see that centralized power gives an opportunity for the creative intelligence of men to find responses to situations which will take account of all the interests of the people over an extensive area. We have not yet adjusted our thinking to an international regime which can seek an international public interest which will ride over our particularistic national interests, but within our own nation the creation of the Constitution and the will to use the powers thereunder have created new possibilities for discovering and promoting the commonly-shared interests of men.

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[25] See, for example, the argument for a new echelon between the departments and the presidency (including an Executive Secretary for Economic Affairs) by George Graham in "The Presidency and the Executive Office of the President," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 12, pp. 519–621 (Nov., 1950), and discussion favorable to a Department of Foreign Affairs with subordinate administrative departments, as a long-run solution to the organizational problem in the conduct of foreign affairs, in *The Administration of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operation: A Report Prepared for the Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President*, by the Brookings Institution (Washington, 1951) and in Arthur W. Macmahon, "The Administration of Foreign Affairs," this REVIEW, Vol. 45, pp. 836–66, especially at p. 846 (Sept., 1951), and *Administration in Foreign Affairs* (University, Ala., 1953), pp. 94–103.

Herring has said that the reconciliation of interests called for "a great administrative machine."[26] We have reached the same conclusion. If government is to exercise controls over the economy on behalf of the people, it must put force in the places where men are forced to search for the common interests of all. This does not mean, of course, that all power must be concentrated. It only means that a framework is needed within which the inclusive interests, problem-wise or area-wise, can have adequate attention. In policy making, deconcentration within a hierarchy and local self-government are principles applicable for less inclusive interests.

IV

A "great administrative machine," adequately equipped with multiple brain centers within, will have some force of its own; but it can gain sufficient strength to counter powerful undercurrents of special interest only if it draws energy from political power centers. An administrator who operates without political support from above will find that his manipulative powers are weakened and that capitulation to group demand is unavoidable.

Obtaining adequate political support is difficult in our political system, where power is splintered and dissipated in many directions. Within the Congress power is distributed among many "working centers," as V. O. Key puts it, and each of these becomes a potential center of direct influence on administration. Before this group of working centers and the organs of overhead management and supervision within the executive branch the administrator strives to obtain a greater measure of support than of resistance and in doing so may find that his power to deal with situations is compromised.

The unity within the executive branch for which Hamilton, the Brownlow and Hoover Commissions, and students of administration generally have argued can be achieved only if there is more unity in the Congress, and apparently this can be achieved only through provision of means by which a unified executive can work with organs of leadership in Congress.

The problem of administrative regulation is ultimately the problem of our total political system. The inclusive point of view cannot be expected to prevail sufficiently in administration unless it prevails also in the Congress. The problem is more difficult for the Congress because the system of local representation puts the representation of interests inside the government. But the primary need is the same, namely, to shift the location of power to a level where men must search for the common interest of the people of the nation. The means of doing this in Congress would carry us out of the area of administration, and would call for another paper.

[26] *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (cited in note 6), p. 9.

CO-DETERMINATION IN GERMANY*

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When the Labour Government began to nationalize industries in Great Britain, swarms of social scientists descended upon that island. They wanted to study this "great experiment,"which many of them viewed as the trail-blazer for an inevitable trend in all modern industrial societies. That was nine years ago. Now it seems that the nationalization dogma has lost most of its force even in Labour circles. But another great experiment has been in progress on the Continent, in West Germany: *Mitbestimmung*, the scheme under which labor participates in the management of private industrial corporations. In part it was born out of British disillusionment with socialism's erstwhile cure-all. Because of its novelty and uniqueness, it is attracting increasing attention from social scientists. But this time, the different disciplines are unevenly represented. Economists, and especially experts in labor relations, have shown the most interest. When they run across a student of politics in pursuit of the same quarry, they often express surprise. And the Germans, who are being visited, interviewed, questioned, polled, and subjected to every conceivable form of social-scientific scrutiny, react even more strongly. They are positively puzzled: "You are not a *Nationaloekonom?* But then surely an *Industrie-* or *Betriebssoziologe*, or perhaps a *Jurist. . . .*" The political scientist is an animal of which few of them have heard. And fewer still can imagine off-hand why he would want to concern himself with co-determination.

And yet this German experiment seems to be pre-eminently suited for investigation by the student of government and politics, and not just for the conventional reason that it has played a role as one of the major issues in recent German politics. The main direction of our interest should rather be in *Mitbestimmung* as a deliberate attempt to introduce constitutionalism at a new level. It appears as a kind of constitutionalism not only in the traditional, negative sense of that word, i.e., because it has created a system of effective and regular restraints upon the action of the wielders of power at this level; but also in the more contemporary, positive meaning of democratic constitutionalism as an arrangement which seeks to distribute responsibility for central decisions among individuals in a manner fairly proportioned to the extent to which these individuals are affected by the consequences of such decisions. To make possible responsible living through institutions of this kind has in recent years been the great preoccupation of a large and diverse number of the most influential friends, in thought and practice, of constitutional democracy.[1] It was also the primary normative conception which motivated the creators of co-determination. To demonstrate this will be the purpose of the first part of this paper, while the second section will try to examine the workings of this new constitutionalism. Finally, an attempt will be made to legitimize the political scientist's special interest in this scheme through indicating some parallels between it and the more familiar varieties of constitutional government and politics.

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I

Mitbestimmung was for the first time concretely introduced, early in 1947, in four and eventually twenty-four iron- and steel-producing corporations which had been created out of existing trusts by fiat of the (British) North German Iron and Steel Control. Here co-determination worked as follows: (1) The supervisory board of directors (*Aufsichtsrat*)[2] of the corporation consisted of eleven members, five representing labor, five capital, and an eleventh member the German Steel Trusteeship Administration, a creature of the British Control. (2) The managing board (*Vorstand*) was expanded to include, in addition to the usual business and technical directors, a third or labor director (*Arbeitsdirektor*, or sometimes, in the beginning, *Sozialdirektor*), to be in charge of personnel and "social" matters. (3) The *Arbeitsdirektor* was to cooperate closely with the works council (*Betriebsrat*), consisting of elected respresentatives of the workers (*Arbeiter*) and white collar employees (*Angestellte*) of the corporation. The works council provided two of the five labor members of the supervisory board of directors; two others represented the metal workers union and the union federation, respectively; while the fifth labor representative was not directly connected with either the corporation or the union, but was nominated by the latter. The labor director, too, was nominated by labor through their representative on the Steel Trusteeship Administration.

What normative conceptions led to the adoption of this scheme? We have to consider this question in relation to the three groups who helped to bring the scheme into being: unions, management, and the British. The British had the final say in all matters affecting the decartelized steel industry. To execute its authority, the Control relied largely on the German Trusteeship Administration. The Administration was headed by Heinrich Dinkelbach, a former managing director of the German United Steel Works, and one of the few German managers who could afford to voice his views at a time when many of his colleagues were being held in Allied concentration camps. The unions, at British invitation and especially through their leader, Hans Böckler, participated in the original establishment of the Trusteeship Administration and were represented on its board.

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[1] Cf. the author's "Responsibility in Citizenship, Government, and Administration," in *Public Policy*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich and J. Kenneth Galbraith (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), Vol. 4, pp. 116–33.

[2] The German Corporation Law of 1937, which is still applicable to the *Aktiengesellschaft*, provides for three governing bodies: the general stockholders' meeting, which usually takes place once a year; the supervisory board of directors, which is elected by the general meeting, meets about four times annually, and lays down the long-range policies of the corporation; and the managing board of directors (*Vorstand*), which is appointed by the supervisory board and usually has two or three members, who either function collegially or are presided over by a *Generaldirektor*. Membership on one of these boards excludes membership on the other.

What prompted the German labor unions to promote *Mitbestimmung*, a scheme which would seem off-hand to go against their traditionally Marxian socialist aims? For there can be no doubt that they did then—and indeed for the most part still do—advocate the socialization of basic industries. Nor can it be denied that they were still carrying most of the ideological baggage of Marxism. Consequently, they might have been expected to look askance at any scheme which would give managerial functions to representatives of the working class and force upon them day-to-day collaboration with capitalists in a reviving capitalist economy. And what prompted capitalist managers, such as Dinkelbach, to promote a scheme which might well restrict managerial initiative and freedom of decision, and give labor representatives the opportunity to supervise and control management activities? And, finally, what prompted the British controllers, appointed by the Labour Government, to forego their chance to socialize on an even larger scale than at home?

To be sure, many concrete coercions which the existing postwar situation imposed upon all three groups played an important role here, quite independently of the normative goals which each of them may have wanted to pursue. For example, the labor unions were not allowed to organize above the local level during the first year after the end of the war. Their first concern was to give their members work, food, and shelter. This led to their active cooperation with what was left of management in the various plants. Meanwhile, socialization continued to be their goal. But even when they were granted Occupation permission to organize on a Zonal scale, they were given no opportunity to bring about socialization. Co-determination therefore appeared to some of their leaders as the little finger which they should accept prior to grabbing the whole arm (or body). Management, on the other hand, had been badly discredited through close association with the Nazi regime. Some managers were released from Occupation arrest only on requests by the unions. And those managers who were permitted to play a role in the reconstruction and reorganization of the steel industry undoubtedly felt that they needed labor support in order to be able to resist those Occupation demands which they considered particularly obnoxious, as for example dismantling. The British controllers, finally, had to defer socialization out of respect for United States views on this question. And since they needed German help in order to put their steel program into effect at all, they had to accommodate themselves to some wishes of those Germans upon whose cooperation they had to rely.

Notwithstanding the importance of these favorable conditions, purely normative considerations did play a significant role in shaping the institution of *Mitbestimmung*. This is true especially of the German actors on the scene, partly because of the old German tradition of ideologically determined and/or rationalized action. Anyone seeking corroboration for the influence of normative theory on political practice could probably find better cases in Germany than anywhere else. Political action which cannot be justified in terms of an elaborate "scientific" ideology is hard to find there. The German labor movement especially stands in this tradition. During the Weimar period, its theoreticians had already worked out the theory of economic democracy as a pendant to socialization.[3] The economy as a whole was to be democratized in addition to being rationalized through socialization. This economic democracy was to be realized through the equal participation of labor and management in a series of economic councils at different levels of the economy. Participation within the individual enterprise was also considered, and the Works Council Law of 1920 indeed granted it, though on a very limited scale. However, these Weimar theories gave but scanty elaboration to labor participation at this lowest level of the economy. But when postwar force of circumstances necessitated relegation of socialization, it was only natural that the theory of economic democracy should be brought to the ideological front in its place. Thus one ground for labor's ideological acceptance of co-determination was given.

A second, and more important, basis existed. Despite the German labor movement's continued espousal of socialization, the expectations which it held of socialization had undergone a profound change. The orthodox Marxist expected socialization to bring about, first, a rational organization of the economy, and, eventually, the establishment of the classless Utopia. But by 1945 too much had happened to leave many adherents of this optimistic variety of Marxism, which holds that socialism enables all individuals to become responsible for their fate through making decisions based upon perfect, certain knowledge. Faith in the supreme desirability of individual responsibility survived the war, but faith in the attainability of perfect knowledge, along with the attractiveness of the rationalism of large-scale organization which both "monopoly capitalism" and socialism bring with themselves, was one of the casualties of the preceding decades. The survivors in Germany of National Socialism, war, and defeat attributed these disasters in part to the institutional inability of the many to contribute to decisions made by the few. True, better opportunities for the affected many to share responsibility for the disastrous course of events might not have made that course any less disastrous. But it would have made the consequences less unbearable. They would rather suffer something for which they deemed themselves responsible than something for which they knew they were not.

A democratic socialism might redress this situation. But because of the gigantic proportions of its organization, the individual would not be able to make really meaningful contributions to central decisions. Co-determination within individual plants, on the other hand, would afford him opportunities for such meaningful responsibility. Of course, bankruptcy of businesses or a depression in the whole national or international economy could still occur, but at least the individuals affected would feel that they had contributed to the occurrence. And the individual worker within the plant would better understand the complexity of the total process of decision-making. He would participate in it not only at the polls, as in democratic socialism, but also in the factory. He would, as the most often used slogan of the proponents of *Mitbestimmung* has it, be brought back into the center of things: *Der Mensch muss in den Mittelpunkt gebracht werden.*

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[3] Cf. G. Decker, "Zum Begriff der Wirtschaftsdemokratie," *Die Arbeit*, Vol. 4, pp. 827 ff. (1927); T. Leipart, *Auf dem Wege zur Wirtschaftsdemokratie* (Berlin, 1928); Fritz Naphtali, *Wirtschaftsdemokratie* (Berlin, 1928).

An additional reason for labor's espousal of co-determination was its interpretation of the past. Large segments of the German labor movement and the Social Democratic party adhere to the Marxian interpretation of the fall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of National Socialism. They believe that this chapter in German history teaches that "monopoly capitalism" leads to fascism, because Thyssen "paid Hitler," Schacht made his collection, and so forth. The correctness of this interpretation is not at issue here, but only the weight carried by the conviction that it is correct. This weight is tremendous. And one means for preventing the recurrence of this kind of subsidization of political extremists by powerful industrialists was seen in the control which co-determination would give labor through its representatives on the supervisory boards of corporations. Thus a changed view of the historical process—the conversion from "optimistic" to "pessimistic" Marxism—led to the advocacy of political institutions designed to canalize that process, so that men might become responsible for their fate.

Normative considerations on the part of the earliest managerial proponents of *Mitbestimmung* may be more easily subsumed under the two main headings of "Christianity" and "escape from accountability." To say that several of the most important managerial supporters of the scheme stood under the influence of modern Christian social doctrines is not to imply that management held a monopoly on Christianity. On the contrary, the inclusion of non-socialist groups in the new unified German Trade Union Federation (*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* or *DGB*) brought many convinced "*Christliche*" unionists into positions of influence on the labor side. This fact made peaceful cooperation between labor and management less difficult in postwar than in Weimar Germany. But, whereas the workers and their leaders would have advanced claims to a greater role in the life of the nation whether they were influenced by Christian thought or not, managers needed this kind of stimulus, in order to grant such a role to the workers. Roman Catholics were able to fall back upon a tradition which goes back at least to *Rerum novarum* and has always had strong exponents in Germany in particular.[4] Both this and newer Protestant social doctrine were entirely sympathetic to any arrangements which, while leaving the institution of private property undisturbed, were designed to give individuals living within huge organizations improved opportunities for the exercise of responsibility. Some old and some newly "Christian" managers devoted themselves to the realization of just this Christian goal after the German collapse had left little else standing in Germany but the moral authority of the churches. Thus they too could agree with the slogan of returning the human being to the center of things through co-determination.

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[4] Cf. Ralph Henry Bowen, *German Theories of the Corporative State* (New York, 1947), ch. 3 "Social Catholicism," and *passim*. Also John F. Cronin, *Mitbestimmung im Streit der Meinungen* (Bad Nauheim, 1953), pp. 46 ff.

At the same time, however, many of them preferrred to remove *themselves* somewhat from the center of things. This motive gave rise to the second normative consideration which made for managerial supporters of the scheme. They wanted to relieve themselves of at least part of the responsibility which had hitherto rested upon their shoulders and consciences, because they had only too recently learned of the corresponding accountability which went with it. Many of them, indeed, felt that they had been held accountable by the Allies for many events to an extent which far exceeded their responsibility therefor. And they sensed from the German climate of opinion that their capacity to shape the course of events had been, and was being, overestimated. The chances were that, if things should go wrong in industry and in the economy in the future, they would again be blamed. So, when *Mitbestimmung* presented them with an opportunity to unburden themselves of part of their responsibility by sharing it with representatives of labor, they were glad to do so in anticipation of letting these representatives share also accountability for the consequences of decisions which would henceforth be made jointly. Managerial support for co-determination thus came from two normative considerations: the partly "Christian" recognition of workers' claims for more responsibility, and the managerial desire to escape total accountability.

What normative considerations, finally, prompted the British Steel Control to permit the experiment to take place? Here, dissatisfaction with the results of the nationalization of coal in Britain played a most important role. This dissatisfaction had nothing to do with the economic results of nationalization, but was the result of the relatively unchanged situation of the miners. They had no more opportunities for meaningful, responsible participation in shaping the future of the enterprises for which they worked than before nationalization. *Mitbestimmung* would be an experiment in providing such opportunities. The title of the major British report on the subject, "Workers Responsibility for Management in the Reorganized Iron and Steel Works," was not selected by accident.

Thus management and labor, Christians and Marxists, Germans and British, thinkers and actors who came from all sorts of radically diverse ideological backgrounds were able to agree on the desirability of giving individuals better opportunities for responsibility by letting them contribute to decisions about the fate of the corporations, on which their own fate depended to a large extent. Whether co-determination, the institution which they deliberately called into being for this purpose, served this end will be our next concern.

II

What happens to any individual depends in large measure upon the course taken by the many groups and organizations to which he belongs. Their fate is in part determined by human decisions. Men who make these decisions may be said to be responsible for their consequences, when the decisions are made (1) upon a choice among alternatives; (2) in light of the availability of resources with which to put them into effect; (3) with knowledge of their consequences. Democratic and constitutional politics seeks to facilitate individual responsibility by enabling individuals to contribute to such central decisions to the extent that they will be affected by their consequences. To examine the functioning of *Mitbestimmung* as a kind of constitutionalism, therefore, we should ask such questions as the following: Who is affected, and how so, by decisions made in and about the corporations covered by the law? Who makes these decisions, and who contributes to making them? What are the alternatives, the resources, and the knowledge upon which these decisions are made? Through which channels can one make contributions to them? And how does all this differ from conditions in these corporations before co-determination was introduced and from conditions in other corporations not affected by the several co-determination laws?

We cannot examine the twenty-four iron- and steel-producing corporations in which the scheme was first tried as though they existed in a vacuum or operated with a fixed, unchanging institution. The provisions and practices of *Mitbestimmung* have been undergoing continuous change. Legally, the high-marks of this process of evolution are to be found in the laws of May 21, 1951, and October 11, 1952.[5] The first of these gave the *Bundestag's* sanction, with slight changes, to existing arrangements in iron and steel and at the same time extended them to all corporations engaged in the production of iron and steel and in mining. It was adopted after lengthy negotiations and a struggle which involved the threat of a general strike by the *DGB*. The second law introduced a milder version of co-determination to most other privately owned corporations. It governs the elections and functions, including a limited right of co-determination, of works councils in all private businesses, including those governed by the earlier law. Under its provisions, one-third of the members of the supervisory board of corporations are elected by its workers and employees. But the unions are not empowered to appoint any members to this board, and there is no provision for a labor director. Passage of a further law, establishing economic councils at various levels, may be expected within a year.

American political scientists of an alegal or antilegal orientation may object to a detailed consideration of the highly detailed provisions of the two laws, and of the vast volume of juristic arguments which have been woven around them, and out of which they emerged. For lack of space, I shall indeed forego such a discussion, but not without first emphasizing the practical importance which legal provisions and controversies have in German politics. Whether it is because of the tradition of Roman and codified law, a characteristic hankering after order and orderliness, a faith in the capacity of human reason to predetermine the course of events, or an aversion to direct personal negotiation for the settlement of differences, it is a fact that a legalism pervades the German political atmosphere which is bound to impress most Americans as excessive. The general practice is to make detailed and comprehensive legal provisions for all possible eventualities before embarking upon a new political experiment, rather than to experiment before giving tried institutions and processes the stamp of legality after they have proved their worth, as in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The only reason why the "German way" was not followed from the very beginning in the case of co-determination is to be found in the non-existence of a German legislature at the time of its introduction under British Occupation auspices. But even in those early postwar days, the participating Germans repeatedly lamented the absence of a legal basis for *Mitbestimmung*. When they were able to create such a basis, they did, and ever since then the literal provisions of articles and paragraphs are forever cited by all those concerned with co-determination, from *Generaldirektoren* to workers.

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[5] *Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsräten und Vorständen der Unternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden Industrie*, May 21, 1951; *Betriebsverfassungsgesetz*, October 11, 1952.

This pervasive legalism also backs up the other caveat: not to consider the twenty-four decartelized steel-producing corporations as though they existed in a vacuum. They existed within, among other things, this legalistic atmosphere. They existed, also, under the difficult economic conditions of the first few postwar years. Their workers lived as members of the newly unified German trade union movement, which made the full realization of co-determination and its extension to all sectors of the economy, both private and public, its primary goal. For the last couple of years, they have lived next door to coal miners, in whose industry co-determination has had a slow and difficult start, and to workers in other corporations governed by the Law of 1952, which granted co-determination on a much narrower scale. They lived close to the Soviet Zone and at a focal point in the East-West strugggle. *Mitbestimmung* was evolved in plants which have been practicing it for seven years, in full consciousness, on the part of the participants, of the importance of the experiment for the rest of Germany and—as some think—of the world.

But what has co-determination achieved with respect to opportunities for individual responsibility? To begin with, no great changes have occurred so far as the effects of decisions made in or about the corporations are concerned. These consequences still affect everyone living in the German and, to a lesser extent, the world economies. They also still affect corporate stockholders who, an Occupation promise to the contrary notwithstanding, have since had their property restored to them. And they still affect, above all, the men and women who work in the plants. Drastic changes have, however, occurred in the distribution of responsibility for making these decisions. They are made by different people than before; new circles of individuals and organizations can contribute to these decisions; and the alternatives, resources, and knowledge upon which they are based are of another kind than previously.

Formerly, day-to-day management decisions were made by the (usually two) collegial business and technical directors. These were appointed by, and personally directly accountable to, the supervisory board and, indirectly, the general stockholders' meeting, in terms of the provisions of the Corporation Law of 1937. These two groups, and the others whom they represented, were thus able to make indirect contributions to the managerial decisions made by the directors. The latters' discretionary power, i.e., the range of alternatives upon which they based their decisions, was limited by their personal accountability to the board and by the prevailing business and labor situation. Their resources for effectuating decisions consisted of physical and financial givens plus their managerial subordinates. Their knowledge about the consequences of their decisions was derived from their general business experience, from the advice of the supervisory board, and, for intra-corporation effects of decisions, from the information which their managerial subordinates supplied.

What changes has *Mitbestimmung* wrought here? Day-to-day management decisions are now made by the three-man managing board. The third or labor director is appointed, as are his two colleagues, by the supervisory board, but on recommendation of the metal workers union. The three managing directors are individually and collectively accountable to the supervisory board of eleven. Five of these eleven represent the stockholders of the corporation. Five others represent labor. Two of these are elected by the works council, one being a worker and the other a white collar employee. Two others are appointed by the metal workers union and the *DGB*, respectively. The eleventh member of the board must be acceptable to the other ten. In other words, the circle of those capable of contributing indirectly to managerial decisions has been vastly extended, and the network of channels through which these contributions flow, vastly complicated. This means that contributions made by those who belonged to this circle prior to the introduction of *Mitbestimmung* have lost in relative weight. At least this is true of the discretionary power upon which decisions by stockholders are based, since the law now restricts the direct choice of the general stockholders' meeting to only five-elevenths of the members of the supervisory board. The increase in the discretion component of responsibility on the part of the workers thus occurred at the cost of the owners. Meanwhile, however, it is possible that the resources and knowledge components have been improved all around.

Managerial responsibility presents a good test case for this hypothesis. Under the law, the three managing directors are collectively accountable for action by any one of them. While each concerns himself primarily with business, technical, and personnel matters, respectively, all important decisions are made jointly. The alternatives available to the two original directors have thus been somewhat curtailed through the addition of the labor director and through the stricter delimitation of their jurisdiction by the co-determination law. Incidentally, this tends to be a general result of the subjection of any sphere of life to explicit legal regulation. Another such general result is improvement of the knowledge about probable consequences of decisions governed by the law. This result may also be observed in the case of co-determination. All three directors, as indeed all concerned, can now anticipate with greater clarity than previously the probable effects of their decisions within (though not necessarily outside) their corporation. But their general knowledge, as well as their legal foreknowledge, has been improved. Through addition of the labor director to the managing board, new channels have been opened for the flow of knowledge to the other two directors. This has occurred not merely through expansion of the corporation's personnel department, which in most cases was rather neglected in Germany before 1945, but also through securing the cooperation of the workers' representatives. This same labor cooperation has also improved the institutional resources which are at the disposal of management in order to put their decisions into effect.

What is the concrete form taken by these improvements in the knowledge and resources components of management's capacity for responsibility? The case of a managerial decision may serve as an illustration. Suppose that the managing board of a steel corporation is considering an expansion of its plant. The financial outlay for this must be approved by the supervisory board. Its five stockholder members provide the usual fund of information about the corporation's competitive situation, the capital market, and other financial factors. Eventually they will also help to secure the needed capital. The two labor members of the supervisory board who represent the workers and employees of the corporation will bring to bear what knowledge they possess of conditions in the plant. This knowledge will be considerable, since these two are usually the chairman and vice-chairman of the works council, positions to which they would not have been elected had they themselves not worked in the plant for many years. Moreover, as officers of the works council they constantly work with its other members, who represent all the different shops of the plant. Members of the council will bring up much relevant information—and not just of a personnel or labor-relations character—in the course of its meetings. These two workers' representatives of the supervisory board will therefore be well informed on such matters as extent of utilization of existing capacity and efficiency of organization. The two supervisory board members who represent the unions, usually high union officers themselves, are able to contribute their general economic knowledge, which is often impressive and is being constantly expanded through union-sponsored training conferences for labor participants in *Mitbestimmung*. In addition to this general knowledge, they can also bring to bear their special knowledge of labor problems. If they had reason, for example, to foresee strikes, they would probably react differently to the expansion proposal than otherwise. It is too early to tell whether co-determination will act as a permanent or strong deterrent to strikes. But it is a fact that a special delegates' conference of the coal miners union recently voted to shelve demands for wage increases which had earlier been voted by the union's general convention. This change in plans must have been a result in part of the improved knowledge about the general economic situation available to the union's representatives on the supervisory boards of the coal mining corporations. Foreknowledge of the consequences of decisions is thus improved for labor as well as for management.

Once the supervisory board votes to accept the managing directors' proposal, the project is put into effect. Then the workers' legal right to "co-determine" through their elected works council becomes most noticeable in personnel questions. Old workers and managers have to be transferred and new ones hired.

Here the operations of the works council assume the character and proportions almost of those of a personnel office. Transfers, hirings, and firings are often done only through the council. Even managers are not hired without approval of the works council in some corporations. Decisions on these matters are made by joint management-works council committees on which both sides have equal representation. A series of such committees exists in each plant. Usually they deal with specialized matters such as economic, personnel, wage, and insurance questions, working conditions, accident prevention, and minors and women employed in the plant. These joint committees provide the managing board with a useful institutional channel for purposes not only of gathering knowledge for their decision-making, but also of putting their decisions into effect with less friction than would be the case if they were obviously management-imposed.

Finally, what opportunites for exercising responsibility exist for the workers themselves? They are informed about the state of the enterprise by management and workers' representatives at quarterly meetings held for this purpose. They elect the works council in biennial elections. They can always carry personal problems and general grievances to their representatives on the council. The council for its part maintains close liaison with its constitutents through so-called "men of confidence" (*Vertrauensmänner*), of whom there is one for about forty workers, on the average. The workers also contribute to central decisions made about the future of the corporation through participation at the different levels of trade union politics, which finally produce, among other things, the union representatives on the supervisory board. They can further contribute to corporate decisions through joining the study and action groups which are maintained in most factories by the several political parties. These groups play an important role in the election of the works council, which often gives an accurate reflection of the political composition of the workers in the plant. In addition, two methods which had been available before co-determination was introduced may still be used: straight union activity of the traditional kind, from collective bargaining through to the strike, and the ballot, through which the corporation's policies and future may be influenced via "the state."

Such, then, in outline, is the shape taken by the new corporate constitutionalism in the German steel-producing industry. The makers of central decisions seem to be provided with a better basis of knowledge and resources. This improved knowledge may also in fact increase the range of alternatives available to them, despite the restrictions imposed in this respect by the co-determination law itself. Certainly the workers in these plants have new means for making contributions to central decisions and for availing themselves of information upon which to base these decisions. The multiplicity of channels through which they may influence central decisions will also tend to increase the alternatives among which they can choose, because it often happens that works council, union local, union, union federation, and *Arbeitsdirektor*—to mention only some of these channels— pursue different policies, which individual workers may then support, as e.g., in works council elections or at the quarterly meetings for all personnel (rarely attended by more than twenty per cent). One danger, however, arises in this respect: the monopolization of these positions by a group of more or less like-minded *Funktionäre*, which would make the multiplicity of channels a mere fiction. When this happens, the worker is in fact confronted by the same union machine, no matter where he turns. When some labor union theoreticians advance the claim that only their organization is truly entitled to represent the workers in all their interests, they only feed this particular flame in the fire of criticism of *Mitbestimmung*, which is constantly maintained by their unreconstructed free-enterprise opponents. They, and even many labor leaders, often also raise the objection that the "average worker" will neither make use of, nor understand, the information on which he may base his contributory decisions. For this reason, the whole scheme has been transformed in the minds of some of its earliest proponents into a great educational experiment, designed to raise the level of economic, social, and political understanding of the German workers.[6] They also insist that academically trained experts must be used as labor representatives on supervisory boards for these reasons. It might be pointed out, however, that the "average citizen" in a constitutional democracy also often fails to make use of or to understand political information available to him. But even if this be true, both citizen and worker are still able to become responsible for central decisions through the accountability to themselves of those men who are charged with making the decisions. Moreover, through participating concretely in the exercise of such responsibility, they become aware of the limits set to the knowledge of all human beings—including that of the most polished academic experts. They recognize also the inadequacies of the ideologies upon which they used to base their decisions. They learn that fundamental ideological disagreements between workers and capitalists need be no barrier to cooperation between human beings forced to find practical solutions to practical problems.[7] All around, their view of reality becomes more "realistic" through their ability to enforce the accountability of the men charged with the exercise of responsibility for the future of the corporation. To the extent that this is true, one of the purposes of the introduction of this constitutionalism at the level of the industrial corporation will have been achieved.

III

Devotees of "scientific management" from the United States who approach the co-determination experiment ask of it: How can a committee of three run a huge corporation? More important, how can the three-man managing board function properly when one of its members, the labor director, is appointed by and accountable to, not the stockholders, who are interested in maximizing profits, but labor, which has quite different aims? Will not the conflicting demands which the interests of the firm, the unions, and the workers make of the labor director cause him to turn into a permanent schizophrenic, or else to favor one side at the cost of betraying the others? Industrial sociologists who are studying *Mitbestimmung* inquire: What are its effects on the attitude of the workers to their job, their employers, to the unions, and to each other? What is happening to the managerial layer of industrial society? Has it been expanded to include labor union leaders? Have the goals and attitudes of its older members changed?

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[6] Cf. the author's "Ein Amerikaner zur Mitbestimmung," *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, Vol. 4, pp. 527–30 (Sept., 1953).

[7] Cf. Carl J. Friedrich, *The New Image of the Common Man*, and the author's review of Cronin, *op. cit.*, in *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, Vol. 4, p. 511 (Aug., 1953).

Economists who approach the experiment ask these questions: What economic consequences does it bring? Will it result, e.g., in "excessive" economic benefits for the workers and thereby harm the German steel industry in international competition, or raise the cost of steel for domestic consumers? Students of labor relations ask: How can the steel corporations engage in collective bargaining with the metal workers union, if men appointed by that union, and owing it their primary loyalty, conduct negotiations on behalf of the corporations? How will strikes be possible under these conditions? Are not the German labor unions "perverting" their traditional goals?[8]

Now these are important questions and, in terms of the relatively narrow focus in which they are put, quite adequate.[9] But all of them miss the really crucial point about *Mitbestimmung*: it is a conscious experiment in constitutional and democratic politics at a new level. It tries to repeat for the history of private industrial corporations what happened in the history of the countries which have become constitutional democracies in the course of the last three centuries. They, just as these corporations, were once ruled by single sovereigns, accountable only to God or "History," and possessed of sole responsibility for all that transpired in their realms as a result of the discretionary capacity, resources, and knowledge which they had concentrated in their hands. Their responsibility, too, was gradually—sometimes not so gradually—restrained and then divided and subdivided among ever more of those who were affected by the consequences of decisions centrally made, until finally all citizens came to share in it. And just as with the managing board today, the executive officials or bureaucrats of one-time sovereign rulers had to exchange very simple relations of accountability to their monarch, for very complicated relations of accountability to all those individuals and groups from whom they now derive their delegated capacity for responsibility, and who are specially affected by the

[8] Cf. Cronin, *Mitbestimmung im Streit der Meinungen* (cited in note 4); Goetz Briefs, *Zwischen Kapitalismus und Syndikalismus* (Munich, 1952); Franz Böhm, *Das wirtschaftliche Mitbestimmungsrecht der Arbeiter im Betrieb*, in *Ordo*, Vol. 4 (Düsseldorf, 1951); H. D. Ortlieb, "*Der Kampf um Wirtschaftsdemokratie und Mitbestimmung*," *Wirtschaftsdienst* (Hamburg), Dec., 1952; McKitterick and Roberts, *Workers and Management —The German Co-determination Experiment*, Fabian Research Series No. 160 (London, 1953); W. H. McPherson, "Co-Determination: Germany's Move toward a New Economy," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 5, pp. 20–32 (Oct., 1951).

[9] The author hopes to deal with some of them in a broader focus in later publications. Cf. also his "*Vom menschlichen und sozialen Wert der Mitbestimmung*," *Sonderbeilage* Nr. 70, *Informationen, Gesellschaft für soziale Betriebspraxis*, Düsseldorf, Feb. 1, 1954.

consequences of bureaucratic decisions. Efficiency may sometimes have suffered, but this result was simply taken in stride by those who preferred to go to ruin under their own steam than to be guided to heaven by an efficient but unaccountable bureaucracy. Anyhow did efficiency really suffer? The notion that an unrestrained and uncontrolled individual can accomplish a job more efficiently than one who is in many, and often devious, ways restrained and supervised by others, is based upon the assumption that this one individual possesses certain knowledge about the consequences of his actions. If he were only permitted to act upon this knowledge, instead of having to consider the conflicting instructions of others who derive a different "knowledge" from their observation of reality, then he could achieve perfect efficiency. But it is precisely the rejection of the attainability of perfect knowledge which lies at the bottom of the contemporary advocacy of the norm of individual responsibility by friends of constitutional and democratic government. They realize first that much of what happens to men as members of communities is not at all the result of human decisions, but is determined by the data of nature and society, and second, that human decisions are based upon limited alternatives, executed with limited resources, and made by men whose foreknowledge of the consequences of their decisions will persistently remain merely probable. But they are also aware of the effects of such decisions on many people who do not themselves make them. Since they are motivated above all by the desire to give these individuals the opportunity to shape their own future, they ask that they be enabled to make equitable contributions to these central decisions —contributions, that is, which are reasonably balanced with reference to the extent to which they will be affected by the consequences of these decisions.

To get ever closer to this unattainable goal of enabling individual human beings to live responsibly seems to be one of the basic purposes which constitutional and democratic government is designed to promote. The constitution-makers and legislators of the German Federal Republic also conceive of it in those terms, as is clearly shown by the Basic Law, the unique "Law to Equalize the Burdens" of the war, by much other recent legislation, and last but not least by the legislation on *Mitbestimmung*. This concept of constitutional democracy pervades the German political atmosphere today in an almost tangible way. It probably arises out of recent disillusionment with Utopian ideologies of the right and left, but contains an element of Utopianism of its own in the form of faith in the feasibility of constitutionalizing literally all spheres of life. The political scientist's paramount interest in the experiment of co-determination is legitimized, because *Mitbestimmung* is a manifestation of this faith. The extreme devotees of the faith are bound eventually to be disappointed, too, though one great hope exists: the introduction of constitutional and democratic politics at this and other new levels may show all those who participate in them that what really matters for their success is not formal agreement on fundamental ideological convictions, but informal observance of methods of procedure.

AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ELECTION OF 1953*

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Conditions for the successful operation of the democratic form of government have not been present in the Orient. Democracy requires a people who have confidence in themselves, in their leaders, and in the democratic processes, and who have the means for operating democratic institutions. Included in the tools that make democracy work are literacy, a willingness to abide by the rules of the game, and a rapid means of communication and transportation.[1] In the Orient a fatalistic view regarding government is widespread. People in the lower income groups feel that government is an institution of the few, by the few, and for the few. Vote buying, spoils politics, favoritism, nepotism, grafting, the squeeze, the hold up, the percentage are all taken for granted. As one Filipino senator put it, "Graft and corruption are inherent in human nature."[2] The Orient also suffers from the primitive character of means of transportation and communications. Roads are bad, newspapers have limited circulations, telephones and telegraph stations are few, radios are scarce, and travel is often complicated by hazards of water, mountainous terrain, bandits, and wild animals.

The Philippine elections of November 10, 1953 show that the difficulties that have hindered the growth of democracy in the Orient can be overcome.[3] Before the elections apprehension was widespread that extensive use might be made of fraud and terror to defeat the free expression of the popular will. The election demonstrated that popular sentiment could be mobilized and its expression protected in a Far Eastern country with limited experience with democratic institutions. The election was, therefore, an especially serious setback to communism and fascism.

I

It should not be expected that a country governed for four hundred and fifty years by foreigners would develop leaders of its own overnight. In governing the Philippines the Spaniards made little attempt to train the Filipinos for self-government. They did not provide universal education, they kept the Filipinos divided by their local dialects, they failed to build a modern system of communication and transportation, and they set the example of a highly centralized government operated for the benefit of the few. The United States, in slightly less than half a century, made some progress in introducing universal education, teaching English as a common language, training leaders, and developing communications.[4] But democracy has to be learned through experience, and for the Filipinos the process of learning really began July 4, 1946, their Independence Day.

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* The author was in the Philippines as an observer of the November, 1953 elections for president and national legislature.

[1] Harold F. Gosnell, *Democracy: Threshold of Freedom* (New York, 1948); Richard McKeon and Rokkan Stein, *Democracy in a World of Tensions;* A Symposium Prepared by UNESCO (Chicago, 1951); Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan T. Possony, *International Relations in the Age of Conflict between Democracy and Dictatorship* (New York, 1950).

[2] Senator José Avelino, quoted by *Philippines Herald*, Oct. 21, 1953.

[3] Harold F. Gosnell, "Filipinos Hold Free Election," *National Municipal Review*, Vol. 43, pp. 120–22 (March, 1954); T. Durdin, "Philippines Awaits a New Deal," *Reporter*, Vol. 10, pp. 17–19 (Jan. 5, 1954); T. Durdin, "Filipino Emerges as a New Asian Leader," *New York Times Magazine*, Nov. 22, 1953, p. 17; C. P. Romulo, "Right Man Wins," *Atlantic*, Vol. 193, pp. 50–52 (Feb., 1954).

The first elections for the republic were actually held before Independence Day. Sergio Osmeña, who became the President in exile when President Quezon died in 1944, ran for re-election in April, 1946 as the candiate of the Nacionalista party. Had he been given a free hand, he might have been re-elected. When he returned from exile, he wanted to outlaw all who had collaborated with the Japanese occupation. General MacArthur prevented his doing this by directing the calling of a session of Congress which included a number of collaborators. One of these, Senator Manuel Roxas, had been long a rival of President Osmeña.

Roxas led the formation of a new political party, called the Liberal party, which challenged President Osmeña's bid for re-election. The Liberals, an offshoot from the Nacionalistas, charged the Osmeña administration with inefficiency, weakness, and favoritism. Effective as a speaker and backed by a large faction of former Nacionalistas, Roxas waged a vigorous campaign, while President Osmeña refused to exert himself. Roxas won by a narrow margin.[5] The election proved that the administration could be changed by democratic means and showed that it might be possible to build up a two-party system in the Philippines.[6]

The Roxas administration was disappointing to many. The new president failed to convince the people that he was governing primarily for their benefit rather than for that of the favored few. Spoils and graft in the disturbed postwar days were hard to eliminate. In his two years in office Roxas failed to live up to the promises of his campaign.[7]

Former Senator Elpidio Quirino, who had been elected vice president in 1946 as a Liberal, became president in April, 1948 following the sudden death of President Roxas. Before he became president, Quirino had not been regarded as an outstanding political leader. He had neither the oratorical powers of

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[4] C. Ralston Hayden, *The Philippines, A Study of National Development* (New York, 1942).

[5] The returns were: Roxas, 1,333,392; Osmeña, 1,129,996.

[6] Bernard Seeman and Laurence Salisbury, *Cross-Currents in the Philippines* (American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1946). This discussion has a curious blind spot on the Communist leadership in the Huk movement. On the party system in the Philippines, see Hayden, *op. cit.;* José M. Aruego, *Philippine Government in Action* (Manila, 1953); George A. Malcolm, *First Malayan Republic, The Story of the Philippines* (Boston, 1951).

[7] Manila *Sunday Times Magazine*, Oct. 25, 1953, pp. 14–16; C. F. Nivera, "Political Review," in *Philippine Yearbook 1950–1951* (Manila, 1951), p. 108.


THE PHILIPPINES
PERCENT MAGSAYSAY 1953
UNDER 50 PERCENT
50—59 PERCENT
60—69 PERCENT
70—79 PERCENT
OVER 80 PERCENT
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Quezon or Roxas, nor the organizing abilities of Senator José Avelino or Speaker Eugenio Perez. The son of a jail warden of Spanish days, Quirino acquired an education, including a law course, in the early days of the American regime, earning his way by government clerkships. He learned politics and administration under the Americans, serving as representative, senator, Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior, and Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He had married into a wealthy family, and had no financial need to indulge in spoils politics. It was charged that he had collaborated to some extent with the Japanese;[8] to counterbalance this charge, however, his supporters could point to the killing of his wife and two of his children by the Japanese. As Secretary of Foreign Affairs he had several diplomatic victories to his credit.

President Quirino started out with plenty of goodwill, but lacked the vigorous health needed for a clean-up administration. His own friends betrayed his confidence and he found it difficult to get rid of them. Instead he used the techniques of palace intrigue, keeping secret dossiers and using them when he felt that his power was threatened.[9]

The elections of 1949 were disillusioning to those who hoped to see increasing acceptance of democratic methods. President Quirino gained control of the nominating machinery by bringing graft charges against Senator José Avelino, who was trying to unseat him. Senator Avelino bolted the Liberal convention and ran on a Liberal ticket of his own. The Nacionalistas put forward José Laurel, an effective orator who had been president during the Japanese occupation and who wanted to vindicate his record. Laurel claimed that General MacArthur had left him behind to do what he could for his people.

President Quirino was apparently unwilling to take his chances in a free election. The temptation to bring pressure to bear upon the voters was too strong. He used the vast powers of the executive, inherited from Spanish times, to influence the result. It was charged that he used the Philippine Constabulary, the provincial treasuries, the mayors, and other officials to terrorize the voters and manipulate the results. In contests following these elections several Liberal representatives lost their seats. It was alleged that ghosts, monkeys, and bees were allowed to vote in some provinces. While the official returns gave President Quirino 1,793,446 votes, Laurel 1,303,575, and Avelino 419,890, Laurel never admitted that he been defeated.[10]

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[8] Malcolm, *First Malayan Republic* (cited in note 6), p. 185; Seeman and Salisbury, *Cross-Currents in the Philippines* (cited in note 6), p. 22; Hernando J. Abaya, *Betrayal in the Philippines* (New York, 1946).

[9] Malcolm, p. 301; "The Tenant in Malacanan," Manila *Sunday Times Magazine*, Oct. 25, 1953, pp. 14–16; José L. Guevara, "LP Chances in the Elections," *Ibid.*, Oct. 25, 1953, pp. 30–31; Isidro L. Tetizos, "Why the LP Is Confident of Victory," *Counter-Point*, Manila, Oct. 20, 1953, pp. 2–3.

[10] Nivera, "Political Review" (cited in note 7). The 1953 presidential elections marked a high point in popular participation in the Philippines as a whole. In spite of this, the vote cast in 1949 in the provinces of Negros Occidental and Lanao was far higher than it was in 1953. In Lanao 150 per cent of the estimated number of eligible voters were registered in 1951, according to the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL.)

In the meantime, the problems facing the government were mounting. Important among these was the growing power of the Communist-led Huk guerrilla movement The Huks or Hukbalahaps were an offshoot of a wartime guerrilla group. In central Luzon, where farm tenancy and unemployment were highest, the Huks were making rapid inroads by promises and threats just as the Communists were doing in other parts of Asia. The armed forces of the Philippines were unable to cope with the situation; their morale was low and they were not popular with the local population, because of the high-handed methods they sometimes used.[11]

The United States made the granting of military aid contingent on the improvement of the internal security situation. A young legislator by the name of Ramon Magsaysay was acceptable to the United States as a new Secretary of Defense.[12] President Quirino appointed him to the post in 1950. The son of a blacksmith, Magsaysay had earned his way through college driving a taxicab. Starting out as a mechanic, he rose before the war to the position of manager of the Zambales branch of a transportation company. His lorries were requisitioned by the Americans. After the surrender to the Japanese, he fled to the hills and became a captain of guerrillas. Following liberation he was made military governor of Zambales. No one could question his war record. He was first elected to the House of Representatives from Zambales as a Liberal in 1946. In the House he stood out as a champion of the interests of the veterans and as a critic of his own party for demoralizing the army and failing to control the Huk menace.

As Secretary of Defense, Magsaysay tackled the main problems facing the Department with great vigor. His rules seemed to be: promotion in the army on the basis of merit without favoritism and nepotism, elimination of the causes of discontent, rehabilitation of the Huks willing to surrender. The measures adopted improved the morale of the army, led to the arrest of prominent members of the Communist Politburo in the Philippines, kept increasing military pressure on the Huks, placed relations between soldiers and civilians on a better basis, and resettled a respectable number of Huks on farms in the public lands of Mindanao. His record was so outstanding that it caught the imagination of the people and as early as 1951 he was hailed as the next president of the Philippines. His prestige was enhanced by the attention that he attracted abroad, particularly in the United States, where he became the subject of a number of articles in magazines of wide circulation.[13]

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[11] Russell H. Fifield, "The Hukbalahap Today," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 20, pp. 13–18 (Jan. 24, 1951).

[12] Mr. Magsaysay said on October 17, 1953, in a speech; "Ask Mr. Quirino if it is not true that the United States refused to enter into the military assistance pact unless he first cleaned out the corruption and inefficiency of his armed forces. Ask him if it is not true that when he suggested that I be made Secretary of National Defense, the American negotiators promptly agreed, and only then was the pact concluded." *Philippines Free Press*, Oct. 31, 1953, p. 55.

[13] Robert Shaplen, "Huks, Foe in the Philippines," *Colliers*, Vol. 127, pp. 11–13 (April 7, 1951), and "Letter from Manila," *New Yorker*, Vol. 27, p. 96 (April 7, 1951);

As the 1951 senatorial and provinicial elections approached, President Quirino gave his Secretary of Defense the job of trying to insure the honesty of the voting. Secretary Magsaysay performed this task so well that the elections were generally accepted as fair and clean. The Nacionalista senatorial candidates defeated the Liberal candidates, including the President's brother, Tony Quirino. All Nacionalista candidates were elected, polling about 59 per cent of the total vote.[14]

The growing rivalry between the President and his Secretary of National Defense made a break between the two men inevitable. On February 28, 1953, Secretary Magsaysay resigned from the cabinet and issued a statement in which he said in part: ". . . it would be useless for me to continue as Secretary of National Defense with the special duty of killing Huks as long as the administration continues to foster and tolerate conditions which offer fertile soil for Communism and I have repeatedly and publicly said that merely killing dissidents will not solve the Communist problem. Its solution lies in the correction of social evils and injustices and in giving people a decent government free from dishonesty and graft."[15] Magsaysay left the Liberal party and Senators Laurel and Recto backed his nomination as the Nacionalista party candidate for president. At the Nacionalista convention, Senator Laurel and other senatorial leaders were able to persuade most of the delegates to support Magsaysay for the nomination. A small number of delegates held out for Senator Osias and then bolted the party to the opposition.

In the Liberal convention, former Ambassador Carlos P. Romulo sought the nomination but the control of the delegates was firmly in the hands of President Quirino. Vice President Fernando Lopez, who had been refused a renomination by the Liberals, joined forces with Romulo. Both men bolted the Liberal party and formed a new Democratic party which campaigned until the middle of August, at which time the two men withdrew their candidacies and formed a coalition with the Nacionalista party. Lopez became a candidate for senator on the Nacionalista-Democratic ticket.

II

Representing the old order, President Quirino made a last stand. Some of his Liberal colleagues had wisely urged him to step aside,[16] but he clung to the idea that he might repeat his performance of 1949. He found it hard to believe that

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Time, "Cleanup Man," Vol. 58, pp. 33–34 (Nov. 26, 1951); W. L. Worden, "Robin Hood of the Islands," *Saturday Evening Post,* Vol. 224, pp. 26–27 (Jan. 12, 1952); H. W. Fey, "Changes in the Philippines," *Christian Century,* Vol. 69, pp. 119–21 (Jan. 30, 1952); W. C. Bullitt, "No Peace in the Philippines," *Readers Digest,* Vol. 60, pp. 95–98 (March, 1952).

[14] *Journal of Philippine Statistics,* Vol. 5, Table 5 (Nov.–Dec., 1952).

[15] "Philippine Elections," *World Today,* Chatham House Review, pp. 508–10 (Dec., 1953).

[16] Leon O. Ty, "Peaceful Revolution," *Philippines Free Press,* Manila, Nov. 21, 1953, p. 4.

this young upstart, whom he had helped to make successful, could defeat an experienced statesman like himself.

He had delusions that he was popular. His sycophants did not tell him that, as one Filipino put it, the people were mad.[17] He attempted to whip up the old fear of American imperialism in order to win the nationalist vote. In reply to Senator Laurel's statement that American help might be needed to get an honest vote, President Quirino exclaimed that he would resist American intervention with the last drop of his blood. He failed to note that the old issue no longer held the interest that it once did. There was little danger of American intervention, as indeed he admitted, but this did not stop his beating the dead horse.[18] The real issue was not American intervention but American aid.

He also appealed, somewhat plaintively, to the record of his accomplishments, insisting that the war damage had been repaired more rapidly in the Philippines than in any other country and that Philippine production had gone forward. On paper the record was impressive. But the opposition questioned how much credit Quirino could claim for it. With American aid and with private capital and initiative, the economic well-being of the country had indeed been going forward, they conceded. What they wanted to know, however, was whether it was going forward as fast as it could and who was reaping the benefit.

The President was confident of winning. He had a well-oiled, well-fueled, and well-financed machine, operated by the shrewd Speaker of the House, Eugenio Perez. This machine had defeated the experienced Laurel in 1949. President Quirino had also the Philippine constabulary, which could bring pressure to bear on the voters; he had the provincial treasurers, who had charge of the election returns; he had appointed members of the Commission on Election; he had local officials; he had means of reaching the remote villages; he had control over the schools. He did not think that the people would be swept off their feet by an ex-mechanic, who shook hands with the *barrio* folk as though he were running for mayor.

President Quirino was a polished speaker and waged as active a campaign as the delicate state of his health permitted. Because of a serious operation, he did not begin his campaign until late in the summer. By conserving his strength he was able to appear in the principal parts of the Philippines. In the northern provinces he spoke in Ilocano, but in other provinces he spoke in English, sometimes using an interpreter. In some localities various pressures were used upon government employees and school children to see that a crowd was assembled. The audiences were respectful but cool. The relative size and enthusiasm of the crowds at Liberal and Nacionalista-Democratic meetings indicated clearly that the tide was running against the Liberals.

III

Shortly after his nomination in April, 1953, Magsaysay began the most strenuous campaign ever waged by a candidate for president in the Philippines.

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

[18] *Philippines Free Press*, Manila, Oct. 31, 1953, p. 11.

By plane, by bus, by car, by boat, and on foot he covered nearly every section of the archipelago. At the end of seven months of such campaigning he was still going as strong as ever. The irregular meals and sleeping arrangements required an iron constitution, an excellent digestion, and an even temperament. His genuine liking for people was such that he did not hesitate to go into the *barrios* and shake hands with the common folk. In previous campaigns the *barrios* had been neglected. While Magsaysay was not an eloquent speaker and did not strain for oratorical effects, he was a persuasive talker, knew how to conserve his voice, and impressed his listeners with his sincerity, his humor, and his interest in their welfare. He spoke English with a pronounced Philippine accent. With most of his listeners this was an asset. He could also address audiences in at least two of the main dialects, Ilocano and Tagalog. No special preparations were needed in order to collect an audience for one of his appearances. The people wanted to hear and see the new leader and they would travel for miles, and wait hours in the rain or sun or darkness, when it was announced that he would be speaking in the vicinity. Magsaysay gave the poor people in the *barrios* the idea that they were important in national politics.

Liberal party attempts to belittle and ridicule Magsaysay as vulgar and uneducated backfired. When he heard that a prominent Liberal had said that he was "fit only to be a *basurero*" (garbage collector), he answered at the next political meeting: "Yes, I am only fit to be a *basurero*, but if you will elect me, my friends, I will play the role of a good, a very efficient *basurero*. I will clean up all the garbage of graft and corruption that the Liberals have piled up in our government! Just give me a chance and I'll show the Liberals what a good garbage collector I'll turn out to be."[19]

Magsaysay's supporters endeavored to win votes for their candidate by building him up as a man of courage, energy, integrity, and action in contrast to President Quirino who was pictured as aging, sick, haughty, tired, and ineffective. They pointed out that under President Quirino unemployment had increased, the deficit in the national budget had become larger, and the government had acquired a reputation for graft and corruption. The Nacionalista platform included among its planks statements on balancing the budget, increasing industrialization as a means of reducing unemployment, effecting land reforms so as to improve the tenant situation, improving educational standards, and securing freedom of action in the field of foreign relations. Magsaysay did not spell out in detail how these objectives would be secured. In a campaign to bring about a change in administration, it is wise for opposition candidates not to be too specific. Magsaysay did, however, place special emphasis upon building artesian wells for *barrios*, on improving the health services of the government, and on building up friendly relations with the United States government. In answering the claims of President Quirino that his administration had brought many economic improvements, Magsaysay accused the administration of favoritism and laxity in collecting taxes and of failure to utilize all the American aid that was available.[20]

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[19] L. O. Ty, "Day of Reckoning," *Philippines Free Press*, Manila, Nov. 14, 1953, p. 5.

Instead of relying on the regular Nacionalista and Democratic parties to carry on the campaign and making arrangements for safeguarding the vote, a group of active Magsaysay volunteers set up their own organization which included the Magsaysay-for-President Movement (MPM), the Women's Magsaysay-for-President Movement (WMPM), and the Student Magsaysay-for-President Movement. The leaders of these organizations were recruited from the Veterans organizations, the Jaycees, the Rotary clubs, the Lions, the League of Women Voters, the National Students' Movement for Democracy, and other special groups. The Coordinator of MPM said that the idea for the organization came from the Eisenhower-Nixon clubs which functioned so well in the American presidential election of 1952. Out of some 18,000 *barrios* in the Philippines, MPM clubs were established in 15,600. Club members checked registration lists, canvassed the voters, supplied information for exclusion proceedings held to revise the lists of voters, educated the voters, arranged for political meetings, organized watchers, couriers, and reserves for safeguarding the casting and counting of the ballots, organized their own system of communications for reporting on the returns, and took other measures to combat fraud and terrorism during the elections.[21] MPM carried on all of these operations using only candidates' watchers credentials. Before this election, candidates had supposed that they had to have the naming of election inspectors to protect their vote. MPM showed that an election could be watched without naming the election inspectors.

Both parties tried to attract and to avoid offending voters who might be influenced by religious considerations. Over four-fifths of the Filipinos are Roman Catholics, but the Constitution provides for separation of church and state. During the campaign certain religious questions were brought in indirectly. Some members of the Church hierarchy signed a pastoral letter which deplored attempts to use fraud and terrorism to win votes. This letter pointed mainly to the Liberal party. The Quirino administration was also under fire on account of a position taken by Catholic clergy on the question of religious instruction in the public schools.

IV

The Nacionalista candidate, Ramon Magsaysay, won a resounding victory, receiving over two-thirds of the total vote cast. In Manila he won four-fifths of the votes and in the other cities over seven-tenths. Such an overwhelming vote meant that all elements of the population supported him. He received strong backing from the Catholics, from other religious elements, from the city dwellers, from the farmers, from the literate and semi-literate, from those living in nipa huts, and from those living in the most expensive houses.[22]

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[20] Summaries of his speeches are to be found in *Philippines Free Press*, Manila *Times*, *Daily Mirror*, *Daily Record*, *Evening News*, Manila *Chronicle*, Manila *Daily Bulletin*, and *Philippines Herald*.

[21] Mimeographed publications of the organizations and articles in *Philippines Free Press*.

Magsaysay carried 25 of the 28 cities and 48 of the 52 provinces.[23] He received his highest percentage in his home province of Zambales. He also ran extremely well in the adjoining provinces of Bataan and Pampanga. These high votes reflect the influence of local loyalties in Philippine politics. Traditional party influences were shown in the overwhelming vote which he received in the Nacionalista strongholds of Batangas, Laguna, Quezon, and Marinduque, which were carried overwhelmingly by Laurel in 1949.

The four provinces which Magsaysay lost were President Quirino's home province of Ilocos Sur and the three adjoining provinces in northern Luzon. In these provinces Magsaysay ran ahead of the Nacionalista percentage obtained in 1949, except in La Union where the difference was slight. The loyalty of the Ilocos region to President Quirino is another illustration of the favorite son influence in Philippine politics. It was striking that Magsaysay carried the other provinces that were once part of the Liberal stronghold in the north.

A comparison of the provincial percentages obtained by the Nacionalista candidates in 1949 and 1953 shows that on the average Magsaysay received 20 per cent more of the total votes recorded than did Laurel. The Nacionalista party made its greatest gains in those provinces where there had been charges of election corruption in 1949, in those where there were concentrations of Mohammedans, in Magsaysay's home provinces, and in the most populous provinces of the Visayas.

The greatest absolute gain was made in the province of Negros Occidental in the Visayas, where Magsaysay won over 70 per cent of the vote as compared with less than 10 per cent received by Laurel in 1949. Serious charges of election manipulation were made in this province following the 1949 elections. It was alleged that the registration lists in 1949 had been padded by nearly 100,000 names.[24] This province is the principal sugar-producing area of the Philippines and on election day the trucks of some of the larger sugar plantations were seen transporting persons who were attempting to be "flying voters." Vigilance on the part of the Magsaysay workers, the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), the Philippine Constabulary, the Commission on Elections, and the local officials prevented the repetition of the 1949 tactics of the Liberals.[25]

A striking feature of the election was the large increase in the Nacionalista vote in the Mindanao provinces containing large numbers of Mohammedans, who in the Philippines are called Moros. In Cotobato and Lanao, which had the largest proportion of Moros, and in the two Misamis provinces there was an increase of over 30 per cent in the Nacionalista vote. There were serious charges of election frauds in Lanao in 1949, and it was claimed that fake voters and false returns swelled the Liberal vote. The number of voters in Lanao was twice the number of literate adults given later by the census. In 1953 Magsaysay's popularity and splits in the local Liberal ranks reduced the Liberal vote while precautions taken by the Nacionalista candidates, non-partisan organizations, and the Commission on Elections prevented extensive frauds. The Commission on Elections attorneys, with representatives of both parties, canvassed the Moro areas in order to forestall efforts to pad the registration lists. Special measures to safeguard the ballot were also taken by the Commission immediately preceding and during the election itself. Magsaysay's speeches in Mindanao were well received and he seemed to attract the Moros as well as other elements of the population.

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[22] A scatter diagram of the percentage of the total vote for Magsaysay and the percentage of families living in dwellings of light materials shows a slight negative relationship between these two variables, but the high Magsaysay provinces spread over the whole range. In other words, Magsaysay got a high vote in both prosperous and poor provinces.

[23] See map.

[24] *Philippines Free Press*, Manila, Vol. 44, pp. 1–3 (Oct. 24, 1953).

[25] Gosnell, "Filipinos Hold Free Election" (cited in note 3).

Magsaysay won the election because he inspired faith in his ability to establish a government for the people. His success story helped the Filipinos build up faith in themselves. Here was one of them, of Malayan stock, who had gained worldwide fame in a short time by reason of his courage, his integrity, his altruism, and his appeal as a fighting leader of the people who was willing to face threats to democracy coming either from the extreme Right or the extreme Left. He met the danger of the Huks by action on some of the grievances of the downtrodden peasants.

The Filipinos have demonstrated that in an oriental country confidence in democratic institutions can be established in spite of the many influences pushing toward a dictatorial system either of the Right or the Left. Both fascist and communist trends have been reversed and a change in power has been brought about by the methods of persuasion, fair election administration, and free organization of citizens.

While caution should be used in interpreting the elections, it is quite clear that they mark a significant achievement in the progress of democratic government in the Far East. The elections demonstrated that given the right kind of leadership, Far Eastern peoples can be stirred to faith in the ideal—fundamental to democratic government—of government as the instrument of the people. They also showed that volunteers can be organized in these countries to safeguard the election process against fraud and terror. The formidable obstacles to the effective operation of democratic processes in the Far East can be overcome.

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ARTICLE

BASIC MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT*

The application of democratic theory to the practice of government in the United States is seen most clearly in state constitutional development. In his survey of American political institutions and practices near the close of the last century, Lord Bryce observed that a better understanding of the changes in the American democracy can be gained from "a study of the State governments than of the Federal Constitution."[1] He referred to the state constitutions and amendments thereto since 1776 as "a mine of instruction for the natural history of democratic communities."[2] In his well-known textbook on state government, Professor Holcombe described the constitutional history of the three branches of the state governments—legislative, executive and judicial—as "a history of the progress of democracy."[3]

The first state constitutions were framed during the early years of the Revolutionary period. In these documents, and especially in those that contained separate bills of rights, was stated the political theory of the American Revolution. Although this theory was libertarian in emphasis and outlook, its chief characteristic perhaps, as Clinton Rossiter has shown in his excellent study of the origin of the American tradition of political liberty, was "its deep-seated conservatism,"[4] its traditionalism and respect for the past. The relatively free society that had developed during the colonial period made unnecessary any great social upheaval like that occasioned by the French Revolution of 1789.[5] It is true that in some states, Pennsylvania for example, the Revolution with its attendant constitution-making precipitated a bitter struggle between radicals and conservatives;[6] but, for the most part, the distance between the two groups was, as Rossiter points out, "the distance between men who stood at opposite edges of a broad, unbroken plateau."[7]

The leaders of the Revolution and the framers of the first state constitutions sought to consolidate gains already won rather than to create a new social order. For this reason, the written fundamental laws of the several states, with the possible exception of Pennyslvania, did not establish governments that differed markedly from the *actual* governmental arrangements that existed in the respective colonies near the end of the colonial period; and Connecticut and Rhode Island, with slight modification, retained their "self-governing" charters as the basis of their state governments. Moreover, in spite of the lofty democratic ideas of the equality of man and the consent of the governed that were expressed in the first state constitutions, the right to vote and to hold office was limited generally to men of property.

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* I am indebted to my research assistant, Mr. William M. Griffin, for the detailed checking of library materials cited in this article.

[1] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (London and New York, 1891), Vol. 1, p. 399.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 434.

[3] Arthur N. Holcombe, *State Government in the United States*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1931), p. 450.

[4] Clinton Rossiter, *Seedtime of the Republic* (New York, 1953), p. 448. See also the Introduction by Carl J. Friedrich and Robert G. McCloskey, eds., *From the Declaration of Independence to the Constitution* (New York, 1954).

[5] Louis Hartz, "American Political Thought and the American Revolution," this REVIEW, Vol. 46, pp. 321–43 (June, 1952).

[6] These struggles are described in Allan Nevins, *The American States during and after the Revolution* (New York, 1924).

[7] *Seedtime of the Republic*, p. 428.

These constitutions, formulated in haste and under the stress of war, were characterized generally by legislative supremacy, a property-qualified suffrage, a weak executive, dependence of the executive and the judiciary upon the legislature, and the lack of a clear distinction between fundamental and statutory law. Defects in the operation of many of these constitutions led to early movements for their revision. It is in this process of constitutional revision and in the framing of constitutions by new states that from time to time were admitted to the union that basic materials for the study of state constitutional development are to be found.

When the voters of Massachusetts were given the opportunity in 1779 to elect a special body to draft a new state constitution and to accept or reject the document recommended, a democratic procedure was originated which afterwards became customary in the revision or initial framing of state constitutions. Since that time almost two hundred constitutional conventions have met in the American states,[8] and in the work and records of these bodies is to be found much of the constitutional history of the American democracy.

All but ten of the forty-eight states operate now under constitutions made prior to 1900. The nineteenth century, in fact, was the great century of state constitution making and revision. It was also a century that witnessed, in the political struggles in the constitutional conventions of that period, a gradual democratization of governmental forms and procedures. Among the most significant developments were broadening of the suffrage, strengthening of the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances through the extension of popular election to the executive and judicial branches of the state governments and the growth of judicial review of legislation, a rather rapid increase in the number of constitutional limitations on the legislature, projection of the state into several fields of social welfare, increasing governmental action in relation to economic activities, especially corporate enterprise, and the extension of popular participation in the revision and amendment of state constitutions. Near the close of the century, a movement to incorporate in constitutions the direct democratic processes of the initiative, statutory referendum, and recall began to gather momentum in many states.

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[8] *The Book of the States, 1941–1942* (The Council of State Governments, Chicago, 1941), p. 45, and table of constitutional conventions, by states, pp. 48–55. Less than one-third of the states have had only one convention; see *The Book of the States., 1954–1955* (Chicago, 1954), pp. 68–73.

Basic materials relating to these developments consist of the state constitutions with their amendments and the debates and proceedings of constitutional conventions. In addition, statutes and legislative committee reports, judicial decisions, newspaper files, pamphlets, official speeches, messages and reports, and personal information concerning the participants should be perused if the nature and significance of specific developments in any state are to be evaluated properly.[9] The mere listing of these sources indicates their scattered and voluminous character as well as their inaccessibility, in many instances, except in the state where the events occurred. This bibliographic survey is concerned primarily with the basic materials, which may be available, at least in part, in the larger university libraries.[10]

I. THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS

A state constitution, framed or revised by an elected constitutional convention, inevitably reflects the environment which exists at the time the convention meets. The political history of the particular state, current political thinking, and experiences of other states are significant factors in shaping this environment. The tendency of constitutional conventions to enshrine the present through long, detailed constitutions has made frequent amendment or revision necessary. The large number of changes resulting creates difficulty for those who attempt to keep abreast of these developments.

Individual State Constitutions. Each state publishes its constitution in booklet form from time to time, but the intervals of publication are not regular.[11] In addition, the revised or consolidated statutes or code of laws of the state contain the constitution, usually annotated, in effect at the time of publication.[12] Moreover, some states follow the practice of publishing their constitutions in their legislative manuals.[13] The most convenient source for checking the official publication of state constitutions is the *Monthly Checklist of State Publications* (Government Printing Office, Washington) with yearly index, prepared by the Division of Documents of the Library of Congress. It lists all official publications of the states which are received in the Library.[14]

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[9] For the skillful use and blending of these materials in tracing a particular development in one state, see Louis Hartz, *Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776–1860* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1948).

[10] Some of the published materials mentioned were unavailable for inspection by the author. Information concerning these was obtained from Library of Congress cards.

[11] An examination of the publication dates of state constitutions indicates that Arkansas, California, Ohio, and Washington lead other states in the frequency of publication since 1930. The length of many state constitutions makes publication rather expensive. For example, sixteen states have constitutions that contain more than 20,000 words. For this estimate, see table prepared by W. Brooke Graves, in *The Book of the States, 1954–1955*, pp. 68–73. State constitutions are usually published by the office of the secretary of state. See *State Constitutions: A Bibliography* (Bureau of the Census, Governments Division, Washington, June, 1944), with *Supplement* (1947).

[12] Space does not permit a listing of the statutory codes of the states, which may be found, of course, in university law libraries. A useful listing, as of 1948, is "Schedule of Latest Editions of Federal, State and Territorial Statutory Compilations with Supplements . . . ," compiled by Minnie Wiener (Federal Works Agency, 1948). A cursory examination of these codes reveals that some twenty-two have been published within the past ten years. In addition, twenty codes have had supplements added since 1950. Leading publishers of state codes are the Michie Co., Charlottesville, Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, and West Publishing Co., St. Paul. All but four states, it appears, have had annotated constitutions published as part of their codes.

Amendments.[15] As of August, 1953, almost 3,000 amendments had been added to the state constitutions now in effect.[16] Only the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 has not been amended.[17] The volume and frequency of amendments within a majority of the forty-eight states often outmode the published constitutions soon after their publication and make the task of determining current content a major problem.

There are several sources for checking constitutional amendments in the states. Session laws, published in most states after each legislative sesssion, usually contain the resolutions proposing amendments. The *Monthly Checklist of State Publications,* mentioned previously, lists the official publication of amendments in the few states that follow this practice. In addition, the magazine, *State Government,* published monthly by the Council of State Governments (Chicago), in its section, "Among the States," and the *National Municipal Review,* monthly publication of the National Municipal League (New York), in its section, "News in Review," often contain brief notices of significant changes in state constitutions. From 1941 on, the biennial editions of *The Book of the States,* also published by the Council of State Governments, contain summaries of state constitutional developments in a separate section and a useful table, in the most recent editions, giving information on the length, number of amendments adopted, and amendment procedures of state constitutions.[18]

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[13] In Texas, for example, these manuals are published biennially to correspond with the regular legislative sessions.

[14] For other sources concerned with state publications, see Everett S. Brown, *Manual of Government Publications* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1950), pp. 45–58.

[15] Constitutional provisions for amending each of the forty-eight state constitutions are reproduced in Christian L. Larsen and Conrad Cowan, *South Carolina State Constitution Amendment Procedures* (Bureau of Public Administration, University of South Carolina, Columbia, 1948), pp. 19–58. See also James Q. Dealey, *Growth of American State Constitutions* (Ginn and Co., Boston, 1915).

[16] See the table on "State Constitutions and Constitutional Conventions," prepared by W. Brooke Graves, in *The Book of the States, 1954–1955,* pp. 68–73.

[17] Because of the difficulty of the procedure, no amendments to the Tennessee Constitution of 1870 were adopted until November, 1953. *National Municipal Review,* Vol. 42, p. 562 (Dec., 1953).

[18] One of the most helpful aids in tracing state constitutional changes was the *State Law Index* (Government Printing Office, Washington), a biennial publication (12 editions) prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, which was published until 1948. In this publication the proposed, ratified, and rejected amendments to state constitutions were indexed for each biennium. From 1929 to 1937, inclusive, and in 1940 this REVIEW carried an annual article on "State Constitutional Development." Sometimes bureaus of public administration or similar agencies of state universities publish pamphlets summarizing and discussing proposed constitutional amendments in a

Collections and Digests of State Constitutions. Several collections of state constitutions have been published. Ben P. Poore made the first comprehensive collection in *The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters and Other Organic Laws of the United States*, 2 vols. (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1877). This was followed by the compilation by Francis Newton Thorpe, *The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America*, 7 vols. (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1909). Each of these compilations contains the texts of all state constitutions adopted prior to its publication. The text of all state constitutions as of 1917 may be found in *The State Constitutions and the Federal Constitution and Organic Laws of the Territories and Other Colonial Dependencies of the United States of America*, ed. Charles Kettleborough (B. F. Bowen Co., Indianapolis, 1918) and, as of January 1, 1938, in *Constitutions of the States and the United States*, Vol. 3 of the reports of the New York State Constitutional Convention Committee (J. B. Lyon Co., Albany, 1938). The most comprehensive comparative digest of state constitutional provisions that has been published is *Index Digest of State Constitutions* (J. B. Lyon Co., Albany, 1915), which was prepared for the New York State Constitutional Convention Commission of 1915.[19] Recent comparisons of state contitutions are made briefly in Christian L. Larsen and G. G. Williamson, *A Comparative Analysis of the Constitution of South Carolina* (Bureau of Public Administration, University of South Carolina, Columbia, 1947) and more extensively in *Manual on State Constitutional Provisions* (Legislative Reference Bureau, University of Hawaii, 1950).[20] Studies prepared for the use of constitutional conventions, which are mentioned later, often contain valuable comparative data on specific constitutional topics.

II. THE WORK OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS

The constitutional convention is the most significant original contribution of the states to the practice of government. It has played such a significant role in the history of the state governments that the literature concerning the nature and work of constitutional conventions is rather extensive.

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state. An example is *Florida's Proposed Constitutional Amendments—1954* by William F. Larsen (Civic Information Series, No. 19, Public Administration Clearing House, University of Florida, Gainesville, 1954). A detailed analysis of state proposals, both constitutional and statutory, voted on in 1946 may be found in *State Proposals Voted upon in 1946*, by Richard C. Spencer and Anna A. Meck (Bureau of the Census, Governments Division, Washington, May, 1947).

[19] In 1912, the Legislative Reference Department of the Ohio State Library published a *Digest of State Constitutions* (F. J. Heer Co., Columbus, 1912), edited by J. H. Newman, for the use of the Ohio Constitutional Convention of that year. Because of the arrangement of materials and its brevity, this digest is not as useful as the one mentioned in the text.

[20] One earlier comparative study is James Q. Dealey, *Our State Constitutions*, Supplement to the *Annals* (American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, 1907).

Bibliographic Aids and General Works. Bibliographic aids to the study of constitutional conventions may be found in "State Constitutions and Constitutional Conventions," by Paul B. DeWitt, in *Manual on the Use of. State Publications*, ed. Jerome K. Wilcox (American Library Association, Chicago, 1940) pp. 117–21; W. Brooke Graves, Norman J. Small, and E. Foster Dowell, *American State Government and Administration: A State by State Bibliography* (Council of State Governments, Chicago, 1949); *Official Publications Relating to American State Constitutional Conventions*, comp. A. F. Kuhlman (H. W. Wilson Co., New York, 1936); and *General Constitutional Revision in the States; A Selected List of References Covering the Period 1937–1947*, comp. Ione E. Dority (University of Michigan, Bureau of Government, Ann Arbor, 1948).

Two standard treatises on constitutional conventions are John A. Jameson, *The Constitutional Convention: Its History and Modes of Proceeding* (Charles Scribner & Co., New York, 1867) and Roger S. Hoar, *Constitutional Conventions: Their Nature, Powers and Limitations* (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1919). A good summary treatment of the constitutional convention is given in Raymond Uhl, R. H. Stoudemire, and G. R. Sherrill, *Constitutional Conventions: Organization, Powers, Functions and Procedures* (Convention Bulletin No. 1, Bureau of Public Administration, University of South Carolina, Columbia, 1951).[21]

Records of Constitutional Conventions. The most valuable guide to the publications of state constitutional conventions is *A List of Official Publications of American State Constitutional Conventions, 1776–1916*, ed. Shearer (2 Bulletins, Newberry Library, Chicago, 1917). The principal records of conventions are (1) the journals, (2) the debates, and (3) manuals or studies prepared for the use of conventions by convention committees or other agencies.

With few exceptions, the proceedings of every constitutional convention have been reported in a published journal.[22] Taken alone, these journals offer little help in understanding the social, economic, and political forces that shaped constitutional changes at the time. When used in conjunction with the debates, however, they are a meaningful and necessary guide to the work of the conventions.

Unfortunately the debates in many state constitutional conventions were not recorded and published. In some seventy-four instances, however, the convention debates have been published in full or in part. These significant records are now available for one or more constitutional conventions held in each decade since 1810. In these records one may find the development of ideas and the clash of interests that led to the "progress of democracy" in state constitutional development. A list of the published debates of state constitutional conventions is attached as an appendix.

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[21] See also Walter F. Dodd, *The Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions* (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1910). The several methods of constitutional revision are described in John P. Keith, *Methods of Constitutional Revision* (Bureau of Municipal Research, University of Texas, Austin, 1949). Appendices B through E list recent joint legislative constitutional committees, unofficial constitutional committees, constitutional commissions, and constitutional conventions in the states. There is a tendency toward greater use of the constitutional commission in the initial phase of constitutional revision. The development of the American procedure for framing constitutions is traced by W. F. Dodd, "The First State Constitutional Conventions, 1776–1783," this REVIEW, Vol. 2, pp. 545–61 (Nov., 1908).

[22] The journals record the motions, votes, resolutions, reports of committees, and other actions of the convention. Many of them also give brief biographical sketches of the delegates. In a few instances the journal also includes the debates.

A constitutional convention, by its very nature as an elective *ad hoc* body, faces tremendous problems in arriving at fundamental decisions which it must make usually within a relatively short period of time. One of the greatest problems is the availability of the necessary information upon the basis of which the delegates may make intelligent decisions. To meet this problem, preparatory work has been done in numerous instances either by convention committees or by outside agencies prior to the convening of the convention.[23] Manuals of varying content, digests or comparisons of state constitutions, or a series of studies of current problems may result from such preliminary work. Among the most significant recent efforts in this regard are the studies made for constitutional conventions in New York (1938),[24] Missouri (1943–1944)[25] and New Jersey (1947)[26] and by the Louisiana State Law Institute, pursuant to a legislative act of 1946, for "any future constitutional convention" that might be called in that state.[27]

Studies of Particular Conventions. In view of the large number of constitutional conventions that have been held, it is surprising to find that very few studies have been made of the work of particular conventions. Among the more significant studies are Vernon A. O'Rourke and Douglas W. Campbell, *Constitution-Making in a Democracy* (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1943), which describes the work of the New York Convention of 1938; John E. Bebout, *The Making of the New Jersey Constitution* (MacCrellish & Quigley, Trenton, 1945); Seth S. McKay, *Making the Texas Constitution of 1876* (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1924); and Carl Brent Swisher, *Motivation and Political Technique in the California Constitutional Convention, 1878–79* (Pomona College, Claremont, 1930). Briefer studies of the work of conventions are Oliver

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[23] Several states have used an appointive commission to study and recommend changes in the state constitution and to report to the governor or the legislature or an elected convention. See, for example, *Report of the Commission on Constitutional Amendment and Revision* (Harrisburg, 1920), a report made to the Pennsylvania General Assembly.

[24] *Report* of the New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, 12 vols. (J. B. Lyon Co., Albany, 1938).

[25] A series of eight *Manuals* (Columbia, 1943) prepared for the Missouri Constitutional Convention of 1943.

[26] A series of mimeographed "monographs" (Trenton, 1947) prepared by individual authors under the general coordination of the Governor's Committee on Preparatory Research for the New Jersey Constitutional Convention of 1947.

[27] *Constitutional Problems*, prepared by the Central Research Staff, Constitution Revision Project, Louisiana Law Institute (1947–1948). This is a series of mimeographed bulletins (sixty-three numbers, some with separate parts) covering the major problems which a convention would face in Louisiana. The Oklahoma Legislative Council prepared a series of constitutional studies (21 bulletins) in 1948.

M. Dickerson, *The Illinois Convention of 1862* (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1905); James W. Harry, *The Maryland Constitution of 1851* (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1902); and William Starr Myers, *The Maryland Constitution of 1864* (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1901).

III. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Although brief treatments of constitutional development in individual states usually are found in books on the history or government of the respective states, detailed constitutional histories of particular states are few in number. In this latter category may be mentioned Albert B. Saye, *A Constitutional History of Georgia, 1732–1945* (University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1948); Ethel K. Ware, *A Constitutional History of Georgia* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1947); William Anderson and Albert J. Lobb, *A History of the Constitution of Minnesota* (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1921); and Benjamin F. Shambaugh, *The Constitutions of Iowa* (State Historical Society, Iowa City, 1934).

A brief historical study of the changing content of state constitutions generally is Sister M. Barbara McCarthy, *The Widening Scope of American Constitutions* (Catholic University of America, Washington, 1928). The constitutional history of a group of states is surveyed in Fletcher M. Green, *Constitutional Development in the South Atlantic States, 1776–1860* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1930), a study of Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, and in John D. Hicks, *The Constitutions of the Northwest States* (University of Nebraska Studies, Lincoln, 1924), which deals with Washington, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, and the Dakotas.

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APPENDIX[*]

THE PUBLISHED DEBATES OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS

ALABAMA

1901. *Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Alabama, May 21st, 1901, to September 3rd, 1901*, 4 vols. (Wetumpka Printing Co., Wetumpka, 1941).

ARKANSAS

1868. *Debates and Proceedings of the Convention which Assembled at Little Rock, January 7th, 1868, to form a Constitution for the State of Arkansas* (J. G. Price, Printer, Little Rock, 1868).

CALIFORNIA

1849. *Report of the Debates in the Convention of California, on the Formation of the State Constitution, in September and October, 1849* (J. T. Towers, Printer, Washington, 1850).

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[*] It is believed that this convenient listing of the published debates, by states and dates, will serve as a guide to those who may be interested in the informative and voluminous records of state constitutional conventions. These debates are available for thirty-nine states and for one or more constitutional conventions in each decade since 1810.

1878–1879. *Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of California, Convened at the City of Sacramento, Saturday, September 28, 1878*, 3 vols. (J. D. Young, State Printer, Sacramento, 1880).

DELAWARE

1831. *Debates of the Delaware Convention, for Revising the Constitution of the State or Adopting a New One; Held at Dover, November, 1831* (Samuel Harker, Printer, Wilmington, 1831).

GEORGIA

1877. *A Stenographic Report of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention held in Atlanta, Georgia, 1877* (Constitution Publishing Co., Atlanta, 1877).

1943–1944. *Records of the Commission of 1943–1944 to Revise the Constitution of Georgia*, ed. Albert B. Saye, 2 vols. (Published by authority of the State, Atlanta, 1946). This was a constitutional commission, not a convention.

IDAHO

1889. *Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho, 1889*, edited and annotated by I. W. Hart, 2 vols. (Caxton Printers, Ltd., Caldwell, 1912).

ILLINOIS

1847. *The Constitutional Debates of 1847*, edited with introduction and notes by Arthur Charles Cole (The Trustees of Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, 1919).

1869–1870. *Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Illinois, Convened at the City of Springfield, Tuesday, December 13, 1869*, 2 vols. (E. L. Merritt and Brother, Printer, Springfield, 1870).

1920–1922. *Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of Illinois convened January 6, 1920*, 5 vols. (Illinois State Journal Co., Springfield, 1920–22).

INDIANA

1850–1851. *Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, 1850*, 2 vols. (A. H. Brown, Printer, Indianapolis, 1850?).

IOWA

1844. *Fragments of the Debates of the Iowa Constitutional Conventions of 1844 and 1846*, edited and compiled with explanations by Benjamin F. Shambaugh, pp. 1–217 (State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, 1900).

1846. *Fragments of the Debates of the Iowa Constitutional Conventions of 1844 and 1846*, edited and compiled with explanations by Benjamin F. Shambaugh, pp. 217–333 (State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, 1900).

1857. *The Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Iowa, Assembled at Iowa City, Monday, January 19, 1857*, 2 vols. (Luse, Lane and Co., Davenport, 1857).

KANSAS

1859. *Proceedings and Debates*, Printed by order of the Convention from the columns of the *Commercial Gazette* (S. D. Macdonald, Printer, Wyandot, 1859).

KENTUCKY

1849–1850. *Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Kentucky, 1849* (A. G. Hodges and Co., Frankfort, 1849?).

1890–1891. *Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates in the Convention Assembled at Frankfort, on the 8th day of September, 1890, to Adopt, Amend or Change the Constitution of the State of Kentucky*, 4 vols. (E. P. Johnson, Printer, Frankfort, 1890?).

LOUISIANA

1844–1845. *Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of Louisiana, Which Assembled at the City of New Orleans, January 14, 1844* (Besancon, Ferguson and Co., New Orleans, 1845).

1864. *Debates in the Convention for the Revision and Amendment of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana, Assembled at Liberty Hall, New Orleans, April 6, 1864* (W. R. Fish, Printer, New Orleans, 1864).

MAINE

1819–1820. *Debates and Journal of the Constitutional Convention of Maine, 1819–'20* (Farmers' Almanac Press, Augusta, 1894).

MARYLAND

1850–1851. *Proceedings of the Maryland Reform Convention to Revise the State Constitution*, 2 vols. (William M'Neir, Printer, Annapolis, 1851).

1864. *The Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Maryland Assembled at the City of Annapolis, Wednesday, April 27, 1864*, 3 vols. (Richard P. Bayly, Printer, Annapolis, 1864).

1867. *Debates of the Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1867* (as reprinted from articles reported in the Baltimore *Sun*), comp. Philip B. Perlman (Hepbron and Haydon, Baltimore, 1923).

MASSACHUSETTS

1820. *Journal of Debates and Proceedings in the Convention of Delegates to Revise the Constitution of Massachusetts, Begun and Holden at Boston, November 15, 1820, and Continued by Adjournment to January 9, 1821*, New Edition, Revised and Corrected (*Daily Advertiser*, Publisher, Boston, 1853).

1853. *Official Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the State Convention, Assembled May 4th, 1853, to Revise and Amend the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts*, 3 vols. (White and Potter, Printers, Boston, 1853).

1917–1919. *Debates in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, 1917–1919*, 4 vols. (Wright and Potter Printing Co., Boston, 1918?).

MICHIGAN

1835–1836. *The Michigan Constitutional Convention of 1835–1836; Debates and Proceedings*, ed. Harold M. Dorr (The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1940).

1850. *Report of the Proceedings and Debates in the Convention to Revise the Constitution of the State of Michigan 1850* (R. W. Ingals, Printer, Lansing, 1850).

1867. *The Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Michigan, Convened at the City of Lansing, Wednesday, May 15, 1867*, 2 vols. (John A. Kerr Co., Lansing, 1867).

1907–1908. *Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Michigan, Convened in the City of Lansing, Tuesday, October 22, 1907*, 2 vols. (Wynkoop, Hallenbeck Crawford Co., Lansing, 1907?).

MINNESOTA

1857. *Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention for the Territory of Minnesota to form a Constitution Preparatory to its Admission into the Union as a State* (G. W. Moore, Printer, Saint Paul, 1858).

MISSISSIPPI

1865. *Journal of the Proceedings and Debates in the Constitutional Convention of the State of Mississippi, August, 1865* (E. M. Yeager, Printer, Jackson, 1865).

MISSOURI

1875. *Debates in the Missouri Constitutional Convention of 1875*, eds. Isidor Loeb and Floyd C. Shoemaker, 12 vols. (The State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia, 1933–1934).

MONTANA

1889. *Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention Held in the City of Helena, Montana, July 4th, 1889 [to] August 17, 1889* (State Publishing Co., Helena, 1921).

NEBRASKA

1871. *Official Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the Nebraska Constitutional Convention Assembled in Lincoln, June 13, 1871*, revised, edited and indexed by Addison E. Sheldon, 3 vols. (Nebraska State Historical Society, York, 1906–1913).

1919–1920. *Journal of the Nebraska Constitutional Convention Convened in Lincoln, December 2, 1919*, 2 vols. (The Kline Publishing Co., Lincoln, 1920).

NEVADA

1864. *Official Reports of the Debates and Proceedings in the Constitutional Convention of the State of Nevada, Assembled at Carson City, July 4, 1864, to form a Constitution and State Government* (Frank Eastman, Printer, San Francisco, 1866).

NEW HAMPSHIRE

1876. *Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the State of New Hampshire, December, 1876* (E. A. Jenks, Printer, Concord, 1877).

1889. *Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the State of New Hampshire* (John B. Clark, Printer, Manchester, 1889).

1902. *State of New Hampshire Convention to Revise the Constitution, December, 1902* (The Rumford Press, Concord, 1903).

1912. *State of New Hampshire Convention to Revise the Constitution, June, 1912* (John B. Clark Co., Manchester, 1912).

1918. *State of New Hampshire Convention to Revise the Constitution, June, 1918* (John B. Clark Co., Manchester, 1918).

1920–1921. *State of New Hampshire Convention to Revise the Constitution, June 5, 1918, January 3, 1920, January 28, 1921* (John B. Clark Co., Manchester, 1921).

1930. *State of New Hampshire Convention to Revise the Constitution, June, 1930* (Granite State Press, Manchester, 1930).

1938. *State of New Hampshire Convention to Revise the Constitution, May, 1938* (Granite State Press, Manchester, 1938).

NEW JERSEY

1844. *Proceedings of the New Jersey State Constitutional Convention of 1844*, compiled and edited by New Jersey Writers' Project, and sponsored by New Jersey State House Commission, 1942.

1947. *State of New Jersey Constitutional Convention of 1947, Held at Rutgers University, the State University of New Jersey*, ed. Sidney Goldman and Herman Crystal, 2 vols. (Trenton, 1949–1951).

NEW YORK

1821. *Reports of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of 1821, Assembled for the purpose of amending the Constitution of the State of New York; Containing all of the Official Documents relating to the Subject, and other Valuable Material* (E. and E. Hosford, Printers, Albany, 1821).

1846. *Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of New York* (The Office of the *Evening Atlas*, Albany, 1846).

1867–1868. *Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York, held in 1867 and 1868, in the City of Albany*, 5 vols. (Weed, Parsons and Co., Albany, 1868).

1894. *Revised Records of the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York, May 8, 1894, to September 29, 1894*, 5 vols. (The Argus Company, Albany, 1900).

1915. *Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York, April Sixth to September Tenth, 1915*, 4 vols. (J. B. Lyon Co., Albany, 1916).

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment. Edited by Coleman Woodbury. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1953. Pp. xix, 764. $9.00.)

Urban Redevelopment: Problems and Practices. Edited by Coleman Woodbury. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1953. Pp. xvi, 525. $7.50.)

Unquestionably these two volumes are major contributions to the literature on urbanism in the United States. Representing the principal products of the Urban Redevelopment Study financed through a Spelman Fund grant to the Public Administration Clearing House, they consist of penetrating essays and research studies diagnosing and frequently prescribing for some of our most serious urban weaknesses. The subject matter is generally broad and interdisciplinary in nature and is not cast within the confines of a narrow concept of urban redevelopment. It does, however, center largely on situations in local areas and not on national and state governmental policies.

The first of the five parts of *The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment*, the book of more general interest, contains short essays on urban redevelopment goals, design, and strategy, although the last phase is largely subordinated. The essayists are well known in the planning and housing fields—Catherine Bauer, G. Holmes Perkins, Henry S. Churchill, Robert C. Weinberg, Arthur B. Gallion, and Vernon De Mars. Their statements are happy choices for introductory considerations, furnishing perspective, and inquiring into difficult problems of urban living. They stress governmental leadership in redevelopment, variety and contrast in design, amenity in the city pattern, and knowledge of people's needs and desires. The six essays all interrelate through the strong thread of their democratic and humane approach.

"Industrial Location and Urban Redevelopment" is a very detailed statement of industrial location developments by the editor with the assistance of Frank Cliffe. It starts with major relationships between industrial location and urban redevelopment, emphasizing the great significance of industrial location within an urban area in shaping its overall structure and land-use pattern. Discussions of industrial location theory and influential factors in location decisions, regional patterns of industrial distribution, and national security considerations in industrial location follow. Attention then turns to the major facts and trends of actual plant location. The chapters effectively uproot a number of long-standing preconceptions, such as the assumption that most communities benefit from any type of industrial expansion.

Despite the problem nature of the subject, William L. Slayton and Richard Dewey in "Urban Redevelopment and the Urbanite" furnish a highly useful and significant monograph. Needs and desires of urban dwellers for housing, recreation, and social relationships, attitudes of residents, property owners, and interests in and near proposed redevelopment areas toward such projects, and participation of groups in redevelopment receive extended treatment. The authors are adept at interweaving many fugitive materials and argue persuasively for the potentialities of the sample survey in determining attitudes toward redevelopment programs. Victor Jones competently deals with developments, problems, and governmental actions in metropolitan areas in "Local Government Organization in Metropolitan Areas." Concentrating on the evaluation of public devices to lessen metropolitan problems, he examines the resurgence of annexation and the continuing growth of special districts and authorities and warns about some activities of functional specialists. Professor Jones exhibits particular interest in reorganization of the urbanized county as an approach to the metropolitan muddle. Metropolitan area students will find this part of the book a worthy supplement to the author's earlier related work.

Coleman Woodbury concludes with "The Background and Prospects of Urban Redevelopment in the United States." Emphasizing that redevelopment can be successful only as one part of an advance on a much broader front of urban life, he imaginatively and interestingly discusses numerous major urban problems, raising key questions and putting forth acute observations and conclusions. The essay is a most incisive and stimulating statement. Metropolitanism, political problems of social heterogeneity, urban planning, local government finance, organizations for improving local government, and representation and leadership in urban public affairs are considered in turn. Especially meaningful are his comments on the impact of tight group and class lines, the financial plight of cities in a high real income period, and the frequency of low morale and ineffective leadership.

The companion volume, *Urban Redevelopment: Problems and Practices*, deals with more technical considerations and is directed mainly to professionals and civic leaders in the planning, housing, and redevelopment fields. In "Measuring the Quality of Housing in Planning for Redevelopment," Allan A. Twichell shows the kinds of information that proper blighted area and screening surveys can produce and how best to obtain the desired data once the needs are determined. "Urban Densities and Their Costs," written by William H. Ludlow, analyzes the relations between various population densities and the costs of housing, public services, and urban businesses and industries and appraises density determinations for redevelopment projects. The role of private covenants in urban redevelopment, warnings about their utilization, and a case study of twenty years' experience with them in Radburn, New Jersey, receive careful scrutiny by Charles S. Ascher in "Private Covenants in Urban Redevelopment." William L. Slayton devotes considerable attention in "Urban Redevelopment Short of Clearance" to the experience with police power regulation of housing and the studies of rehabilitating areas.

Based on events in Chicago, "Relocation of Families in Urban Redevelopment" has wide applicability. Jack Meltzer and Sheilah Orloff speak forcefully and accurately, noting that haphazard redevelopment causes many relocation problems. The final part, "Eminent Domain in Acquiring Subdivision and Open Land in Redevelopment Programs," by Ira S. Robbins and Marian Yankauer, takes an unusual but effective means of presentation for the subject at hand. The first portion is shaped as a legal brief, tracing the evolving concept of public use. The second indicates kinds of social and economic data appropriate and available for use in litigation over the validity of governmental action to "insure that such vacant land as is left in our cities will be used for the welfare of all" (p. 496).

These two volumes stand as impressive stock-taking, analysis, and advice on many major phases of urban life and growth. A listing of incidental criticisms would be inconsequential in comparison with the execution of the undertaking and would be like a flea biting at a citadel. The books furnish an agenda for further inquiry and action as well as an excellent informational source on past research and efforts. They reveal again the large-scale significance of many facets of urbanism and represent a magnificent challenge to researchers, public officials, and private leaders on the urban scene. How effectively and comprehensively will the challenge be met?

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Program Budgeting: Theory and Practice with Particular Reference to the U. S. Department of the Army. BY FREDERICK C. MOSHER. (Chicago: Public Administration Service. 1954. Pp. xiii, 258. $5.00.)

This book is the outgrowth of studies that began with a focus on the military budget as an economic phenomenon, and moved to the processes of military budgeting as a cluster of problems in organization and administration. The result is a sophisticated and illuminating work which continually lifts the reader's attention from factual detail to significant question or generalization—"from technique to statesmanship," to use Paul Appleby's phrase.

For military practitioners it is a suitable textbook, particularly because of its chapters on the study of budgeting, on the setting of military budgeting, and on military comptrollers and the budget. For any civilian student of public administration and budgeting the main interest will lie in three central chapters on plans, programs and budgets, on military performance budgets, and on the budget process, together with the concluding recommendations stemming from these. Here is a first-rate contribution to the literature, at once empirical and theoretical.

Mosher dispels some illusions and confirms some suspicions. One of the former is the notion that a program or "performance" budget is a simpler substitute for the traditional forms of presenting estimates, either by the organization units that spend or by the objects (e.g., materials, personal services) to be bought. It is not a substitute but a new synthesis, emphasizing ends rather than means, superimposed on the older classifications, and much more complex to work out, however more enlightening the product may be. Another illusion is the notion that military budget administration in practice pays attention to the precept, cherished in military tradition, that authority and responsibility should be commensurate. A post commander, according to this principle (and the author defers to tradition by listing, p. 6, seven such principles), should estimate for all his needs. But his basic needs, men and equipment, are determined for him in tables of organization and equipment already fixed; they are furnished gratis to him and estimated for him centrally. If his complement includes a band, the budget reviewer may surmise as much from the presence of an estimated figure for more sheet music, but the players and instruments are given and do not appear in his budget. One suspicion confirmed is that much military planning, including budgeting based on "requirements," is paper work irrelevant to any subsequent event.

Most significant, however, is the author's analysis of the problems and inner contradictions of the concept of a performance budget itself. A performance budget should be based on approved work plans. But for a military organization these are uncontrollably uncertain. The processes of developing them, and of meshing their annual and longer-term components over successive cycles of time, are too lengthy and too complex, and move through channels too distinct from the fiscal, to serve the need. The organizational difficulties are as baffling as the temporal. The Air Force is functionally organized and the Navy's performance budget is "functional in the same degree [as] the organization of Navy bureaus" (p. 85). But the Army, with its geographical area commands, its technical service commands (medical, signal, transportation, etc.), and its multi-purpose field installations, cannot possibly construct a budget classification according to performance goals that does not do violence to one or another of the prescriptions the Hoover Commission loosely lumped in a slogan. The segregation of capital from operating expenses poses another perplexing search for criteria. The attainment of economical procurement and issue of many items appears to involve setting up working capital funds, which thereupon drop out of any annual expenditure budgeting system. The reconciliation of responsible field operation with headquarters estimates based on political feasibility raises more than budgetary questions. "The performance budget is more a statement of direction and intent than a description of a current condition" (p. 123). The author recommends a performance budget, with lump-sum appropriations to a few suggested broad categories, for purposes of executive and congressional review, and an "administrative budget," along organizational unit lines, to be prescribed by delegated authority for purposes of internal management and control, as Budget Bureau apportionments are now handled; all within a much shorter time span.

The discussion of these and related topics marks a real advance in the clarification of an important and nebulous concept. Two matters his theory does not comprehend are the role of Congress in all this, and the role of a performance budget in times of emergency military build up when money does not matter and other instruments must be relied upon to insure that first things are put first.

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD.

The Ohio State University.

Tito's Promised Land. By Alex N. Dragnich. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 1954. Pp. 333. $5.75.)

Two of the basic functions of the political scientist in foreign affairs are performed competently in Alex N. Dragnich's *Tito's Promised Land.* The author not only has brought together and analyzed a vast supply of data to make the finest available study of the contemporary Yugoslav state, but also has gone beyond the fact-finding process to raise some serious questions concerning Western policy toward that unhappy land. Dragnich has an impressive background for his task, including knowledge of the language and traditions of Yugoslavia which he secured from his Montenegrin immigrant parents, a good training in political science and Slavic studies at the University of California, a tour of duty for the American government in Washington and Belgrade, and intensive research and investigation in the Western and Slavic literature, all capped by several trips through Yugoslavia, where he interviewed government officials, many professional people and opinion leaders, and hundreds of peasants.

More than two-thirds of the book is devoted to a detailed analysis of Tito's regime. Serious attention is given to the rulers' efforts to find a rationale different from those found in the Soviet philosophy or Western theory; to the mechanisms in the fields of policy making, administration, law, propaganda and mass control, and economics; and to the results achieved and the strengths and weaknesses revealed, especially in relation to the needs and desires of the Yugoslav people. This is one of the best presentations of the subject, ranking in perceptiveness and insight with Josef Korbel's *Tito's Communism,* hitherto the best available in the English language, and surpassing it in quantity of detail, especially for the vital years after the Tito-Stalin break and the alleged "transition to democratic socialism" after 1950. This aspect of the book is invaluable to the Western student of foreign affairs and comparative government, providing analysis of up-to-date data and source materials which are as yet unavailable in English.

In addition to his study of the contemporary Yugoslav regime, Dragnich examines several historical developments relating to Tito's road to power. He concludes that Mihailovich, Tito's great rival in the civil war that raged between 1942 and 1945, was outsmarted by Tito and betrayed by the Western powers—in spite of Tito's inability to secure a real following among the Yugoslav masses and his failure to make a real contribution to the Allied war effort against the Axis. Although Dragnich does not fail to analyze Mihailovich's mistakes and shortcomings, which were serious, and while he does not overlook Tito's skillful tactics (including his exploitation of the uprooted and disorganized and his masterful propaganda operations), Dragnich believes that the "most important source of Communist success" was Western aid.

The key issue now for the United States is focused by Dragnich's sharp analysis on two questions. How strong is the Tito regime likely to be in any future crisis? Dragnich believes that there is deep and widespread hatred for that regime among the Yugoslav opeple. Moreover, he feels that the army, thought by many observers to be Tito's strongest power base, is actually deeply disloyal, with the officers largely pro-Soviet and the enlisted men likely to refuse to fight for Tito in any conflict. Among the non-military masses, Dragnich finds the young people increasingly anti-Tito, and the older Yugoslavs yearning for significant political changes and even willing to accept the old prewar types of government if no other alternative to Tito is possible.

Dragnich's picture of the Yugoslav situation is full of despair and tragedy. In the urban areas, there have been some advances toward industrialization, but at tremendous cost in human blood, as well as money and materials. The people despair before the show of unreal aims, gross inefficiency and corruption in industry, terribly low standards of living, and even some unemployment. In the countryside, the peasants hate the collective farm system and resist the efforts to impose it upon them, and Tito's cause is not helped by the low rate of production and inefficient management. The clear outlines of the Soviet class state are already evident, with privileged classes in existence and growing with each passing year, while the standard of living among the masses is at an abysmally low level—"considerably below that of pre-World War II." Dragnich declares that "every Yugoslav citizen knows that Communist experimentation has been more ruinous to the economy than the direct consequences of the war"—and thus for material reasons does not support the regime. But more important is the fierce hatred which Dragnich found to exist among the masses for their Communist overlords, as a result of the stifling of civil liberties, the anti-religious campaigns, and the ubiquitous secret police. Even inside the Communist ranks, Dragnich found confusion and divided loyalties, with pro-Soviet elements, disillusioned idealists, and resentful party people accused of disloyalty because they are dissatisfied. Dragnich summarizes this situation by reporting that the American diplomats agree that 85% of the population are opposed to the Tito regime, that he himself now feels the figure should be 90%, and that Yugoslavs whose judgment he trusts insist that the figure should be even higher.

Should the United States continue to give material and political assistance to Tito? Dragnich feels that Western aid to Tito was wisely given in 1948, when there was some hope of splitting the Communist empire, and when Yugoslav aid to the Greek rebels and the threat to Trieste menaced fragile Western defenses. Today, however, Dragnich asserts that Western aid to Tito is no longer desirable in terms of our national interest or our moral principles. Our aid, he hints, simply bolsters a tottering regime, led by men who prefer living as equals in a Communist world and who maintain their uneasy alliance with the West on a temporary basis. Tito's interest in the Western orientation will continue only so long as he cannot get his supplies elsewhere and would be replaced if he worked out a satisfactory arrangement with Stalin's successors. Dragnich ends his discussion of Western policy toward the Yugoslavs with this question: "How can we justify contributing to an *indefinite* enslavement of those people?"

Louis Nemzer.

The Ohio State University.

Terror and Progress USSR: Some Sources of Change and Stability in the Soviet Dictatorship. By Barrington Moore, Jr. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1954. Pp. xvii, 261. $4.50.)

The Russian Research Center of Harvard University has published the twelfth book in its series of publications, a slim yet insightful volume by one of its senior research fellows, the author of the valuable analysis of Soviet society, *Soviet Politics—the Dilemma of Power.* In his latest book Dr. Moore has utilized Russian source materials and the interviews with Soviet refugees conducted in 1950–51 by members of the Russian Research Center in "an attempt to weigh with an eye to the future the sources of stability and the potentialities for change in the Bolshevik regime." He has supplied many illuminating answers to the question of what people in different walks of Soviet life do when confronted with a series of situations which arise, as it were, from the logic of dictatorship.

The author begins by examining some of the problems with which the Soviet leaders have to contend, and the agencies of control which they utilize to solve them: the party, the secret police, the armed forces, and the "Soviet apparatus." He then proceeds to an examination of the specific way in which these agencies operate in industry, agriculture, and the cultural sphere of the arts and sciences, and of the reactions, tensions, and pressures in the people over whom the controls are exercised. He points out that the dynamism of the Soviet economic system is due to the tremendous political pressure exercised from the top of the hierarchy downward, and suggests that if this drive for the prompt and efficient fulfillment and overfulfillment of production standards suddenly ceased or slackened, stagnation and collapse would ensue. Moore believes that disastrous as the agricultural collectivization program was, it was at the same time a highly practicable albeit ruthless way of breaking the political resistance of the conservative peasantry. Today, torn between the demand for increased agricultural output and the desire to maintain its political control over the peasantry, the regime finds the peasant question one of the "running sores" of the body politic. In respect to intellectuals, the author thinks that the Kremlin has been forced continually to compromise between its own demand for practical results and the amount of control that it entails, and the requirements of freedom and autonomy necessary for creative endeavor. Estimating that one in every five Soviet men has felt the iron hand of the police, and that of those subjected to it perhaps less than one-half were actually sentenced, Moore maintains that the regime is constantly having to avoid applying too little terror, thereby losing effective control of various sectors within society, and of employing too much coercion, thereby producing a complete collapse of morale.

The volume ends with a chapter entitled "Images of the Future," in which Moore hazards some guesses as to the long-range tendencies of the present Soviet dictatorship. His forecasts tend to lie between the extremes of no foreseeable change in the future and total disintegration. He sees at present three possibilities of change. One is that there will be a continuation and intensification of the dynamic totalitarian characteristics of the Stalinist regime. He feels, however, that this would require a consolidation and strengthening of power in the hands of a single leader as ruthless and as politically astute as Stalin. A second alternative would be a "managerial revolution," with a triumph of the technical bureaucracy. Such a change would hardly lead to democracy, but would be characterized by the rule of law and great social mobility. A third possibility is the coming into prominence of traditionalist elements, including a freezing of the status quo, the creation of a caste system, and the dispersion of power among despotic satrapies. The change in this direction of oriental despotism could come only with a cessation of hostilities between East and West which would allow a de-emphasis of dictatorship and industrialization. Moore feels that the second possibility is the most likely, although he does not rule out the third, and admits that he is dealing with ideal types. Any regime which may eventuate will contain elements of all three, with emphasis on one.

Dr. Moore has written a book which dramatically describes the politics of survival of both the rulers and the ruled in the Soviet Union. It is indeed a pity that he did not expand upon this theme, portraying it with many more examples than he has given us. The title is perhaps a misnomer, for although the use of terror by the regime in molding the human stuff to its will is insightfully elucidated, terror remains always as a backdrop. And industrial and economic progress has been possible only because there have existed spheres in which the politics of survival could operate. In other words, at least in this respect a completely monolithic society exists and is feasible only on paper.

In the reviewer's mind, the chief value of this book lies in its descriptions of the efforts of people caught in the Soviet bureaucratic web to create some sort of modus vivendi. Paradoxically enough, the regime endures because this is possible. The "private deals," the personal intrigues, the "family circles," the extra-legal operations, in short, peculiar and perverted forms of political compromise, become an absolute necessity for the individual, if he is to have any security in a monolithic police state. Moore's treatment sustains the conclusion that Soviet communism falls far short of realizing Engels' ideal of the "administration of things," that the government of men continues to flourish instead. Contemporary political scientists will do well to glean at least one lesson from Moore's essay, and that is that public administration has not replaced politics based on interest, even in a polity embodying planning, manipulation, and coercion—all directed without democratic or constitutional checks from a central authority.

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The Threat of Soviet Imperialism. EDITED BY C. GROVE HAINES. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1954. Pp. xvi, 402. $5.00.)

In August, 1953, the School of Advanced International Studies sponsored a conference in Washington on "The Problem of Soviet Imperialism." The twenty papers which were read and discussed at the conference form the chapters of the present volume. Its title, like the theme of the conference, is somewhat misleading, for the real theme of these papers is the cold war in all its complexities and ramifications.

The first three papers discuss in the broadest outlines the Soviet attitude toward the non-Soviet world, its historical background, the baffling question concerning Soviet motivation, and the principles of Soviet strategy. Part Two is devoted to a survey of tools and techniques used by the Kremlin in its struggle with the West. Part Three contains an assessment of the most important features of strength and weakness in the Soviet world. Parts Four and Five give an area-by-area survey of the cold war, the forces that fight it out, the battle lines that have been drawn, and the prospects for further development. In the final paper, some implications for United States foreign policy are drawn on the basis of the preceding discussions.

A symposium in which half of the participants were State Department officials, and the title of which consists of loaded words, might well arouse caution or suspicion in the academic reviewer. Any such reserve, however, is unjustified in the present case. Instead, the outcome of this conference has been a first-class summary of cold war problems. It contains admirable individual contributions; it has been edited with skill; and it constitutes a valuable addition to the library of any student of contemporary world affairs. The elements of discontinuity inevitable in symposia of this sort have been kept at a minimum by a judicious balance in the overall outline. Since very few of the papers fall short of very high standards, the entire book provides almost uninterruptedly excellent reading. The inclusion of brief comments by discussants enriches the contribution of the main speakers, although it does tend to make the book a little more disjointed. Some of these comments are rather cryptic, and some are banal and superfluous. The only other criticism that might be offered is that the scope of each contributor's subject was so vast that many speakers had to talk in generalizations. Statements of this kind often raise more questions in the readers' minds than they answer.

In the discussion of Soviet motivation, in the first part of the book, Messrs. Kennan and Morgan have performed brilliantly indeed. And yet one misses a consideration of the Soviet *national interest*, which is clearly relevant for an understanding of Soviet foreign policy. Professor Barghoorn, who observes the skillful use made by Soviet propagandists of Western ideals and Western slogans, might have supplemented this by examining why the Kremlin finds it possible to use our own slogans with such success, though later speakers dealt with this problem at great length. Certainly every single contribution could be subjected to criticism in this manner, but it is clear that this would go beyond the confines of this review.

Some propositions can be singled out which run through all the contributions of this book. Every speaker took it for granted that the Soviet state and the world Communist movement constitute a grave threat to the existence and prosperity of the United States, and to the integrity of its institutions. Every speaker revealed a healthy respect for the skill which the Kremlin has shown in "exploiting intangibles," to use the happy phrase found by Admiral Stevens.

Most or all of them seemed to believe that it is these intangibles which will count most decisively in the cold war. Finally, many speakers seemed to agree that the United States and its agencies have shown themselves inept and clumsy in manipulating these intangibles; and the sobering impression that the cold war has not, so far, taken a course favorable to the United States is gained from the book.

A number of current clichés are rejected in these papers. Willis Armstrong in an excellent presentation shows that Soviet trade will never be a very dangerous weapon. D. Vernon McKay indicates that Africa is not likely to fall victim to communism in the foreseeable future. Perhaps the greatest surprise is the implication left by many speakers that the greatest threat to America lies not in Soviet strength or the Kremlin's aggressiveness, but in the possibility that the nations of Europe, Asia, and Latin America who have not yet been incorporated into the Soviet orbit might lose faith in the United States and cease to support us in the cold war. Paul H. Nitze's concluding words, which seem to echo the Administration's current "tough" language, therefore come as an anticlimax. One wonders just how much of the wise, restrained, and detached analysis of high-level foreign service officers such as the contributors to this volume ever reaches the ears of those who really make American foreign policy.

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The Struggle for Indochina. BY ELLEN J. HAMMER WITH A PREFACE BY RUPERT EMERSON. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1954. Published under the Auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Pp. xvii, 332. $5.00.)

In Indochina the Communists have scored a significant triumph—their second in Asia since World War II. Americans with few exceptions had been led to expect a happier outcome. As it turns out, Indochina has furnished an almost classic demonstration of Communist strategy in a colonial setting. It is important to establish just what happened, and why.

Miss Hammer's book is a welcome contribution to the scanty literature in English. Wisely she refrains from trying to answer all the questions. And some of her judgments can be challenged. For the most part, however, she subordinates judgments to a straightforward, well-constructed narrative of events from the fall of France in 1940 to the eve of the Geneva Conference in 1954. Rupert Emerson adds a thoughtful preface pointing up the tragedy of the whole affair, and the dilemmas it has posed alike for Frenchmen, Americans, and the peoples of Indochina.

After telling the interesting tale of Decoux and the Japanese, the author turns to her main subject: France confronted with postwar Vietnamese nationalism. In some detail she describes the eight years of negotiation and fighting which followed upon the French attempt to return to Indochina in 1945. One learns much about French party politics and politicians in relation to Indochina, about the personalities and structure of the Bao Dai regime, and something of the Viet Minh before they passed behind the Iron Curtain in 1950. The book is written from documentary and personal sources in France and the United States. Enough historical background is provided to introduce the reader to the more contemporary scene.

Miss Hammer tells the story in terms of lost opportunities. She blames extremists and blunderers on both sides for the war, *la sale guerre*, which sowed anarchy in the countryside and ended by delivering north Viet Nam (at least) into the Communist camp. The Communists she condemns for betraying the Vietnamese national revolution. Turning on their allies in the Viet Minh, they imposed a Communist dictatorship which overtly allied itself with Moscow and Peiping in 1949 and invited large-scale American and Chinese intervention. It is the French, however, specifically the Right Wing, on whom she places the underlying responsibility for the Communists' success in capturing and so largely retaining the leadership of Vietnamese nationalism through the postwar struggle.

For France the issue was really settled in 1940, says the author. Struck down by Hitler in Europe, France had also to suffer the disintegration of her prestige and authority in Indochina during Japan's humiliating overlordship. At the war's end she had no viable course of action, weakened and distracted as she was, but to come to terms with an aroused Asian nationalism. Instead, French policymakers and administrators grossly miscalculated the dynamics of the situation. Determined to return France to a paramount position, they rejected the demands of Ho Chi Minh's new coalition government for the unity and independence of Viet Nam within the French Union. Thus the opportunity was lost for a peaceful settlement in 1946, when the Viet Minh was far weaker and more conciliatory than it later became.

Thereafter military action could never solve the problem, as General LeClerc and others predicted. Nor did the accompanying political maneuvers to split the resistance movement—especially the Bao Dai experiment—achieve their hoped for results. To win over the Vietnamese *attentistes*, and still more Ho's non-Communist supporters, Bao Dai had first to convince them of his independence of the French. His regime had also to organize some representative political base and program. In neither did it carry conviction or inspire confidence. The immediate reason, in Miss Hammer's view, was the grudging, halting manner in which the French had to be driven to yield the substance of freedom—always too little or too late. More fundamentally, she attributes the weakness of nonrevolutionary nationalism in Indochina to France's longstanding colonial policies. They stunted the growth of a modern middle class and blighted its opportunities for leadership and self-expression in moderate channels. This is the burden of the author's argument.

It is possible to agree that the French blundered badly in Indochina, of course, and still take a more sympathetic view of their purposes and their objective difficulties after the war. Perhaps they would have done better to concede independence and national authority to the Viet Minh regime in 1946. But Miss Hammer herself describes it as already firmly in the grip of the Communists, despite its posture of moderation and conciliation. Its subsequent behavior shows all too clearly that it was merely applying the Trojan-horse tactics of the two-stage revolution long advocated by Ho Chi Minh in company with Mao Tse-tung. In the disunity and the political incapacity of the non-Communist nationalists, relative to the disciplined strength of the Communists, the French faced a more intractable problem than the British in India and Burma, or the Dutch in Indonesia. Besides faction-ridden Viet Nam, there were Cambodia and Laos, weak and fearful of their neighbor. And once again in the spread of communism the contiguous border becomes a strategic factor with the arrival of the Chinese Red armies in December, 1949.

After eight years the French could find no satisfactory way out of their policy dilemma, despite massive American aid. Prophetically, Miss Hammer quotes the 1950 speech of a Radical Socialist whose views were to win increasing acceptance by his party. Addressing the National Assembly, he rejected France's whole military effort and political policy in Indochina as falsely conceived and powerless to effect a solution. In their place he called for "concessions, large concessions" to reach an agreement with the Viet Minh. In 1954, when Pierre Mendès-France took the premiership, he moved at once to translate his words into action.

WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD.

Princeton University.

Totalitarianism: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, March 1953. EDITED BY CARL J. FRIEDRICH. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1954. Pp. viii, 386. $6.50.)

This symposium is an attempt to develop an appraisal of the nature, origins, strengths, and weaknesses of modern totalitarian dictatorships. It is a provocative and balanced volume containing diverse papers and commentary by a veritable small army of scholars. Its contents range from an impressionistic paper by George F. Kennan to a speculative model by Harold Lasswell.

A number of basic issues are discussed. One of these is the question of whether totalitarianism is a historically unique phenomenon without genuine precedent or a trait which has characterized various earlier authoritarian societies. Nicholas Timasheff takes the latter position and, with the help of a rather elaborate system of distinctions and categories, suggests a quantitative approach to the study of the phenomenon. Carl Friedrich contends that totalitarian society, like the Greek *polis*, is *sui generis* and then identifies a series of characteristics which support this view. Probably the question is really one of the extent to which the totality can be escaped and whether or not it was easier to evade it in the past than it is now. If escape and evasion are less likely now as a result of the development of political technology, then Friedrich's thesis appears to be the stronger one.

Many other questions also receive attention. The nature of Soviet and Nazi anti-intellectualism and the attitude of the two regimes toward science are treated quite fully in the papers of Raymond Bauer, H. J. Muller, Bertram Wolfe, and Else Frenkel-Brunswik, as well as in the commentary by Hannah

Arendt. The function of terror and tensions is well defined by Jerzy Gliksman, Alex Inkeles, and George Kennan. The role of ideology is dealt with in the papers of Carl Friedrich, Raymond Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and the late Waldemar Gurian. Of special interest to political scientists is the paper by Karl W. Deutsch, which contains a series of hypotheses and categories for determining the effectiveness of totalitarian regimes.

A number of questions were raised but not fully discussed. Among these was the question of the contribution of Christianity and democracy to the context from which totalitarianism emerged. Another problem not fully explored—although discussed to some extent by Andrew Gyorgy in his commentary on the proceedings—was that of how "total" a regime must be to be genuinely totalitarian. A more impressive effort also could have been made to define the respective roles of rationality, irrationality, and nonrationality in decision-making under totalitarian systems.

The study of a phenomenon such as totalitarianism obviously requires a multi-faceted approach, and a number of disciplines and varieties of experience are represented in this symposium. It is unfortunate, however, that the extent to which social scientists do not speak the same language is so much in evidence. An additional problem is that of comparability of data. The psychologists employ a rather abstract and generalized approach, concerning themselves almost as much with manifestations of embryonic totalitarianism among Americans in 1953 as among Germans in the 'thirties. Yet they almost completely ignore the Russian species of totalitarianism. Their discussions of the psychic needs fulfilled by totalitarian ideology, the characteristics of the totalitarian personality, and the conditions of ideological compliance are based on very limited data but do offer many insights and apparently valid hypotheses although they are sometimes buried in verbosity.

This is a symposium of substance on a subject which, unfortunately, has long been neglected by too many political scientists. It contains much data of the kind which too often has not been included in courses in comparative government. If the volume lacks a certain unity it is probably due to the fact that all participants were not fully acquainted with all totalitarian regimes. This condition might also be regarded as inherent in symposia of any size unless the editor himself employs totalitarian methods. Yet a symposium of this type serves a very real purpose to the extent that it reflects a genuine exchange of views, facilitates further interdisciplinary research, defines the key issues, and clarifies areas of disagreement. In terms of these criteria, the editor and his fellow-participants in the conference have succeeded in producing a volume of consequence.

JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR.

Princeton University.

Supreme Court and Supreme Law. EDITED BY EDMOND CAHN. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1954. Pp. ix, 250. $4.00.)

This volume, the outgrowth of the New York University Law School's commemoration of the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of *Marbury* v. *Madison*, contains papers presented by Edmond Cahn, Ralph F. Bischoff, John P. Frank, Paul A. Freund, Willard Hurst, and Charles P. Curtis. The eight chapters represent an attempt to describe and appraise the institution of judicial review in action from 1803 to 1953 and, as the editor states in the preface, the essays "present questions of policy and judicial statecraft that are enormously important because they cut sectionally across the entire corpus of constitutional law" (p. vii). The book deals specifically with such matters as constitutional change, justiciability, the process of constitutional construction, and the impact of judicial review upon federalism, civil liberties, the distribution of national power, and majority rule.

As regards justiciability, Professor Bischoff believes in a relaxation of the Court's insistence upon the presence of parties with a material interest in cases involving civil liberties, just as Professor Frank is in favor of narrowing the concept of political question in similar cases. In his longer essay, "Review and Federalism," Professor Freund provides a good account of the impact of judicial review upon federal power, which has increased as judicial review has declined.

Perhaps the most controversial chapter of the book is Professor Frank's essay, "Review and Basic Liberties," in which he concludes that judicial review in the expectations of the Founding Fathers has been "in its relation to basic liberty . . . a failure of prediction almost as great as the electoral college" (p. 130). This does not mean that Mr. Frank is opposed to judicial review. On the contrary, he desires more of it, but in what he regards as the right instances. Accordingly, among other devices to extend judicial review in civil liberties cases, he recommends the contraction of the area of non-justiciability, enlargement of the concept of standing of parties to raise constitutional issues, and reversal of the traditional presumption of the validity of statutes into one of invalidity in cases affecting basic liberties. In some instances his last suggestion has already been followed by the Court in decisions granting a "preferred position" to freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and religious worship. Professor Frank apparently prefers a double standard of judicial review in that he is willing for the Court to be abstemious in the invalidation of legislation not affecting basic liberties by resting constitutionality in such cases upon the traditional formula of reasonableness, but anxious for the Court to be activist when statutes are challenged as infringing the basic freedoms. Double standards of judicial review are not new, as all know who are familiar with the history of the distortion of liberty into freedom of contract and the later application of the "preferred position" principle. Although Mr. Frank expressly asserts that he would not have the Court accept a roving commission to correct evil, his demurrer is hardly convincing because there is a fundamental incompatibility between restraint and activism which produces in turn a rather cruel dilemma for those juristic libertarians who support the extension of legislative and executive power into some areas but seek judicial intervention when the extended power of government intrudes upon civil liberties. Professor Hurst raises less controversial issues in his discussion of "Review and the Distribution of National Power," where he describes the extent of abdication by the Court as final censor of legislative and administrative action. In the final chapter, "Review and Majority Rule," Mr. Curtis concludes that John Marshall "snatched from the majority and offered to our courts, the function of rendering our political decencies and aspirations into immanent law. What we owe to John Marshall is the opportunity he gave us of combining "a reign of conscience with a republic" (p. 198).

Professor Cahn and his associates have provided a volume of an unusually high uniform quality for a collective effort and one highly suggestive for the continuing study of that institution which "combines a reign of conscience with a republic."

ROBERT J. HARRIS.

Vanderbilt University.

Robert M. LaFollette: June 14, 1855–June 18, 1925. BY BELLA CASE LAFOLLETTE AND FOLA LAFOLLETTE. (New York: Macmillan Co. 1953. 2 vols. Pp. xx, 730; vii, 731–1305. $15.00.)

This is an unusual biography of an important American political leader and statesman. The first biography of Robert M. LaFollette, it is a "family" biography in the sense that it was begun by his wife and completed by his daughter, but it is immeasurably superior in concept and execution to most such works. It is solidly based upon the vast collection of LaFollette letters and papers, which are extensively quoted; it draws upon the rich personal knowledge of the two authors, who were each actively associated with the Senator's political career; and it is as conscientiously objective in narration as the intelligence and integrity of the authors, combined with their deep affection and loyalty for the Senator, could make it. The result is a full and detailed account of the long political career of one of the giants of the American past, dramatic in the telling as it was in life, and revealing LaFollette (with Bryan, Theodore Roosevelt, and Wilson) as one of the four dominant political figures in the United States from 1890 to 1920.

LaFollette was actively engaged in politics throughout his mature life. Elected district attorney at age 25, he served in that office 1881–1885, as Congressman 1885–1891, as leader of Wisconsin Republican insurgency 1892–1900, as governor of Wisconsin 1901–1906, and as United States Senator 1906–1925. In addition, he was a leading contender for the 1912 Republican presidential nomination and in 1924 polled almost five million votes as an independent presidential candidate. It is this long and prominent career, with LaFollette at the center of successive major political battles, which marks him as one of the important professionals in our political history and makes him of such great interest to political scientists. His long-sustained leadership role, so richly annotated in these two volumes—ranging from his fight for the McKinley Tariff in 1890, through the dynamic "Wisconsin Idea" of his governorship, his leadership of the Progressive movement of 1910–12, his opposition to Wilson's war policy, his fight against the Versailles Treaty and the League, to the culmination of his career in the third-party effort in 1924—makes the story of his life an illuminating synopsis of much of American political history in the half-century from Cleveland to Coolidge.

There are some major disappointments in this distinguished biography. The first of these is the brief and inadequate treatment of the Wisconsin phase of the LaFollette career, particularly his decade of struggle in the '90's to capture and make a progressive instrument of the Republican state organization and his great record as governor of the state. This was the period in which his distinctive political ideas and methods were developed and the period when he exercised his outstanding talents as a chief executive to make Wisconsin a great example of enlightened government. Yet less than 200 pages are devoted to his pre-senatorial career, as contrasted with the 1,000 pages given to the period following 1906. A second defect is the disproportionate detail (the whole of the 500-page second volume) devoted to the 1917–1925 period, in contrast with the much briefer treatment of his central role in the Senate during the Roosevelt-Taft years and of his great national influence on the beginnings and growth of the Progressive movement from 1910 to 1912. There is, too, a consistent tendency to concentrate upon the issues which LaFollette emphasized and to neglect the story of his relationship to the party system, to the interest groups which supported or opposed him, to his party colleagues and rivals, and to the broad social movements upon which his leadership depended. The authors may have felt that these are matters for others to relate.

However this may be judged, there remains the problem of the one-dimensional effect produced by the biography. LaFollette occupies the center of the stage—all else is background; the story is told as LaFollette saw it; his policies and decisions are explained, not weighed or questioned. The reader frequently gets the impression that time stopped in 1925; that the flow of events since then, and our greater knowledge of what happened in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, have provided no new perspectives from which to judge, by results, the wisdom of the leaders who contended for and against tariffs, trusts, direct primaries, isolation, war, the League, and the return to normalcy. In any such account LaFollette will emerge not without fault but with great stature. This family biography will provide a rich storehouse for such a future critical and analytical biography.

WALLACE S. SAYRE.

Columbia University.

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

A Court for Children: A Study of the New York City Children's Court. BY ALFRED J. KAHN. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1953. Pp. xxii, 359. $4.50.)

The problem of "individualized justice" as it is practiced in the juvenile court has received less attention from political scientists than it would appear to warrant. The problem is two-fold. One aspect is the need to balance the child's and his family's rights to protection from well-meaning but arbitrary interference with the flexibility necessary for individual treatment and care where the state has established its right to intervene. Fortunately the New York court which Dr. Kahn studies appears to be more careful than most in this respect and Dr. Kahn has little reason to be concerned, aware as he is of the problem. One might comment in passing, however, that his otherwise adequate bibliography omits the more outstanding writings in this area, such as those of Judges Waite, Woodward, and Vanderbilt.[1]

The second aspect of the problem, and the one implicit in Dr. Kahn's work, is the question of criteria. Once the comparative certainty of the penal code has been, for humanitarian and pragmatic reasons, abandoned, what can be put in its place, so that "individualized" shall refer to the child and his situation rather than to the judge? Dr. Kahn makes his judgments of the court in the light of a "yardstick" of values which could perhaps best be summed up as those of a humanitarian clinicism. With some reservations, he finds the court sadly lacking by these, or, in fact, by any other reasonable standards. He paints a pathetic picture of judges who lecture children on the Ten Commandments, extract meaningless promises from them "to be good," and erect for themselves routinized or impulsive criteria of judgment; he tells too of probation officers who fail to make of probation anything but the most superficial of experiences.

Public indifference, overworked probation officers who lack professional training and skill, judges who are ill-equipped or jealous of their prerogatives—these are the identifiable factors which hinder the realization of what Dr. Kahn calls his "still unrealized dream." That this dream is by no means a monopoly of social workers is shown by the almost identical diagnosis and recommendations of a group of lawyers who have studied the same court.[2] What neither group has examined—and what Dr. Kahn, in view of his declared values, certainly could not be asked to examine—is the question of whether the values implicit in humanitarian clinicism can or ought to be the predominant values in approaching the problem of society's demands on the individual, youthful or mature. There seems to be room to question whether the judges' fumbling attempts, for instance, to impose their own versions of morality on children is due solely to ignorance or obstinacy, or whether it does not in fact represent some confused recognition of the need for something more of a moral content, some greater investment of the human will, than clinicism can provide. No one would wish to deny that clinicists have contributed to our knowledge of causes and treatment. The question is not whether clinicism is useful, but whether it does not need to be integrated into some larger framework.

These are questions for further study. The successes, excesses, and failures of "individualized justice" provide a fruitful commentary on the dilemma of our times. Dr. Kahn's book is excellent case material. It is courageous, fair, well-documented, illuminating, and essentially practical, particularly in the sphere of administrative reorganization. It is recommended both to those who wish to acquaint themselves with the practical problems of juvenile courts and those whose interest is in the more abstract problems presented.—ALAN KEITH-LUCAS, *University of North Carolina.*

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[1] The best discussion of this problem is contained in The United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare's *Standards for Specialized Courts Dealing with Children* (Washington, D. C., 1954), prepared in cooperation with the National Probation and Parole Association and the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges.

[2] *Children and Families in the Courts of New York City*, A Report by a Special Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and a Study by Walter Gellhorn, assisted by Jacob D. Hyman and Sidney H. Asch, on the "Administration of Laws Relating to the Family in the City of New York" (New York, 1954).

Federal-State-Local Tax Correlation: Symposium. (Princeton: Tax Institute. 1954. Pp. viii, 248. $5.00.)

The Tax Institute selected the formidable subject of intergovernmental fiscal relations for its 1953 symposium. Twenty-two persons, representing universities, business, and government, sought over a two-day period for means by which our three levels of taxation could be brought into balance. For the purpose, primarily, of analyzing American practice and prescription, the managers of the symposium organized the papers and discussion in five parts: background considerations, intergovernmental relations, federal aid and state aid, conflicts of jurisdiction, and potentialities of cooperation. The finished product, as might be expected, suffers from a lack of balance. Yet it can be said that this little volume embraces much of the experience and wisdom that has been distilled from the many studies of the problem of intergovernmental fiscal relations during the past twenty-five years.

The supporters of separation of tax sources as between the federal and state governments will receive no comfort from these pages. Paul Studenski characterizes the proposal for tax source separation as "an attempt to turn the clock of history backward." He goes on to say that the development of overlapping federal-state taxation has not been wholly irrational; the two levels of government, with revenue requirements not always overlapping in time, have naturally moved in on a tax source which was not being used to full capacity. And even if such a separation should be imposed, Studenski concludes, the fluctuating revenue requirements of the states and the nation would soon lead to its abandonment. The U. S. Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, which has received many recommendations for tax source separation, will find it difficult to overcome the arguments presented in these pages.

The familiar subject of federal and state grants-in-aid is discussed by Mabel Newcomer. She finds the fundamental objections to grants-in-aid to be that they (1) undermine home rule and promote centralization, (2) lead to the distortion of governmental services, (3) redistribute wealth, geographically, in a wasteful and unfair manner, and (4) promote irresponsible spending and consequent waste. While certain specific programs may be open to criticism, she does not find any substantial evidence to support the four fundamental objections. Piecemeal though the development of federal and state aid may have been, she concludes, "Piecemeal revision of a piecemeal growth can conceivably result, given time, in a rational and effective system."

What, then, are the "potentialities of cooperation" if we cannot look forward to tax source separation or the abandonment or serious curtailment of grants-in-aid? As revealed by the concluding part of this symposium, these seem to lie in the continuation, at an accelerated pace, of the present beginnings of administrative cooperation among federal, state, and local tax administrators. Uniformity in definitions for tax purposes, coordinated action on domicile problems, interstate cooperation in the development of allocation formulas for corporation taxation, acceptance of the tax audits of one jurisdiction by another—these and many more are proposed as means for the reduction of administrative conflict. The much-abused tax administrator, whatever his habitat, may find solace from the recognition in this book of the significance of his work.—WELDON COOPER, *University of Virginia.*

The Regulation of Businessmen. BY ROBERT E. LANE. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1954. Pp. xiii, 144. $3.75.)

This book is the first serious study of the responses of businessmen to regulation. It is principally concerned with business attitudes toward federal acts of general application: the trade regulation statutes, the labor relations acts, and the wage-hour law. The study draws upon the reports of federal agencies, which of course are of limited utility because enforcement is fragmentary and reporting is poor. In addition, the author interviewed twenty-five New England businessmen and several federal administrators and made a content analysis of two long runs of the journal of the Manufacturers Association of Connecticut. The author has thoroughly digested the behavioral sciences and the principal tools employed are concepts from psychology, sociology, and opinion analysis. Numerous graphic and tabular representations will assist or vex the reader.

A number of the conclusions appear to be well substantiated. Resentment towards and violation of regulatory laws by businessmen do not spring, in the main, from economic causes. Resistance to regulation is a defense of the businessman's conception of the good society and of his social role, or, more accurately, a defense of his conception of proper power relations in society. These values, like others, are socially conferred; they are common to the community to which the businessman belongs. But there is no single business community, nor are a man's associations solely in his business. Large businesses tend to be more law-abiding than small; those in cities resist change less bitterly than those in small towns. Moreover, within a single firm one may find occupational attitudes peculiar to the lawyer, the personnel man, or the public relations man. Between businessmen as a whole and administrators, however, there stands a great gulf. Burnham's thesis of the "managerial class" is shown to be pure fiction.

The tools of opinion analysis brought to bear in this book make it possible to replace impressionism with scientific findings. It is probable, however, that the author is unduly optimistic when he looks forward to a resolution of the conflict of economic interests by a regulatory administration informed in "the growing knowledge of inter-personal and inter-group relations."—FRANCIS D. WORMUTH, *University of Utah.*

Is There a Republican Majority? Political Trends, 1952–1956. BY LOUIS HARRIS. (New York: Harper & Bros. 1954. Pp. xviii, 231. $3.50.)

Louis Harris, research executive with Elmo Roper, has presented a readable analysis of recent election returns and of six pre-election polls and one post-election poll conducted in 1952. A principal value of using poll data to study political behavior is that voting preferences can be related directly to the social characteristics of the voters. The author's tabulations show that Eisenhower was supported by a coalition of executive and professional, white collar, independent, upper income, college educated, German-American, Irish-American, farmer, and feminine groups, while Stevenson was supported by a coalition of labor, low income, lower middle income, Italian-American, Polish-American, Negro, Jewish, Catholic, and less educated groups. These two coalitions had within their ranks conflicting tendencies on foreign and domestic policies.

In his study of the candidates, Mr. Harris shows that while Stevenson gained in popularity, Eisenhower did not lose any. An increasing number of people thought Stevenson a man of high intelligence and attractive personality, but the number regarding him as a man inspiring confidence remained small. The polling method thus sharpens our perception of the role of the personality of the candidate in the campaign.

In order to appeal to a wider audience, Mr. Harris has sacrificed details which are essential to research technicians. He does not present the numbers on which the percentages are based, and does not give the important cross tabulations; he does not describe his questionnaire design in which such concepts as white collar, upper and lower income are defined; nor does he describe the sampling design. The turnout index which was used to calculate most of the figures was based on a post-election estimate of the actual proportion of 1952 voters in the total population. Because of the author's insight in interpreting his materials, however, the book is an excellent contribution to the understanding of American party trends.—HAROLD F. GOSNELL, *Washington, D. C.*

Letters on Public Administration: From a Dean to His Graduates. BY LENT D. UPSON. (Detroit: Citizens Research Council of Michigan. 1954. Pp. xi, 178.)

In content, this book consists of six "letters" which, as the title indicates, the late Dean Upson wrote (over the years, with revisions from time to time) to his graduate students. Actually, the letters turn out to be essays written in informal, conversational, indeed highly personal style. The first four obviously were done, as another reviewer has said, with tongue in cheek. The fifth ("How to Graft") marks Dr. Upson as a master of the curve ball. The sixth, and as public administration the best, of the letters was written in serious and purposeful, but also good-humored, vein. I propose to leave the reading of the book to anyone who may be interested enough to pick it up—it is worthy of and doubtless will command a wide audience—and to comment briefly on the letters from the three principal points of view which their style and content invite.

First, as *humor*, the letters are good fun: they are whimsical, light-hearted, witty, sometimes gay. They reveal a fine sense of the incongruity which almost always provokes a smile. They also reveal an author who could laugh at himself and all his works, not to mention the works of most other writers as well. One suspects that the letters succeeded well in what clearly was their primary objective, namely to amuse the audience for which they were written.

Second, as *literature*, the letters leave a good deal to be desired. (I would not invoke this criterion except that the author, on p. 36, lists the ability to write and speak "the King's English" as a primary attribute of an administrator. He comments that most people around a university are fairly intelligent, but that practically nobody knows how to write and speak so as to make himself understood.) The author's style is so very conversational that it loses considerable through simple reduction to print. There are frequent grammatical slips. Worse, the proof was very poorly read: witness "sound" for "second" (p. 7), "scaler" for "scalar" (p. 8), "meanful" for "meaningful" (p. 15), "underlying" for "underling" (p. 33), and so on to "demurer" for "demurrer" toward the end of the book (p. 174). "Up" deserved better of his academic executors.

Third, as *public administration*, the book is wholly lacking in system and plan. There is no skeleton on which the essays depend, and there is no common thread running through the series unless the author's humor be taken as providing the underlying motif. In subject matter the letters are uneven, probably for no more obscure reason than that they were designed to entertain rather than to instruct. As a not unnatural consequence substantive disharmonies appear, so that Dean Upson's unquestioned technical mastery does not show through consistently.

Some of the author's friends and admirers—and they are legion—may inquire, "What do you want for a dollar-seventy-five, a combination of Browning, Bryce, and Benchley?" Conceding the point, let's apply the one standard which seems the most appropriate and with which Dean Upson, in the circumstances, presumably would have been the most pleased. I find little of Browning here, and not much more of Bryce; but as Benchley, the *Letters* are good.—ROSCOE C. MARTIN, *Syracuse University.*

A Descriptive Catalogue of Government Publications of the United States, September 5, 1774–March 4, 1881. BY BEN: PERLEY POORE. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1885. Ann Arbor, Mich.: J. W. Edwards, reprinted, 1953. Pp. 1392. $14.40.)

The above basic catalog of United States public documents, together with the two volumes of the *Comprehensive Index*, 1881–1893, of Ames, and the *Checklist of United States Public Documents, 1789–1909*, all three of which have been out of print and increasingly difficult to obtain, have been reissued in facsimile reprint editions under the auspices of the Joint Committee on the Reproduction of Bibliographical and Reference Works appointed by the Reference Librarians Section of the Association of College and Reference Libraries (ALA) and the Association of Research Libraries. Poore and Ames were both prepared at a time when very extensive collections of public documents were not readily available. Increasingly for the period previous to 1893, when the office of the Superintendent of Documents was created at the United States Government Printing Office, there is a need for the reworking of the material in both Poore and Ames in view of the present status of collections of public documents and of present-day needs for information.—J.B.C.

Party Politics in the Golden State. BY DEAN R. CRESAP. (Los Angeles: The Haynes Foundation. 1954. Pp. xi, 126. $2.50 cloth, $2.00 paper.)

This monograph presents a comprehensive and scholarly picture of the structure and operation of the California party system at every level of government. Such subjects are included as state regulation of parties, state and local executive organization, the state convention, the relationship between state and national party organizations, partisanship in the legislature, the nominating process, the conduct of campaigns, and party leadership. A final chapter presents a plea and sets forth the conditions for a more responsible two-party system in the state. Interviews, personal observations, and questionnaires as well as written sources were employed in securing the data used. Such studies are needed in every state if the intricacies and variations of our national two-party system are to be thoroughly understood.

Civil-Military Relations: An Annotated Bibliography. 1940–1952. BY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS RESEARCH OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1954. Pp. x, 140. $2.00.)

This selective bibliography begins chronologically at the termination date of the Social Science Research Council's 1940 publication on *Civil-Military Relations: Bibliographical Notes of Administrative Problems of Civilian Mobilization.* It includes only English titles and focuses on the United States, with some related listings from British Commonwealth experience. Its aim is to include titles which will reveal procedures for making policies at levels where policy decisions are of joint concern to civilian and military officials. References to other bibliographical sources for the United States and Great Britain are given in the introduction. An index is included.

Management in the Public Service: The Quest for Effective Performance. BY JOHN D. MILLETT. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1954. Pp. xi, 417. $5.50.)

This text is planned as one of two volumes, the as yet unpublished one to deal with the "politics of public administration," while this one is on "the operation of administrative agencies as such." It treats problems of management which are common to the different agencies and takes as the apex of attention the department head or other chief agency officer. There are chapters on "work direction," including leadership, planning, communication, supervision, and public relations; on "work operation," including organization, budget and fiscal operations, personnel, legal service, and management improvement; on "internal services," including capital, plant, supply, etc.; and a final chapter on "The Value of Management." It should serve as a useful text for those desiring emphasis on management.

Ford: The Times, the Man, the Company. BY ALLAN NEVINS. WITH THE COLLABORATION OF FRANK ERNEST HILL. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1954. Pp. xx, 688. $6.75.)

While this book states as its purpose the relating of the story of the Ford Motor Company from its antecedents through its attainment of spectacular success by the middle of World War I, it is also, as the title implies, a biography of the firm's central figure—the first attempt at depicting Ford from the extensive use of inside sources. Professor Nevins, his collaborator, and his research staff have had full access to the Ford Archives, a treatment accorded no previous biographer, with the result that here is a rather appreciative, somewhat discursive, but quite full account of the Company and the man.

Le Système Constitutionnel des États-Unis d'Amérique: Histoire Constitutionnelle. BY ANDRÉ TUNC AND SUZANNE TUNC. PREFACE BY RENÉ DAVID. (Paris: Éditions Domat Montchrestien. 1954. Pp. viii, 507.)

This is a comprehensive, well-annotated survey of the constitutional history of the United States from the earliest colonial period through 1952, with interesting comments on the complexities of the American legal system as it looks to those trained in the civil law. This is the first of three volumes planned by the authors to fill a gap in French literature on the United States Constitution.

The American Government: Democracy in Action. BY CHARLES E. MERRIAM AND ROBERT E. MERRIAM. (Boston: Ginn & Co. 1954. Pp. xi, 944. $6.25.)

This text is the result of a joint attempt by the late Professor C. E. Merriam and his son, Robert E. Merriam, to introduce a fresh approach to the beginning course in American Government. Departing from the traditional sequence, the authors take up first state government, then local, and finally national. As to the effectiveness of this device, the individual teacher will have to decide for himself. The text on the whole is somewhat detailed and ponderous, although attempts are made to lighten it by including a profusion of illustrations, charts, and graphs.

I Protest. BY G. BROMLEY OXNAM. (New York: Harper & Bros. 1954. Pp. 186. $2.50.)

Bishop Oxnam's account of his experiences with the Velde Committee and of the procedures used by investigatorial committees.

Local Government and Administration: Principles and Problems. BY JAMES E. PATE. (New York: American Book Co. 1954. Pp. ix, 595. $5.75.)

A textbook in which principles and problems are treated sometimes with reference to local government in general, sometimes with reference to a particular unit. The municipality is given more extensive consideration than other units.

Newton D. Baker and His Books. By Willis Thornton. (Cleveland: The Press of Western Reserve University. 1954. Pp. 85.)

A reproduction of selected comments written by Newton D. Baker on the margins of many of the books in his large personal library, which was given after his death to the Cleveland College Library of Western Reserve University. The comments are woven together by the explanations of the author.

Building a Better Home Town: A Program of Community Self-Analysis and Self-Help. By H. Clay Tate. (New York: Harper & Bros. 1954. Pp. xvi, 236. $3.50.)

A presentation of the merits of urban decentralization with reference to the small city rather than the metropolitan suburbs, and an analysis of the Central Illinois Community Betterment Program carried on cooperatively by *The Daily Plantagraph* of Bloomington and the University of Illinois, closing with a formula for community improvement based on this experience.

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
University of Maryland

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

The Future of the House of Lords. EDITED BY SYDNEY D. BAILEY. (London: The Hansard Society. 1954. Pp. 180. 10/6.)

This symposium on the House of Lords first appeared in *Parliamentary Affairs.* By making it available in book form the Hansard Society furthers its splendid work of acquainting the public with all phases of parliamentary government.

There might be some question as to whether the title is not misleading, since this collection of articles deals but little with the future. The editor justifies the title by pointing out that knowledge of the past and present is essential to plans for the future. The book is important, nevertheless, not so much for what it reveals about the future of the House of Lords as for the light cast upon the development and operation of the British constitution by the examination of a major element of that constitution.

For example, the article by V. M. R. Goodman on "Appellate Jurisdiction" traces the history of the House of Lords as a judicial body. An excellent description is provided of the constitutional problems which faced the government in the 19th century when it began to appear that the Lord Chancellor was the only peer qualified to hear legal arguments. This impasse was solved by empowering the Crown to confer baronies for life on persons with high legal qualifications. Thus the House was enabled to remain the representative of the High Court of Parliament in judicial affairs. Again illustrating how the British constitution may develop, the author suggests that the Law Lords in moving from the House chamber to a committee room in 1947, to escape the noise of a pile driver used in rebuilding the Palace of Westminster, may have set in motion profound developments in the constitution. This "Appellate Committee's" sittings have continued in a separate room though the cause for moving has disappeared. While judgment is reserved for the House, the committee hears arguments without interference from the general business of Parliament.

Although the symposium covers most aspects of the House of Lords, including "The Queen in Parliament," "Should Peers be Paid?", and "The Delaying Power," the usefulness of the volume for a political scientist might have been increased by including an examination of the educational, vocational, and political characteristics of the peers. Also valuable would have been a statistical analysis of the bills delayed by the peers as well as an examination of the socio-economic background of recently created peers.

There is some unevenness of quality (and some repetition) among these articles, but many of them are valuable indeed. Sydney D. Bailey presents a well-documented account of "Life Peerages." R. W. Perceval's description of "The Origin and Development of the House of Lords" is a concise and scholarly survey of considerable merit. Lord Campion's discussion of "Second Chambers in Theory and Practice" is a sweeping and thoughtful analysis of second chambers in general. Classifying second chambers as "strong" (co-ordinate) or "useful" (limited), he examines those of most governments in the Western world. He concludes that a "useful" chamber may "perform its minor but valuable functions in a spirit of objectivity." His conclusions with regard to a "strong" second chamber are less sanguine, for he believes that "in the end party spirit will use its strength to kill its usefulness."

One of the most valuable features of this volume is the appendix. Here are to be found letters patent creating a baron; writs of summons to a new Parliament; An Act For the Abolishing the House of Peers, 1649; reports of the Bryce (1918) and Roseberry (1908) committees; The Parliament Acts, 1911 and 1948; and the statement issued by the conference of party leaders on the Parliament Bill, 1948.—JOHN R. WILLIAMS, *West Virginia University.*

Uruguay: Portrait of a Democracy. BY RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON. (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press. 1954. Pp. xiv, 301. $5.75.)

In this worthwhile new book Russell Fitzgibbon paints a full-length and distinguished portrait of a small but remarkable South American nation. It is particularly fortunate that this study of Uruguay, a country in so many ways the exception to the rule among Latin-American states, was undertaken by a person of Professor Fitzgibbon's broad experience in the area, for he brings to it a rare ability to evaluate and to underline the differences which set Uruguay apart from its neighbors.

Here, as the author demonstrates, is a Latin-American country that has overcome the difficulties which beset its sister-states and achieved its own type of democracy, based on a politically responsible government that administers progressive social legislation honestly and faithfully and that participates in a broadly conceived and expanding semi-socialistic economy for the benefit of the general population. Obviously, from the way he writes and the things he says, Professor Fitzgibbon approved most of the things he saw in Uruguay and found its citizens *simpático.* He points out certain weaknesses in the Uruguayan way of life, such as the disparity between the economic and social conditions found in Montevideo and those in the hinterland, but he tempers this with a higher proportion of favorable comments about life in a country whose citizens have, as he puts it, learned to enjoy themselves.

The book is not primarily a monograph on government as the title might seem to indicate; instead, as the dust jacket states, it is "an informal survey of the Switzerland of Latin America." Its pages are crowded with a wide range of things Uruguayan—geography, history, art, economics, politics, and the like, together with a liberal sprinkling of introductions to the persons past and present who have made these things what they are. Reading the book leaves one with a feeling of insight into the country and the people who inhabit it.

The three short chapters which deal specifically with politics and government demonstrate clearly that Professor Fitzgibbon has captured the sense of the political system of the *orientales,* as the Uruguayans call themselves. They also prove that by the author's or any other reasonable standard Uruguay deserves to be recognized as a democracy. Freedom of elections, effectiveness of justice, a strong legislature, the adoption of a collegial executive, all indicate a limited and responsible government.

Some readers may be disappointed that the author did not devote a greater portion of his book to the political system of Uruguay. The present book, however, does supply a wealth of material upon which Professor Fitzgibbon or some other student may build a specificially political study in the future. Certainly the stated objective of presenting a comprehensive picture of Uruguay has been accomplished. No one can demand more of a writer than that he do what he set out to do.

A short but inclusive bibliography adds to the value of the study.—ROBERT E. SCOTT, *University of Illinois.*

Interpretación de la Historia de Sudamerica. BY ARTURO VILELA. (La Paz, Bolivia: Biblioteca Pacena. 1953. Pp. 230.)

This is without doubt the best short interpretative essay on the political development of the Spanish-speaking republics of South America to be found in any language. It has so much to commend it that it is difficult to know where to begin. The author is an exceptionally able young Bolivian social scientist who did his graduate work in political science at Northwestern University. His book shows a mastery of research techniques used in this country. With some minor exceptions, the footnoting and bibliography of over 200 sources demonstrate use of the standard and classic sources (in Spanish, English, and French) relevant to the subject. Vilela writes so lucidly that the reader with only a rudimentary knowledge of Spanish will have no trouble in understanding the major ideas. At the same time his graceful style will be a pleasure to those who know Spanish well.

It is the author's contention that the political evolution of the Latin-American countries can best be understood through evaluation of sociological, economic, and historical factors. He therefore dismisses as inadequate and naive the efforts of a fairly large number of Latin-American intellectuals to explain political development in terms of the class struggles. He is aware of the importance of social classes, of course. Indeed, his sections on the criteria of class (race, culture, possession of wealth) and the relationship of classes to politics is certainly one of the best short treatments available. The book is organized chronologically—colonial period, independence, nineteenth century, the present time.

Dr. Vilela is concerned throughout with the dynamics of change. The theme that runs through every historical period, however, is the struggle of the Latin-American countries to free themselves from the hierarchical, authoritarian, absolutist nature of political, social, and economic institutions of the colonial period. His abstracts of the political thinking of the men of the independence period are excellent. It is hard to point to better analyses of the classic nineteenth-century thinkers, men such as the Argentines Alberdi and Sarmiento, the Ecuadorian Montalvo, the Chilean Lastarria, the Bolivian René Moreno, the Cuban José Martí, and others. The author believes that men like Lastarria of Chile, Alem of Argentina, Battlle of Uruguay, and Aquileo Ortiz Parra of Colombia established bases for the development of the liberal-democratic state. However, whereas the upper-middle elite understood both the theory and the practice of democracy, the masses did not. Traditional liberalism failed to achieve the successes for which it is noted in England and in the United States. The emphasis at present among major Latin-American thinkers, and certainly among those who call themselves "liberals," is not on political democracy but on what is frequently referred to as economic democracy. Intervention of the state in economic affairs ("dirigismo") is the outstanding characteristic of modern political theory in the Latin-American countries. The "liberal" or revolutionary thus tends to be a statist. The supporter of liberal democracy and economic capitalism is a conservative or reactionary.

The author is inclined to believe that Dr. Vilela has correctly analyzed and evaluated the political thinking of leading men in the South American countries. However, it is ironical that after a century and a half of seeking liberty and freedom the principles of state centralization, regulation, and control associated with the colonial period should reappear as the creed of the modern-day liberal! —WILLIAM S. STOKES, *University of Wisconsin.*

The Dynamics of Democratic Government. BY JOHN P. ROCHE AND MURRAY S. STEDMAN, JR. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1954. Pp. ix, 445. $5.00.)

A comparative study of democratic government in the United States, Great Britain, and France with a functional approach. The main subjects considered are the basis of democratic government, political parties, interest groups, electoral systems, the legislative, administrative, and judicial processes, the regulation of economic activity, and the conduct of foreign affairs.

Why Dictators? The Causes and Forms of Tyrannical Rule since 600 B.C. BY GEORGE W. F. HALLGARTEN. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1954. Pp. xiii, 379. $5.50.)

The purpose of this book, in the author's own words, is to "prove that there were typical situations—both economic and social—in which certain kinds of dictatorships arose, and were indeed bound to do so whenever the basic situation repeated itself." In support of his thesis the author offers an all-embracing "comparative social diagnosis" of the various dictatorial régimes from the tyrants of ancient Greece and Rome through the dictatorships of the Middle Ages and the "ultra-revolutionary" dictators in the 18th and 19th century revolutions to the dictatorial systems of today, including such recent additions as Mao Tse-tung, Malenkov, Tito, and Egypt's Naguib.

Art under a Dictatorship. BY HELLMUT LEHMANN-HAUPT. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1954. Pp. xv, 277. $5.50.)

A study of the abuse of art for the purposes of political ideology and propaganda under the Nazi rule in Germany. Three concluding chapters deal, briefly, with the postwar situation in Germany, with the fate of art in the Soviet-controlled part of Germany, and with the exploitation of art by the Communist rulers in the Soviet Union.

Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations. By Kjeld Philip. (Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard. 1954. Pp. 171.)

A short comparative study by an economist at the University of Copenhagen of grants-in-aid to local government, covering several European countries, England, and the United States. This is not a comprehensive survey of the subject, but rather a consideration of the general topic of centralization and an exploration of several of the problems arising from fiscal relationships.

Public Administration Organizations: A Directory of Unofficial Organizations in the Field of Public Administration in the United States and Canada. (Chicago: Public Administration Clearing House. 1954. Pp. xi, 150. $2.50.)

Though similar in arrangement to previous editions, the seventh edition of this directory confines the listings more closely to national organizations directly identified with some field of public service, omitting state and provincial associations.

Catalogue of Papers Printed by Order of the House of Commons, 1731–1800. (London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1953. Pp. ix, 101. £1 1s. 0d.)

Shortly after 1801, when the collecting and binding of annual sets of the papers presented to the House of Commons was initiated, four sets were collected of all previous papers available from 1731 through 1800, and bound in 110 volumes. The original *Catalogue* of these made-up sets was printed in a small edition in 1807, and has been out of print for many years. The facsimile reprint of the *Catalogue* in 1953 may make it desirable to consider making positive microfilm prints of the original collections more generally available from the microfilm negative on file in the Library of Congress.—J.B.C.

The Home Office. By Sir Frank Newsam. (London: Allen & Unwin; New York: Oxford University Press. 1954. Pp. 224. New Whitehall Series. 15s.)

The first volume of the New Whitehall series deals with one of the oldest departments of state, and has been prepared by the permanent under-secretary of state for the Home Department. At the end of the volume is given a table of the Secretaries of State for the Home Department from 1782, and also of the parliamentary under-secretaries of state and of the permanent under-secretaries. The series is being edited by Sir Robert Fraser under the auspices of the Royal Institute of Public Administration.—J.B.C.

Consolidated Index to Government Publications, 1946–1950. (London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1954. Pp. 162. 6s.)

Beginning with the year 1936, the British annual *Government Publications Consolidated List*, covering the publications issued for sale by H. M. Stationery Office, has been paged continuously by five-year periods. The above is the third of the five-year indexes. Thus, the annual catalogues from 1936 through 1950 can now be bound in three five-year volumes, the temporary annual indexes which have been excluded from the pagination being discarded. —J.B.C.

Members of the Long Parliament. By D. Brunton and D. H. Pennington. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1954. Pp. xxi, 256, $4.25.)

The Long Parliament, 1640–1641: A Biographical Study of Its Members. By Mary Frear Keeler. (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society. 1954. Pp. ix, 410. $6.00.)

The first of these books is an analytical study of the Long Parliament based upon biographical data with respect to all 800 of its members who sat between 1640 and 1653. The second is primarily an elaborate biographical dictionary of the 547 members who sat during the first year of the Long Parliament, 1640–1641, with introductory chapters on the body as a whole and on the elections in which it was chosen.

A Short History of Parliament: 1295–1642. By Faith Thompson. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1953. Pp. x, 280. $4.50.)

A readable account of the growth of the English Parliament up to the time of the English Revolution. It is particularly valuable to the scholarly reader for the integration of some recent views of British and American historians into the traditional framework.

British Politics and the American Revolution. By Charles R. Ritcheson. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1954. Pp. xv, 320. $4.00.)

A scholarly inquiry into political developments in Britain during the period of the Revolution and the reasons for the split in opinion that brought on the conflict. The volume will serve as a useful corrective to some of the distortions in the traditional American explanations of the period.

The Constitution of Sweden. Translated by Sarah V. Thorelli with an Introduction by Elias Håstad. (Stockholm: Ivar Haeggströms Boktryckeri. 1954. Pp. 110. Documents published by the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, New Series, II: 4. 7 Sw. crowns.)

The Swedish Constitution is not a single document, but four fundamental laws embodying the constitutional provisions. The English translation presents these four, The Instrument of Government, the Riksdag Act. the Act of Succession, and the Freedom of the Press Act, all as amended through 1953.—J.B.C.

French Institutions: Values and Politics. By Saul K. Padover with the Collaboration of François Goguel, Louis Rosenstock-Franck and Eric Weil. (Stanford: University Press. 1954. Pp. vi, 102.)

Themes In French Culture: A Preface to a Study of French Community. By Rhoda Métraux and Margaret Mead. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1954. Pp. xi, 120. $1.50.)

Two Hoover Institute studies containing much valuable background information helpful for the proper understanding of French political behavior and the operation of French political institutions. The first-named study in particular could serve as useful collateral reading in courses on French government and politics.

Protestantism and Politics in France. By Stuart R. Schram. (Alençon, France: Imprimerie Corbière & Jugain. 1954. Pp. viii, 272. $2.50.)

While a great deal has been written on Catholicism and politics in France, the opposite is true of the impact of Protestantism on French politics. Mr. Schram's dissertation is therefore a welcome contribution to the study of a field hitherto greatly neglected.

Handbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1953. By the Bundesministerium des Innern. (Köln-Berlin: C. Heymanns Verlag K. G. 1953. Pp. 247.)

The first official directory of the Federal Republic of Germany is much after the pattern of the former *Handbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, which last appeared in 1938. It includes information about the Parliament, executive and other agencies, diplomatic and consular representatives, and federal organizations of cities, of "Landkreise," and "Landgemeinde." There are indexes by agency and by person.—J.B.C.

Administration et Politique en Allemagne Occidentale. By Alfred Grosser, et al. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1954. Pp. xxi, 247.)

This is the first in a series of studies on the government and politics of Western Germany by the *Centre d'Études Des Relations Internationales* of the French Foundation of Political Science. The present volume contains contributions by both French and German scholars and administrators. It consists of several "case" studies of governmental systems of selected German states and cities, preceded by a general review of the work of the first federal legislature (1949–1953) and followed by a useful bibliography of German sources. It is a valuable contribution to the literature on the political system of the West German Republic and its subdivisions.

Toward Understanding Germany. By Robert H. Lowie. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1954. Pp. ix, 396. $6.00.)

A study of the social psychology of the German people by a professor emeritus of anthropology at the University of California. Basing the study mainly upon his recent field study in Western Germany, the author analyzes the attitudes and behavior of various social groups, discusses family life and relations, and covers such political topics as particularism, nationalism, anti-semitism and the German attitude toward democracy and dictatorship.

The Federal Constitution of Switzerland: With German Texts. Translation and Commentary by Christopher Hughes. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1954. Pp. 223. $4.00.)

The usefulness of this concise volume lies mainly in the running commentaries which are appended to almost every article of the constitution. The book includes also verbatim translations of the 1902 law on the relations between the councils and of the 1939 decree on emergency powers.

The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement. BY HARRY KANTOR. (Berkeley: University of California. 1953. Pp. v, 163. Paper, $2.00; cloth, $3.00.)

A sympathetic account of the *Aprista* movement in Peru, whose program advocated "the reconstruction of social and economic institutions" within the democratic framework. Following a short and disastrous tenure of governmental participation, and the 'detention' in the Colombian Embassy of its leader, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, the movement has virtually collapsed.

Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1949–1953. (Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. 1954. Pp. x, 586. $2.50.)

The selection of the more significant of the Indian Prime Minister's speeches and writings covering the period August, 1949 to February, 1953 is arranged in a topical fashion. Messages, broadcasts, and articles are included. The message on the inauguration of the Republic, January 26, 1950, furnishes introduction. The volume is a sequel to the Indian Prime Minister's collection entitled *Independence and After*, published in 1949, including his more important speeches from September, 1946 to May, 1949.—J.B.C.

Some Characteristics of the Indian Constitution: Being Lectures Given in the University of Madras during March 1952 under the Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aieyr Shashtiabdapoorthi Endowment. BY SIR IVOR JENNINGS. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1954. Pp. 86. $1.25.)

A famous British authority on constitutions concludes in these brief lectures that India has laid up trouble for itself in a Constitution that is too long, too detailed, and thus too rigid, and that claims to create a federal system while endowing the central government with extensive power.

The Viet-Minh Regime; Government and Administration in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. BY BERNARD B. FALL. (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program. 1954. Pp. ix, 143. $1.75.)

An important description and analysis of the Vietminh regime in Indochina. The author, a French citizen who has done advanced work in American universities, had access to official government documents and other sources in Vietnam.

Far Eastern Governments and Politics: China and Japan. BY PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER, DJANG CHU, ARDATH W. BURKS. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co. 1954. Pp. x, 630. $6.50.)

The first postwar text on the governments of these countries. The emphasis is heavily historical: of the 250 pages on China, only 50 treat the Communist government; of the 290 pages devoted to Japan, 100 are on postwar and only 20 on post-occupation Japan. Among the useful appendices are the Chinese Organic Law and the Japanese Constitution.

A Selected List of Books and Articles on Japan in English, French and German. COMPILED BY HUGH BORTON, SERGE ELISSEEFF, WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD AND JOHN C. PELZEL. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1954. Pp. xi, 272. $5.00.)

Revised and enlarged edition of a 1940 volume, containing the titles of over 1700 books and articles, and divided into sections dealing with geography, history, economics, sociology, language, literature, etc.

A Survey of Local Government in the Philippines. BY JOHN H. ROMANI AND M. LADD THOMAS. (Manila: University of the Philippines, Institute of Public Administration. 1954. Pp. iii, 151.)

A descriptive handbook, dealing with organization, offices, procedures, finances, judiciary, city services, central-local relations, etc.

Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan. BY GEORGE W. BARCLAY. (Princeton, Princeton University Press. 1954. Pp. xviii, 273. $5.00.)

When the Japanese, at the beginning of the century, undertook to improve the conditions of life in Taiwan in order to make of the island a profitable colony, they incidentally collected valuable population statistics; these statistics constitute the basic material of this book. They clearly show that the Japanese occupation inaugurated a period of population increase so rapid that if long continued it can only end in disaster.

Le Droit Soviétique: Tome I. Les Données Fondamentales du Droit Soviétique. Tome II. Le Droit et L'Évolution de la Société Dans L'U.R.S.S. By René David and John N. Hazard. (Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence. 1954. Pp. viii, 366; 409.)

These volumes form part of a series on contemporary legal systems published by the Institute of Comparative Law of the University of Paris. The first, by René David of the University of Paris faculty of law, deals with the fundamental concepts of Soviet law as viewed philosophically and juristically by a student of the Civil Law. The division of his work falls into four parts dealing successively with the Russian legal tradition, the Marxian theory of law, sources of Soviet law, and the organization of the courts and legal profession. The second volume, by John N. Hazard, is a translation, with the omission of Chapter XI, of *Law and Social Change in the USSR* reviewed in this Review, vol. 48, pp. 541–44. Since each author originally presented his work in lecture form, the approach is more generalized and elementary than is the case in some of the recent detailed studies of Soviet law. Mention should be made of the excellent bibliography appended to the second volume and covering the literature published on the subject in six languages since 1941.

Challenge in Eastern Europe. Edited by C. E. Black. (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press. 1954. Pp. xviii, 276. $4.00.)

A collection of twelve essays on selected Eastern European political and economic topics of today and of the recent past. Written partly by American scholars and partly by exiled Eastern European statesmen.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

A Study of the Philosophy of International Law as Seen in Works of Latin American Writers. By H. B. Jacobini. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1954. Pp. viii, 158.)

This study is a successful attempt to extract the Latin-American attitudes toward international law from the works of 19th and 20th century writers. The first chapter gives a general survey of the philosophy of international law since the 15th century. With this background, Professor Jacobini discusses the works of Latin-American writers in Chapters II and III, classifying them into the traditional schools of international law—naturalist, positivist, and eclectic. His discussion is interesting and stimulating. He perhaps exaggerates when he says that most Latin-American writers are eclectic. Although this reviewer would not agree with the label attached to certain writers, in general the author's classifications are well-conceived and acceptable. He shows the enormous influence exercised by European publicists on Latin-American writers. Finally, in Chapter IV Professor Jacobini gives an exposition of the highly controversial American international law school. Conceding that there are legal rules and practices peculiar to the Western Hemisphere, he goes on to say that they are not enough to constitute a body of doctrine which would warrant the recognition of an American international law. He reveals that most Latin-American writers object to the American school.

The argument of the book is well-reasoned and the plan expertly executed. The author might well have given more attention to the attitude of contemporary Latin-American writers toward the protection of human rights. The views of the Brazilian Jorge Americano, which the author discusses briefly, are not representative enough to give an adequate idea of the exact nature of the Latin-American position. This matter is important, for Latin-American writers are perhaps the strongest supporters of an international covenant on human rights. The author narrowed his discussion greatly by merely showing each writer's attitude toward the idea of the individual as a subject of the law of nations.

In spite of this deficiency, Professor Jacobini should be congratulated for a scholarly and original study, enriched by an excellent bibliography. He has certainly made a major contribution toward the understanding of a regional interpretation of international law.—Manuel R. García-Mora, *University of Detroit.*

Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy. By Gerald Stourzh. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1954. Pp. xvii, 335. $4.50.)

This is an excellent book; it reflects painstaking research, is well written, and is thoroughly documented. It was written under the auspices of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy, directed by Hans Morgenthau, and is the second in a projected series of works analyzing the foreign policies of American statesmen.

Being both a protegé and disciple of Professor Morgenthau, Mr. Stourzh's analysis of Franklin's thought is undertaken from the realist viewpoint. The central assumption of his book is therefore that one's views on politics are ultimately linked with his conception of human nature. After an exhaustive analysis of Franklin's political thought, the author concludes that the traditional view of Franklin as the "embodiment of the Age of Reason" is wrong. Franklin, argues Mr. Stourzh, is a victim of misrepresentation. He did not share the Enlightenment's confidence in the boundless goodness of man; on the contrary, he held a modest opinion of human nature. Consequently Mr. Stourzh's Franklin is less the advocate of "reason," less attached to the belief in "progress," and, in general, less the personification of eighteenth-century ideas than he has been previously painted. Franklin, the author asserts, "rejected the idea of inevitable human progress"; he recognized the "permanency of moral imperfection"; and he "acknowledged the imperfection of human reason." Moreover, in his own thinking he "sacrificed 'reason' to 'experience'." Insofar as the theory of Jeffersonian democracy rests upon faith in the rationality and goodness of man, Mr. Stourzh holds that Franklin cannot be classed as a Jeffersonian. Franklin was a confirmed monarchist during most of his life, and his advocacy of democracy in later life was, according to the author, largely based upon his conviction that democracy "works better," is more "practical," than other governmental forms. (Government is more "efficient," argued Franklin, if founded on public opinion rather than upon force alone.) In similar fashion, Franklin's ardent pacifism was, Mr. Stourzh believes, based primarily on pragmatic considerations; i.e., only by accommodation and a reasonable adjustment of differences can you "get things done."

In Mr. Stourzh's hands, then, Franklin becomes more the political bedmate of Edmund Burke than the embodiment of the Enlightenment. One must recognize the painstaking scholarship that has gone into this effort, and it is quite evident that Mr. Stourzh has discovered hitherto neglected aspects of Franklin's political thought. In this reviewer's opinion, the earlier view of Franklin must be revised as a result of this work. The author may have exaggerated to make his point, but it is a point both well worth making and well made: Franklin held a modest view of human nature and his political beliefs were framed accordingly.

But how does this relate to Franklin's views on foreign policy? Mr. Stourzh's central theme in this regard is that Franklin had an acute appreciation of the nature and role of political power. Here again the point is worth making and the author demonstrates it repeatedly; but it seems to be overdoing the matter to present Franklin as a protegé of Hans Morgenthau. Franklin's conception of the role of national power was not formal and doctrinaire, it was casual and matter-of-fact.

Franklin took power for granted. Consequently, he appears never to have been much bothered by the conflict between morality and power which concerns rival academicians of our day. He was both a pragmatist and an enlightened idealist, and he never doubted that there was ample room for both altruism and self-interest in the conduct of personal and state affairs. To the "realist" of our day Franklin has this to say: "I dislike those pessimists who affect to discover self-interested views everywhere at the bottom of the fairest, the most generous conduct." To the "moralist" he declares: "There is no Science, the Study of which is more useful and commendable than the Knowledge of the true Interest of one's Country." In essence, then, Franklin's appeal is to prudence, tolerance, and an enlightened self-interest.—S. GROVER RICH, JR.
University of Utah.

Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Its Aftermath. EDITED BY HARRY ELMER BARNES. (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd. 1953. Pp. xiii, 679. $6.00.)

This is an unpleasant book to read. Ostensibly it is a review and appraisal of American foreign policy during and after the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Actually it is a shallow piece of special pleading, arguing that the foreign policy of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman involved "perpetual war, presented in the guise of a global struggle of free peoples for perpetual peace"; its purpose is to acquaint the American people with that "fact" before "it is too late to revise our course and resume a sane foreign policy, based on continentalism, national interest, ideological coexistence, international urbanity, and rational co-operation in world affairs" (p. viii). The most significant circumstances and events of these fateful years are either ignored or shuffled by so fast that one can hardly recognize them. Such procedures undoubtedly make for good polemics, but they do not add up to historical analysis.

Eight men have written the ten chapters in the volume. Except in one instance the chapters are very much alike, reflecting the fact that the contributors are mostly the leading revisionist writers of the post-World War II period. Harry Elmer Barnes, the editor, wrote both an introduction, which treats of the "historical blackout" which he says has greeted revisionist writings, and the conclusion. In both places, Mr. Barnes tries manfully to discourage criticism by vilifying all critics in advance. Charles Callan Tansill has offered two chapters, one dealing with American policy in Europe from the end of the First World War to the beginning of the Second, and the other with Japanese-American relations during the same period. His sweeping indictments in both are backstopped first by Frederic R. Sanborn, in a chapter called "Roosevelt is Frustrated in Europe," and then by George Morgenstern, who discusses "The Actual Road to Pearl Harbor." There is also a partisan survey of the various investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack, by Percy L. Greaves, Jr.; another political broadside at the "bankruptcy" of Roosevelt's foreign policy, by William Henry Chamberlin; and an odd and elusive argument about American foreign policy and the national interest, by George A. Lundberg. Almost hidden in this mountain of chaff, but glowing in comparison, is a thought-provoking essay by William L. Neumann on how American policy contributed to war in the Pacific. Dr. Neumann seems to suffer the limitations of a pacifist ideology, and it is not always possible to agree with him, but he demonstrates more analytical ability, insight, and care in the use of data than all the other contributors put together. He also respects the all-important distinction between poor policy judgments and acts of treason, a distinction his colleagues do not seem even to understand.

It is useless to try to argue with the school of thought embodied in this book, and equally a waste of time to refute individually all of the wildly improbable assertions it contains. To these men, "revisionism" is by definition "truth" and any criticism a "smear." Thus their armor of "righteousness" is impregnable. All that a reviewer can usefully do with this book is describe it, and characterize it, and then let the reader beware.

The book is distinguished by three closely related features: on the analytical level, by an almost total lack of consideration given to problems of American security in a dangerous world; on the factual level, by distorted interpretation of evidence; and on the philosophical level, by a conservatism so pervasive that it destroys all balance in the making of evaluations.

1. None of the authors of this volume has any realistic conception of what American security consists of, or of what a threat to it looks like. They steadfastly refuse to concede that the United States has any interests of any character anywhere in the world outside of our continental borders which are important enough to protect by force of arms if they are threatened by hostile power. The actions of American political leaders are repeatedly divorced from the threatening international situation in which they took place, and are treated as if policy making were an easy succession of simple acts rather than a groping, in an atmosphere of indeterminacy, toward some desired but ill-defined objectives.

2. The cavalier fashion in which historical fact and evidence are treated does not inspire confidence in the professional judgment and competence of the authors. Facts must always be evaluated by scholars according to their own criteria of relevance, to be sure, but the authors have set their own topic and have then omitted data incontestably pertinent to it and have included evidence of the most doubtful, irrelevant, or meaningless sorts. For example, in treating American relations with Germany prior to World War II almost all of Hitler's acts of violence and aggression are ignored and he is portrayed as a sweet, reasonable, attractive, and understanding statesman. Even Hitler himself knew better than this!

One is obliged to conclude that the major criterion of admissible evidence is the usefulness of any datum in advancing the standard revisionist argument: that Roosevelt and his henchmen were responsible for World War II. Thus the crafty words of Adolf Hitler, for instance, or the insignificant phrases of Hamilton Fish at the Interparliamentary Union, are given credence by Tansill and treated as important steps to halt the tide of war, while the words and pleas of President Roosevelt are regarded as spoken only "for the record" (pp. 161–65).

3. Underlying both the analysis and the selection of evidence in this volume is an ideological standard against which all things are measured and found to be "true" or "false." The standard is a conservatism so deep that it rejects both of the major political parties as they are now constituted, although it reserves its greatest antipathy for the Democratic party and particularly for Franklin D. Roosevelt. The connection between the philosophy of the authors and the revisionist school of historiography to which they belong is especially transparent in this book, because the authors move so often from historical to political discourse.

The primary public values in this conservative ideology are "civil liberty, economic expansion, financial solvency, national prosperity, and governmental economy" (p. xi). The chief enemy of these values is modern war, with its tremendous consumption of resources and output of destruction. In the shadow of such an enemy, however, the ideology is not able to direct hostility toward any external threat, since that would only foster an eventual conflict. The blame for any war, then, has to be transferred away from those who instigate conflict by demanding unacceptable things, to those who, like Roosevelt, accept the challenge of war rather than accede to those demands and surrender what they conceive to be vital interests. And it is particularly easy to lay the guilt at Roosevelt's door because the social values of his Administration were as antagonistic to nineteenth-century values as are the demands of modern war.

The uninformed student who is persuaded to read this book will be further away from knowing the real history of these times than he was before. Mr. Barnes, the editor, complains that revisionists are not well reviewed today, as they were in the interwar period. Perhaps the reason is that today's revisionists write such poor books.—BERNARD C. COHEN, *Princeton University.*

Japan: From Surrender to Peace. BY BARON E. J. LEWE VAN ADUARD. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1954. Pp. xv, 351. $7.50.)

When an account of the wholly American occupation of Japan and the subsequent peace negotiations appears from the pen of a non-American it is reasonable that we should take particular notice. Of the many surveys of our relations with Japan since 1945, only two (Harold Wakefield's *New Paths for Japan* and W. Macmahon Ball's *Japan: Enemy or Ally*) were written by non-Americans. Mr. Ball's particularly critical and searching account, written from the vantage point of his position as Australian representative on the Allied Council for Japan, revealed aspects of the occupation unknown to anyone in a lesser position.

Although Baron Van Aduard held a similar diplomatic post as head of the Netherlands Mission in Japan during the years 1949–1952, his book is not so much a critique as a conventional account of our relations with Japan since 1945. Van Aduard's position of diplomatic importance and his Dutch citizenship seem to have made him an agreeable and sympathetic recorder of events and trends rather than a foreign critic. Doubtless the author's position did make it possible for him to show the changes in occupation policy under the impact of international tension. He demonstrates how a growing American awareness of the Soviet threat resulted in more aggressive efforts to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. This account of the transition in American policy is an important contribution of the book. Of equal significance is the fact that it is the first major work which recounts in some detail the negotiations preceding the peace treaty ratified by Japan in 1952.

Wisely limiting his discussion of the occupation to about a quarter of the volume, Van Aduard devotes the remaining 300 pages to the problems of the peace treaty and the future of Japan. He is generous in his praise of both General MacArthur and Secretary Dulles. One of the disappointments of the book is the absence of documentation of any kind. In the preface by Mr. Dulles the reader is assured that while "it cannot be completely authoritative" yet it is "on the whole a reliable account." It is lamentable, too, that the author does not expand his analysis of Japanese reaction to the treaty and document this reaction by reference to Diet debates and committee hearings. This expanded treatment might have taken the place of the opening quarter of the book dealing with the surrender and occupation—topics adequately treated in many other books. As it is, Baron Van Aduard's book has the virtues of restraint, balance, and completeness. It lacks the qualities of probing critical analysis which we so badly need for this crucial period of Japanese-American relations.—RALPH BRAIBANTI, *Duke University.*

Bibliografía de las Conferencias Americanas. BY THE COLUMBUS MEMORIAL LIBRARY OF THE PAN AMERICAN UNION. (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union. 1954. Pp. x, 277. Bibliographic Series No. 41. $1.50.)

The bibliography of the American conferences includes the 1st to 9th International Conferences of American States; the three conferences for the maintenance of peace and security, Buenos Aires, 1936, Mexico, 1945, Rio de Janeiro, 1947; and the four meetings of consultation of Foreign Ministers, 1939–1951. An attempt has been made to list (a) the documents of these conferences, as completely as possible; (b) publications related to the conferences; and (c) reports and works on the conferences. The publication of the documents of the conferences has usually been the charge of the country acting as host, and as a result there has not always been uniformity in the publication of the various editions and in their distribution. For the first time there is really an adequate record of these materials.—J.B.C.

Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science: *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement.* By Karl W. Deutsch. (Pp. x, 70.) *The Revolution in American Foreign Policy, 1945–1954.* By William G. Carleton. (Pp. x, 94.) *France: Keystone of Western Defense.* By Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. (Pp. xvii, 77.) *The Problem of Internal Security in Great Britain, 1948–1953.* By H. H. Wilson and Harvey Glickman. (Pp. x, 86.) *Germany: Dilemma for American Foreign Policy.* By Otto Butz. (Pp. x, 69.) *Democratic Rights versus Communist Activity.* By Thomas I. Cook. (Pp. viii, 56.) (New York: Doubleday & Co. 1954. $.95 each for Studies 1–5, $.85 for sixth.)

The first volumes in a series of paper-bound booklets dealing with specialized or topical subjects; a highly commendable publishing venture and an extremely useful set for supplementary or illustrative readings in various political science courses. A lengthy list of additional titles has been announced for early publication.

L'Internationalisation des Constitutions. By Yves L. Auguste. (Madrid: Industrias Graficas España. N.D. Pp. 226.)

The author, First Secretary of the Haitian Embassy in Madrid, examines the relationship of international and constitutional law. Believing in the supremacy of international law over national law, he concludes that a new chapter ought to be added to all national constitutions which would "fix the obligations of the states as members of the international community," including such obligations as the duty to execute international obligations or to settle international disputes by peaceful means.

NATO and Its Prospects. By J. D. Warne. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1954. Pp. vii, 110. $3.00.)

A British officer, formerly on the staff at SHAPE, succinctly summarizes the origins and evolution of NATO, deals briefly with the many problems—by no means all military—encountered in its development, discusses the role of the proposed European Defense Community, and speculates on the future of the Atlantic Community and the East-West split.

Freedom of Information as a Project of International Legislation: A Study of International Law in Making. By Hilding Eek. (Uppsala: A.-B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln and Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. 1953. Pp. 176. 12 kr.)

A scholarly and technical analysis of the problems surrounding the drafting of international legislation aimed at securing a worldwide right to freedom of information. An analysis and critique of existing international draft covenants is also presented by the author, a former member of the U.N. Secretariat.

Organizing for Peace: International Organization in World Affairs. By Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland, Jr. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1954. Pp. x, 917. $7.00.)

A new text by two young professors who still retain considerable enthusiasm and optimism for the future of international organization. Following the usual review of historical attempts at some kind of international organization are two lengthy sections (670 pages) that treat the League and the United Nations simultaneously, first from the standpoint of structure and authority, then from the functional standpoint. These are followed by a shorter section on regional systems, and brief concluding chapters in which the authors discuss the "fundamental issues."

Introduction to International Relations. By Charles P. Schleicher. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1954. Pp. xvi, 941. $6.75.)

A new text in the traditional approach. Part I ("Principles and Dynamics") contains the customary background materials, and discusses the elements of national power along with such topics as nationalism, sovereignty, international law, and war; Part II ("Foreign Policies and Area Problems") draws on seven other contributors for discussions of the major countries or regions, and their interests and policies; Part III ("Organizing the World Society") devotes 300 pages to the structure, activities, successes, and failures of various international bodies.

International Relations: In the Age of the Conflict between Democracy and Dictatorship. By Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan T. Possony. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1954. 2nd ed. Pp. xiv, 826. $6.50.)

Reduced in length by 121 pages, this new edition of a 1950 text is greatly improved in style, content, and arrangement.

Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1953. Edited By Peter V. Curl. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1954. Pp. xxii, 458. $5.00.)

Fifteenth volume in this reference series of world affairs. Included in this compilation are policy statements of Republican and Democratic party leaders as well as policy documents of foreign governments. Increased coverage has been given to events in the Communist world.

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1936. Vol. II: Europe. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1954. Pp. xcv, 853. $4.25.)

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1936. Vol. IV. The Far East. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1954. Pp. xci, 1012. $4.50.)

In Europe the Nazi controls over Germany tighten, and the Spanish civil war prompts policy of strict neutrality; in the Far East Japan continues to consolidate the control of Manchuria, Japanese pressure upon China grows, Chiang Kai-shek is kidnapped, and assassinations in Japan confirm the growing power of the militarists.

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1936. Vol. V. The American Republics. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1954. Pp. xcv, 992. $4.50.)

Concluding the 1936 series, this volume is concerned almost entirely with commercial and financial topics, and with the reciprocal trade agreements program.

Documents on German Foreign Policy: 1918–1945. Series D (1937–1945). Vol. VIII. The War Years: September 4, 1939–March 18, 1940. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1954. Pp. lxxvi, 974. $4.00.)

Continuing the massive project of documenting Germany's foreign policy, this volume —already the eighth—covers the period from the entrance of France and Britain into the war, to the eve of the Brenner Pass meeting between Hitler and Mussolini in March, 1940. German-Soviet relations, economic as well as political and military, bulk largest in this period; relations with Italy, with the Low Countries and the Scandinavian area, and with the neutrals, are also of interest and importance.

Russland, die Westmachte und Deutschland: Die Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik 1943–1953. By Boris Meissner. (Hamburg: H. H. Nölke Verlag. 1954. Pp. 372.)

A well-documented and thorough description of Soviet policy toward Germany from the Teheran Conference to the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development. By Stephen Hemsley Longrigg. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1954. Issued under the Auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Pp. xiii, 305. $4.00.)

An exhaustive history of the subject down to 1953, with emphasis on oil politics. The author is a long-time British resident of the Middle East, most recently as an oil company executive.

Security and the Middle East: The Problem and Its Solution. (New York: The Nation Associates. 1954. Pp. xiv, 159.)

A report concluding that the United States is on dangerous ground in helping arm the Arab states, and in siding so unqualifiedly with governments that practice neither political nor economic democracy; urging U.S. efforts and financial assistance to resettle Arab refugees in Arab lands; and proposing U.S. sponsorship of a Regional Resources Development Board whose assets would be available when such resettlement was agreed upon and when Arab-Israeli agreement was reached on the terms concluding the Palestine war.

China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839–1923. By Ssu-yü Teng and

John K. Fairbank. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1954. Pp. vi, 296. $6.75.)

A fascinating collection of translations of Chinese documents, dealing with the reactions of the Chinese to the appearance or impact of Western people, weapons, and ideas, and to the problems generated by these foreign influences. The documents cover the period from 1839 through 1923, and are introduced by comments of the editors.

Japan's Decision to Surrender. By Robert J. C. Butow. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1954. Pp. xi, 259. $4.00.)

A carefully documented study of the forces in Japan which led to the surrender. The cumulative effect of successive defeats and the "political miracle" of the influence of the Imperial Throne were far more important than the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Sources used are primarily records of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East, and unpublished memoirs and interviews.

Typhoon in Tokyo. By Harry Emerson Wildes. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1954. Pp. v, 356. $4.50.)

A semi-popular account of the American occupation of Japan based largely on the personal experiences of the author, who served in the government section of SCAP throughout the occupation. The focus is on personalities and tidbits of information rather than on issues and fundamental problems.

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H. ARTHUR STEINER*

University of California (Los Angeles)

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United States Information Agency. Second Report to Congress; January–June, 1954.

POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. BY ERNST CASSIRER. TRANSLATED AND EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY PETER GAY. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1954. Pp. vii, 129. $2.75.)

Professor Peter Gay has supplied the first

English translation of Ernst Cassirer's *The Question of Jean Jacques Rousseau,* first published in German in 1932. Professor Gay has furnished an excellent introduction reviewing the primary interpretative theories about Rousseau's works, and also a careful annotation of Cassirer's text.

Cassirer approached the question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau with the assumption that all internal inconsistencies could be legitimately resolved by rational doctrinal analysis. Moreover, Cassirer announced that the purpose of the essay was to demonstrate the universal "objective necessity" of Rousseau's moral teachings.

The absolutism of the *Social Contract* and the radical individualism of the main corpus of Rousseau's works are resolved by interpreting the absolutes of the *Social Contract* as Kantian moral imperatives embodying freedom. The general will is another term for *rechtsstaat.* Its fundamental aim is not happiness or welfare for the individual but the realization of higher moral purpose.

Accordingly, the apparent conflict between the rationalism of the *Social Contract* and the mysticism of *Émile, Nouvelle Héloise* and the *Confessions* disappears, for at the base of them all Cassirer finds a mystical self-validating intuitionism with Rousseau assuming an objective scientific validity for his random sense impressions, emotional preferences, and moral judgments. This natural virtue (Cassirer suggests that "nature" for Rousseau carried a Baconian meaning) was achievable on the individual level through education which removes the inhibitions arising from conventional restraints, thus freeing the individual to develop according to his ideal-natural potential. On the social level, evil inhibitions were so deeply embedded in political institutions that liberal reformism would not suffice. Nothing less than revolutionary root and branch excision of social evils would release men to live and develop freely according to their natural potential.

This revolutionary social transformation, which according to Cassirer was one of Rousseau's greatest creations, need not be feared, for man's basic nature is good rather than sinful. Rousseau solved the problem of theodicy by eliminating original sin and placing it in evil human institutions which could be rationally and confidently reconstructed.

Thus Rousseau's educational and moral writings only appear more individualistic than his political writings, for in the former he was concerned primarily with the *negative* "revolutionary" problem of saying what inhibitions it was necessary to cut away to permit free development according to natural human potential. Man's *positive* potential remains nonetheless categorically absolute, as glimpsed especially in Rousseau's passages on civil religion.

Cassirer's argument is a powerful one, despite a few unintegrated side explorations. As Professor Gay has pointed out, it has strongly influenced contemporary analysis of Rousseau. However, the underlying assumption of the validity of devising rational syntheses of internal inconsistencies was never inspected. The Kantian freedom required to integrate individualist and absolutist texts seems forced. Finally, Cassirer failed to demonstrate the validity and "objective necessity" of Rousseau's intuitive moral perceptions.—HARVEY WHEELER, *Washington and Lee University.*

Notre Maître, M. Sorel. BY PIERRE ANDREU. (Paris: Bernard Grasset. 1953. Pp. 338.)

A gap in the literature about the author of the *Reflections on Violence,* has now been filled: Dr. Andreu's book, in addition to being a competent survey of Georges Sorel's diffuse writings, is the first real story of the man, a man whose peaceful, suburban existence seemed to belie the violent ideas he expressed in speech and print. No future writer on the subject will be able to do without the findings of this author, who devoted many years of research to establish hitherto unknown facts about Sorel—the government official who resigned his position and began writing at the age of forty; the agnostic husband of a devoutly religious girl, whose education he took in hand while respecting her convictions; the mercurial friend of many distinguished contemporaries, among whom the creative genius of Charles Péguy stands out foremost. In general, Dr. Andreu's account confirms what a close reading of Sorel's works leads us to suspect: that his revolutionism was essentially conservative; he wanted to destroy in order to preserve—a tendency which makes Sorel's occasionally violent vacillations between extremes of political persuasion intelligible if not fully convincing.

The other great merit of this study is that, in contrast to most previous monographs on Sorel, it pays a great deal of attention to the philosophical substratum of his political thought, above all to the influence upon him of Henri Bergson and William James—two authors about whom Sorel in his turn has a great deal to say. But who ever read his *De l'utilité du pragmatisme?* It was, and still is, a pity that Sorel should be known by one book only. In his introduction to the present work, Dr. Daniel Halévy, one of the few surviving personal friends of the hermit of Boulogne-sur-Seine, and one who had been instrumental in getting the *Reflections* published, relates how, after the death of Sorel and Péguy, within the same week both the Fascist and the Soviet governments had approached a high French official offering to restore the supposedly neglected graves of the two illustrious Frenchmen —an anecdote which, at least as far as Sorel is concerned, sums up very neatly the indestructible popular misconception about his "responsibility" for both Mussolini's and Lenin's revolutions.—JAMES H. MEISEL, *University of Michigan.*

Principia Politica. BY LEONARD WOOLF. (London: Hogarth Press. 1953. Pp. 315. 25/–.)

The Vocabulary of Politics. BY T. D. WELDON. (Baltimore: Penguin Books. 1953. Pp. 199. 2/–.)

These two books present a singular contrast. Mr. Leonard Woolf is a rationalist who is angry with the follies of a world bewitched by superstition. Mr. Weldon, a Magdalen College don, holds that principles, like tastes, are not really matters for disputes among civilized men. *De gustibus non disputandum* as to Buchenwald and Siberia is a slight exaggeration, but yet is pretty near to the truth. What matters for logical positivists is to get their words right.

Mr. Woolf writes a book on the (doubtless well-meant) advice of Lord Keynes unfortunately called by the great name of *Principia Politica.* However, he explains to us that it is no systematic discourse but in part an autobiography. He wrings his hands over "the stupidity of the human mind . . . only in Athens, human beings enjoyed for a brief moment a lucid interval in their chronic lunacy." The probable character of the good may well be indicated by a grand tradition of the centuries—what E. M. Forster calls "the true human tradition," shaped by and shaping human culture. But it is dangerous to construe this tradition as something bequeathed to a little inner circle of the Bloomsbury *illuminati* who can scold the rest. This impulse is all the more extraordinary since Mr. Woolf is the British publisher of Freud, and should know that the great tradition has been written out on the broad page of history and contains more things than were acceptable to Voltaire.

Mr. Weldon, on the other hand, is no crusader, although he is nearer to that painstaking Linnaean task of classification to-day so necessary for basing principles and examining morphology in the social sciences. He holds the view that it would be wisest to say that a man is a good judge of political institutions as "he is a good judge of pictures or of wines." This can require "an intelligent performance." "There is no agreement as to what political institutions are for." Mr. Woolf, who reviews Mr. Weldon, disapproves of this iconoclasm. Many, however, of Mr. Weldon's prejudices are sound—as that to base political studies on so transient a form as "the State" is misleading. But, like many British academics, Mr. Weldon, properly concerned with semantics and vocabulary, neglects almost entirely the work in that field of measurement and experimental observation (not to speak of psychological study) which Hume rightly said was indispensable to significant advance.—GEORGE CATLIN, *London, England.*

The Political Ideas of Alexander von Humboldt: A Brief Preliminary Study. BY E. R. BRANN. (Madison, Wisconsin: E. R. Brann. 1954. Pp. v, 50.)

Any student of political theory who has had an interest in Wilhelm von Humboldt, will find this short study a useful addition to the literature in the field. Brann notes that von Humboldt was reputed to be in sympathy with republican thought and other liberal trends. His position at the Prussian Court was thus weakened and his advice seldom called for or used.

Individualism Reconsidered and Other Essays. BY DAVID RIESMAN. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1954. Pp. 529. $6.00.)

The re-publication of thirty essays published by the writer (a few with collaborators) in fifteen journals and half a dozen symposium volumes between 1947 and 1953 and dealing with such subjects as individualism, freedom, culture, Veblen, Freud, totalitarianism, and the methods of the social sciences.

American Thought: A Critical Sketch. BY MORRIS R. COHEN. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1954. Pp. 360. $5.00.)

This comprehensive volume illuminates the history of American ideas with respect to history; scientific, economic, political, legal and religious thought; aesthetics; and general philosophy. After Morris Cohen's death, Dr. Felix S. Cohen completed the editing before his own death.

French Thought in the Eighteenth Century: Rousseau, Voltaire, Diderot. BY ROMAIN ROLLAND, ANDRÉ MAUROIS AND EDOUARD HERRIOT. WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY GEOFFREY BRERETON. (New York: David McKay Co. 1953. Pp. xxiii, 428. $3.00.)

Excerpts from the writings of Rousseau, Voltaire, and Diderot with introductions, respectively, by Romain Rolland, André Maurois, and Edouard Herriot, together with a general introduction by Geoffrey Brereton. The material on Rousseau and Voltaire was previously published in separate volumes of The Living Thoughts Library.

The Great Issues of Politics: An Introduction to Political Science. BY LESLIE LIPSON. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1954. Pp. xvi, 431. $7.00.)

This book discusses such general problems as the nature of society, the origins of the state, the content and method of political science, citizenship, equalitarianism, politics and economics, authority, the constitutional distribution of governmental powers, international relations, and the dynamics of political change.

Communism: Challenge to Americans. BY CARROLL HAWKINS. (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press. 1953. Pp. 76. $1.00.)

Second edition of a volume intended as a handbook for the average citizen, presenting a general summary of the nature and development of communism and its status in the United States and throughout the world, along with some suggestions as to how it can best be combated by the West.

Mao Tse-Tung: Selected Works. Vol. 1: 1926–1936. (New York: International Publishers. 1954. Pp. 336. $3.00.)

The first of five volumes bringing together, in chronological order, what the Chinese Communists believe to be Mao's most important writings. Based on the Chinese edition, but translated, published, and further annotated in England, this first volume includes the famous "Report on an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan," Mao's analysis of classes in Chinese society, considerable comment on revolutionary and guerrilla warfare, and first speeches pointing toward a united front against the Japanese.

The State the Enemy. BY ERNEST BENN. (London: Ernest Benn Ltd. 1953. Distributed by the British Book Centre, New York. Pp. 175. $3.00.)

Sir Ernest Benn, head of one of the large English publishing houses, spells out in Spencerian terms his indictment of socialism and the planned society. For Sir Ernest, nationalization, socialism, and the Labor party are anathema and the utilization of the state as the instrument for the attainment of their purposes is deplored. The author's solution is a return to unhampered individualism.

Contemporary British Conservatism: Its Nature and Content. BY LUIGI SAVASTANO. (New York: Vantage Press. 1953. Pp. v, 63. $2.50.)

This book comprises a superficial summary of the "content" of British conservatism, followed by the author's conclusion that it represents neither a sound political philosophy nor a serious contender for popular support in the modern world.

Wirtschaftssysteme und Gesellschaftssysteme. BY EDUARD HEIMANN. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr Paul Siebeck. 1954. Pp. xiv, 250.)

A searching analysis of various economic and social systems by an author who believes that the present social crisis is caused by the weakening of the religious spirit of Western man and that the solution of the problems confronting our society can only be attained through Christian social ethics.

Experiment in Education: What We Can Learn from Teaching Germany. BY WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. 1954. Pp. xvi, 303. $5.00.)

Using the American attempts to "reeducate" Germany as a springboard, the famous philosopher subjects the American system of higher education and its philosophy to a searching criticism that focusses primarily upon what he believes to be the faulty assumption that democratic education means equal education open to all comers; to proceed from such a premise means only that educational standards and the quality of scholarship decline together.

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FRANCIS G. WILSON
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NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

1955 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION

The 1955 Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association will be held September 7–9, 1955, at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado. The Chairman of the Program Committee is Professor Weldon Cooper of the University of Virginia; the Chairman of the Committee on Local Arrangements is Professor Dayton D. McKean of the University of Colorado.

Fiftieth Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association

Minutes of the Council Meeting

The Council of The American Political Science Association met at 9:30 A.M., September 8, 1954 in Parlor O of the Hotel Sherman, Chicago, Illinois. President Ralph J. Bunche called the meeting to order. The following officers and members of the Council were present: Walter H. Bennett, Hugh A. Bone, Taylor Cole, Robert A. Dahl, Manning J. Dauer, Hugh L. Elsbree, David Fellman, John Gange, J. A. C. Grant, Claudius O. Johnson, Victor Jones, Earl Latham, Arnaud Leavelle, Harvey C. Mansfield, Dayton D. McKean, Charles McKinley, Jack Peltason, C. Herman Pritchett, Emmette S. Redford, C. B. Robson, Clinton Rossiter, Wallace S. Sayre. Also present were Past Presidents Pendleton Herring, Peter H. Odegard, and James K. Pollock; Evron M. Kirkpatrick, the incoming Executive Director; and Kenneth W. Hechler, Associate Director.

President Bunche asked the Executive Director, Mr. Gange, to report on the present membership of the Association. Mr. Gange noted that as a whole the membership had held up well even though during the past year many were dropped from the roster who were not current in their payment of dues. As of September 1, 1954 there were 4,340 individual members and 1,838 institutional members. He recommended to the Council that consideration be given to appointing a Committee on Membership which would conduct a vigorous membership campaign, seeking to hold current members and enlist new members. Mr. Dauer moved that in accordance with the recommendation of the Executive Director a Committee on Membership (with regional or state members) be established. The motion carried.

Mr. Gange then reported on organizational affiliations of The American Political Science Association for which an annual fee is paid, namely, the American Council of Learned Societies, the American Council on Education, the International Political Science Association, and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He recommended to the Council that continued affiliation with these organizations be given careful consideration and that, if it is decided to continue the Association's participation, a more active part be taken in the activities of the organizations. Mr. Gange moved that the new Executive Committee be asked to review this matter. The motion carried. It was the consensus of the Council that support of the International Political Science Association should be continued.

In connection with the Association's membership in the Social Science Research Council, the Executive Committee, on May 11, 1954, voted to recommend to the Council the election of Mr. Earl Latham as a director of the SSRC for the term 1955–57. A motion to elect Mr. Latham was carried.

Mr. Jones called attention to the new organization proposed for political theorists and inquired whether it would be wise to consider the formation of various specialized groups within the Association. After some discussion Mr. Jones moved that the general subject be referred to the Executive Committee for careful study. The motion carried.

In the absence of Mr. Litchfield, Mr. Gange presented the Treasurer's report to the Council. He noted that the budget, as adopted by the Council for 1953–54, had been set at $122,125.97. The actual income in 1953–54 was $124,405.13, and the actual expenses were $127,004.04. The deficit was met by using unexpended reserves from grants made in fiscal year 1953. On June 18, 1954 the estate of Frederic A. Ogg paid the Association $10,830.56, representing the bequest of $10,000 by Mr. Ogg plus interest earned while the estate was being settled. The Association's endowment fund now totals $33,580. Mr. Gange noted that while the Association is in good financial health, he would recommend to the Council that a Committee on Finance be created to work closely with the Treasurer, Executive Director, and next year's Executive Committee on the problem of increasing the Association's endowment funds and strengthening the resources for current operating and research project expenses. Mr. Gange pointed out that the present type of accounting system did not give an accurate picture of the Association's financial position on the basis of an artificial fiscal year and recommended that the new Executive Director give consideration to changing it from the cash to the accrual system. Mr. Redford moved that the Executive Committee, the Treasurer, and the Executive Director make a study of the present accounting system within the next year. The motion carried.

President Bunche asked Mr. Gange to report on the proposed budget for 1954–55, which was adopted by the Council with the understanding that adjustments might be made during the course of the year with the approval of the Executive Committee.

There was some discussion of the advantages of having the national Association send a representative to the regional associations' annual meetings. Mr. Gange moved that there be a meeting of the Executive Director of the national Association with the president or a representative of each regional society during this annual meeting, and annually hereafter, to explore possibilities of support and mutual cooperation in arranging for speakers at the regional meetings. The motion carried. Mr. Redford also moved that the government section of the Southwestern Social Science Association be considered one of the regional societies for this purpose. The motion passed unanimously.

President Bunche asked Mr. Elsbree, Managing Editor of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, to make his report for 1953–54.

The Managing Editor of the REVIEW reported that 240 manuscripts were received during the past year, approximately the same number as in the preceding year. Just under fifty articles were published. Because of the number and quality of manuscripts voluntarily submitted, only a small number of the articles published were solicited.

The editor expressed his gratitude to the members of the Editorial Board and to numerous other political scientists for the valuable service they have rendered in reading and commenting on manuscripts. He also called attention to the increasingly difficult task of selection confronting the Book Review Editor, the section bibliographers, and the News and Notes Editor.

Mr. Elsbree submitted to the Council the names of the present members of the editorial board and recommended that they be re-elected: V. O. Key, Jr., James L. McCamy (Associate Editors); Taylor Cole, Henry W. Ehrmann, Harvey C. Mansfield, C. Herman Pritchett, and Francis O. Wilcox. A motion to this effect was made and carried.

President Bunche reported on the two book publications of the Association this year—*American State Legislatures*, published by the Association's Committee on American Legislatures with Belle Zeller as editor, and *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952*, which was published in five volumes by the Johns Hopkins Press with Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman, and Malcolm Moos as editors. He stated that through an additional grant from the Edgar Stern Family Fund of $2,000, excellent publicity was given to these latter volumes, and presentations were made to the President of the United States, ex-Presidents Hoover and Truman, and the governors of twenty-nine states, two territories, and the commissioners of the District of Columbia. President Bunche also reported that certain state chapter reprints of *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952* have been received in the Washington office and are available. The Association will arrange financial support for the publication of these reprints and encouragement for their use in colleges, adult discussion groups, and possible serialization by newspapers.

Mr. Jones moved that the study of the national nominating conventions be repeated in

1956 if possible and that the Executive Director be instructed to see that planning and other necessary action to that end is undertaken. The motion carried.

President Bunche reported that a project design for a comparative public administration project had been completed during the year by a committee drawn largely from the old Committee on Public Administration and chaired by Wallace S. Sayre. After discussions in two Executive Committee meetings it was agreed that the project be approved in principle as deserving support and encouragement but that the Association ought not to undertake the project. It was therefore agreed to refer the project to the Governmental Affairs Institute with the hope that it could obtain foundation support for it.

The President reported that preparation of an Election Statistics Yearbook would not be undertaken by the Association. The project has been referred to the Governmental Affairs Institute. The Institute reports that funds may be forthcoming to carry out the project.

President Bunche reported that this year the Woodrow Wilson Foundation had agreed to offer $1,000 as a cash prize for the best book published in 1953 on government and democracy. Also, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Foundation offered $1,000 for the best book published in 1953 in the field of government and human welfare. There was considerable discussion as to methods of improving and handling the Award Program. Mr. Grant suggested that final arrangements should be completed with the panel members and foundations no later than the end of February for making awards to be presented at the subsequent annual meeting. This suggestion was put in the form of a motion and was carried.

President Bunche reviewed past efforts, beginning in 1950, to obtain foundation funds for a political science "inventory" and indicated that another presentation will be prepared and submitted with some hope for favorable action.

The President asked Mr. Hechler to report on the Congressional Interne Program during 1953–54 and the coming program for 1954–55. Mr. Hechler expressed his appreciation to the Advisory Committee for the Interne Program: Ernest S. Griffith, chairman; Stephen K. Bailey, Senator Irving M. Ives, Representative Richard Bolling, and Merlo J. Pusey. It was noted that the program had received enthusiastic support on Capitol Hill. There were many more congressional requests for assignment of the internes than the Association could possibly fill.

A grant from the Edgar Stern Family Fund enabled the number of interneships to be expanded to ten for 1954–55. Five of the new group of internes are journalists and five political scientists. They commence their work on November 1, 1954. Those selected are: Clifford D. Coover, John T. Dempsey, Louis B. Fleming, William C. Gibbons, Marvin A. Harder, Daniel B. Jacobs, W. Astor Kirk, Richard T. Mittauer, Eli Rapaich, and William L. Rivers.

President Bunche asked the Executive Director to report on the Association's Personnel Service. Mr. Gange indicated that over 400 applicants have filed *vitae* with the Service and the number will probably increase to 600 before the end of the year. About 80 positions have been listed with the Service in the past year. Two trends were noted: (1) an increased number of one-year positions; and (2), despite some increase in enrollments, there is no noticeable increase in the number of positions.

At 12:45 P.M. the Council adjourned for lunch; it reconvened at 2:30 P.M.

In the absence of Mr. Bailey, Mr. Gange read the report of the Chairman of the Program Committee.

President Bunche asked Mr. Gange to report on arrangements for the 1955 Annual Meeting which will be held in Boulder, Colorado. Mr. Gange reported that arrangements had been made in the spring of 1954 with Dean Dayton McKean of the University of Colorado to use university facilities. Rooms and meals at the Student Union Building will be very reasonable and meeting rooms are also adequate. Mr. Odegard inquired about transportation from Denver to Boulder and Dean McKean stated that the University plans to have special buses meet the trains and planes. From the station in Denver to Boulder is approximately a 25-minute trip and from the airport to Boulder is about one hour. President Bunche recommended to the Council that for the 1955 meeting only, the schedule be moved ahead one day, leaving a longer weekend for travel back home after the meeting. Mr. Johnson moved the adoption of the following dates for 1955: Tuesday, September 6, meeting of the Council; Wednesday through Friday, September 7 through 9, the general sessions. The motion carried.

President Bunche asked the Council to set the dates for the 1956 meeting to be held in Washington, D. C. Mr. Fellman moved that the following dates be adopted for 1956: Wednesday, September 5, meeting of the Council; Thursday, September 6 through Saturday, September 8, the general sessions. The motion carried.

The President urged the Council to make a decision as to the place and dates for the 1957 meeting. After much discussion it was decided to wait until after the experiment with the university facilities at Boulder before deciding on a specific site. Mr. Peltason moved that the following dates for the 1957 meeting be adopted: Wednesday, September 4, the meeting of the Council; Thursday through Saturday, September 5 through 7, the general sessions. The motion carried and the Executive Director was instructed to explore hotel and university facilities for this meeting in Cleveland, New York, and Philadelphia.

President Bunche asked Mr. Robson to present the report of the Committee on Nominations. Mr. Robson presented the following recommendations of the Committee on Nominations to the Council for their acceptance and presentation to the Annual Business Meeting: President-Elect, Harold D. Lasswell, Yale University; Vice Presidents: Hubert H. Humphrey, U. S. Senator from Minnesota; Charles S. Hyneman, Northwestern University; Lindsay Rogers, Columbia University; Secretary, Harvey C. Mansfield, The Ohio State University; Treasurer, Edward H. Litchfield, Cornell University; Members of the Council, 1954–56: Gabriel A. Almond, Princeton University; Stephen K. Bailey, Princeton University; James M. [illegible]ns, Williams College; Gwendolen M. Carter, Smith College; Samuel J. Eldersveld, University of Michigan; Avery Leiserson, Vanderbilt University; Leslie M. Lipson, University of California (Berkeley); Norman D. Palmer, University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Robson recommended that from time to time the Council reexamine the present nominating procedure and that before publication of the list of nominees in the June issue of the REVIEW, *all* nominees be consulted. Heretofore, only the President-Elect has been consulted as to his willingness to accept the office. He also recommended that some financial provision be made for the Committee on Nominations to meet before the final list of nominees is prepared. President Bunche asked that a motion be made to this effect. Mr. Rossiter moved that members of the Committee on Nominations meet each year in early spring, after the canvass for suggestions has been completed, when and if money is available. The motion carried.

Mr. Pritchett presented the report of the Local Arrangements Committee. President Bunche expressed appreciation to Mr. Pritchett, on behalf of the Council and the members of the Association, for the excellent work he and his committee had done in arranging for the meeting in Chicago.

President Bunche requested that Mr. Gange report on the 1953 edition of the *APSA Directory.* Mr. Gange indicated that 1243 copies have so far been sold, about half of which have been paperbound and half clothbound. After some discussion as to whether to consider a 1955 edition of the *Directory*, Mr. Gange moved that action be deferred for a year and that at next year's Council meeting consideration be given to a 1958 edition of the *APSA Directory.* The motion carried.

Mr. Cole, a member of the Board of Directors of the Governmental Affairs Institute, was invited by President Bunche to report on the Institute's activities. Mr. Cole mentioned the organizational relationship between the Association and the Institute which was strengthened during the past year when the Governmental Affairs Institute amended its by-laws to include as *ex officio* members of its Board of Directors the President-Elect and Executive Director of The American Political Science Association. He indicated that other members of the Institute Board include three past presidents and the former executive director of the Association, that any action taken by the Institute Board is taken with the advice of the President of the Association, and that several projects, which the Association as a membership organization did not wish to undertake, had been passed on to the Institute. President Bunche asked that Mr. McKinley and Mr. Gange, who had attended the Institute Board meeting on September 6 and 7 as *ex officio* members, report as to the efficacy of the present arrangement. Both agreed that it was a very satisfactory arrangement. The question was brought up as to whether the Council of the Association should review the financial report of the Institute, but it was decided that there was no necessity for reviewing internal management problems. Members of the Council felt that more regular reports should be made on Institute activities to the

Executive Committee and the Council. Mr. Cole made a motion to approve the Association's *ex officio* representation on the Institute Board; it was carried.

President Bunche invited Mr. Pollock, senior vice-president of the International Political Science Association, to report on the activities of IPSA. Mr. Pollock read a letter he had just received from Professor William A. Robson of London, president of the international organization, expressing appreciation for the cooperation of American political scientists and inviting them to attend the 1955 Congress to be held in Stockholm in August. Mr. Pollock urged all American political scientists to support IPSA by subscribing to an annual membership, which costs $5.00 and entitles the individual to a year's subscription to *International Political Science Abstracts* or the *Social Science Bulletin*. Mr. Gange stated that the new APSA membership forms will have a box for enclosing membership dues in IPSA along with dues in APSA.

President Bunche reported that a survey of the cost of printing a monthly newsletter to be sent to all members of the Association had shown it to be too costly to undertake at this time.

The President asked that Mr. Gange report on the proposed Social Sciences Library Service (a book rental service) which Robert Oshins had been interested in making available to members of the Association. Replies to the questionnaire which Mr. Oshins sent out have been quite favorable.

President Bunche stated that during the past year the Association has had very few requests to assist government agencies. Some suggestions of personnel for government commissions and other positions were made in reresponse to requests from government agencies.

The Council considered requests from the New England Political Science Association, from individual members of the Midwest Conference, and from Professors Manning J. Dauer of the University of Florida and Dale Pontius of Roosevelt University for resolutions to be presented to the Annual Business Meeting on the subject of recent threats to academic freedom and individual liberties. After extended discussion, a committee was appointed to formulate a resolution to be presented to the Annual Business Meeting. Members of the committee were Charles McKinley chairman, Taylor Cole, Manning J. Dauer, and Pendleton Herring.

Mr. Gange stated that the Association had committed itself to the purchase of sufficient copies of a forthcoming publication of the Graduate Education Division of the Southern Regional Education Board on research and teaching in government in the South, for distribution to chairmen of all departments of political science.

President Bunche expressed his appreciation to Mr. Gange for his excellent service to the Association during the past year as Executive Director. He introduced the new Executive Director, Mr. Evron M. Kirkpatrick, who will take over his new duties on October 1, 1954.

The Council meeting was adjourned at 6:15 P.M.—HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Secretary*.

Minutes of the Annual Business Meeting

The Annual Business Meeting of The American Political Science Association was held at 4:45 P.M., Friday, September 10, 1954, in the Louis XVI Room of the Hotel Sherman, Chicago, Illinois. The meeting was called to order by President Ralph J. Bunche, who asked Mr. Harvey C. Mansfield, Secretary of the Association, to report to the members present on the action taken by the Council at its meeting on September 8.

Mr. Mansfield summarized briefly the Council's decisions and indicated that two resolutions would be presented by the Council to the Annual Business Meeting.

In the absence of the Treasurer, Mr. Litchfield, Mr. Gange made the financial report. He noted that, in the Frederic A. Ogg bequest to the Association, Mr. Ogg had specified very clearly how the funds were to be used but that no complete record appeared to exist as to the specific purpose for which earlier contributions to the endowment fund might be used. He asked that any members who had information on these funds give it to the Washington office.

President Bunche expressed his deep appreciation to Mr. Gange for the assistance he had given him during his term of office.

Mr. McKinley, chairman of the committee appointed by the Council to draft a resolution on behalf of the Association on academic and civic freedom, was asked to read the draft prepared by the committee.

Mr. McKinley did so and indicated that his committee wanted a separate vote on points 1 and 2 of the resolution. After extended discussion and several proposed amendments and amendments to amendments, point 1 was passed by a majority vote. Point 2 was passed with a unanimous vote. The resolution, as adopted, reads as follows:

"The officers of this Association have received from its members and their local associations during this past year many expressions of grave concern over the growing encroachment upon academic and civic freedom in the United States.

"Your Council believes that this Association should throw its full weight against the forces that seem bent on slamming shut the doors to freedom of inquiry, discussion, and association. Scholars cannot hope to pursue their callings with professional integrity or play their rightful part in civic life in an atmosphere of censorship and coercion of opinion. Your Council therefore recommends that The American Political Science Association at this time take these actions.

"Be it resolved that:

"1. The American Political Science Association advise all members of the Special Committee of the House of Representatives to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations, Reece Committee, that it objects to the false statements of fact and conclusion contained in the staff reports of that Committee and to the haste with which its public hearings were closed and rebuttal testimony cut off.

"The statements by the staff show a lack of understanding of how research is carried on and of how learned societies function.

"The American Political Science Association is a voluntary, non-partisan, scholarly society. It is an independent body and composed of over 6,000 political scientists devoted to free inquiry into government in all its aspects.

"The Association is concerned with the advancement of political science as a discipline and as a profession and with the basic understanding of our political institutions and their effective operation. During its fifty years of existence, it has fostered scholarly interchange of thought and freedom of teaching and research. It stands dedicated to high standards of professional integrity.

"We express the hope that despite the misleading statements prepared by the staff, the Committee members will reflect in their own reports an accurate view of this Association and of the other scholarly agencies and foundations concerned with the advancement of knowledge and the strengthening of our democratic institutions.

"2. The Executive Committee of the Association with the aid of the staff initiate as soon as possible exploratory discussions with the American Association of University Professors, the American Civil Liberties Union, and other appropriate organizations to discover ways and means by which members of the Association through informed joint efforts with them may most effectively promote the objectives of academic and civic freedom. The Executive Committee is hereby authorized to put such plans, developed from these discussions, as it deems feasible into effect and report to the Council."

Secretary Mansfield read the following resolution expressing appreciation to the Edgar Stern Family Fund and Dr. Will Alexander:

"Recognizing the importance of first-hand training and observation in the organization and operation of the Congress of the United States for young teachers of political science and journalists concerned with public and governmental affairs, The American Political Science Association wishes to express its deep gratitude to the Edgar Stern Family Fund for the very generous financial support which its trustees have given to the Congressional Interne Training Program of the APSA since the Spring of 1953; the Association also wishes to express its gratitude to Dr. Will W. Alexander for his continuing interest, enthusiasm, and support of this program in collaboration with the officers of the Association and the trustees of the Stern Family Fund."

Mr. Mansfield moved that this resolution be adopted. The motion was seconded and carried unanimously.

President Bunche asked Mr. C. B. Robson, Chairman of the Committee on Nominations, to make the committee's report. Mr. Robson encouraged all members to take an interest in the nominating process and send suggestions of nominees for the Association's officers to the new Chairman of the Nominating Committee. He presented the following recommendations of the Committee on Nominations: President-Elect: Harold D. Lasswell, Yale University; Vice Presidents: Hubert H. Humphrey, U. S.

Senator from Minnesota; Charles S. Hyneman, Northwestern University; Lindsay Rogers, Columbia University; Secretary: Harvey C. Mansfield, The Ohio State University; Treasurer: Edward H. Litchfield, Cornell University; Members of the Council (1954–56); Gabriel A. Almond, Princeton University; Stephen K. Bailey, Princeton University; James M. Burns, Williams College; Gwendolen M. Carter, Smith College; Samuel J. Eldersveld, University of Michigan; Avery Leiserson, Vanderbilt University; Leslie M. Lipson, University of California (Berkeley); Norman D. Palmer, University of Pennsylvania.

Mr. Pollock moved that the Secretary be authorized to cast a unanimous vote for all of the nominees. The motion was seconded and carried unanimously.

Mr. Cole moved that the appreciation of the members of the Association to Mr. Gange for a job well done be made a part of the Association's formal record. The motion was seconded and carried unanimously.

President Bunche introduced Mr. Evron M. Kirkpatrick, who will assume the duties of Executive Director on October 1, 1954.

President Bunche expressed his pleasure in knowing Mr. McKinley and his deep respect for him. The gavel was then turned over to the incoming President.

There was no further business and the Annual Business Meeting was adjourned at 6:45 P.M.—HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Secretary*

The International Political Science Association held a Round-Table Conference on Teaching and Research in the Field of Comparative Government at Florence, April 5–10, 1954. Representatives from fourteen countries attended. The United States delegation consisted of James K. Pollock, senior vice-president of IPSA, and Professors Charles Aikin, Samuel H. Beer, Eugene Chase, Carl J. Friedrich, Karl Loewenstein, Roy C. Macridis, Robert E. Ward, and Harold Zink. Numerous papers of high quality were presented and a most fruitful discussion was held. An extensive report of the conference proceedings will shortly be published by Professor Gunnar Heckscher of Sweden, the rapporteur-general. A representative selection of papers submitted has already appeared in the Spring number of the Italian political science journal, *Studi Politici*. The Executive Committee considered arrangements for the next Congress of IPSA which will be held at Stockholm, August 22–27, 1955. Professor Heckscher will be in general charge of the meeting. The program will include sessions on: (1) the government of great cities; (2) political parties, emphasizing (a) their role in democracy, (b) the place of polls in a study of political parties, and (c) the relation between social classes and political parties; (3) the political implications of development programs; (4) presentation seminars dealing both with comparative government and bureaucracy (the two topics which have occupied the attention of the International Association during the past two years); and (5) large and small states in international relations. Members of the American Political Science Association are cordially invited to attend the Stockholm Congress.—ROBERT E. WARD.

The International Institute of Administrative Sciences held a round-table at The Hague, July 23–28, 1954, which brought together over ninety participants from thirty-nine countries and eight international bodies. Unlike the triennial congresses, the annual round-tables are restricted in principle to members of the various organs of the Institute, all of which held useful meetings defining the Institute's program. The Council of Administration, composed of delegates of member-states and national sections, under the chairmanship of M. René Cassin of France, authorized the creation of sections of international civil servants stationed in the same area, and adopted a new schedule of dues based upon the United Nations' scale of contributions which should greatly facilitate the membership of less developed countries of large population. Observers were present from Japan, India, Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, and other countries in which there is active interest in joining the Institute. Program plans were defined in meetings of the Committee on Administrative Practices (Donald C. Stone, U. S. A., chairman) and the Scientific Committee (Henry Puget, France, chairman). The Committee on Contracts (André Molitor, Belgium, chairman) dealt with proposals for cooperation with UN, UNESCO, and the European Productivity Agency of OEEC. M. Henri Matton, president-emeritus of the Cour des Comptes of Belgium, was elected a vice-president in place of Professor Jules Lespes, whose untimely death was deeply regretted.

The business meetings were garnished with two and a half days of scientific discussions of two principal subjects: Public Economic Enterprise and In-Service Training, carried on in small groups permitting wide-spread participation. Participants from the United States included Charles Aikin, University of California; Charles S. Ascher, Public Administration Clearing House; Lynton K. Caldwell, UN Institute of Public Administration, Ankara; Albert Gorvine, Brooklyn College; William Ronan, New York University; MacDonald Salter, Foreign Operations Administration; and Donald C. Stone, Springfield College. The round-table for 1955 will be a residential week at one of the Oxford colleges during the first half of July, for which the Royal Institute of Public Administration will be host.

The Fourth International Congress of Comparative Law, held at the Law Faculty of the University of Paris, August 1–7, 1954, attracted some 250 political scientists and law professors, of whom some thirty were Americans, including the political scientists Charles Aikin (California), Charles S. Ascher (Brooklyn), Reginald D. Lang (Carlton), Karl Loewenstein (Amherst), Robert R. Wilson (Duke), and J. N. Hazard (Columbia). Roscoe Pound as president of the sponsoring Academy of Comparative Law presided. Subjects discussed ran the gamut of the law, from history and legal philosopny to political parties and commercial treaties. Specialists in each field met in panels with general reporters who had digested reports prepared well in advance to present conclusions for debate. State interference in the internal structure of parties to preserve democratic principles when voters have no real alternative to a single party evoked sharp debate under the guidance of Karl Loewenstein. Control over public corporations as presented by Henry Puget of France drew forth comparisons from Frank Scott of McGill and Charles S. Ascher of Brooklyn College. Robert Wilson of Duke reported to the international lawyers on his experience with commercial treaties, while Reginald D. Lang reported on political regimes and the international community. Papers prepared by American political scientists unable to attend included those by Robert K. Carr (Dartmouth) and Joseph R. Starr (Maryland). The Fifth Congress will be held during the summer of 1959 at The Hague.—JOHN N. HAZARD.

A new International Association for Juridical Sciences will be created soon out of the International Committee of Comparative Law. This was the principal decision of the latter's Executive Bureau at its meeting of July 28–29, 1954, at Munich. In its new form it will parallel more closely the structure of the International Political Science Association and reach out to attract lawyers and political scientists interested in law, regardless of their prior concern with the comparative method. No individual memberships are planned as yet, however, for the American Foreign Law Association will remain the national representative for the comparatists in the United States, and individual Americans will participate in the work of the International Association through their national body.

To relate its work closely to the principal concern of UNESCO, namely underdeveloped areas, the new association will establish a two-year program of study of the impact upon an underdeveloped area of a Western legal system. The country chosen for study will be Turkey, and a preliminary meeting is planned for Istanbul in September, 1955, to prepare for a larger colloquium scheduled for Barcelona in September, 1956. The Barcelona meeting will also include panel discussions of the teaching of law as a social science on the basis of the report by Professor Charles Eisenmann published by UNESCO in July, 1954, and of the maxim, *"audi alteram partem."*

Barcelona panels will utilize the experience gained at Munich with two colloquiums held concurrently with the Executive Bureau meeting. One concerned the function and structure of comparative law centers. It was presided over by Professor Hessel E. Yntema of the University of Michigan and attracted some fifty representatives from a large part of the world. The other discussed a question posed by UNESCO, namely the method of implementing in domestic legislation obligations assumed in treaties. Professor G. T. Mangone of Swarthmore College presented the procedure in the United States.

A new Secretary General was elected to replace the retiring Professor René David. He is Professor André Bertrand, director of studies of the French National School of Administration. Dr. Kurt Lipstein of Cambridge was named director of research, while Professor Felipe de Sola Cañizares of Barcelona was delegated to prepare for publication a directory of comparative law centers throughout the world so as to facilitate interchange of views and cooperative research.—JOHN N. HAZARD.

The International Union of Local Authorities will hold its Twelfth Congress in Rome, Italy, September 26–October 1, 1955. The two principal subjects for discussion will be "Local Government Finance and Its Importance to Local Autonomy" and "Cultural Activities of Local Authorities." Mayors, city managers, other municipal officials, and students of local government are invited to attend. American municipalities are eligible to join the International Union of Local Authorities through the American Committee for International Municipal Cooperation. This will give their delegations at Rome official recognition and voting rights. Persons desiring to be kept up to date on future developments about the Rome Congress or wishing to join the International Union of Local Authorities are invited to write to the American Committee for International Municipal Cooperation, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago 37.

The biennial convention of Pi Sigma Alpha was held on September 9, 1954, in conjunction with the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Chicago. The following officers were elected: president, J. Eugene Harley, University of Southern California; vice-president, Claude E. Hawley, Washington, D. C.; secretary-treasurer, Don L. Bowen, University of Maryland. Newly elected members of the executive committee with terms expiring in 1958 are: A. C. Breckenridge, W. Brooke Graves, and Egbert S. Wengert. Continuing as members of the executive committee with terms expiring in 1956 are: Mona Fletcher, Cullen B. Gosnell, and Charles W. Shull. Winners of Pi Sigma Alpha's first annual essay contest were: William C. Griffith, first prize (Emory University); Stanley Kravit, honorable mention (Rutgers University); and Nancy Whittier, honorable mention (Syracuse University). The first prize winner was awarded $100; honorable mention winners received a choice of any two books cited for award by the American Political Science Association.—DON L. BOWEN.

The University of Minnesota held an Institute on Minnesota Government and Politics during the period July 19–30, 1954. Sessions of the institute were devoted to such issues as constitutional revision, responsible political parties, party designation of legislators, reapportionment, reorganization, financing the government, merit employment, judicial reform, local government problems, and citizen participation. These issues were discussed by panels of public officials, leaders of civic groups, journalists, and educators.

The sixty-two persons who participated in the panels included the governor, the chief justice, the speaker of the House of Representatives, and about an equal number of legislators, state officials, civic leaders, and educators. Political science Professors William Anderson, Asher N. Christensen, Clarence C. Ludwig, Arthur E. Naftalin, and Lloyd M. Short participated in one or more of the panel discussions. George A. Warp, associate professor of political science, served as director of the institute.

Of the 204 persons who enrolled for the sessions of the institute, about one-fourth registered for academic credit. The occupations of those attending the institute included assessor, assistant dean, bacteriologist, budget examiner, businessman, civil service administrator, clerical worker, economist, housewife, journalist, justice of the peace, librarian, lobbyist, medical artist, medical technician, political party official, radio announcer, real estate broker, recreation director, school board member, singer, state legislator, student, teacher, university regent, and welfare worker. Those who attended the institute were enthusiastic in their comments. Most of them (85 per cent) indicated that they were definitely interested in attending another institute.—GEORGE A. WARP.

Supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation to the Social Science Research Council of New York, a Seminar in Political Behavior Research was held on the campus of the University of Michigan, June 21–August 13, 1954, under the joint sponsorship of the department of political science and the Survey Research Center. The purpose of the seminar was to stimulate interest in the quantitative study of political behavior. To this end a group of post-doctoral fellows from the field of political science were brought together in Ann Arbor. As a means of coordinating the activities of the group, a series of meetings was organized in which visiting scholars, political scientists, and other behavioral scientists resident at the University of Michigan participated. Formal presentations of research methodologies were made available through the University's Institute on Survey Research Techniques. Participants in the seminar were: Robert E. Agger, University of North Carolina; Heinz Eulau, Antioch College; William Goodman, University of Tennessee; Robert E. Lane, Yale University; Daniel M. Ogden, Jr., State College of Washington; Stephen B. Sarasohn, Wayne University; Allan P. Sindler, Duke University; and John P. White, University of Michigan. The following served as guest lecturers: Samuel Eldersveld, Ronald Freedman, Gerald Gurin, Morris Janowitz, Dwaine Marvick, Norton Long, Neil Staebler, V. O. Key, Jr., LeRoy Ferguson, Herbert McCloskey, and Paul F. Lazarsfeld.

The thirteenth annual meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists will be held at Purdue University, May 5–7, 1955. Program suggestions should be sent to James Miller, Michigan State College, chairman of the program committee.

The Emory Institute of Citizenship, a campus activity for fifteen years before the war, was revived this fall with plans for two sessions during the year 1954–55. The subject of the institute will be "Education for World Affairs." Professor Cullen B. Gosnell, of the department of political science, is serving as general director.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The commemorative course in Japanese Civilization sponsored jointly by the Duke University department of political science and the Japan Society was held during the second summer session. Of the ten advanced students who received scholarships, five were political scientists. They were: Yung Ping Chen, a candidate for the doctorate at the University of Maryland; Barbara F. Hampe, of Warren Wilson College, North Carolina; Joel D. Singer, candidate for the doctorate at New York University; Harold W. Sundstrom, graduate assistant in political science at Michigan State College; and Mrs. Edyth F. Winningham, of the faculty of Charlotte College, North Carolina. Two other political scientists attended all sessions of the course as registered auditors: Spencer Gervin, associate professor of political science at Hiwassee College, Tennessee; and Robert T. Hubard, assistant professor of English and government at Hampden-Sidney College. The five other holders of scholarships were: Dr. George Abernathy, professor of philosophy at Davidson College, North Carolina; Dr. Doris E. King, professor of history at Stephen F. Austin State College, Texas; Dr. Janet L. MacDonald, professor of history at Hollins College, Virginia; William H. Baskin, III, candidate for the doctorate in Romance languages, University of North Carolina; and James M. Clifton, graduate student in history at Duke University.

Indiana University has established a special program of public administration training for governmental employees in the Indianapolis area. The initial student group includes representatives of federal, state, and local agencies. The undertaking, developed by the department of government in cooperation with the Division of Adult Education and Public Services, takes the University's facilities to the 20,000 government workers in Indiana's largest city. Current offerings include studies in supervisory training, administrative organization and methods, and public administration, in addition to a wide variety of courses regularly offered to over 2,000 students at the University's Indianapolis extension center.

New York University, the University of Ankara, and the Turkish Ministry of Education have established a three-year cooperative program designed to broaden and strengthen higher education facilities in Turkey. Under the terms of the agreement, the New York University Graduate School of Public Administration and Social Service will play a leading role in planning and developing curricula and research in public administration at the University of Ankara. Arrangements have also been made for research and study programs in the United States for Turkish professors, other faculty members, and their assistants. The program is being financed jointly by the Turkish Government and the Foreign Operations Administration of the United States Government.

Stetson University has announced the inauguration this year of an American Studies Program leading to the bachelor's and master's degrees. Dr. J. Ollie Edmunds, President of the University, stated that the program will aim to expose "the false and stupid hypocrisies of the Communist movement while teaching the development of American ideals and institutions." The Charles E. Merrill Chair of American Studies has been created for this purpose and is named for the investment banker whose gift made the program possible.

Three $4,000 post-doctoral fellowships in statistics are offered for 1955–56 by the University of Chicago. The purpose of these fellowships, which are open to holders of the doctor's degree or its equivalent in research accomplishment, is to acquaint established research workers in the biological, physical, and social sciences with the role of modern statistical analysis in the planning of experiments and other investigative programs, and in the analysis of empirical data. The development of the field of statistics has been so rapid that most current research falls far short of attainable standards, and these fellowships (which represent the fifth year of a five-year program supported by the Rockefeller Foundation) are intended to help reduce this lag by giving statistical training to scientists whose primary interests are in substantive fields rather than in statistics itself. The closing date for applications is February 15, 1955; instructions for applying may be obtained from the Committee on Statistics, University of Chicago, Chicago 37.

The Middle East Institute is preparing for publication an annual Survey of Research in Progress on the Middle East. Countries included in the survey are the Arab nations, Israel, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, North Africa, the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Persons engaged in research on the Middle East are urged to submit the following information: name, address, topic of investigation, sponsoring organization (if any), estimated date of completion, and pertinent comment on the nature of the research, sources being used, and method of approach. Correspondence should be addressed to: The Middle East Institute, 1761 N Street, N. W., Washington 6, D. C.

Arthur W. Bromage has been appointed by Governor Williams to Michigan's Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.

Maurice G. Burnside, formerly of the Marshall College political science department, has been elected to the U. S. House of Representatives from the Fourth Congressional District in West Virginia. Dr. Burnside represented the Fourth District in the Eighty-First and Eighty-Second Congresses.

Conley H. Dillon, professor and head of the department of political science at Marshall College, delivered a series of lectures on "Minimum Wage Laws and the Fair Labor Standards Act" at the 1954 American Federation of Labor School, held August 30–September 4, at Huntington, West Virginia.

Samuel J. Eldersveld, of the University of Michigan, completed a series of television programs on political parties during 1953–54. Several members of the political science department and other persons of political importance participated in the series with Professor Eldersveld. These programs will be released to educational television centers throughout the country.

Wesley R. Fishel, associate professor of political science at Michigan State College, spent the month of September in Saigon as consultant to the United States Special Technical and Economic Mission to the Governments of Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam.

George B. Galloway, senior specialist in American government and public administration, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, has received a grant from the Ford Foundation to make a comparative survey of the legislative procedures of the United States and Great Britain, under the sponsorship of the National Planning Association. Dr. Galloway spent several weeks during the fall in London observing the House of Commons in action and interviewing various members and officials.

John H. Hallowell, of Duke University, gave the principal address at the annual commencement of the General Theological Seminary, New York City, in June.

Earl T. Hanson, of Duke University, again served as director of the International Studies Program for Foreign Students held at Duke for seven weeks during the summer. Forty-eight exchange scholars from twenty-one countries attended the program. Dr. Hugh Hall, also of the Duke political science department, served as one of the staff members of the program.

Richard H. Heindel, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and professor of history and government at the University of Buffalo, has been named to serve on the Committee on International Exchange of Persons as one of the two representatives of the American Council on Education. The committee is responsible for guiding the selection of persons of professional status and advanced workers to receive grants under the Fulbright Act.

Gladys M. Kammerer, associate professor of political science at the University of Kentucky, was named by the Mayor of Lexington as co-chairman of the Greater Lexington Committee, created to study the urban problems of Lexington and Fayette County and to recommend solutions to the city and county governments. Ruth McQuown, research associate of the University of Kentucky Bureau of Government Research, was appointed executive secretary and research director for this committee.

Karl Loewenstein, professor of political science at Amherst College, was a guest professor during the second semester of the academic year 1953–54 in the law school at the University of Marburg, Germany. He also lectured at the Universities of Hamburg, Göttingen and Heidelberg. In August, he attended the Congress of the Academy of Comparative Law where he was general reporter on the subject, "The Legal Status of Political Parties."

Joe W. Neal, special instructor in government and director of the International Advisory Office at the University of Texas, spent eight weeks during the summer of 1954 on a tour of the Middle East under the sponsorship of the Friends of the Middle East.

James E. Pate, of the College of William and Mary, is serving as chairman of the Williamsburg City Planning Commission and as a member of the Colonial Regional Planning Commission recently created to develop a plan and to draft a zoning ordinance for the protection and development of the historic area including Jamestown, Yorktown, and the environs of Williamsburg.

George A. Peek, Jr., assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan, acted as coordinator and moderator for a series of six television programs on "Tension Areas in the Far East" during the summer of 1954. Mr. Albert Ravenholt of the American University's field staff was the visiting guest for each program. All programs were recorded on kinescope and will be sent to educational television stations throughout the country.

Joseph S. Roucek, professor and chairman of the departments of political science and sociology at the University of Bridgeport, lectured at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, in October on "The Commitments of the USSR and Her Satellites."

William H. Simpson, of Duke University, spent the summer in England making a study of installment buying and credit practices of British business.

Dwight Waldo has contracted to write a trend report on American political science for the International Political Science Association. He invites correspondence concerning both intellectual currents of the present and recent past and information concerning research in progress, particularly group research. Correspondence should be addressed to: Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley 4.

Harvey Walker, of the department of political science at the Ohio State University, spent the past summer in Europe at the invitation of the Government of Western Germany, studying legislative and administrative institutions in Belgium, Switzerland, and France, as well as in Germany. In August Professor Walker served as a consultant at the National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration held at the University of Denver.

Henry Wells, associate professor of political science at the University of Puerto Rico, presented three papers on recent constitutional and political developments in Puerto Rico at a symposium held at The Hague, September 6–11. The subject of the symposium was "Developments toward Self-Government in the Caribbean Commission Territories." The Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Co-operation sponsored the meetings, which were attended by participants from British, French, and Dutch universities, as well as by Dr. Wells.

Robert R. Wilson, of Duke University, read a paper on "Foreign Economic Interests before National Jurisdictions: The Role of

Commercial Treaties" before the panel on public international law at the Fourth International Congress of Comparative Law held in Paris, August 1–7, 1954. Professor Wilson also attended, as a delegate of the American Branch, the forty-sixth annual meeting of the International Law Association held at Edinburgh, August 8–14.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Orville Alexander, chairman of the department of government at Southern Illinois University, has been on leave during 1954 to serve as director of research for the Ohio State School Survey Committee.

Totton J. Anderson, associate professor of political science at the University of Southern California, has been granted a special leave of absence to serve as Associate National Director of the Citizenship Clearing House for 1954–55. The Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation of Pittsburgh sponsors the Citizenship Clearing House, with offices located in the Law Center of New York University.

Morley Ayearst has been appointed acting chairman of the department of government in Washington Square College of Arts and Sciences, New York University. Professor Ayearst spent last year in the British West Indies studying their politics and administration under a Fulbright grant.

James H. Bahti has resumed his duties as assistant professor at the Michigan College of Mining and Technology after spending the past year in graduate work at the University of Michigan.

Chester W. Bain, research assistant in the Bureau of Public Administration of the University of Virginia, has been appointed acting assistant professor of political science for the academic year 1954–55.

Lawrence L. Barber, of Trinity College, recently began a one-year assignment with the United Nations Public Administration Institute in Rio de Janeiro.

Ernest R. Bartley, associate professor of political science at the University of Florida, has received a Ford Foundation grant and is spending the year 1954–55 in Washington observing the operations of federal government agencies.

Paul Beckett has been promoted to a full professorship in public administration at the State College of Washington.

Robert P. Benedict, of Boston University, spent the summer doing research and lecturing in Europe. During the past academic year he was acting chairman of the department of government at Boston University.

A. LeRoy Bennett, recently of Michigan State College, has been appointed professor and acting head of the department of political science at Drake University.

W. E. Benton, formerly assistant professor of government at Southern Methodist University, has joined the staff of the University of Houston as assistant professor in the department of government.

Loren P. Beth is a visiting professor of political science at the University of Florida during 1954–55.

Roy G. Blakey, of the University of Minnesota, has returned from the University of Ankara, Turkey, where he has been visiting professor of public finance during the past three years.

John C. Bollens has been appointed acting director of the Bureau of Governmental Research at the University of California (Los Angeles). He will serve as director during 1954–55 while Winston W. Crouch is on sabbatical leave in India.

John A. Bond has joined the staff of the department of government at Southern Illinois University.

Hugh A. Bone is on sabbatical leave from the University of Washington to study under a Ford Fellowship for the Advancement of Teaching. Major emphasis of Professor Bone's research is upon Congress, and his headquarters in Washington is the office of Senator Henry M. Jackson.

Robert P. Boynton, formerly teaching fellow at the University of Michigan, has been appointed instructor in the department of history and government at Wells College.

Leo Cagan has returned to the political science department at San Francisco State College after a year as public administration specialist with the United Nations Secretariat.

Lynton K. Caldwell, of Syracuse University, succeeded Marshall E. Dimock as co-director of the Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East at Ankara on August 10, 1954. Professor Caldwell's assignment in Turkey is for one year.

Francis Michael Carney has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of California (Riverside).

H. Paul Castleberry has been promoted to an associate professorship at the State College of Washington. He is currently serving for the second year as a Fulbright lecturer at the American University at Cairo, Egypt, and will resume his duties at the State College in the fall of 1955.

David T. Cattell has been promoted to assistant professor of political science at the University of California (Los Angeles).

Floyd Cave, professor of government at San Francisco State College, is on sabbatical leave during the fall semester of 1954–55, studying political developments in Western Europe and Great Britain.

Warner O. Chapman has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of government at Indiana University.

Harwood L. Childs has resumed his duties at Princeton University after a year's leave of absence in Brazil where he served as lecturer in public relations at the School of Public Administration in Rio de Janeiro sponsored jointly by the Brazilian Government and the United Nations.

Asher N. Christensen, of the University of Minnesota, has been awarded a Fulbright lectureship to the United Kingdom for the 1954–55 academic year. He is teaching at University College, Aberystwyth, Wales. During the months of March and April, 1955, Professor Christensen will teach at the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies.

David Cooperman, of the department of political science at the University of Minnesota, has been granted a Rockefeller Foundation fellowship to study the relationship between legal systems and political ideologies of totalitarian states. His work is being done at Columbia University.

Claude B. Cross has been reappointed for an additional year as acting instructor in the field of international relations at the State College of Washington.

Larry Dennis has been appointed administrative assistant to the President of the Pennsylvania State University.

John C. Donovan has been promoted to an associate professorship in political science at Bates College. During the past summer session, Dr. Donovan was a visiting professor at the University of Maine.

James W. Drury, who has been awarded a Fulbright fellowship in Japan, is on leave from the University of Kansas during the current academic year.

William Ebenstein, of Princeton University, was a visiting professor at the University of Michigan during the past summer session.

David G. Farrelly has been promoted to associate professor of political science at the University of California (Los Angeles).

Vernon L. Ferwerda has been appointed assistant professor of government at Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut.

Vincent T. Finneran, formerly financial management assistant in the U. S. Public Health Service, has been appointed research assistant in the Bureau of Public Administration of the University of Virginia.

Willian S. Flash has been promoted to assistant professor of government at Bowdoin College, effective July 1, 1954.

Ossip K. Flechtheim, who was in Berlin during 1951–1954, has resigned his position at the Hochschule für Politik and has accepted an appointment as visiting professor in the department of history and government at the University of Kansas City.

Julian F. S. Foster, formerly visiting lecturer in political science at the University of Michigan, has received a teaching fellowship in the department of political science at the University of California (Los Angeles).

Guy Fox is on leave from Michigan State College during the academic year 1954–55 as a Fulbright professor of political science in Japan.

Henry C. Galant, who taught at Connecticut College last year, has accepted a position as associate professor and chairman of the department of political science at Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, New York.

Wallace B. Graves, of DePauw University, was promoted to associate professor of political science, effective July 1, 1954.

Priscilla M. Greeley, recently of Wilson College, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, New York.

Jay V. Groves has recently been appointed professor of political science and sociology at Potomac State College, Keyser, West Virginia.

Nathan Hakman, who recently received the doctorate at the University of Illinois, has been appointed instructor in political science at Michigan State College.

Owen A. Haley has retired after more than a quarter-century of service in the department of government at the City College of New York.

Earl T. Hanson has been appointed Director of Admissions of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Duke University. He will continue his teaching in the department of political science on a part-time basis.

Philip Haring, who served as lecturer in political science at Northwestern University during the past year, has accepted a position as assistant professor of political science at Knox College.

Heber R. Harper, formerly instructor of history and government at Wells College, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Dickinson College.

Frederick H. Hartmann resumed his duties as associate professor of political science at the University of Florida in September follow- one year's leave of absence spent in Germany under a Fulbright research award.

Lashley G. Harvey has resumed his duties as chairman of the department of government and director of the Bureau of Public Administration at Boston University after a year's assignment with the United Nations Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East at Ankara.

William C. Havard, Jr. is serving as acting director of the Public Administration Clearing Service at the University of Florida during the current academic year.

Carroll Hawkins, on sabbatical leave from Michigan State College, is spending this year in Western Europe and in Mexico studying the ideological forces affecting the labor movement.

Ferrel Heady has returned to his duties at the University of Michigan after spending fourteen months as Director and Chief Adviser, Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.

Samuel Hendel has resumed his regular duties in the department of government at the City College of New York after a year's study in Europe on a Ford Foundation fellowship.

Norman Hill, of the University of Nebraska, will be visiting professsor of political science at the University of Washington from January 1 to June 15, 1955.

Ivan H. Hinderaker has been promoted to associate professor of political science at the University of California (Los Angeles).

Willard N. Hogan is serving this year as acting chairman of the social science division, State University Teachers College, New Paltz, New York, while Eugene P. Link is lecturing at the University of Annamalai, India, under a Fulbright grant.

John A. Houston, formerly associate professor of political science at the University of Mississippi, has accepted the chairmanship of the department of political science at Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois.

Ronald F. Howell has been promoted to assistant professor of political science at Emory University.

Clyde E. Jacobs has been promoted to assistant professor of political science at the University of California (Davis).

James Jarvis, formerly of the University of Illinois, is a visiting instructor in public administration and local government at the University of Kansas.

Morton A. Kaplan, formerly visiting professor of political science at Haverford College, has accepted a position with the Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

Clifford Ketzel has joined the staff of the department of political science, University of Kansas, as an assistant professor. Dr. Ketzel spent two years with the State Department and two years with the Institute of Public Affairs prior to completing his graduate work at the University of California.

Joseph B. Kingsbury returned to Indiana University in August after a year in Turkey, where he served as lecturer in personnel administration in the United Nations Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East. On his way home he attended the conference of Arab states on public administration at the American University at Beirut, July 28–30.

William F. Larsen, assistant professor of political science, University of Florida, has been awarded a research fellowship with the National Municipal League, beginning July 15. Prior to assuming his duties under this appointment, Professor Larsen was in New York City as a research fellow with Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Beane to study bond financing.

Luke T. Lee, assistant professor of history and government at the St. Lawrence University, has been appointed as special consultant for the Harvard Law School—Israel Cooperative Research for Israel's Legal Development.

Avery Leiserson, professor of political science at Vanderbilt University, was a visiting professor at the University of Washington during the autumn quarter.

Benjamin E. Lippincott, of the University of Minnesota, has been granted a sabbatical furlough for the current academic year, for the purpose of completing a volume on The State in the Modern World.

William S. Livingston has been advanced to associate professor of government at the University of Texas.

John Logue, who taught at Notre Dame last year, has been appointed instructor in the department of political philosophy at Fordham University.

Richard P. Longaker, who recently received the Ph.D. degree from Cornell and served as an instructor at Kenyon College, has joined the faculty of the University of California (Riverside) as assistant professor of political science.

Arthur W. Macmahon returned in September to his position on the graduate faculty of political science at Columbia University after a half-year's leave of absence spent largely as visiting professor at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium, broken in the spring by a month's lecturing at the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies.

Mavis A. Mann is on leave from West Virginia University during 1954–55 to lecture at Keio University, Tokyo, under a Fulbright award.

George Manner resumed his duties in the department of political science at the University of Illinois in September after a year's sabbatical leave spent in the study of international law at The Hague.

Lucian Marquis has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Oregon.

Charles E. Martin, of the University of Washington, has been awarded a Rockefeller grant and is on sabbatical leave this year. He will spend five months in Japan and Southeast Asia followed by study in India and the Middle East.

Curtis Martin is the newly designated chairman of the department of social sciences, University of Colorado.

Dwaine Marvick, of the University of Michigan, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at the University of California (Los Angeles).

Bruce B. Mason is visiting assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida during 1954–55.

Charles A. McCoy, formerly assistant professor of government at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, has been appointed research assistant in the Bureau of Public Administration of the University of Virginia.

David S. McLellan has been appointed assistant to the dean of freshmen and instructor in political science at Yale University.

George McTurnan Kahin has been promoted to associate professor of government at Cornell University.

Robert O. McWilliams, formerly of Yale University, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio.

James H. Meisel has returned to the University of Michigan after spending a year in Europe doing research.

Thomas Patrick Melady, of Norwich, Connecticut, and Washington, D. C., has accepted a position as a staff officer with the Foreign Operations Administration in Washington.

Warren Miller, formerly study director in the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of of California at Berkeley.

William Monat, formerly of the University of Minnesota, has been appointed to the teaching staff at Wayne University.

Gerhart Niemeyer, member of the staff of the Council of Foreign Relations, New York, has been appointed visiting lecturer in political science at Yale University

C. Bickford O'Brien, chairman of the department of history and political science, University of California (Davis Campus), is spending his sabbatical leave this year in Europe.

Maurice E. O'Donnell, who received the doctorate at the University of Wisconsin in 1954, has been appointed instructor in political science at Michigan State College.

Edward S. Overman is on leave from his position as associate professor of political science at the University of Virginia during the academic year 1954–55 for study at Harvard University and Washington, D. C., under a Ford Foundation faculty fellowship.

Gene Overstreet, of Michigan State College, is spending a second year in India as a Ford fellow.

Don Pilcher has joined the Governmental Research Center staff at the University of Kansas as assistant director for child research. Mr. Pilcher has his M.S.W. degree from Kansas University and several years of practical experience in Kansas City and Wichita.

Ira Polley, formerly regional chairman of of the Minneapolis Wage Stabilization Board and assistant professor at Michigan State College, has joined the faculty of the department of public administration at Wayne University.

R. Vance Presthus, associate professor of political science, Michigan State College, is serving as research director of the United Nations Institute of Public Administration in Ankara, Turkey, during the academic year 1954–55.

Nathaniel S. Preston is serving for a second year as visiting instructor in political science at West Virginia University.

Emmette S. Redford, professor of government at the University of Texas, is serving during the fall semester as visiting professor at Duke University where he is offering courses in public administration.

James R. Roach has been advanced to associate professor of government at the University of Texas.

James S. Roberts, of the University of North Carolina, is serving as assistant professor in the departments of political science and of the Scandinavian Area Studies at the University of Minnesota during the academic year 1954–55.

William H. Roberts, of the Catholic University of America, has received a grant—sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation—from the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University for a study on "The Theory of International Politics."

Leo C. Rosten, member of the board of editors of *Look Magazine*, has been appointed visiting lecturer in political science at Yale University.

Dankwart A. Rustow, assistant professor of politics at Princeton University, has returned from a year abroad, spent in research on political conditions in Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Israel. He lectured at Istanbul University, at Robert College and at the American University of Beirut.

Ake Sandler has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the department of government at Los Angeles State College. During the 1954 summer session he was a visiting member of the faculty at the University of Minnesota.

Fayez Sayegh, social affairs officer of the Division of Human Rights, United Nations, has been appointed visiting lecturer in political science at Yale University.

Herbert Pierre Secher, who recently received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin, has accepted a position as instructor in the department of political science at Western Reserve University.

Walter R. Sharp has been granted a year's leave of absence from Yale University to accept an appointment as co-director of a new Institute of Public Administration to be established in Cairo under the joint sponsorship of the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration and the Government of Egypt. After completion of this assignment, Professor Sharp will spend the summer of 1955 in Europe doing research on the decision-making process in the United Nations system. He plans to resume his regular duties at Yale at the beginning of the fall semester of 1955–56.

Foster H. Sherwood, of the University of California (Los Angeles), taught at Northwestern University during the 1954 summer session.

Edgar L. Shor has joined the faculty of Indiana University as instructor in government.

Marshal D. Shulman, former special assistant to the Secretary of State, has assumed his new duties as associate director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University.

John F. Sly, professor of politics, Princeton University, has been appointed Director of Studies for the Temporary Commission on Educational Finances of the State of New York.

John Malcolm Smith, formerly of Columbia University and the Foreign Policy Association, has accepted an assistant professorship in political science at the University of California (Riverside).

David Spitz, of the Ohio State University, was a visiting member of the Hunter College staff during the summer session, 1954.

Edwin O. Stene, professor of political science at the University of Kansas, is on leave for a year at the University of the Philippines where he is directing the Research Bureau of the University and consulting on administrative problems of the Philippine Government.

T. Noel Stern has resigned his position at Boston University to become director of the Fondation États Unis, Paris. Professor Stern had been a Fulbright lecturer in France during 1952 and was acting director of the Fondation during the summer of 1952.

John E. Stoner has been promoted to a full professorship in government at Indiana University.

William L. Strauss has joined the Ford Foundation's Fund for the Republic as a consultant.

Marvin R. Summers, a graduate of the University of Iowa, has accepted a position in the department of history and political science at

Wisconsin State College in Milwaukee. For the past two years, Mr. Summers has been an instructor at the Michigan College of Mining and Technology.

Joseph L. Sutton has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of government at Indiana University.

Thor Swanson has been appointed instructor in public administration at the State College of Washington.

Charles H. Titus, of the University of California (Los Angeles), has been on sabbatical leave in Europe since June, 1954. He will resume teaching in the spring semester.

Arthur C. Turner has been appointed associate professor of political science and chairman of the division of social sciences at the University of California (Riverside).

Paul W. Van der Veur has been appointed instructor in political science at Yale University.

P. J. Vatikiotis is on military leave from his instructorship in the department of government at Indiana University.

Herbert Von Beckerath, professor of economics and political science at Duke University, has returned from a summer in Germany where he lectured at the University of Tuebingen and at the Institute of Politics in Munich.

E. V. Walter, formerly of Wisconsin State College, Eau Claire, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Ohio Wesleyan University.

Lawrence C. Wanlass is on leave of absence this year from Mount Holyoke College to study communism in Southeast Asia under a Fulbright research grant. He is associated with the University of the Philippines in Manila.

John Harvey Wheeler, Jr., formerly a member of the Johns Hopkins University faculty, has been appointed associate professor of political science at Washington and Lee University, effective in September, 1954.

Urban Whitaker, of the University of Washington, has accepted an instructorship in political science and international relations at San Francisco State College, beginning in the fall semester, 1954.

Arthur Bruce Winter, who was recently associated with the Bureau of Public Administration at the University of Tennessee, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Nebraska, effective in September, 1954.

S. Joseph Wodka, former graduate student in political science at the University of Michigan, has been appointed instructor in the department of government at the University of Detroit.

IN MEMORIAM

Franz L. Neumann. The inexplicable swerve of a car in which he was riding as a guest of friends on a wet road in Switzerland on September 2, 1954, ended in mid-career the life of a singularly potent teacher and writer in the fields of political theory and comparative institutions. At the time, Franz Neumann was about to return to his post at Columbia University as professor of government after a sabbatical leave spent partly on the faculty of the Free University of Berlin. Behind his seven remarkably successful years in Columbia's graduate faculty of political science there had been three periods of richly varied and maturing preparation.

Born in Upper Silesia on May 23, 1900, Neuman studied law at the Universities of Breslau, Leipzig, Rostock, and Frankfurt am Main, receiving the J.D. degree from Frankfurt in 1923. He had already had two years of training as Referender; this seasoning was resumed in the period 1924–27 after a year as a university assistant in international law. After the completion of his second academic examination in 1927 he became a member of the Berlin bar, specializing in labor and cartel law. Meanwhile he lectured in the Labor Academy of the University of Frankfurt am Main and in the Deutsche Hochschule fuer Politik in Berlin. Moving to England in 1933, Neumann spent three student years at the London School of Economics with emphasis upon the history of political theory; he received the degree of Ph.D. in 1936. His subsequent career was

in the United States, first as a member of the Institute of Social Research during its location at Columbia. In the war years he served in the Board of Economic Warfare and later in the Office of Strategic Services in charge of research on central Europe. Subsequently he was for a time a chief analyst in the State Department's Office of Research and Intelligence. Meanwhile, among other lecturing assignments, he participated in the Navy Department's School of Military Government at Columbia and in the early stages of the development of the School of International Affairs. After 1947 he was a permanent member of the graduate department of public law and government.

By the time of his death Professor Neumann had become the central pillar in the teaching of political theory at Columbia. The mere fact that at least a score of dissertations were in various stages of progress under his direction when he died was a clue to his dynamic role as a teacher. It would be an error to say that he had or sought disciples, but the number of his true followers was unusual. Much of his appeal was rigorous intellectual vitality combined with moral earnestness but with them went personal interest and affection. He was downright but subtle; sure but questioning; and his grounding in history suited his emphasis upon the interaction of political thought and political reality in times and places. His writings included the well-known *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*, originally published in 1942, a critical edition of *The Spirit of the Laws* in 1949, and at the time of his death the Free Press, Glencoe, was preparing to bring out in book form certain of the many essays that have revealed the force and range of his mind and interests. —ARTHUR W. MACMAHON.

1955 CONGRESSIONAL INTERNE PROGRAM

Applications for the 1955 Congressional Interne Program will close on February 1, 1955. The primary purpose of the Congressional Interne Program, now in its second year of operation, is to enable young political scientists and journalists to gain the practical experience of working as staff members of congressional committees and in the offices of House and Senate members. Next year ten interneships will be awarded—five for those with graduate training and/or teaching experience in political science and five for journalists or young teachers in schools of journalism. The stipends are $4,000 (tax-free, according to current rulings), plus travel expenses to and from Washington, D. C., for each award winner.

The program will commence on November 1, 1955, with one month of work in the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. This will include both a general orientation on the activities of the Legislative Reference Service and an attempt to prepare the internes for their future work on committee staffs, with senators and with members of the House of Representatives. Individual projects will be assigned in the Legislative Reference Service according to the interests and objectives of each interne. Frequent group meetings of the internes will be held, enabling the exchange of experiences and the discussion of legislative problems as well as furnishing the opportunity to meet informally with House and Senate members and their staffs.

Following the month's service in the Legislative Reference Service, the internes will divide the next eight months equally between two active staff assignments. These assignments will be worked out with the aim of providing experience in both House and Senate operations and in both committee work and the work of a member's office. As far as possible, each interne will be allowed a free choice with respect to his assignments. The Association office will advise the internes which committees and members of Congress might provide the richest experience in terms of the interest of the interne, as well as which offices have specifically requested that they be assigned internes. The number of requests so far exceeds the number of internes that no difficulty is anticipated in arranging stimulating assignments for the entire group.

Applications should be submitted to the chairman of the department of political science in the case of those who have done graduate work and/or teaching in political science; and to the dean or director of the school of journalism for teachers in schools of journalism. Working journalists should submit their applications through their editor, publisher, or supervisory official at the magazine radio, or television station where they are working. Preference will be given to applicants in the age group 25 to 30 and preference will be given to those who have not had the opportunity to work or live in Washington, D. C. The following types of experience and training are suggestive rather than binding: (1) completion of doctorate in political science; (2) completion of two years of graduate work in political science, plus one year of experience in politics, teaching, or public administration; (3) undergraduate major in political science and law degree; or (4) A.B. degree with honor average in political science and practical experience on a newspaper or with radio and television (applicants will be considered only if they are currently active in the field and will be able to obtain leaves of absence).

The Association is again asking the chairman of each department of political science and the supervisors in the case of journalists to recommend the *one* candidate deemed best qualified for a Congressional Interneship. These recommendations should reach the Association office by February 15, 1955, and the names of the successful applicants will be announced during April, 1955.

The program will commence on November 1, 1955 and continue through July 31, 1956. Further information and details concerning the Congressional Interne Program may be secured by writing to the Association office, which will also supply application forms.

SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS

Suggestions Requested by Nominating Committee

The Committee on Nominations of The American Political Science Association invites all members to suggest persons for nomination as officers of the Association. The offices to be filled are: President-Elect, three Vice Presidents, Secretary, Treasurer, and eight members of the Council.

Last year's Committee received sixty-four letters which represented the combined suggestions of about two hundred members of the Association. The Committee commented in its report: "Obviously the degree of participation depends upon the initiative of the members. In the present instance a comparatively small percentage of the total membership of the Association availed itself of the opportunity. About one-fifth of these submitted suggestions after the deadline set for their receipt, namely, February 1. If the apathy which is indicated by the non-participation is to any degree due to the existence of a feeling that suggestions are without effect upon the decision of the committee, it may be important to make it clear that such a feeling is totally without justification in so far as the experience of the present committee may be regarded as typical."

Please send your suggestions and with them any additional comments you care to make to Norman J. Padelford, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts no later than February 1, 1955.

Program for 1955 Annual Meeting

All members of the Association are invited to send suggestions on topics for the 1955 annual meeting program and comments on panel procedure to Weldon Cooper, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, chairman of the Program Committee.

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

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